


HESIOD'S

Theogony

From
Near Eastern
Creation Myths to
Paradise Lost



STEPHEN SCULLY


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For
Ben, Katherine, and Chiara

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Acknowledgments

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This has been a work long in the making and a source of great delight and fascination as I considered Hesiod in relation to Homer and explored the long and winding road of the *Theogony's* place in the history of Greek and Roman literature, religion, and philosophy. The study has also invited explorations in texts, both Indo-European and Semitic, from foreign lands east of Greece, including Mesopotamia, Anatolia, and the Levant, and it has raised questions of the poem's place in an emerging Christianity, nowhere more richly seen than in Milton's own creation epic, *Paradise Lost*. And, more recently, the *Theogony's* distant shadow, an adumbration from our culture's past, appears to fall upon the writings of the twentieth-century's great myth-maker, Sigmund Freud, even though he had only the faintest recall of the poem. For this wide-ranging exploration I certainly owe a debt of gratitude to many, both in and outside of Classical Studies. First, I cannot thank enough those who have read the manuscript in its entirety at various stages of it making: Kathleen Coleman, Richard Rutherford, Frank Nisetich, Irene Tayler, and Nancy Jones. Each has been extremely generous as they helped me find my way across new terrain. Also, I owe a great sense of gratitude to my colleagues who have read sections of the book or discussed with me a wide range of topics, authors, and puzzlements. I am happy to name them here: first my colleagues in Classics: Stephen Esposito, Wolfgang Haase, Jeffrey Henderson, Patricia Johnson, Alexander Nikolaev, Stephanie Nelson, Jay Samons, James Uden, and Ann Vasaly; in Philosophy: Charles Griswold, David Roochnik, and Fred Tauber; and in Religion: Adam Seligman, with whom, along with Bennett Simon from Harvard, I enjoyed a wonderful year of myth talks. Tzvi Abusch from Brandeis University has been invaluable on Near Eastern questions, as was Alice Slotsky. I also am indebted to audiences, near and far, from Brandeis University, to Brown University, Harvard University, and the University of Dallas and at conferences ranging from San Antonio to Berlin, Athens, and Delphi, as well as to those at the American Academy in Rome where I was a visiting scholar for a year and at the Università degli Studi di Padova and at the Università degli Studi di Napoli L'Orientale where I enormously enjoyed my stay as an exchange faculty for portions of two summers. Especially pleasurable is the acknowledgment of my graduate students in Classical Studies

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{Abbreviations}

- AJP*American Journal of Philology
*BICS*Bulletin of the Institute of Classical
Studies, University of London
*BMC*Bryn Mawr Classical Review
*CA*Classical Antiquity
*CJ*Classical Journal
*CP*Classical Philology
*CQ*Classical Quarterly
*CR*Classical Review
*CW*Classical World
*G & R*Greece and Rome
*GRBS*Greek, Roman, and Byzantine
Studies
*HSCP*Harvard Studies in Classical
Philology
*JHS*Journal of Hellenic Studies
*LfgRE*Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos
*LIMC*Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae
Classicae
*MHM*Museum Helveticum
*PCPS*Proceedings of the Cambridge
Philological Society
*QUCC*Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura
Classica
*RE*Real-Encyclopädie der klassischen
Altertumswissenschaft
*RÉG*Revue des études grecques
*RMR*Rheinisches Museum für Philologie

Hesiod's *Theogony*

Introduction

The *Theogony* belongs to a group of creation tales found through the eastern ancient Mediterranean. Like others in this group, it narrates—and to some extent “explains”—a movement from cosmic origins to the making of culture and from “family” to “city.” In the case of the *Theogony*, this is also the movement from natural biological reproduction to Zeus’s extraordinary birth of Athena from his head, and from generations of familial violence to the making of a political order that is stable, permanent, and—for the most part—harmonious. Hesiod tells the story through myth, that is, through (divine) genealogical stories. He also tells it through personified abstractions, with many divine names being common nouns, like Earth, Sky, Ocean, Night, but also Discord, Quarrel, Lies, Bad-Governance, Good-Governance, Justice, and Eirene (Social Peace). From start to finish, the poem consistently refers to Zeus and his political achievements, inviting one to read the cosmogonic story as a hymn to Zeus and as a city creation myth.

While Hesiod’s poem has long ago receded into the shadows of our cultural memory, the power and urgency of creation stories are as much with us today as they were two millennia ago. We in the United States know this well, as throughout our country in our homes, our local school committees, and our courts, we have debated the merits of Darwinian and Creationist accounts of the origin of humankind. Origin stories matter because they inform how we think of ourselves and our place in the universe. Unlike Darwin’s exclusive focus upon the descent of species, the Hebrew Bible and Hesiod also offer an account of the origin of the universe, and of time and space themselves.

Here again, in the past century and a half science has given us its own story of cosmic creation. This story, initially told in the language of mathematics, has forever changed our picture of the universe and of our place in it. Gone is the view of our Milky Way as the sole galaxy in a static and eternal universe, the only bright light surrounded by dark and empty space. Within the span of our lifetimes, the spectacular Hubble Space Telescope and instruments capable of reading radio signals from deep space have revealed beyond question that our galaxy is but one of billions of galaxies, perhaps as many as

400 billion, and a relatively late-born galaxy at that, in an ever-expanding universe. Today, most astronomers accept the view that our universe was violently wrenched into birth roughly 13.8 billion years ago. As with Darwin's story of evolution, in this story verifiable fact and scientific hypothesis have supplanted the language of myth and the authority of the Muses. Even as the Big Bang theory of time and space confounds the imagination, it fascinates and spellbinds. The latest discoveries are front-page news, as when in July of 2012 it was announced that experiments at CERN's Large Hadron Collider observed a new particle consistent with the Higgs boson, the "God" particle, hypothesized 50 years earlier. In quick succession, in March of 2014 an observatory in Antarctica reported that it had detected primordial gravitational waves, the first ripples in the fabric of space-time at the moment of the cosmic explosion. But by July of the same year, the confident claims of March were seriously challenged. Such is the beauty of science, ever probing to find either consistency in or alternative explanations for the natural world.

Not so different from Hesiod's creation story, this cosmogonic narrative posits origin out of chaos, with evolution unfolding restlessly thereafter through progressive unification of primordial elements, but the understanding of this chaos and creation differs from Hesiod's in at least two important ways. For Hesiod, *χάος* (the word first appearing in extant Greek in the *Theogony*) was understood as a gap, an initial opening that made movement and division, birth and life, possible. Whether Hesiod thought the question unanswerable or unimportant, he never discusses what it was that existed on either side of that gap. In Big Bang theory, chaos has a very different meaning. It does not refer to an opening but to an intensely dense and hot submicroscopic speck, a billionth the size of a nuclear particle, of primordial plasma of indeterminate energy and matter. Some scientists think of that plasma as a particularly dense primordial egg, not unlike the cosmic egg that some Orphic stories posit at the beginning of creation. At the moment of cosmic inflation, the rather bland scientific term used to describe the Big Bang (or the violent opening, if you will), the nature of the plasma was forever changed and "reordered," erasing, it is thought, all traces of its earlier composition. As Hesiod's opening occurs without explanation, an event beyond his ken, there is no known trigger of the cosmic inflation. It falls to the realm of belief whether one prescribes it—and the mathematical beauty of the emerging universe—to an impersonal nature or to a creator god. At present, much else about our universe also remains mysterious and inaccessible to scientists, including the identities of the "dark matter" (a gravitational force) and "dark energy" (an expansion force), which together are thought to make up

95 percent of space. It is equally difficult for scientists to explain the miraculous spark of life that turned inanimate into animate matter. Such are the frontiers that scientists continue to probe, seeking to map out the unknown and to turn hypothesis and story into history. In Hesiod, there is no distinction between inanimate and animate as for him the creation of the universe and the creation of life are one and the same: figures like Earth, Eros, Night, Sea, and Sky are both primordial essences and living gods. And in Hesiod all is story, revealed to him by divine Muses who are capable of telling true stories or false ones sounding true. Intriguingly, Hesiod never reassures us that the theogony he learns from them belongs to the first category.

Hesiod's vision of creation differs from that of astral cosmogony in another significant way, as well. Today's cosmologists only concern themselves with natural phenomena and the physical laws of matter and energy fields. They have little to say about humankind other than to note the striking idea that human beings, like everything else in the universe, are star children, composed of the same primordial gas and dust as are the galaxies. But the Big Bang story has nothing to say about our personal beings and social selves. For that, the link between cosmogony and the human condition, we must turn to science fiction writers and philosophers.

It is precisely this link between cosmic generation and the creation of society that most interests Hesiod. Like a number of other creation stories from the ancient Mediterranean, from both Semitic and Indo-European peoples, Hesiod sees a tension between sexual reproduction and an anarchic Aphrodite, on the one hand, and social harmony, on the other. Primordial Eros is a dynamic and creative force from which wellsprings of violence burst forth, especially violence within the familial unit. A late god, born in the third generation of gods, Zeus comes into a world and into a family setting that is already rife with discord, quarrels, and bloodshed. He succeeds in breaking free from an inherited cycle of violence that beset his father and father's father, in part by creating an enclosed space, called Olympus, set apart from the larger world. Within that space, he creates a mode of existence that sets divine order apart from nature's nature. Through the Muses in the form of a sacred gift, this new order reaches down to humankind, enabling those in a πόλις to rid themselves of great quarrel (μέγα νεῖκος) and to live in communal harmony.

This view of a divide between nature and culture is deep-seated in Western myth and thought. In our times, it surfaces most prominently in another modern creation story—Freud's composite "scientific myths" about the nature of the human psyche and the making of civilization, expressed most fully in *Civilization and Its Discontents*

(1931).

The science of these constructs stems from Freud's study of human psychology. The mythic component has two dimensions: 1) his own imagined story of human social evolution from primordial times to the present day and 2) his construct of the psyche as an ever-fluctuating conflict between two primordial instincts: Eros and Thanatos, Love and Death. As Freud put it shortly after the publication of *Civilization and Its Discontents*: "My interest, after making a long-long *détour* through the natural sciences, medicine, and psychotherapy, returned to the cultural problems which had fascinated me long before. ... I perceived ever more clearly that the events of human history, the interactions between human nature, cultural development and the precipitates of primaeval experience ... are no more than a reflection of the dynamic conflicts between ego, the id, and the superego, which psychoanalysis studies in the individual—and are the same process repeated upon a wider stage."¹ At about the same time, he wrote the following about Eros and Thanatos: "The theory of the instincts is so to say our mythology. Instincts are mythical entities, magnificent in their indefiniteness. In our work we can never for a moment disregard them, yet we are never sure that we are seeing them clearly" (*SE* 22: 95).²

There can be no question of direct influence from Hesiod in Freud's own creation story, even though its account of family violence, civic order, and the taming of Eros, re-echoes suggestively, as if a cultural palimpsest, with Hesiod's own themes in the *Theogony*.³ For an understanding of this unrealized cultural writing-over, I draw on Richard Armstrong's assessment of Freudian psychoanalysis, which, he writes, taps into "the uncanny after-work generated by the archive of ancient culture, ... reflect[ing] ... the cultural logic, the values, the textual maneuvers, and nuances, and even the psychological interests of the ancient world" (2005: 5).

Freud's myth tells the story of human evolution from the incipient family (the male bonding with the female for the pleasure of a steady sexual partner, the female with the male for the protection of her children) to full-blown civilization. At the core of this story is a taming of the "crude and primary instinctual impulses," "curbing" and "severely impairing" an inborn pan-sexuality of auto-eroticism, incest, and socially prohibited perversions (*SE* 21: 79–82). Of this taming, Freud writes: "It is impossible to overlook the extent to which civilization is built up upon a renunciation of instinct, how much it presupposes precisely the non-satisfaction (by suppression, repression or some other means?) of powerful instincts" (97). At best, civilized man sublimates these impulses; at worst, he represses them. In the most extreme form of this redirection, Freud claims that advanced

societies give the impression that the sexual life of civilized man becomes, like his hair, an unnecessary appendage (cf. 101–5).

The painful repression of the Love Instinct stems from the necessary taming of the Death Instinct, which must be suppressed at all costs.⁴ This annihilating instinct, directed both against the self and others, is summarized in the expression *homo homini lupus*, man is a wolf to man. As a mythic construct, Freud portrayed it as the myth of the Primal Horde, initially outlined in *Totem and Taboo* (1913). It tells a communal Oedipal story wherein a horde of sons kills *en masse* a domineering father and, then, out of a sense of guilt, forms a pact that is intended “to prevent a repetition of the deed,” as Freud describes it in *Civilization and Its Discontents* (SE 21: 132).

For Freud, the sublimation and containment of an individual’s instincts can only be achieved, in the end, at the communal level:

Human life in common is only made possible when a majority comes together which is stronger than any separate individual and which remains united against all separate individuals. ... This replacement of the power of the individual by the power of the community constitutes the decisive step of civilization. The essence of it lies on the fact that the members of the community restrict themselves in their possibilities of satisfaction, whereas the individual knew no such restrictions.” (SE 21: 95)

“The liberty of the individual,” as he says, “was greatest before there was any civilization” (95). While this move to community and civilization is essential for the health and well-being of all humankind, it also comes at a great cost. Even short of civilization’s greatest imperative, “Love thy neighbor as thyself,”⁵ the evolution of civilization leads to disequilibrium: “If the evolution of civilization has such a far-reaching similarity with the development of an individual, and if the same methods are employed in both, would not the diagnosis be justified that many systems of civilization—or epochs of it—possibly even the whole of humanity—have become ‘neurotic’ under the pressure of civilizing trends?” (141).⁶

Even with this melancholic recognition of the cost of civilization’s restraints, Freud’s myth is clearly at its core a city creation myth. It is similarly anti-natural, as it “justifies” the curbing of nature’s polymorphic *eros* as a necessary prelude to free humankind from inborn human violence. A challenging (and, surely, a culturally determined) component of Freud’s understanding of this creation myth is that women, “represent[ing] the interests of the family and of sexual life,” are “little capable” of sublimating primal instincts: they

“are forced into the background by the claims of civilization [and] adopt a hostile attitude towards it” (SE 21: 103).⁷ None of this thinking stems directly from the Babylonian *Enûma elish* or Hesiod’s *Theogony*, although similar views of the primal female’s hostility to civilization are depicted in Tiamat’s effort to kill Marduk and in Gaia’s desire to destroy Zeus when she creates Typhoeus. In these different faces, the patriarchal ideology of city myths has a long history, reaching back 3000 years.

Hesiod was not read at the Gymnasium in Freud’s day, and it is uncertain whether Freud encountered his writings in college. Shortly after publishing *Civilization and Its Discontents*, he alludes to the poem briefly when writing on Prometheus and the theft of fire (1932),⁸ but there is no indication in that study that he engaged himself with the *Theogony*’s broader themes, and nowhere else in his writings does he refer to Hesiod’s creation myth. Yet in one of those splendid and uncanny ironies of history, at the very end of his life in the very last paragraph of one of his last (and unfinished) essays, he retells the Cronus-Zeus myth from memory. A few months before his death in 1939, when in London without much of his library at hand and in poor health, memory tricked him. Writing on childhood pathologies triggered by sexual desires and feelings of endangerment, Freud thinks of Cronus in the following reconstruction: “At this point it is impossible to forget a primitive fragment of Greek mythology which tells how Kronos, the old Father God, swallowed his children and sought to swallow this youngest son Zeus like the rest, and how Zeus was saved by the craft of his mother and later on castrated his father.”⁹ First, he remembers the tale as “a primitive fragment of Greek mythology” and recasts it as if it were a variation of the Oedipal conflict. While Hesiod’s myth unfolds over three generations—1) old Father Sky refuses to let his children reach the light of day, leading his son Cronus to castrate him in order to be born; 2) Cronus in turn swallows his own children, as soon as they are born, in order not to be overthrown; and 3) Zeus, saved by his grandmother, grows up to defeat his father *and* the other Titans *with an army**, Freud remembers it as a two-generation story where Father Cronus swallows all of his children except Zeus, who, saved by his mother, grows up to *castrate* his father.

This late-in-life reconstruction of the *Theogony* helps explain why the Greek creation myth never greatly appealed to Freud. In contrast to his almost exclusive focus upon the child in the family story, the primitive myth plays equal, or greater, attention to the father’s hatred—and fear—of his children. Sky is described as “rejoicing in his evil doing” (*Th.* 158–59) when he prevents his offspring from being born, and Cronus re-echoes his father’s anxiety about his own children when

he tries to swallow them at birth. Even in the Oedipus story, Freud has little to say about Laius's (and Jocasta's) attempted murder of Oedipus, while he considers the son's murder of the father "normative development." The *Theogony* might have offered some grist for Freud's mill when it describes Cronus as "hating his lusty father" (*Th* 138), but it is the mother who invites this castration, and the three-generation sequence is not concise from Freud's vantage point.

In ways that Freud did not see, however, the ancient myth and Freud's modern "scientific" version imagine a similar need for the Olympians, or humankind, to escape from the natural conditions into which they were born. As Jonathan Lear points out in a discussion of *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1990: 14), when looking for the opposite of the Love Instinct, Freud would have been better served if he had used Hesiod's political terms *Eris* and *Neikos* (Discord and Quarrel, or, in Lear's rendering, Hate and Quarrel) rather than the biological Death Instinct. For Freud, as for Hesiod, the biological struggle between life and death is secondary to a social and psychic conflict between interpersonal union and harmony, on the one hand, and strife and hatred, on the other. For both mythographers, stability, permanence, and harmony are only obtainable if the social order can become as free from the biological imperative as possible. But they differ importantly in specifics. In Hesiod, as just noted, the father initiates the violence against the son. Also, unlike Freud's myth of a primal horde where the father-slaining children create the first social contract *en masse*, in the *Theogony* Zeus's creation of a new civic order can only be achieved by a mythic solution, and that is by his swallowing Metis and becoming the sole parent of Athene. But it is in their respective views of the endpoint that the two myths diverge most severely. For Freud, civilization is a malaise, an uneasiness, as the current title has it, *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur*. Or, it is even worse if we choose Freud's original title, *Das Unglück in der Kultur* (*The Unhappiness in Civilization*). This dis-ease stems from man's conflicted state, at once drawn to and horrified by instincts that he must sublimate or repress. For Hesiod, by contrast, the beginning of evolution is beset by evils, manifest by both paternal and maternal acts of violence, and the creation of Olympus, limited as the space is within the larger world, is a welcome enclave. In the *Theogony*, anything that is good in the universe comes late, and, more often than not, it is associated with life within that enclave: good governance, cherished customs, and the pleasing song and dance of the like-minded Muses. Unlike Freud,¹⁰ Hesiod does not consider a universal solution to this conflict but a spatial one where Zeus, and honey-tongued kings in the city agora, can create a place that keeps at bay disruptive gods like Discord, Lies, and Quarrels. In the *Theogony*, even

this is not achievable within the marriage of Zeus and Hera.

Nevertheless, almost a century ago now, Freud helped us to look upon Greek myths as expressions, often buried, of the human psyche. His “scientific myths,” individually and collectively, illustrate how secular modernism replaces divine cosmogonies with biological and psychological “truths.” As Hesiod did in a mythic and proto-philosophical context, so Freud in a psychological and social context sought to work out a new understanding of man’s relation to nature and culture. The “science” of Freud’s myths reduces the prismatic, open-ended expansiveness of mythic stories, as he looks for primal causes; about the Love and Death instincts he writes that, although as mythical entities they are indefinite, “to my mind they are far more serviceable from a theoretical standpoint than any other possible ones; they provide that simplification, without either ignoring or doing violence to the facts, for which we strive in scientific work” (*SE* 21: 119).¹¹ Unlike ancient allegorists who sought to save myths by deflecting attention away from their sordid literalness, Freud’s reductionist tendencies embrace the violent emotions in myth, finding in them an expression of psychic truths which later, more “sophisticated” Western narratives paper over. Even so, his scientific use of myth reduces complexity of symbol and character to useful didacticism. Thus, in the myth of the first families in *Civilization and Its Discontents*, Freud only sees the first fathers as protectors of the young and in the Oedipus complex he focuses exclusively on the child’s fear of castration, in both cases ignoring the father’s hostility toward the child that is an initial part of the *Theogony* and Oedipus myth, as discussed above.

By contrast, the *Theogony*, and Greek myth in general, are open-ended and multi-directional. The familial triangle of father, mother, and son is filled with violence and attraction from every possible direction and emotion. A son can be attracted to or repelled by the father—similarly, in regard to his mother. But, just as likely, a father can embrace or fear that child and a mother can desire to save or kill her offspring. Not to be overlooked, these myths endlessly explore the multiple forms of attraction and repulsion between the parents, as well. Aristotle’s classification of myths captures their multi-directional nature: they “occur,” he says, “within the sphere of natural affections—for example, when a brother kills a brother, or a son his father, or a mother her son, or a son his mother, or something equally drastic—that is the kind of action a poet must try for” (*Poetics* 1453b). To that extent, myths like Hesiod’s *Theogony* and the Babylonian *Enûma elish* are bolder in their depiction of the emotions that wreak havoc upon the biological family than Freud’s Oedipal complex. They are also more expansive in their imaginings of civilization’s glories.

We no longer remember many of the names and places in Hesiod's telling, but the patterns of familial violence that he told and his turning of that dynamic into an argument for civilization are still with us, in part because of Freud. Reductionist and scientific as his modern myth-making is, and as poorly as he remembered the "primitive fragment" of old, his *Civilization and Its Discontents* vividly renders a narrative by which we can richly interpret Hesiod's myth, the oldest, most authoritative, and most enduring of the Greek myths of origins.

In addition to its study of the *Theogony*, this book explores how the poem has inspired and influenced, has been constructed and reconstructed, in the story of its reception and afterlife in later, more rationalistic ages. These reworkings are found both among peoples and cultures who believed in the Greek (and Roman) pluralistic pantheon of gods and those, ancient and modern, who looked upon pagan beliefs with disdain. The book concludes with a consideration of the poem as reflected in *Paradise Lost*, Milton's own vision of creation that draws deeply from and reflects upon the ancients, as well as its more obvious Hebrew and Christian sources.¹²

* Unless otherwise noted, *italicized* words signify author's emphasis.

Points of Comparison

Hesiod and Homer; the *Theogony* and *Genesis*

Hesiod and Homer

Unlike the poet(s) of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, Hesiod identifies himself by name in the *Theogony*, speaks in the first person in the *Works and Days*, and offers tantalizing bits of personal history in both poems. A good case can be made that both his name and personal biography are generic, describing a character type rather than a particular person.¹ In antiquity, numerous interpretations of his name Ἡσίοδος were proposed, ranging from: (1) “I speak of festivity” [combining a rare word for enjoyment/festivity (ἥσις) and “I am versed in” (εἶδω)], to (2) “I shall cast a road” [combining “I shall cast” (ἥσω) and “road” (ὁδός)], to (3) “he who travels on an auspicious road” [combining “auspicious” (αἰσία) and “road” (ὁδός)]. Today, the preferred reading is “he who delights in the road,” or Enjoyroad [combining the future of the verb “I delight” (ἡδομαι) and “road” (ὁδός)], a spirited name for a sea-adventuring father to give a son. If so, it was ill chosen, as Hesiod was by his own account a most reluctant traveler.² Hesiod reveals his name in the *Theogony*, in a duly famous and much-imitated passage describing how the Olympian Muses transformed a Boeotian shepherd on wooded Mt. Helicon into a famed singer who knows about the beginning of the universe and Zeus’s making of Olympus (*Th.* 22–34). Glenn Most attractively proposes that Hesiod himself reinterpreted the meaning of his name to Songsender after the Muses’ intervention.³

The ancients attributed 16 songs to Hesiod, but he was most famous

for 4: the *Theogony*, *Catalogue of Women* (now in fragmentary form), *Works and Days*, and the *Shield*, a short narrative poem about Heracles. Today, only the *Theogony* and *Works and Days* are thought to be by Hesiod,⁴ the *Theogony* being the first.

In Archaic and Classical times, the Greeks knew Homer and Hesiod as ἀοιδοί (singers), using the same hybrid “epic” dialect. By the fifth century, Greeks began calling them poets, ποιητής in the singular, literally a “maker” or “one who crafts or writes verses,”⁵ and a few centuries later in the Hellenistic period, critics began to distinguish Homeric “narrative” epic from Hesiodic “hymnic” epic (*Theogony*) and “didactic” epic (*Works and Days*). Both ancients and moderns have generally regarded the two singers to be roughly contemporary, living circa 675 BCE,⁶ when the art-speech of ἔπεα (epic) was easily comprehended by all Greek-speaking peoples from Asia Minor to Sicily and from the Black Sea to the shores of North Africa.

Even though Hesiod was from the Aeolic-speaking region of Boeotia in mainland Greece and Homer was from the Ionian-speaking Greeks on the Asia Minor coast, there are remarkably few regional differences in their spelling and vocabulary. Interesting exceptions exist, such as πόλις, the single word in Homer for all human settlements, regardless of size, whereas Hesiod has the term κώμη (*W&D* 639), of Doric origin, to describe his village of Ascra. Also, rather curiously, Hesiod uses more exclusively Ionic features than does Homer, as in the instance when he refers to the Ionian month of Lênaiôn (*W&D* 504) even though a local Aeolic form was readily at hand.⁷

Defining the genre of Archaic ἔπεα is not an easy order beyond classifying its formal characteristics: its artificial, hybrid dialect, its verse in successive dactylic hexameters, and its highly formulaic phrasings, created over centuries to serve the needs and aesthetics of oral composition. Thematic classification proves problematic; to say, as some have, that epic refers to Muse-inspired songs of past deeds, ranging in time from the birth of the gods to age-old heroes,⁸ leaves little room for poems like *Works and Days*, where Hesiod speaks in the first person about current toils with his brother Perses. Nor does it include mock epics like the *Batrachomyomachia* (*Battle of Frogs and Mice*), which some in antiquity attributed to Homer, or the philosophical poems of the Presocratics. From this vastly popular medium, the Greeks by 600 BCE singled out Homer and Hesiod as the two mighty suns of ἔπεα, looked to as much for their educational illumination as for their poetic brilliance.⁹ In most instances, Homer was considered the greater of the two lights, but by no means was this always the case. They also came under heavy censure, with ever-growing vigor over the centuries.

Also from early times, the Greeks imagined the two in a poetic face-

off. The *Certamen*, which tells this story (dating in its present form to the second century CE, but with large portions traceable at least back to the fourth century BCE), offers both lives of the two singers and the story of their competition at Chalcis on Euboea: Hesiod would begin a verse that Homer had to complete, and each recited “the “best” of his poetry. (This itself was a clear sign that the Greeks saw them as coming out of the same poetic tradition.) Against the people’s acclaim, King Panedes (did the Greeks understand the name to mean All-Knowing?), presiding over the contest, handed the victory tripod to Hesiod, on the grounds that a poem about agriculture and peace (the *Works and Days*) was more useful for a community than one about war (the *Iliad*).¹⁰

In modern times, the important but unfortunately unanswerable question of writing dogs Hesiodic and Homeric studies. By the end of the eighth century, the Greeks had developed an alphabetic writing system that was used, among other things, to record hexameter verses on drinking cups. It is unknown if Hesiod or Homer was literate or if either one “took advantage” of this new technology when composing (although how writing might have aided composition at this time has never been clearly demonstrated). If they did not commit their songs to writing, they may either have recited them to scribes or had them memorized by rhapsodes who retained the songs (perhaps in a fluid state) for a period of time before transcription. Some take Hesiod’s act of naming himself as proof of writing, as a singer before a live audience would feel no such need, while others see the name Hesiod (if Songsender) as a generic descriptor of the oral song tradition.¹¹

However the *Theogony* gained its present form, it displays a poet in command of his medium at almost all levels—from the word, to the phrase, to the line, and ever outward to the broad shaping of the song itself. Our task is to make as much sense of the poem as we can, including asking how Hesiod’s personal comments function within the poems themselves and help to establish narrative authority.

Compared to Homer, Hesiod may seem parochial and small-minded, with narrow concerns. In the *Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics* (1974), for example, C. A. Trypanis, a classicist, literary critic, translator, and poet, writes that “didactic epics” (i.e., Hesiod) were for “the peasant of Boeotia rather than the Ionian aristocrat, being concerned with the morality and beliefs of the small farmer toughly confronting a life of ceaseless labor and few rewards” (326). And, indeed, Homer’s broad canvas in the *Iliad* frames the battle of Troy under the watchful eye of the Olympian gods and includes a catalogue of participants that embraces most of the known world; his *Odyssey* explores regions even further afield, from Calypso’s home at the “navel of the sea” to distant lands of the Cyclopes and Phaeacians,

to the fjord-like regions of the Laestrygonians, and even to the Underworld. But, of course, Trypanis's view is unwarranted. In the *Works and Days*, Hesiod's eye rarely roams outside his isolated village under Helicon. He does not even look to the larger πόλις of Thespieae a few kilometers away. But a bitter family quarrel over a small local farm is placed within the context of the five ages of man and Prometheus's struggle with Zeus. Far from a blinkered horizon, these broadened vistas enlarge the local poet's concerns into something approaching Homer's universal themes. Similarly, the *Theogony* begins with reference to the local Muses on Mt. Helicon but evolves seamlessly into the Muses of Mt. Olympus, who narrate the expansive story of the birth of the gods and the origins of the universe. For all his local focus, Hesiod opens up his immediate world to vast horizons.

Hesiod and Homer on the Gods

In broad outline, Hesiod and Homer tell a similar story of creation and of Zeus, a third-generation god, the son of Cronus, who married Hera and fathered many of the Olympians. Herodotus (in the fifth century) famously says that the two of them gave the Greeks the names and attributes of their gods:

Whence each of the gods came into being, or whether they always existed, and what their forms were, these things the Greeks did not know until recently – yesterday, so to speak. Hesiod and Homer lived 400 years before my time, I believe, and not more. They were the ones who *established a theogony** (ποιήσαντες θεογονίην) for the Greeks, gave the gods their titles (epithets), defined their honors and functions, and described their forms. Those said to be older poets than these men, are, in my opinion, younger.¹²

(2.53.1–3; most of it quoted in most 2006: t98)

Herodotus appears to stress Hesiod over Homer, as the naming of him before Homer and the word theogony might suggest. As Friedrich Solmsen wrote long ago, Hesiod was the one who questioned “what does Zeus represent? What is the nature of his government? ... To trace the whole history from the origin of the Earth to the organization of Zeus' empire was to view him in the right perspective,”¹³ whereas Homer did not greatly concerned himself with how Zeus attained supreme power. Or, as Barbara Graziosi and Johannes Haubold have more recently put it (2005: 36, 38): “the Homeric and the Hesiodic epics describe the same world, albeit from

different perspectives and at different stages of development. This shared vision of the cosmos lies at the heart of the early epic tradition. ... If Hesiodic poetry gives a general account of the history of the cosmos from its origins to the present day, the poems attributed to Homer ‘zoom in’ and explore in detail crucial moments within that history.” But we should note that Herodotus’s use of the word “theogony” does not refer to Hesiod’s poem by title,¹⁴ and much in this statement does not fit Hesiod closely: although he names many more gods than does Homer and his genealogies are far more complete, Hesiod is less concerned with the honors and functions of individual gods than he is with Zeus’s mode of governance, and he is virtually silent about many prominent Olympians, including Apollo, Artemis, and Poseidon.

With a few exceptions, Herodotus also thinks that the Greek gods came from Egypt (2.50). Modern historians of Greek religion have reason to question both claims: far from originating with Hesiod and Homer, the names and epithets for many of the Greek gods are already found on Mycenaean Linear B clay tablets from 1200 BCE. Some of these names appear to be pre-Greek, others have been imported from the Near East (see [Chapter 3](#)), and still others are of Indo-European descent. But, still, the historian has a point: in lieu of a priestly class and sacred texts, Hesiod and Homer gave the Greeks their nomenclature for the gods, Olympians and otherwise. A generation or two before Herodotus, the Greek philosopher Xenophanes put it another way: “All of those things which are blameworthy and a reproach among men, both Homer and Hesiod have attributed to the gods: to steal, to commit adultery, and to deceive one another.”¹⁵

But if Homer and Hesiod agree in broad outline, they differ significantly in their portrait of Zeus and the character of Olympus. The Zeus of the *Iliad* is an abusive ruler, quick to threaten another god with physical punishment if he—or she—crosses his will. This Zeus rules by virtue of his superior strength (8.19–26 and 15.180–81). Under a veneer of festivity and civility, a mood of fear and hostility pervades Olympus. The laughter of the gods at the banquet table is less a sign of good cheer than of released tensions when the gods see a lame Hephaestus trying to restore Olympian harmony (*Il.* 1.595–600). Hera’s fear of Zeus is expressed in the furrow on her brow even as she speaks of his will with a smile on her lips (*Il.* 15.101–3).¹⁶ The *Iliad* repeatedly depicts Olympus as a place rife with rivalry, jealousy, and resentment. Zeus and Hera are the primary offenders, both stirring up ἔρις and νεῖκος, discord and quarrel, against each other (cf. *Il.* 1.519–21, 4.5–6, 4.37–38, and 21.513), but other gods contribute to the turmoil on Olympus as well (cf. *Il.* 1.396–594, 14.256–62, 15.11–193).

In the *Odyssey*, Zeus rules Olympus with a smoother hand,¹⁷ but even here his rule is a far cry from what we find in Hesiod's *Theogony*.

In the *Iliad*, Zeus attains supreme power by lot when Zeus, Poseidon, and Hades divvied up their portions of the cosmos by chance (cf. *Il.* 15.189–93). Nothing could be further from Hesiod's vision of how Zeus gains the kingship on Olympus when, by virtue of his good statesmanship and Earth's sanguine advice, the Olympians elect him to be their king and lord.

Hesiod is the first poet to concern himself with a Zeus who makes Olympus a place of communal harmony, based upon a principle of laws and cherished customs.¹⁸ Unlike the Iliadic portraiture of Zeus, the *Theogony* depicts Zeus as an ideal king who rules according to a principle of shared governance (65–79). All of his power comes from what others have given him. He does not change the universe, nor could he if he wanted to, but he can and does create a new kind of community set apart from the rest of the cosmos, a space free from discord, quarrel, and lies (782–85). Hesiod's Zeus uses Bia (Violence) to overthrow the Titans,¹⁹ but even in this fight his power and weaponry come in the form of gifts bestowed upon him by those grateful for his aid and inclusive policies. Far from gaining Olympus by lot, Zeus comes to power and rules by a fair distribution of honors (73–74, 383–403, and 881–85).²⁰

Other differences between Homer and Hesiod regarding creation also need to be noted. The word Chaos does not appear in Homer; in the *Iliad*, Oceanus is referred to as the “origin of the gods” and his mate Tethys as the “mother of the gods” (14.201; cf. 14.246). In the *Iliad*, Zeus reveres, even fears, “Night, subduer of gods and men” (14.259–61). Zeus and Dione are the parents of Aphrodite (5.370–418), and Zeus and Hera create Hephaestus. In only one instance (*Od.* 24.60) does Homer speak of nine Muses (unnamed); the usual reference is to a single, nameless Muse. Some of these divergences can be traced to Near Eastern origins, although in general no text shows greater affinity with Near Eastern myths than does the *Theogony*.²¹

A further difference between the *Iliad* and the *Theogony* concerns Zeus's relation to the human πόλις. This difference raises central questions about the *Iliad* itself: Is Troy doomed because of its sins? Gasper Griffin speaks for many when he writes: “It is vitally important for the *Iliad* that at bottom, beneath all the apparent indifference or amorality of heaven, the cause of the Achaeans is just” (1995: 80).²² But is this so? While mortals discuss the gods avenging Helen's abduction, Zeus does not. Little in the *Iliad* suggests that Zeus is concerned with justice or that he destroys Troy for its crimes. Rather, he oversees the existence of things. Much more than Hera, Athena, or Poseidon, he insists on the fall of Troy, even as he says that “there is

no city in all the world under the sun and starry heaven/that has ever been more honored in my heart than sacred Ilios” (4.45–46). Sacred though Ilios may be, placement within the frame of sun and stars seems to confirm its mortality, a “city of mortal men.” In the *Iliad*, Troy stands for all cities; its fall is not a story of crime and punishment; its fate is not that of a particular city for a particular crime.²³ Rather, it is a mark of the paradoxical nature of every city, both sacred and mortal.

This duality is suggested a second time in the scene just mentioned, when Hera says that she will allow any of her favorite cities to be destroyed, whenever Zeus so chooses, whether it be Mycenae, Argos, or Sparta (*Il.* 4.51–53). Again, the fall of these cities is not a case of crime and punishment, but rather of an Iliadic theme that the city, humankind’s grandest achievement (and much grander than anything the greatest of heroes may do on the battlefield), is also finally like all things mortal. The city wall attempts to separate those in the city from nature’s mutability, but finally the city is of nature and subject to its cycle. Achilles is Zeus’s agent for this fall. The *Iliad*, so read, is an uncompromising poem, at once celebrating the πόλις as the glory of human achievement and acknowledging at the same time its limit.²⁴ Zeus sees that Troy meets its end.

Turning to Hesiod, the contrast is dramatic. His Zeus is primarily a god of justice and sound statesmanship. Born into time and violence, he creates an (idealized) enclosure of social order that is permanent and stable. From him, through the Muses, Zeus’s kings can pass the attributes of this idealized enclave onto humans in a civic context.

Hesiod and Homer: Stylistic Comparisons

Hesiod and Homer also differ in style. Scholars often criticize Hesiod for being a bungler of formulaic phrasing, and certainly no Homer. “Old formulas from the Ionian tradition, even when not varied, are combined with each other in a clumsy, redundant, or colourless manner,” according to Geoffrey Kirk (1960). Martin West’s characterization shows no mercy: “it is as if an artisan with big, awkward fingers were patiently, fascinatedly imitating the fine seam of the professional tailor.”²⁵ This view needs to be challenged, as attention on formulaic phrasing overlooks important differences in Hesiodic and Homeric focus upon the word. The difference is particularly apparent in the *Theogony* in its interplay between genealogy and narrative and use of personified abstractions.

Personifications appear occasionally in Homer (more in the *Iliad*

than in the *Odyssey*) as in the figures of Terror (Deimos), Fear (Phobos), and Discord/Strife (Eris) on Agamemnon's shield (*Il.* 4.440) or the figures of Sexual Intercourse (Philotes), Desire (Himeros), Love Chatter (Oaristys), and Encouragement (Parphasis) "fashioned" on Aphrodite's girdle (*Il.* 14.215–17). In this second passage, which has much in common with hymnic or theogonic stories, the personified Philotes also appears throughout the scene as a lower case noun, φιλότης, pertinent to the story of Hera's seduction.²⁶ But, to a much greater extent than even in this Homeric passage, in Hesiod's art, a personified abstraction resounds throughout the narrative, the root of the word re-emerging as a verb, adjective, or common noun.

Examples abound in the interplay between storyline and genealogical lists. In one instance, the names of the gods appear to emerge out of a narrative description, as if "virtually summoned" into existence, to quote from William Thalmann's graceful description of this phenomenon (1984).²⁷ For example, immediately following a lovely description of the Muses singing and dancing on their way up the slopes of Olympus to Zeus's home, we learn their names, most of which, we see, have already been intimated in the preceding description. It is worth noting in this context that the *Theogony* is the earliest extant poem to name the Muses individually or to give them a genealogy [although Martin West (2013: 71) suggests that it is possible that they were also named in the *Cypria*]. First, Hesiod's narrative:

παρ δ' αὐτῆς Χάριτές τε καὶ Ἵμερος οἰκί' ἔχουσιν
 ἐν θαλίῃς ἐρατὴν δὲ διὰ στόμα ὅσσαν εἶσαι
 μέλπονται, πάντων τε νόμους καὶ ἥθεα κεδνὰ
 ἀθανάτων κλείουσιν, ἐπήρατον ὅσσαν εἶσαι.
 αἱ τὸτ' ἴσαν πρὸς Ὀλυμπόν, ἀγαλλόμεναι ὅπῃ καλῇ,
 ἀμβροσίῃ μολπῇ· περὶ δ' ἴαχε γαῖα μέλαινα
 ὑμνεύσας, ἐρατὸς δὲ ποδῶν ὑπο δοῦπος ὁρώρει
 νισομένων πατέρ' εἰς ὄν· ὁ δ' οὐρανῷ ἐμβασιλεύει (64–71)

Next door to them the Graces and Desire have their houses,
 in joyous *festivities*; the Muses send forth a *lovely* voice from
 their mouths
 as they *sing and dance* and *glorify* the laws and the cherished
 customs
 of all the immortals, sending forth their *lovely* voice.
 Exalting in their *lovely* voice and ambrosial *dance*, they go
 to Olympus, the black Earth echoing all 'round as

they hymned, and a lovely din rose under their feet as they made their way to their father who reigns as king in heaven.

Then, his list of the Muses' individual names:

ταῦτ' ἄρα Μοῦσαι ἄειδον Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι,
ἐννέα θυγατέρες μεγάλου Διὸς ἐκγεγαυῖαι,
Κλειώ τ' Εὐτέρπη τε Θάλεια τε Μελπομένη τε
Τερψιχόρη τ' Ἑρατώ τε Πολύμνια τ' Οὐρανίη τε
Καλλιόπη θ' ἡ δὲ προφερεστάτη ἐστὶν ἀπασέων. (75–79)

These are the things that the Muses who have their homes on Olympus sing,

the nine daughters conceived from mighty Zeus:

Glory, Happily Delighting, *Festivity/Blooming* (Thalia), and *Song and Dance*,

Delighting in the Chorus, *Lovely*, *Hymning* Many, and *Heavenly*,
and *With Lovely Voice*, the oldest of them all.

The two Muses not overtly prefigured in the narrative—Happily Delighting (Euterpe) and Delighting in the Chorus (Terpsichore)—have already made an appearance in Hesiod's mention that the Muses *delight* the mind of Zeus (*Th.* 51). In the story's movement from narrative to genealogical list we sense commonplace words leaping into divine beings.

The interplay between genealogy and storyline works just as smoothly in the opposite direction, when a list of names prefigures the words in the narrative to follow. A case in point: first, the genealogical list of Eris and her children (all conceived without a male):

αὐτὰρ Ἔρις στυγερὴ τέκε μὲν Πόνον ἀλγινόεντα
Λήθην τε Λιμόν τε καὶ Ἄλγεα δακρυόεντα
Ὕμινας τε Μάχας τε Φόνους τ' Ἀνδροκτασίας τε
Νείκεά τε Ψεύδεά τε Λόγους τ' Ἀμφιλογίας τε
Δυσνομίην τ' Ἄτην τε, συνήθεας ἀλλήλησιν,
Ὅρκόν θ', ὃς δὴ πλεῖστον ἐπιχθονίους ἀνθρώπους
πημαίνει, ὅτε κέν τις ἐκὼν ἐπίορκον ὁμόσση· (226–32)

And then hateful *Discord* (Eris) gave birth to grievous Pain,
and *Forgetfulness* (Lêthe), Hunger, and tearful Griefs,
and Fightings, Battles, Murders, and Man-Killings,
and Quarrels and *Lies* (Pseudea), Words, and DoubleWords,
and Bad Governance (Dusnomia) and Ruin (Ate), two sisters
who go together,
and Oath, who especially brings suffering for earth-bound
humankind, whenever someone willfully swears a false oath.

Then, the narrative description of Nereus, fathered by Pontos (Sea)
(with no mention of a female partner):

Νηρέα δ' ἄψευδέα καὶ ἀληθέα γείνατο Πόντος
πρεσβύτατον παίδων· αὐτὰρ καλέουσι γέροντα,
οὔνεκα νημερτῆς τε καὶ ἥπιος, οὐδὲ θεμίστων
λήθεται, ἀλλὰ δίκαια καὶ ἥπια δήνεα οἶδεν· (233–36)

Pontos begot *Nereus*, one who *does-not-lie* and *does-not-forget* [i.e.,
is *truthful*],
the oldest of his children; moreover they call him the old man
because he is both unerring and gentle; *nor does he forget*
ordinances but knows just and gentle counsels.

The sequence of Eris's children in itself tells us something about Hesiod's art. Discord first introduces to the world Pain (226), a general term which can take a number of different forms (each expressed in a full verse of names) from (a) Forgetfulness, Hunger, and Griefs (perhaps understood here in agricultural terms) (227), to (b) Wars and Man-Killings, as suggested by all the children listed in verse 228, to (c) political conflict, as suggested by the children: Quarrels, Lies, Words, or DoubleWords (229). This triad of Pains—agricultural, military, and political—is aptly summarized by Eris's two daughters who never part company: Bad Governance (Dusnomia) and Ruin (Ate), who described abstractly both the kind of society that generates these individual maladies and the consequences of them (230). While these ills are present in farming, war, and social discord, the sequence of the list suggests that they are most manifest in political conflict. Hunger, or famine, suggests that the first cause of pain stems from agricultural neglect and the economic grief that

comes from it. Forgetfulness in this context may refer to a farmer's failure to attend to Zeus's weather signs, as described in the second half of Hesiod's *Works and Days*, but it can also be associated with falsehood and the disregard of the law (cf. *Th.* 233–36). Manslayings, Wars, Battles, and Murders are another form of pain, with the emphasis here especially upon the conflicts that exist between cities. The following verse turns to the pain within the city in the form of political upheaval. Quarrels, Lies, Words (Logoi), and DoubleWords (Amphillogiai) suggest the agitation of competing words in the ἀγορή in contrast to the like-minded concord of a community at one with itself.²⁸

Oath comes last and holds an ambiguous status, as it is both an expression and guarantee of a faithful adherence to one's word, but when that promise is forsworn, as here, the social fabric is irreparably torn. In this context, Oath is a worthy child of Discord. Even when Oath is honored, it remains painful and hateful, as suggested by its habitation far from Olympus, deep below the highways of Earth, under the watchful eye of "dread, hateful Styx," as described later at 775–76.

Then in the narrative that follows, the verbs and adjectives describing Nereus's gentle manner set him apart, point by counterpoint, from the list of Discord's politically disruptive offspring. Here, the interplay between deified abstractions and narrative depends as much on etymology as on personified abstractions.²⁹ The effect is the same: attention on single terms. Hesiod's choice of the word *does-not-lie*, ἀψευδέα, is rare in Greek, found only here in Hesiod's extant works, and not at all in Homer. (Nor will it reappear in extant Greek for another 200 years.) There is every reason to suppose that Hesiod chose it deliberately, to contrast with Eris's Pseudea (Lies), when Hesiod uses the alpha-privative to distinguish ἀψευδέα from ψευδέα.³⁰ In like manner, in contrast to Eris's Lethe (Forgetfulness), Nereus is ἀληθέα, truthful, a word Hesiod here suggests means *does-not-forget*. As if to underscore his etymology of ἀληθέα, he repeats this verbal echo, saying that Nereus *does not forget* (οὐδὲ/λήθεται) ordinances. Words built off of the root λήθ- appear only three times in the *Theogony*, two of them being here, first as Eris's child and then as the verb negated (or we can suppose a third instance of the root λήθ- in this 10-verse stretch if we follow Hesiod's derivation of ἀληθέα). (The only other instance of λήθ- is at verse 28 when the Muses are said to tell lies like truths.) It has even been proposed that Nereus's name is here interpreted as deriving from Ne-Eris, "Not-Discord,"³¹ though Hesiod also plays on the verbal likeness between Nereus and νημερτής ("unerring"). The language of this passage clearly flows from the genealogical list that precedes it. In

addition to drawing attention to individual words, this stylistic feature wonderfully energizes both list and narrative description, as the names of gods seem to pulsate through the everyday language of common nouns, verbs, and adjectives.

The case of the Muses' names being summoned out of the narrative is a delightful touch, but the verbal play in the case of Eris and Nereus offers a basic civic lesson. If Bad Governance is characterized by Forgetfulness, Lies, Quarrels, and a plurality of Words, Nereus offers a paradigm of political leadership: not-lieing, always telling the truth, not forgetting ordinances (θέμιστες), being gentle, and knowing just and gentle counsels. The child Good Governance (Eunomia)—the pointed antithesis of Discord's Dunsomia—will not be born until near the end of the poem when Zeus beds down with Themis (Custom/Law/Ordinance), and they together bring into the world the three Horai (Seasons): Eunomia, Justice (Dike), and Social Peace (Eirene) (*Th.* 901–3).³² We have to wait close to 700 verses for Zeus and Themis to produce these deities, but already at this point in the poem we have been introduced to the essential contrast between good and bad governance, in the contrast between Nereus and Eris's children. Further comparisons between Nereus, the just kings of the proem, and Zeus are discussed in [Chapter 2](#).

Such word play is certainly found in Homer, as in the example of Astyanax, Lord of the City, the name the Trojans give Hektor's and Andromache's son (*Il.* VI.403), but the *Theogony* never seems to tire of the habit. The *unerring* (νημερτής) Nereus is a case in point, as are the *Hôrai* (Seasons) who “mind” (ὠρεύουσι) the works of men (*Th.* 901–2), a pun difficult to capture in English. Such *figurae etymologicae* both draw attention to the proper noun and underline the sense that a name captures a being's essence.

Hesiod's definition of terms is a further instance of his eye falling on the word. There is not one Eris but two, he says in the *Works and Days*, and then he proceeds to inform his reader of that difference (*W&D* 11–26). In the *Theogony*, this lexical focus can take the form of words curiously juxtaposed or of words evolving in meaning. Again, what is playful also has point. Calling a woman a καλὸν κακόν, a beautiful evil (*Th.* 585), draws attention to both “beautiful” and “evil.” To use the same word μήδεα, first for genitals (at the first stage of evolution) (180, 188), and then for Zeus's *plans* (545, 559, 561), is another example of focalization upon a word.³³ The same is true when the word for *sexual intercourse*, φιλότης, comes to describe Zeus's *social intercourse*, or *alliance* (cf., when he asks the monstrous Hundred-Handers to “remember his kindly friendship” and to stand with the Olympians against the Titans [651]). The new meaning of φιλότης is underscored by its new epithet ἐννής (kindly or gentle),

only here with φιλότης in extant Greek. In the context of this new form of alliance, the Hundred-Handers also praise Zeus for his exceptional understanding and intelligence, praise which sets this φιλότης apart from the erotic form which “overpowers the mind and thoughtful counsel of gods and men” (121–22). At moments like this in the poem, we see words evolving, like the universe itself, away from the physical and sexual towards the political and orderly. A similar shift is evident in the movement from Cronus’s crooked μήτις (18, 137, *passim*) and Prometheus’s shifty and crooked μήτις (511, 521, 546) to Zeus’s μητιόεις (457, 286) and μητίετα (56, 520, 904, 914) by which he can differentiate good from evil (899). In Hesiod’s art, content and the shifting meaning of words work together to plot the trajectory of the poem and bring out the poem’s political and philosophical themes, a theme we shall return to in the next chapter.

In short, Hesiod’s style is didactic. This quality of style is often underappreciated. While Hesiod and Homer draw from the same poetic medium, little in Homer parallels Hesiod’s focus on individual terms, a point most critics of Hesiod’s style miss.

All these aspects of Hesiod’s art bedevil modern-day editors and translators as they have to decide whether or not to capitalize a word. Both for Hesiod’s audience who heard the poem rather than read it and for later Greeks who only knew letters of one size, this modern editorial difficulty would most likely never have occurred to them. But modern conventions inevitably distort our appreciation of a passage when in one instance Gaia (being a goddess) is capitalized and in another instance she appears as a lowercase, common noun. When the minuscule script was introduced in the Byzantine period, editors were forced to decide whether to write Gaia or γαῖα, or to choose between Bia and Kratos (Styx’s children given to Zeus at *Th.* 338) or βίη and κράτος (or κάρτος), the force and might Zeus uses to defeat the Titans or Typhoeus. Before the Byzantine invention, goddess and common noun would have been written GAIA, and there would have been little reason to distinguish between them. Are we to suppose Hesiod’s hearers and readers before the ninth century CE saying to themselves: “Oh, there, Might and Force are Styx’ children and gods, but here they are descriptive, common nouns.”

It might be simple enough for a modern editor to capitalize Might and Force at all times, but what is one to do when the god appears in the form of a plural noun (like Quarrels, Neikea) but elsewhere the noun appears in the singular (νεῖκος)? Or, even more problematically, what if the god appears elsewhere in the form of a verb (“one who lies” instead of Lies), or what if the noun appears in adjectival form? Consider, for example, the phrase κάρτει νικήσας in the sentence “Zeus is king in heaven, *having conquered* his father *by might*” (73).

One might capitalize Kartos (an alternate of Kratos) for being Styx's child and said always to be by Zeus's side. But, Nike, Victory, is also Styx's child, although here the word appears as a participle, νικήσας. One can hardly capitalize both κάρτει and νικήσας. But such is Hesiod's art. These orthographic problems permeate the *Theogony*. Eris, Neikea (Conflicts), and Pseudea (Lies) are gods and family, as Eris mothered Neikea and Pseudea (225–30), but they also appear as common nouns and verbs when Oath punishes anyone on Olympus who introduces ἔρις or νεῖκος (νεῖκος here in the singular) or who lies ψεύδεται (Pseudea here as a third-person singular, indicative verb). One hearing the words ἔρις, νεῖκος, and ψεύδεται in close succession at 782–83 might recall Eris, Neikea, Pseudea mentioned earlier at 225–30, and so might we as attentive readers, even in our modern texts, but the orthography of upper and lower cases muffles the resonance of these associations. Later, ἔρις (or is it Eris?) appears to enter Olympus, now as a verb (ἥρισεν) (928), when Hera rages against her husband for giving birth to Athena. How are we to represent these words on the page? Such are the choices modern editors have to make, and it has the effect of quieting the poem and of diminishing the sensation that the *narrative* is alive with divinities. The problem is only intensified in translation.

Short of returning the entire text to capital letters, there is no easy solution to this orthographic problem. But the effect of our printing conventions is secularizing, declaring for the reader that god is present in one instance but not in another. Perhaps drawing from Hesiod, Ovid in his *Metamorphoses* on occasion displays a similar play between proper and common noun. It is less clear if the ancient rhetoricians recognized it. Horace and Longinus marveled at Homer's stylistic range, narrative force, and emotional subtlety, but they hardly say a word about Hesiod's style. Those who do praise it as representative of the middle, or smooth, style—in company with poets like Sappho, Anacreon, and Euripides—discuss the writing as pleasing (τὸ ἡδύ) and sweet (τὸ γλυκύ). A fourth-century rhetorician, one Menander Rhetor, when discussing genealogical hymns, especially praised the *Theogony* (in contrast to the Orphic hymns) for its purity or cleanness (καθαρότης) and moderation (συμμετρία) in periphrases. Centuries earlier, under the reign of Augustus, the influential writer on style Dionysius of Halicarnassus praised Hesiod's poetry for its delightfulness or pleasantness (ἡδονή), its smoothness of names (sometimes translated smoothness of words) (ὀνομάτων λειότης), and its harmonious composition (σύνθεσις ἑμμελής).³⁴ Dionysius also praises Hesiod for effectively fitting and interweaving words together.³⁵ It is not easy to know exactly what is meant by these various terms, but they may relate to Hesiod's graceful interplay

between proper names and epithets in his genealogical lists and perhaps even to his distinctive interweaving of verbs, nouns, and adjectives in his narrative with the proper names of his genealogical lists. Richard Hunter has attractively drawn the link between the critics' words characterizing Hesiod's style and those that Hesiod himself uses to describe the gentle and honeyed manners by which just kings talk to their people when issuing "straight judgments."³⁶ In the Renaissance, poets like Spencer and Milton, capitalizing both commonplace nouns and personified abstractions, again effectively create a verbal play between narrative description and proper names, but that orthographic convention only partially captures the sense in the *Theogony* that the gods thoroughly permeate the narrative.

The Theogony's Afterlife, a Brief Sketch

In a field of many creation stories—by the Classical period there were at least a dozen theogonies in verse or prose—Hesiod's *Theogony*, the oldest of them all, always stood out as the authoritative version.

For writers in the Archaic and Classical periods interested in questions of justice and idealized forms of civic order, the influence of the *Theogony* is deeply felt. This includes poets like Solon, Pindar, and Aeschylus and, in prose, philosophers like Plato, who looked to and drew on the *Theogony* in important ways even as he singled it out for telling the biggest lies about the biggest things (*Republic* II.377e). Also the "scientific" Presocratics, in both the East and West, rework and censure the *Theogony* in a variety of telling ways.

In the Hellenistic period, a new group of scholar/poets in Alexandria claimed inspiration from Hesiod and made much of specific passages from the *Theogony*, but its stories of god-on-god violence offended. Some at this time even placed Hesiod and Homer in Hades for their blasphemy: they have Hesiod screaming, bound to a bronze pillar, and Homer is suspended from a tree and surrounded by snakes. The prevailing Stoic thinkers of this period had little use for Hesiod's Zeus, depicting instead a benevolent, *cosmic* god who creates all matter on principles of justice, reason, and harmony.

A source from the second century CE offers a puzzling account that Boeotians living near Helicon regarded *only* the *Works and Days* as genuine, and even for this poem they rejected the first 10 lines as spurious (as did the Alexandrian scholar, Aristarchus).³⁷ They went so far as to engrave the entire poem (minus the proem) on a lead tablet and erect it on Mt. Helicon by the fountain of the Hippocrene. The local rejection of the *Theogony* is curious. Some suspect that it may

reflect an ancient tradition (Cingano, 2009: 93), although there is no evidence of such. It is certainly possible that the rejection is itself late and the result of a growing discontent in antiquity with the *Theogony*'s stories of filial violence in the form of Cronus castrating his father and of Zeus imprisoning Cronus. But no one in antiquity, apparently, objected to Zeus's swallowing of Metis.

The importance of the *Theogony* certainly wanes in the Roman period. Indeed, it was often the object of ridicule or parody, as in the case of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, which loosely, and ironically, models its nonlinear story from Chaos to Caesar Augustus on the *Theogony*'s creation myth from Chaos to Zeus. Ironic as Ovid may be, one sees in this parody a writer who sensed and exploited Hesiod's underlying argument, as well as style.

Even Hesiod's story of divine inspiration became increasingly ridiculed in the first centuries of the Common Era, by pagan satirists (Lucian) and Christian apologists alike. Christians especially scoffed at Hesiod, the "prince of matter," for being misled by wicked demons. By the time of Dante, Hesiod was all but forgotten in the West. As he did for so many things classical, Petrarch (1304–1374), at the headwaters of the Renaissance, was the first to bring Hesiod back into the Western literary imagination.

The *Theogony* reaches the height of its postclassical glory in Milton's *Paradise Lost* (1667 and 1674), a Christian creation poem that responds to the ancient pagan poem. As a close reader of Hesiod and a believer in a later religion, Milton simultaneously imitates and borrows from the old pagan story as he means to supplant it.

The *Theogony* and *Genesis*

Nothing sets the *Theogony* and *Genesis* more apart than their polytheistic and monotheistic views of the divine, although at the start it needs to be stressed that, unlike modern understandings of monotheism, the ancient Israelites understood their "single god," *El Elion* (God Most High), in a system with lesser gods and demons who carried out his supreme will and in company with a multitude of inferior gods worshipped by other peoples.³⁸ It is in this context that we should understand the First Commandment, "Thou shalt have no other gods before me," and the many references in the Torah to angels, demons, and foreign gods.

We can see, thus, that the ancient understanding of monotheism

gravitates toward a polytheism of sorts, in the sense that it sees its one god as supreme over all other gods. Greek polytheism equally gravitates toward monotheism, as it repeatedly longs for a single god who rules over all with a clear, guiding hand. The philosophers especially long for such coherence. Many centuries after Hesiod, one figure commented of Plato: “What is he but Moses speaking in Greek?”³⁹ But, even as both systems gravitate one toward the other, at their core, Greek polytheism and Hebraic monotheism were rooted in contrasting grounds regarding a god’s relation to time and space and the place of humankind in the cosmic landscape.⁴⁰ Rarely is this movement back and forth between “monotheism” and “polytheism” more dramatically played out than in John Milton’s *Paradise Lost*, as we shall see in the [Chapter 6](#).

The opening chapters of *Genesis* famously offer two stories of creation. One, composed almost 200 years after the *Theogony*, refers to God as *Elohim* (Hebrew ‘*Elôhm*), the plural of *Elôah* (God), and perhaps an expansion of the Phoenician ‘*El* (God),⁴¹ where creation unfolds over six days, with man and woman made in the sixth day in the image of God. The seventh day is set aside as the Sabbath, a day of rest and worship of the Creator (*Gen* 1–2:3). The other, narrated second but composed some 500 years before the *Theogony*, refers to God by the word never-to-be-spoken, YHWH (Yahweh or Jahweh). This story narrates the creation of Adam from dust and divine breath, the making of Eve from Adam’s rib, and their eventual expulsion from the Garden of Eden (*Gen* 2:4–4:2). Even with these differences, the two versions have a number of features in common and may be understood as complementary: Elohim creates the world by an act of speaking, and Adam in the Garden creates order in the world through names; the first story ends with a human couple, man and woman made in God’s image, the second with the couple of Adam and Eve. We shall look at both parts but concentrate primarily on the first. While composed long after the *Theogony*, *Genesis* I shows no signs of Greek influence, even while both myths share a distant common ancestry in the Akkadian and Phoenician creation stories, as we shall see in [Chapter 3](#).

I shall use the term myth for the *Theogony* and *Genesis*. Befitting both works, the *Theogony* (in verse) and *Genesis* (primarily in prose),⁴² the term designates an authoritative story which narrates the deeds and personalities of gods and heroes in times past that helps establish the founding principles for how a culture thinks of itself.⁴³ The place of these myths in their societies, however, differed significantly: *Genesis*, considered by its people to be dictated to Moses by God, was thought sacred and was part of religious practice, while the Greek poem—given by the Muses (who can tell lies like truth) to Hesiod—

was not a sacred text and competed with other creation myths at festivals in poetic competitions.

In both myths evolution occurs through separation and division, but their understanding of the universe could hardly be more divergent. They start out on different footings and move in different directions.⁴⁴

The P source of *Genesis* describes creation occurring over six days (using Everett Fox's translation, 1995): On the first, "*God separated the light from the darkness. God called the light: Day! and the darkness he called: Night!*" (*Gen* 1:3–5). On the second day: "*God made the dome and separated the waters that were below the dome from the waters that were above the dome*" (vv. 6–7). On the third day: God gathered the waters in one place and created dry land. He also said: "*Let the earth sprout forth with sprouting growth plants that seed forth seeds, fruit trees that yield fruit, after their kind. ... God saw that it was good*" (vv. 9–12). On the fourth day, God "*separated*" day from the night and "*made two great lights, the greater light for ruling the day and the smaller light for ruling the night*" (vv. 14–18). On the fifth day, God let there be fish in the waters and fowl in the air (vv. 20–21). And on the sixth day, "*God made the wildlife ... [and] saw that it was good ... God said: Let us make mankind, in our image, according to our likeness! Let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and the fowl of the heavens, animals, all the earth, and all crawling things that crawl about upon the earth! ... God created mankind in his image, in the image of God did he create it, male and female did he create them. God saw everything that he had made, and, behold, it was very good*" (vv. 24–31). On the seventh day, the task was "*finished... and He ceased...from all the work which He had done,*" blessing the day and declaring it holy (2:1–3). The *Theogony*, by contrast, begins with Chaos, and the supreme god and his community of Olympians come into being in the third generation of gods.

A major difference between the two mythic systems concerns sexual reproduction. Second born in the *Theogony* after Chaos is the male god, Eros, "the most beautiful of all the gods,/the limb-loosening god, who dominates the mind and sensible thought in the breasts/of all gods and of all mortals" (120–22). After his birth, evolution (with few exceptions) is biological, female and male deities joining in intercourse to produce offspring, each of whom adds further diversity and complexity to creation. If there is a prime mover in the *Theogony*, it is the "limb-loosening" god, an irrepressible and anarchic force, to paraphrase W. H. Auden's characterization of Aphrodite.⁴⁵ Biological reproduction quickly leads to familial tensions between parents and offspring and between the parents themselves. In the first two generations of gods, those tensions explode into violence when Cronus, at his mother's bidding, castrates his father Sky and in turn

swallows his own children before he is overthrown by Zeus.⁴⁶

In *Genesis*, by contrast, creation is through the word and insemination is a speech act: “*God said: Let there be ...*” and so it was. Psalm 33:6 captures this form of creation well: “By the word of YHWH the heavens were made, and by the breath of His mouth.” We find it again in the Gospel of John: “In the beginning was the Word, ... and the Word was made flesh” (John 1:1 and 14). In *Genesis*, sexuality is first alluded to after Adam and Eve eat of the forbidden fruit and cover their private parts in shame. Compared to the biological version of (pro)creation, the version in *Genesis* is elegant. It bypasses familial conflict and creates a clear hierarchical relation between creator and begotten. It also subordinates body and passion to logos and intellect.

The Greek beginning from Chaos is clearly a far cry from the Hebrew existence of God before time or space. Chaos is neuter in gender, referring to a chasm or gap that makes division possible. The figure otherwise is without personality. Evolution occurs without rhyme or reason, as first one god and then another is simply “born.” The closest the Greek myth comes to proposing design is the figure of Eros, but sexual desire and biological destiny have little to do with conscious intent. The Greek gods are born into time and to a certain degree are subject to laws. The famed Greek physician Galen (ca. 160 CE) puts it this way: about our religion “we say that certain things are impossible by nature and these God (here Galen means The Demiurge or “Zeus”) does not even attempt; he only chooses the best among the things that come about” (*De usu partium*, On the use of Parts, xi.14). In Hesiod’s telling, nothing in the beginning is called good. *Κακόν* (“harm, evil”)⁴⁷ exists long before anything expressed by the prefix *εὖ-* (“well”). *Dus-nomia* (Bad Governance) (230) exists before *Eunomia* (Good Governance) (902) and *κακόν* long before either of these. Grievous harms enter the poem alongside sexual generation when Sky delights in preventing his children from being born (158) and Gaia in retaliation schemes to castrate him (160). Goodness comes late and is hard-won when in the third generation Zeus, following Earth’s (and Sky’s) advice, swallows *Metis* in order to avoid being overthrown by his son and creates a space apart, called Olympus.

But *Genesis*, by contrast, begins with design mystery when the supreme godhead, who exists before time or space, decides to enter time. Invisible, motherless, and without origin, he is himself a figure of profound mystery, beyond imagination and before history, who for his own reasons elects to create our universe, including the heavens and earth, according to his will. As Galen puts it: “For Moses, God has only to will to bring matter into order, and matter is ordered immediately.”⁴⁸ When Abraham asks his God whether Sarah could conceive in her ninetieth year, he responds: “Is anything too hard for

the Lord?” (*Gen* 18:14). In this creation story, all is of God and with God.⁴⁹ As often depicted in medieval illuminations (see Fig. 1), the Lord God can be seen as a master architect with compass and ruler who creates the universe with forethought and a sense of purpose.⁵⁰ The authors of the Priestly tradition suggest as much, when after each day’s work *Elohim* pronounces that all was “good” and that on the sixth day it was “very good” and “finished” or “completed.”⁵¹

This godhead is especially associated with time. His title *Adon ‘Olam* is typically translated as Lord of the World, or Eternal Lord, but ‘*olam* in its oldest sense refers to “extended time,” so we can think of this God first and foremost as the Lord of Time who unfolds his identity over the course of history. One of the mysteries of this figure is why he should seek to enter into time at all.⁵² For whatever reason, time is his special gift to his chosen people, whether it is to enable Sarah to conceive well past her childbearing years or for his people when he enters into history and frees them from servitude. But his biggest gift will come in the future, as Sergei Averintsev writes (1999: 27): “The persuasive motif of the Bible is the promise ... Yahweh is the lord of the past and present, but his power will be fully realized, and his glory will fully shine, only in the future, with the coming of the day of Yahweh, of which the prophet spoke.”



God as architect of the universe. Manuscript illumination. folio 1 verso of a moralized bible, paris, ca. 1220–1230. österreichische Nationalbibliothek. Vienna. Codex Vindobonensis 2554. Ink, tempera, and gold leaf on vellum.

Zeus has a very different relation to time. Born into a world of change, evil, and *Dus-nomia*, he creates—by sexual intercourse—with Themis (Law, Custom) *Eu-nomia*. He also creates stability. In the one story about Zeus that defies Galen's generalizations, Zeus overcomes his fate of being deposed by a son by swallowing Metis (Wisdom, Cunning), the wife pregnant with that threatening child. With the mother swallowed and the son unborn, Zeus gives birth from his head to Athena, a daughter loyal to him alone. Thus, Zeus evades his fate, defies biology, and thwarts time, at least for himself and the gods on Olympus. He remains forever middle-aged, while his children, frustratingly for them, remain eternally youthful, his son Apollo never

growing a beard and his daughters rarely marrying. Zeus in effect has created an eternal present on Olympus, where the Olympians are fixed in time.

The ingestion of Metis makes stability possible, but, at least as Hesiod tells it, Zeus's success as a permanent ruler of the Olympian gods depends upon something altogether different. Here is where we see the particular Greek genius in its full force. He does not change the universe, nor could he if he tried, as Galen noted. What he can do—and this is related to the Muses' gift to man—is to create a space set apart from nature's more turbulent forces, and to live according to principles of laws and cherished customs (*Th.* 66). This is his Olympus: an enclosed place (*Th.* 37, 51, 408) where the Olympians can keep the discordant and quarrelsome aspects of nature at bay (*Th.* 782–806) and live in communal harmony. Such is the civic orientation of the *Theogony*; family gives way to city, natural forces are redirected towards the social good, and a life of shared honors and distributive justice, never imagined in nature (according to Hesiod, *W&D* 276–80), might be realized. After this creation, Zeus through the Muses and kings passes this “sacred gift” to humankind, giving men of the ἀγορή the tools to create a harmonious civic order. In Greek thought, the πόλις is sacred space.

By contrast, the Hebrew God creates for the benefit of man and woman, it would seem, who are made in the god's image and have dominion over the earth.⁵³ In the Garden of Eden, Adam and Eve see YHWH face to face, but cities lead humans away from god. Enoch is the first city in *Genesis*, made by Cain and named after his son, a telling indication of the impetus behind the building of cities. In the city of Babel, humans build towers to reach heaven, challenging God and to make a name for themselves. Until the making of Jerusalem, and even there in the tragic story of David, cities in the Hebrew Bible more likely than not alienate God from human beings, as they are the creations of man and pull the human heart away from the divine.

Prior to the expulsion from Eden and the creation of cities, the order of creation underscores the splendor of humankind, although a number of steps in that creation defy logic. How, for example, are we to understand the creation of day and night on day one when the sun and moon do not appear until the fourth day? Why does god make grasses, herbs, and fruit trees on day three before there is the sun to sustain them? Why do days three and six have two sets of creations when there is only one creation on each of the other days? One might answer these questions in many ways, but the following pattern suggests itself: creations on days one, two, and three are stationary and insentient (if we consider plants insentient before the advent of the sun). On days four, five, and six, God creates things with motion,

with the first being lifeless (according to this story)—the sun, moon, and stars. On day five, creatures are both self-propelled and have life, before man and woman on the sixth day have self-propulsion, life, and understanding. The sun and moon of the fourth day are said to “rule” the day, but the language is purely metaphoric, perhaps a holdover from polytheistic myths where the sun and moon are indeed deities. The real rulers in this myth are man and woman, the crown of creation, able to move and to discern, and thus, like God, to hold dominion over all other living things.

The *Theogony*, by contrast, shows considerably less interest in humankind. It does not even tell a story of the creation of man, and the creation of woman, a trick, “beautiful evil,” and “great burden” for man (585, 592, 609, respectively), is anything but an honored creature.

In both *Genesis* and the *Theogony*, conflict and evil reside primarily within the nuclear family, although in one myth that family is divine and in the other mortal. Divine families in the *Theogony* appear early and it takes some time before the gods can invent a harmonious new order. In *Genesis*, families of any kind do not appear until after the expulsion from the Garden of Eden, when in quick order God’s fallen creatures engage in violence, one son killing the other. In the Greek myth, the family structure is typically triangular (father, mother, son), but in *Genesis* it tends toward the rectangle: father, mother, and (two) sons, befitting its greater concern with sibling rivalry than generational strife. God’s perpetual intervention in human affairs—whether by ordering a father to sacrifice his son, or by favoring a second son over the firstborn, instills God himself as a fifth member of this family unit.

In sum, we could characterize both creation myths as being concerned with balance. The equilibrium each seeks, however, is of a different order. In *Genesis*, the primary equilibrium sought concerns the relation between God and his most cherished creation, a relation that is fraught with contention and is ever evolving. Like all dynamic relationships, this one exists in flux, sometimes prone to rage and disobedience and sometimes to compassion and love, as both god and human seek understanding and harmony. In polytheism, the main concern is between the gods themselves, naturally enough, as each god is eager to acquire his or her share of honor and power. Thus, the key question of Hesiod to the Muses is: “Tell me, how did the gods divide their wealth and how did they distribute their honors?” (*Th.* 112). In Hesiod’s poem, harsh, discordant forces like Eris and Dismos move through the universe at large, but thanks to Zeus’s rule a balanced sharing of power, befitting each god, exists among the Olympians (that is, except for Zeus’s wife, Hera). Unlike the medieval

illumination of the Hebrew God, the Greek king of the gods is seen as very much in nature, and often as a splendid image of the male nude, ennobling the human form. The impressive bronze statue from Cape Artemisium shows Zeus as a figure of balance and power, perfectly calm and centered yet also in motion and dynamic, poised at the moment just before release (as shown by the distribution of weight on the heel of his front foot and on the toes of the back foot). This is a god about to act. Equally awe-inspiring is the god's steady gaze down the reach of his outstretched arm as he takes measure. In the *Theogony*, this dynamic equilibrium and measured gaze are expressed politically, made manifest by Zeus's leadership skills.



Zeus. Bronze statue from Cape Artemisium, ca. 460 bce. Athens National Archaeological Museum X 15161.

* Unless otherwise note, *italicized* words in a translation or greek passage signify author's emphasis

The *Theogony*

In this chapter I discuss Hesiod's creation poem as a political poem and a hymn to Zeus. Others have read the *Theogony* in similar ways,¹ but much in this essay describing Olympus as a portrait of an idealized πόλις is new. This reading of the poem is central to my understanding of the poem's relation to the earlier Babylonian *Enûma elish* and to its reception among writers in the Archaic and Classical periods. Chief among them are Solon, Pindar, Aeschylus, Aristophanes, and Plato, who are themselves concerned in varying ways with idealized images of polity and with visions of communal harmony. In the essay that follows I shall concentrate on this one aspect of the poem, well aware that there are many other components of the *Theogony* that are important in the story of its reception from the Archaic period to Milton's *Paradise Lost*. These include the shepherd's encounter with the Muses on Mt. Helicon, the beginning of creation with Chaos, stories of familial violence in the succession myth, and Prometheus and Typhoeus stories, to name the most obvious. These I shall address at relevant points in later chapters, but here I shall discuss the *Theogony* as a πόλις-creation myth.

In its beginning stages, Hesiod's *Theogony* is both a cosmogony and theogony, as its primordial gods are also elemental features of the physical universe, but in the last phase of his myth this changes. With Zeus's ascendancy, a new order is born, one contrary to nature and based on good governance. The overriding aim of the *Theogony* is to narrate and to justify that ascension and achievement.

The *Theogony* tells its creation story in a curious way. To a degree not found in other ancient Mediterranean creation myths and not attested in other early Greek epic, many of the gods in Hesiod are personified abstractions, as already seen in [Chapter 1](#). A small sampling includes figures like Eros (Love), Apate (Deceit), Philotes (Love, Friendship), Eris (Discord, Strife), Logoi (Words), Dusnomia (Bad Governance), Bia (Force), Dike (Justice), Eirene (Social Peace), and Eunomia (Good Governance). In many cases, Hesiod appears to be

the first to turn such words into deities. With these abstractions, we sense a poet moving toward philosophy, using the technique of personification to assemble the building blocks of logical argument, turning a mythic story into something approaching political science and political allegory.

Another oddity: Hesiod's creation myth says next to nothing about the creation of man, although it does describe at some length the creation of the first mortal woman. Woman is described as a gift, a "beautiful evil" (*Th.* 585) that brings hardship and occasional joy to man, but the "sacred gift" (*Th.* 93) in the *Theogony* is political in nature. This gift takes the form of Zeus-nurtured kings who speak to men in the city agora with straight judgments and the honeyed words of the Muses. Like Zeus on Olympus, they bring concord to a community previously beset by great unrest. This focus on righteous kings, and not on man's creation, again, speaks to the poem's political concerns. The Muses' gift of a σκῆπτρον to Hesiod is equally striking, as this object, unique for bards, is exclusively associated with prophets and political authority, whether that of kings or heralds, and places Hesiod ambiguously between singer (*Th.* 94–103), seer and voice of the πόλις.

Another oddity of the poem is its structure. Unlike all other ancient Mediterranean creation myths, the *Theogony* prefaces its creation myth with a prolonged and rich vision of the Muses, Olympus, and Zeus's rule. As a consequence, the poem begins and ends with Zeus. A vision of Olympian permanence and harmony frames a creation tale of evolution, change, and violence. As with Hesiod's intellectualizing traditional myths with a rich dose of personified abstractions and with the poem's portrait of idealized kings, so its long proemium underscores the *Theogony's* political focus and its attention from beginning to end on Zeus.

A fourth oddity has already been alluded to: contrary to what one might assume, the late-born Zeus does *not* remake the world into a harmonious and perfected order. Ancient and modern students of Greek religion and myth sometimes assume that he does, and the later Stoics will have the "real" Zeus do exactly that. But this was not Hesiod's view. In his version, Zeus is born into a world already inhabited by forces like Deceit, Love, Discord, and Bad Governance. He cannot undo this mix or change the nature of these forces. In the *Theogony*, Zeus's success as a leader is not that he changes the world, for he cannot undo, or un-create, the deities already born into it. His success is in creating a space apart, called Olympus, which can keep those violent and discordant forces at bay. Those within Olympus live a life defined by cherished customs, laws, and social concord, freed, in large measure, from the strife, quarrels, and familial violence of the

previous two generations of gods.

But what, if anything, on the human plane does this space resemble? As Hesiod calls Zeus both “the father of gods (and men)” and “king of the gods,” there is room for debate about the nature of this new order. The tendency in modern scholarship is to emphasize the paternal side of Zeus and to think of the Olympians as a divine family and of Olympus as analogous to the human οἶκος. So, for example, Walter Burkert (2004: 25) frequently speaks of Olympian “parents” and “children.” Richard Janko (1992: 1) describes Greek polytheism in terms of “Zeus as merely the mightiest member of the divine family.” Giulia Sissa and Marcel Detienne (2000: 5–6) refer to the Olympians as “linked by *kinship*” bonds, “constituting a society ... allied by endogamous marriages [which] form a closed group composed of three generations in which each individual remains forever in the same age group.” In terms of the *Theogony* itself, Johannes Haubold (2002: 15) writes that “Zeus’ major contribution to the physical make-up of the universe is to father the younger Olympian gods.”

The language for Olympus in Hesiod and Homer, however, does not easily align with an οἶκος orientation. Hesiod describes the Olympians as living “within Olympus,” (ἐντὸς Ὀλύμπου, *Th.* 37, 51, 408), a phrase that echoes Homer’s description of the Trojans living “within the walls” of Troy (τείχεος ἐντὸς, *Il.* 22.85), the preposition ἐντὸς implying a space enclosed by walls. Without describing city walls, Homer has gods entering Olympus through city gates (πύλαι) (*Il.* 5.749–51).² Within Olympus, Hesiod says there are dancing floors (*Th.* 62), a πόλις feature, and that the gods live in separate dwellings, with Zeus’s home perched on the highest point. Words for Olympian gatherings are also drawn from the πόλις. Within Olympus, there are εἶρα (*Th.* 804), a rare word found elsewhere only in the *Iliad* when describing a gathering of men in council debate (*Il.* 18.531). A scholiast says this is Aeolic for ἀγοραί or ἐκκλησίαι. Hesiod is not alone in thinking of the Olympians as assembled in an ἀγορή. Homer describes Themis “calling the Olympians to the ἀγορή” (*Il.* 20.4), just as she does for the “ἀγορή of men” in the human πόλις (*Od.* 2.69).³ More pointedly, in Hesiod the gods also meet in a βουλή (council chamber) and share in communal feasting (δαῖτες) (802), features which on the human plane are associated with civic life.⁴ From these linguistic pointers—spatial, architectural, and societal, the language for Olympus in Hesiod and Homer more closely aligns with terms for the human πόλις, not the οἶκος. A Homeric scholiast saw it the same way when he wrote “on the height of Olympus there is by the same name Olympus the πόλις.”⁵ But if all understood Olympus as a πόλις, one supposes that the scholiast would not have felt compelled to make

the point.

If we were to emphasize Zeus's role as king, how might we think of his kingship? Some, like Martin Nilsson (1932: 249–51), look to Mycenaean times and think of Zeus as an all-powerful *wanax*, living on the crest of the hill. Others, like Arthur Adkins (1985), look to “Dark Age” social conditions and see Olympus as a “socio-political order superimposed on a familial, genealogical order.” Adkins, in particular, avoids the epic terms of βασιλεύς and ἄναξ for Zeus and calls him an ἄγαθός, or great man.⁶ Sissa and Detienne (2000, 5–17) also avoid the term king, preferring instead to describe Zeus as a tyrant, above and outside the rule of law. The Homeric scholiast did not speak of Zeus, but surely he saw Olympus the πόλις as a classical city-state with Zeus as its ruler-king.

Perhaps it is best not to push the distinction between οἶκος and πόλις too hard on the grounds that human models cannot comfortably overlay the heavenly domain. Olympus the πόλις obviously has no need of temples, cultivated lands, or marketplaces, all essential components of the human πόλις, and the gods live free of labor, the defining condition of humankind in the Age of Iron, as the *Works and Days* says.⁷ And unlike any human model, the Olympians assemble in Zeus's house, a point made frequently in Homer but never in Hesiod. One contemporary scholar writes that it is “obvious” that “the gods should choose Zeus' home for their gatherings.”⁸ But is it so obvious? Is it a sign of Mycenaean palace conditions, as Nilsson might say? Or is it a sign of the blurring of categories, Zeus as father and king, as others might say? One should not rule out the possibility that the allusion is borrowed from the Near East where, in the Akkadian, Hittite and Ugaritic traditions, gods *do* meet in *assembly* in the chief god's *house*, both his city temple and cosmic home.⁹ But in the *Theogony* the distinction between οἶκος and πόλις appears to have a point. Taken together, the topographical layout of Olympus (however dimly delineated), its institutions, and the nature of Zeus's rule suggest something resembling a human πόλις, albeit of course without the human need for farmland, commercial center, or temples. Following Hesiod's language, I shall regard Hesiod's Olympus as a proto-πόλις.

While in most regards the nature of Zeus's governance in the *Theogony* has little in common with his threatening ways in the *Iliad*, Hesiod's Zeus can be a forceful, violent, and cunning god.¹⁰ To gain supremacy over Cronus and the Titans, he “conquers by might,” using collective force in the form of an army to defeat them (*Th.* 73; cf. 617–712, 881–82). Following Earth's (and Sky's) advice to overcome his fate, he resorts to trickery and violence when swallowing Metis. At this moment, in language and deed, Zeus is hardly distinguishable

from his father:

τότ' ἔπειτα δόλῳ φρένας ἔξαπατήσας
αἰμυλίοισι λόγοισιν ἔην ἐσκάτθετο νηδύν, (889–90)

Having deceived (Metis') mind by a trick
And with wily words, *he placed her down into his belly*

τὸν τόθ' ἔλῶν χεῖρεςσιν ἔην ἐσκάτθετο νηδύν,
σχέτλιος, (487–88)

Then, taking (the stone) into his hands, *he place it down into his belly,*
the wretch

Both fathers performed this ingestion in order that no other hold “kingly honor” (βασιληίδα τιμήν); compare Cronus at 461–62 and Earth’s (and Sky’s) advise to Zeus at 892–93. But in Hesiod Cronus pays dearly for his swallowing and is described as a “wretch” and having “crooked-μῆτις,” whereas Zeus for his Cronus-like act is rewarded many times over: he escapes his fate, assumes Metis’s name, becoming μητίετα Zeus, “wise-counseling Zeus,” and becomes king of the gods without end. Furthermore, Metis, now consumed, “join with him in counsel (συμφοράσσαιτο) about good and evil” (900).¹¹ No doubt echoes like this, linking Cronus and Zeus, caused figures like Plato in a later age to chastise epic poetry (cf. *Republic* I.331–36 and *Euthyphro* 5–9). We shall return to these passages later.

If Hesiod’s Zeus resorts to cunning and violence to gain supremacy and to abort succession, a different quality enables him to secure a lasting rule. For that, a new mode of existence, best defined by εὐνομίη (good governance), is essential. In Hesiod’s mythic language, εὐνομίη is a personified abstraction, Zeus’s eldest child by Themis (Law), the first of three daughters who introduce into the cosmos the necessary conditions of good-governance:¹²

δεύτερον ἡγάγετο λιπαρὴν Θέμιν, ἣ τέκεν Ὠρας,
Εὐνομίην τε Δίκην τε καὶ Εἰρήνην τεθαλυῖαν,
αἳ τ' ἔργ' ὠρεούουσι καταθνητοῖσι βροτοῖσι, (901–3)

Second, he led (to bed) gleaming Themis (Law), who bore the
Horai,

Eunomia (Good Governance), Dike (Justice), and blooming Eirene
(Social Peace),

who tend to the works of mortal man.

Punning on their collective name, Ὥρας, with the verb ὠρεύουσι, Hesiod describes the Horai as “tending to the works of humankind” (903), but, as we shall see, Eunomia’s presence is first manifest on Olympus.

Zeus’s governance is less based on genealogical ties than it is on a fair distribution of honors, a system of laws and cherished customs, and a harmonious integration of competing parts. It is a curious feature of this creation story to introduce us to this achievement (35–79) long before it commences with the story of evolution itself (at verse 116). As a consequence, the poem begins where it ends, framing a story of birth and change with one of permanence and political stability. The Olympian Muses sing of this governance in the following way:

κάρτει νικήσας πατέρα Κρόνον· εὖ δὲ ἕκαστα
ἀθανάτοισι διέταξε νόμους (διέταξεν ὁμῶς) καὶ ἐπέφραδε
τιμὰς. (73–4)

having gained victory [over Cronus] by might, well (εὖ) in each of the details

[Zeus] distributed laws (νόμοι)¹³ and has assigned honors for the immortals.

A few lines earlier the phrase for governance is even more striking when the Muses celebrate in song the “laws and cherished manners of all the Olympians”:

ἐρατὴν δὲ διὰ στόμα ὅσσαν ἰεῖσαι
μέλπονται, πάντων τε νόμους καὶ ἥθεα κεδνὰ
ἀθανάτων κλείουσιν, ἐπήρατον ὅσσαν ἰεῖσαι. (65–67)

sending forth a lovely voice from their mouths,
they dance and sing, glorifying in song the laws and cherished
manners
of all the immortals, sending forth their lovely voice.

Given the paucity of early Greek texts, we cannot say how Hesiod’s audience would have responded to the language and sentiment of verse 66, but by comparison to Homeric phrasing Hesiod’s is remarkably innovative. This is the first time in extant Greek that

νόμος means law. In Homer, the word, accented on the ultima, refers to pasturelands (i.e., that which is distributed); here, the same word, with the accent on the penult, refers to laws or ordinances (i.e., that which the king distributes). In Homer, ἥθεα refers to the “accustomed abode” of animals, but here it refers to the manners of the gods, i.e., an “accustomed way” of life,¹⁴ and its epithet κεδνὰ is equally unusual in comparison to Homer where it usually modifies a person (a “cherished” lord, a “devoted” wife, or a “trusted” nurse) rather than a cherished way of life (ἥθεα), i.e., “cherished manners.” Hesiod may not be responsible for these “innovations,” but the concentration of these non-Homeric meanings in the context of describing Zeus’s creation of a lawful, civilized Olympus is noteworthy.

Hesiod returns to the question of Zeus’s kingship near the end of the poem, describing how the gods (once again prompted by Earth)¹⁵ urged him to be their king and lord:

δῆ ῥα τότ’ ὤτρυνον βασιλευμένῳ ἡδὲ ἀνάσσειν
Γαίης φραδομοσύνησιν Ὀλύμπιον εὐρύοπα Ζῆν
ἀθανάτων· ὁ δὲ τοῖσιν εὖ διεδάσσατο τιμὰς. (883–85)
the gods, spurred on by Earth’s counsel and foresight,
urged the Olympian, wide-seeing Zeus to be king and lord
of the immortals, and (δὲ) he divided up their honors well (εὖ).

This view is also quite un-Homeric. In the *Iliad*, Zeus gains dominion over Olympus by lot (*Il.*15.209–11), but here it is by collective urging, almost an election, that he be king and lord. What prompts this urging, first from Earth, then from the Olympians? The good distribution of honors again seems the answer. The aorist verb διεδάσσατο (885) indicates that Zeus was made king before he divided the honors well. δὲ must be translated as “and”: first Zeus was made king, then he divided the honors. But from the way Hesiod speaks of Zeus’s rise to power in the *proem* and from the numerous digressions throughout the poem about Zeus’s *route* to kingship, we can also suppose that the gods urged him to become king *because* they had reason to believe that he would share honors and offices in a fair manner. In this sense, the particle δὲ verges upon being explanatory, i.e., the gods urged Zeus to be king *for* he [would] divide up honors well (εὖ). The presence of εὖ/ἐν (“well”) at both 73 and 885 in the context of distributing νόμοι and τιμαί goes some way to describing what is meant by Εὖ-νομίην (Good Governance), first exemplified, we see, by Zeus on Olympus.

It is also worth noting that *no component* of Zeus’s power in the

Theogony is innate. It *all* comes from others, male and female, whom Zeus has either included into his rule or liberated from oppression. So, for example, the Oceanid Styx gives Zeus her children Might (Kratos), Force (Bia), Zeal (Zelos), and Victory (Nike) when he promises to bestow honors upon any god who will fight by his side against the Titans, even if that god had previously been without honor (383–403). Throughout the poem, Zeus has Victory by means of Might and Force (i.e., κάρτει νικήσας, 73), in myth-talk the children of Styx, whom he acquired by means of shared governance.

In the *Theogony*, neither the thunderbolt nor lightning blast is a thing of nature but a manufactured object, crafted by the Cyclopes (children of Earth and Sky in this poem) and given by them to Zeus in gratitude for having been freed from bondage under the Earth. Or, as Hesiod says it, they gave Zeus the weapons as “they remembered the grace of his kindness” (οἳ οἱ ἀπεμνήσαντο χάριν εὐεργεσιάων) (503; cf. 139–41).¹⁶ With this assemblage of forces—the thunderbolt and lightning, Might, Force, and Victory, Zeus defeats Typhoeus, but he cannot prevail against the Titans without a second act of liberation. This involves the freeing of the Hundred-Handers, the Cyclopes’s brothers, from their bondage in the Earth. “Mindful of (Zeus’) kindly friendship” (μνησάμενοι φιλότητος ἐνηέος) (651; cf. 655–57), the Hundred-Handers come to his aid and ensure Olympian victory. Such examples in the poem are pervasive: Zeus’s power and rule stem from shared governance and political alliances.¹⁷ Thus, we see two sides to Zeus’s power: one, a military prowess—all acquired in the form of gifts—which he uses against those outside of Olympus. But within Olympus, he rules—characteristically—by a principle of laws and an enlightened distribution of honors, that is, to all except his wives (a point to which we shall come shortly).

The community of Olympus is itself free from discord. In a passage frequently overlooked, Hesiod describes how that concord is maintained:

ὁππότε ἔρις καὶ νεῖκος ἐν ἀθανάτοισιν ὄρηται,
καὶ ῥ’ ὅστις ψεύδεται Ὀλύμπια δώματ’ ἐχόντων,
Ζεὺς δέ τε Ἴριν ἔπεμψε θεῶν μέγαν ὄρκον ἐνεῖκαι
τηλόθεν ἐν χρυσῇ προχώῳ πολυώνυμον ὕδωρ,

...

ἄλλος δ’ ἐξ ἄλλου δέχεται χαλεπώτερος ἄθλος·
εἰνάετες δὲ θεῶν ἀπαμείρεται αἰὲν ἐόντων,
οὐδέ ποτ’ ἐς βουλὴν ἐπιμίσγεται οὐδ’ ἐπὶ δαΐτας
ἐννέα πάντ’ ἔτεα· δεκάτῳ δ’ ἐπιμίσγεται αὖτις

† εἰρέας ἀθανάτων οἱ Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσι. (782–85 and 800–4)

whenever ἔρις and νεῖκος arise among the immortals
and whoever of the gods holding homes on Olympus *lies*
Zeus sent Iris to carry in a golden jar the great oath
of the gods from afar, the much-famed water ...

(whoever of the gods, pouring a libation, foreswears, he lies in a
coma for a full year)

then another penance, even more harsh, follows:

for nine years, he is cut off from the gods who live forever
and never mixes in the βουλή or in the communal feasts
for a full nine years; but in the tenth he mixes once again
in the εἶραι of the immortals who have their homes on Olympus.

If ἔρις or νεῖκος arise among the immortals and someone of those
who have homes on Olympus *lies* (ψεύδεται) (782–83), Zeus sends
Iris to Styx to ensure that that god is punished, first by being cast into
a coma for a year (793–99) and then, as a worse punishment, by being
banned from the βουλή (council chamber), communal feasts (δαῖτες),
and the εἶραι (Aeolic for ἀγοραί) for another nine years (800–4). The
punishment in sum comes close to being the divine prototype of
political ostracism that the Athenians introduce on the human plane
200 years later.¹⁸

Earlier in the poem, ἔρις was introduced as a goddess, “hateful”
Eris/Discord,¹⁹ parthenogenic daughter of Night (225–26) and mother
of Neikea (Quarrels) and Pseudea (Lies), also parthenogenically
conceived (229), as well as Ponos (Toil), Hunger, Murders,
DoubleWords (226–29). The nature of these children may be
characterized, collectively, as Dusnomia (Bad Governance) and Ate
(Ruin) (230), Dusnomia being a word that in extant Greek only
appears here and in a Solon fragment (to be considered in [Chapter 4](#)):

αὐτὰρ Ἔρις στρυγερὴ τέκε μὲν Πόνον ἀλγινόεντα
Λήθην τε Λιμόν τε καὶ Ἄλγεα δακρυόεντα
Ὑμῖνας τε Μάχας τε Φόνους τ' Ἀνδροκτασίας τε
Νείκεά τε Ψεύδεά τε Λόγους τ' Ἀμφιλλογίας τε
Δυσνομίην τ' Ἄτην τε, συνήθεας ἀλλήλησιν,
Ὅρκον θ', ὃς δὴ πλεῖστον ἐπιχθονίους ἀνθρώπους

πημαίνει, ὅτε κέν τις ἐκὼν ἐπίορκον ὁμόσση (226–32)

Then hateful *Eris* begot grievous *Ponos*,
Forgetfulness and Hunger and tearful *Griefs*,
Fightings and Battles and Murders and Man-Killings,
Neikea and *Pseudea* and Words and DoubleWords,
Dusnomia and Ate (Ruin), two sisters that go together,
and Oath, who especially brings great suffering for earth-bound
humankind, whenever someone willfully swears a false oath.

As Night and Eris produce parthenogenically, their contributions express an essential quality of the female, albeit, of course, only one aspect of her.²⁰

Reading verses 782–83 and 226–30 side by side illustrates the conundrum facing modern editors of ancient Greek texts, forced as they are to distinguish proper noun from common noun and from verb, secularizing the text. Also as verses 782–804 show, Zeus *cannot* change or undo what is already there. He is born into a world defined both by violence in the nuclear family and by Bad Governance and Ruin. If the *Theogony* were concerned with a Zeus who could integrate all aspects of the world into some form of cosmic order, then we might expect that he would find a way to allot functions and realms to Night and her children. This is beyond his means. What he can do, and does with brilliant success, is to create an enclosed space, Olympus, which can keep those discordant forces at bay. This is the central element of Hesiod's vision of Zeus and of a harmonious Olympus, a place of law and political concord in contrast to a wider world of strife and discord. So, I am largely in agreement with the scholiast: Olympus is like a πόλις or as close to a πόλις as a divine realm can be. In this early stage of its development it may be defined less by genealogical ties than as a (walled) community, which holds within itself an ἀγορή, a βουλή, dancing floors, and multiple houses and is characterized by its unchanging laws, cherished customs, and fair and proportional distribution of honors. The most succinct word for this form of governance is Eunomia, Zeus's firstborn daughter from Themis (902) and counterfoil to Eris' *Dusnomia* (230).²¹

More than a creation myth, the *Theogony* reads like a hymn to Zeus and a city-state creation story, narrating—and justifying—the movement from primal Earth to stable Olympus, from dominant female to dominant male, and from initial familial structures to ultimate civic order. Hesiod employs the language of myth, i.e., genealogy, to establish a pattern of violence in the first two generations of the universe which exposes the need to escape from

that (natural) pattern. In the third generation, Zeus's achievement is not cosmic but political, not of nature but apart from it. The poem's numerous flash-forwards further contribute to this sense as each of them reveals something crucial about Zeus's statesmanship long before he is made king and lord at verses 881–85.²² Much in the long poem is also political in nature and thus might equally be considered proleptic, especially verses 60–96. Calling these out-of-sequence flash-forwards digressions implies that they impede the story, but if Zeus is the true storyline, then we might regard them as the true markers, highlighting the poem's major themes, and a sign of Hesiod's genius.

The special character of Olympus seems best defined as a place of like-minded gods in social and political harmony with each other. The closest term for this may be *ὁμόφρονες*, “of like mind,” a word Hesiod uses for the Muses (*Th.* 60). In the *Odyssey*, variations on the word describe the domestic tranquility of a husband and wife who look upon the world with like mind (6.181–82). In the context of the Muses, Martin West suggests (1966 *ad loc.*), perhaps rightly, that the sisters' like-mindedness is also familial, the result of being born from the same parents. But it is worth considering that in the *Theogony* the term has a social meaning in the form of choral dancing where one holds the wrist of the person next in line. In this society, such dancing is both a vehicle bringing that community together and an emblem of that collective harmony. So, in the *Theogony*, *ὁμόφρονες* may convey a social mindset rather than a familial one, with the shared steps and singing of the Muses understood as an expression of Olympian homogeneity, of a community at one with itself.²³ In the *Odyssey*, Odysseus appears to echo such a view when he says that nothing is more pleasing (*τέλος χαριέστερον*) than the well-mindedness (*εὐφροσύνη*) that passes through the *δῆμος* when those at a banquet listen to a bard (*Od.* 9.5–11). One scholar has recently described that communal joyfulness as “an outward and visible sign of a stable and peacefully ordered community.”²⁴

How does this Olympian achievement relate to humankind? For a creation myth, the *Theogony* is surprisingly quiet about the creation of man, a point that many have noted.²⁵ But Hesiod does speak about kings, especially those nurtured by Zeus, in a passage that follows fresh on the heels of the Muses' praise of Zeus's reign:

ἡ γὰρ καὶ βασιλεῦσιν ἅμ' αἰδοίοισιν ὀπηδεῖ.
ὄντινα τιμήσουσι Διὸς κοῦραι μέγалоιο
γαινόμενόν τε ἴδωσι διοτρεφέων βασιλῆων,
τῷ μὲν ἐπὶ γλώσση γλυκερὴν χεῖουσιν ἔέρσην,

τοῦ δ' ἔπε' ἐκ στόματος ῥεῖ μείλιχα· οἱ δέ νυ λαοὶ
πάντες ἐς αὐτὸν ὁρῶσι διακρίνοντα θέμιστας
ἰθείησι δίκησιν· ὁ δ' ἀσφαλέως ἀγορεύων
αἰψά τι καὶ μέγα νεῖκος ἐπισταμένως κατέπαυσε·
τούνεκα γὰρ βασιλῆες ἐχέφρονες, οὐνεκα λαοῖς
βλαπτομένοις ἀγορῇφι μετὰτροπα ἔργα τελεῦσι
ῥηιδίως, μαλακοῖσι παραιφάμενοι ἐπέεσσιν·
ἐρχόμενον δ' ἄν' ἀγῶνα θεὸν ὧς ἰλάσκονται
αἰδοῖ μείλιχίη, μετὰ δὲ πρόπει ἀγρομένοισι.

τοίη Μουσῶν ἱερὴ δόσις ἀνθρώποισιν (80–93)

She (Kalliope) (is the greatest) for she tends *on revered kings*.
Whomever among the Zeus-nourished kings the daughters of
great Zeus honor and behold once he is born,
upon his tongue they pour sweet dew
and soothing words flow from his mouth.

All look to him as he decides judgments
with straight verdicts; and speaking in public unfailingly
he straightway and skillfully halts even a *great neikos*.
For in this way kings are wise, because for the populace
harmd in the assembly, they manage to turn the events
easily, persuading (craftily) with mild words.

When he goes into the gathering they propitiate him as if he
were a god
with honeyed reverence and he is conspicuous among the
assembled gathering.

Such is the sacred gift of the Muses to humankind.

Nowhere else in the Greek corpus are kings so closely linked to the Muses.²⁶ Some have condemned the passage as “contrived [and] awkward” or as “seemingly tangential to the central concerns of the poem.”²⁷ But is it either? Hesiod composes the scene with considerable care, linking the “reverence” bestowed upon Zeus-nourished kings (80–81) and their “gentle words” (ἔπε' ... μείλιχα) (84) at the beginning of the scene with the people’s “gentle reverence” (αἰδοῖ μείλιχίη) (92) for the king at the scene’s end. Also, the vignette follows thematically from the political innovations just described for Olympus. The two passages taken together reveal the essential political nature of the poem and offer a roadmap of sorts

toward communal harmony, achieved by good leadership. Like Zeus, these kings do not have absolute power. Rather, their success as rulers comes from a dutiful remembrance of rightful actions, from issuing “straight verdicts,” and from “speaking knowingly” with “honeyed speech,” enabling them to soothe even a “great quarrel” (μέγα νεῖκος, 87) in the city agora.²⁸ The populace worships a ruler who combines straight justice with gentle speech “as if he were a god,”²⁹ and Hesiod regards the Muses’ aid to kings as their “sacred gift to humankind” (93).

Zeus is certainly not always so favorably disposed toward the human race, as the Prometheus story in the poem attests, but the shift in narrative movement from Olympus to just kings in the city suggests that he, like the Muses, is intent that the newfound harmonies of the Olympians filter down from the sky to men of the πόλις. For Hesiod’s audience, living at the dawn of Greek colonization and a time when the πόλις was coming into existence, the *Theogony*’s divine model of social harmony, both distant and idealized, and this vision of just kings enabled them to reflect upon the very forms and principles of social cohesion that they were moving toward themselves.³⁰

A further echo of Zeus and his kings is the Zeus-like figure of Nereus, the obvious counterfoil to Eris and her children (226–32), as discussed in [Chapter 1](#):

Νηρέα δ’ ἀψεудέα καὶ ἀληθέα γείνατο Πόντος
πρεσβύτατον παίδων· αὐτὰρ καλέουσι γέροντα,
οὔνεκα νημερτῆς τε καὶ ἥπιος, οὐδὲ θεμίστων
λήθεται, ἀλλὰ δίκαια καὶ ἥπια δῆνεα οἶδεν· (233–36)

The Sea (Pontos) begot Nereus, one who does-not-lie and does-not-forget,

the oldest of his children; moreover they call him an old man
because he is both unerring and gentle; nor does he forget
ordinances but knows just and gentle counsels

The gentle ruler is everything that Eris and her offspring are not. Eris begets Lies (Pseudea) (229), he does not lie (ἀ-ψεудέα) (233); in contrast to her child Forgetfulness (Lethe) (227), he does-not-forget (ἀ-ληθέα) (233), Hesiod’s etymology of truth: not forgetting.³¹ Rather than forswearing (231–32), he is unerring (νημερτῆς) (235), Hesiod suggests, punning on Nereus’s name. In contrast to Battles and Ruin (228 and 230), he is gentle and knowing (235–36). As already noted, it has even been proposed that Hesiod here suggests that Nereus’s

name may derive from Ne-Eris, Not-Discord.³² Deviating from his standard practice, Hesiod only mentions Nereus's father, as if Nereus were exclusively from a male line (as Eris and Dysnomia are exclusively female).³³ In sum, Nereus is the counterpole of Eris and Bad Governance. Like the just kings of the proem, he is a paradigm of idealized leadership, combining two essential components: "straight justice"—in the form of not lying, not forgetting ordinances, being truthful and unerring, and knowing just counsels—and gentleness of manner. The latter is a rare quality in this poem and strongly linked with good governance. ἥπιος, repeated here in the space of two lines, appears in only one other instance, not in regard to Zeus, but to Leto, where it is linked with μέλιχος to describe her remarkably soothing and gentle (honeyed) manner (406–8). But μέλιχος also brings us back to the Zeus-nurtured kings of the proem, whose straight verdicts with soothing/gracious (honeyed) speech cause the community to look upon them with a gracious reverence (84 and 92). We may suppose that Nereus is called an old man (γέρων) (234) not because of his age but because, as early as Homer, elders (γέροντες) was the political term for the Seniors and Chiefs who formed the king's council. In time it became the title at Sparta for their Chief of State. Nereus is certainly not a stand-in for Zeus in all regards, as the king of the gods can be a god of force, capable of great violence, but in Hesiod the Zeus who rules Olympus appears as something like a Nereus-like statesman: easeful, not forgetting of laws, and, yes, "non-discordant."

There is one major exception to this story of "happy" solutions, and that concerns Zeus's wives and the "institution" of marriage which he creates. In the *Theogony*, Zeus is the first "to make [a sexual partner] a wife." In Hesiod's other poems and in other theogonies, including the Orphic theogonic tradition, and in the much later *Library* by Apollodorus, sexual unions—starting with Sky's γάμος to Earth—are frequently called marriages.³⁴ In the *Theogony*, however, such language is restricted. Despite what most commentaries and translations would lead one to believe, prior to 886 couples simply joined in φιλότης, sexual intercourse.³⁵ Nor are most of Zeus's partners wives. Only two enjoy that explicit designation: first Metis

Zeὺς δὲ θεῶν βασιλεὺς πρώτην ἄλοχον θέτο Μῆτιν (886)
 Zeus, king of gods, *made* Metis his first wife

and then Hera

Distinctive in both occasions is the verb of making Metis and Hera a wife, an act that implies a social gesture or public proclamation that is absent from all of Zeus's other sexual couplings.

In contrast to a king who succeeds as a ruler by distributing honors equitably, even to unmarried goddesses, and who maintains an Olympus free from discord, as a husband Zeus takes away honors from his wives and manages them harshly. The first wife he swallows, by Earth's advice, "in order that no other of the gods who live forever hold the kingship-honor (βασιλῆίδα τιμὴν) other than Zeus" (892–93) and that "she advise him about good and evil" (900).³⁶ He also assumes her name as his chief epithet, Zeus μητίετα and Zeus μητιόεις.

For his second wife, he engenders her "intense wrath and feeling of ἔρις for her husband"³⁷ (ζαμένησε καὶ ἥρισεν ὧ παρακοίτῃ, 928), a heat of rage unattested anywhere else in the poem. One may suppose that the poor quality of this union is expressed by the nature of their only son, "the city-destroying" Ares (936). But the real bane on the marriage is Zeus's giving birth to Athena, which Hesiod strategically narrates just after Hera had given birth to her children (924–26), a full 24 verses after Zeus had swallowed Metis (889). In the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo*, Hera makes it explicit that her ἔρις for her husband stems directly from his giving birth to Athena. In retaliation for this "dishonor" (*h. Apollo* 312), she gives birth to Typhaon in the hope that he will overthrow Zeus (*h. Apollo* 305–54). In the *Theogony*, less dramatically, the cause of her wrath and ἔρις is not named explicitly and she retaliates by creating Hephaestus "without mixing in φιλότης." In both cases, her efforts are futile and ultimately without consequence. In the *Theogony* passage we may infer that Hera's giving birth to Hephaestus parthenogenically by not going to bed with Zeus imitates to a certain degree Earth's fertility at the beginning of time as well as Earth's and Rhea's successful retaliations against their sexual partners but Hera's efforts pale by comparison as her offspring is in various versions either born lame, an embarrassment to his mother, or famously powerless to stand up against Zeus.³⁸ Nor does her wrath and ἔρις appear to interrupt the general edict that Olympus be free from such discordant elements.

Does Hesiod ever suggest an easing of this familial discord? Some find it in the moment Heracles takes Hebe, Hera's and Zeus's daughter, as his bride: "the subsequent catalogue of marriages serves to resolve ... by proxy ... and effects the reconciliation of Zeus and

Hera through the harmonious unions of their offspring.”³⁹ This seems an unlikely reading. Another “marriage” at the end of the poem, that between Persephone and Hades, does little to bring Zeus and Demeter into harmony. To my way of seeing, Hera’s wrath is too intense and too significant in the poem to be resolved by proxy and without comment. I suspect her rage remains, as it does in many other literary representations of this marriage. In cult, Hera, as queen of the Olympians and Zeus’s wife, enjoys great public prominence,⁴⁰ but in the *Theogony* she suffers from an intense rage against her husband. Zeus’s two institutions—marriage and Olympian polity—seem to have neutralized her fury effectively. Hera’s wrath is set against the general good cheer of Olympus, and marriage appears to domesticate or contain familial tension.

Between the stories of Zeus’s two wives, Zeus’s nonmarriage unions produce some of the most joyous and civic-minded creatures in the poem. With Themis, Eurynome, and Mnemosyne, Zeus introduces the new civic and agricultural order of the cosmos: the three Hours (or Seasons) (Horae) and the three Fates (Moirae)⁴¹ with Themis; the three Graces (Charites) with Eurynome; the nine Muses with Mnemosyne.⁴² With their collective names, each group is, as it were, a chorus of maidens.⁴³ In the absence of other strong male figures in the *Theogony*, we might imagine Zeus as the choral leader who leads the community in the dance.⁴⁴ The contrast between Zeus’s wives and these female partners exposes a divide within Olympus between the harmonious πόλις and Zeus’s strife-ridden οἶκος.⁴⁵

As said above, Zeus’s achievement is not cosmic but political, not of nature but apart from it. Much in the manner of Olympus involves a separation from nature, that is, from the (natural) world that Zeus was born into, a theme that will be important when we consider Hesiod’s poem in light of the Presocratics, Aeschylus, and Plato. The laws and customs of Olympus, its implied enclosure, its keeping at bay elements like Eris and Quarrel, have already given us a glimpse of this distancing from nature, but most striking are the multiple ways in which Zeus tames or redirects the generative but anarchic power of primordial Eros.⁴⁶

There is some evidence of this in the poem on the lexical level, in the shift in the meaning of a word like μήδεα from genitals (Sky’s, at 180, 188), to counsels (Zeus’s, at 545, 559, 561), or the unique use of φιλότης when Zeus asks the monstrous Hundred-Handers to be mindful “of our kindly *friendship*” (φιλότητος ἐννέος, 651) in their stand with the Olympians against the Titans. As discussed in [Chapter 1](#), we witness in such shifts an evolution of language that parallels the genealogical evolutions of the poem, as creation moves from the physical and sexual toward the political and orderly.

This passage has further echoes with description of Eros⁴⁷ at the beginning of creation:

λυσιμελής, πάντων τε θεῶν πάντων τ' ἀνθρώπων
δάμναται ἐν στήθεσσι νόον καὶ ἐπίφρονα βουλήν. (121–22)
the limb-loosening god who in the case of every god and man
overpowers the mind in the breasts and their sensible counsel.

But Zeus is described as having “sensible counsel,”⁴⁸ and the Hundred-Handers associate Zeus’s φιλότης with surpassing intelligence: “we know that your understanding (πραπίδες) is supreme, as is your thought (νόημα)” (656). Contrary to Eros’s “limb-loosening” power, which “overpowers the mind (νόον) and sensible counsel (ἐπίφρονα βουλήν) of all gods and men” (120–22), this φιλότης results in the Hundred-Handers fighting “with unbending mind (ἄτενεϊ νόω) and earnest thought” (πρόφρονι θυμῷ) (661).⁴⁹ The constellation of terms throughout this passage suggests an unsexing of φιλότης as Zeus harnesses the “might” and “excessive force” of the Hundred-Handers (149) to his advantage. As in his other moves to power, none of this would have happened without “Earth’s advice” (Γαίης φραδμοσύνησιν, 626).⁵⁰

It hardly needs underlining that Zeus’s invention of marriage is a crucial step in the socialization of Eros, and, in the case of Zeus’s two wives, the consequence is a severe containment of the female: for Metis, the containment is literal; for Hera it represents a containment of a female rage. After Zeus’s marriage to Hera (921), most of the other Olympians follow his lead and “make” their sexual partner “a wife.” I mention those up to verse 955: Hephaestus makes Aglaia a wife (945–46); Dionysus does the same with Ariadne (947–48); and Heracles with Hebe (953). In this section, only Ares does not marry Aphrodite. Two of their children, Fear and Terror, join their “city-destroying father in the chill of battle,” but Cadmus made their daughter Harmonia, an interesting union of war and love, his wife (933b–37). The storyline suggests that the institution that Zeus creates on Olympus is becoming the norm for the gods and he sees to it that the institution will be passed onto men where it is described, rather ungenerously, as being at its best “an evil balanced with good” (609).

But Zeus also employs Eros (or, rather, φιλότης) toward the “social good” outside the bonds of marriage. His prodigious fecundity rivals that of Earth and Night at the beginning of time, but for Zeus sexual unions with nonwives take the form of alliances. In the case of Sky and Cronus, sexual union leads directly to generation conflict, but

Zeus's sexual prowess forges bonds across generations, bringing potentially hostile families into the Olympian orbit and bridging the gap between divine and human. Bedding down with Titans Themis and Mnemosyne from the previous generation, he produces the Horae and the Moirae with one Titaness and the Muses with the other, as already noted. After Hera, Zeus "takes Maia up into his sacred bed," again sexually uniting across generations with a female from a previously hostile family (the line of Iapetus). Together, they produce Hermes (937–39), a trickster god like Prometheus but now loyal to Zeus. Extending his sexual energies to mortal women, he bridges the divide between immortal and mortal by "mixing in φιλότης" first with Semele and then with Alcmenae. Both women give birth to gods, immediately in the case of Dionysus when Semele "a mortal woman gave birth to an immortal son" (942). (In the *Theogony*, only Athena is born "parthenogenically" from Zeus.) Heracles's deification, and marriage to "the royal couple's" daughter, comes only after a life of mortal labors (953–55).⁵¹

With so many children from so many partners, Hesiod makes literal the phrase that Zeus is "the father of gods and men." But in the *Theogony* the nature of this fecundity takes on a special flavor. Upon reflection, we realize that the most famous of the Olympians—figures like Apollo, Poseidon, Demeter, and Artemis—have a remarkably low profile in the poem.⁵² The personified abstractions have a greater presence in the poem: many of these terms also appear in Homer, but Hesiod has elevated them to godhead and even on occasion to Olympian status: Philotes, Apate, and Nemesis (from Night); Ponos, Neikea, Pseudea, Dusnomia, among others (from Eris); Eunomia, Eirene, Dike (from Zeus and Themis), Euphrosyne (from Zeus and Eurynome); Terpsichore, Ourania, and Calliope, et al. (from Zeus and Mnemosyne). Especially in the case of Zeus's children, Hesiod establishes a tradition that later Greeks will long follow. We also see how these children contribute as much, if not more, to the story of Zeus as "king of the gods" as to his identity as "father of gods and men."

But, without question, Zeus's most decisive taming of Eros is thoroughly mythic in nature: Zeus's swallowing of Metis and becoming the parthenogenic father of Athena, born from his head. While female in form, she is most like her father in intellect and might: "having strength and sensible counsel equal to her father" (896); "the terrible queen, battle-rouser, army-leader and tireless, who delights in din, wars, and battles" (925–26). In all of Greek myth, this is the transcendent act that the Greeks come back to again and again in tireless admiration. Later generations of Greeks will roundly chastise Cronus and Zeus for their assaults against their fathers, but no

Greek ever found fault with Zeus for swallowing Metis, although Pindar avoids stories about her, it appears. Indeed, unlike Dionysus, who is frequently identified in the context of his incinerated mother Semele, in only one instance that I have been able to find (this by the Stoic Chrysippus) is Athena even mentioned in the context of Metis.⁵³

Let us return to the verbal parallels where we began—Cronus's ingestion into his νηδύς of his children and Zeus's ingestion into his νηδύς of Metis. Both acts were intended to prevent another god from holding the "kingly honor" (βασιλίδα τιμήν) (461–62 and 892–93). The ἀγκυλομήτης Cronus (the Cronus of crooked—μῆτις) (473), however, is foiled by Earth's μῆτις (471) and unequivocally condemned: his effort, it is implied, thwarts evolution, reversing the process of a child being born "from the mother's holy womb (νηδύς)" (νηδύος ἐξ ἱερῆς μητρὸς) (460). But when Zeus ingests the pregnant mother into his own νηδύς (890 and 899), he gains Earth's (891)—and his own—desired goal: permanent kingly honor.⁵⁴ In this most Freudian romance of father, mother, and child, the Greek imagination sees that underlying the generational conflict of father and son lies another equally elemental conflict, that between father and mother. The removal of one of those poles makes stability possible. In comparison to Cronus, Zeus does not stop evolution, or least he does not appear to stop it when he becomes the birth parent and brings a child into the world, not a son but a daughter who is like her father in almost every way and who never imagines that she once had a mother. It also needs to be restated that, as important as this act of trickery and ingestion is for political stability, the *Theogony* strongly implies that it is only a precondition for that stability, a necessary but not sufficient act. It requires the king's εὐ-νομίη to turn possibility into reality. In sum, not only by assuming female reproductive powers but also in multiple other ways—by inventing the institution of marriage, by using his sexual prowess to form bonds across generations and formerly hostile families, and by using familiar words like φιλότης in new ways—Zeus tames or redirects the generative but anarchic energy of primordial Eros (associated with οἶκος, evolution and change) when in contrast to the discordant Eris he generates stability and civic concord to all Olympians except for his wife.



Athena. Bronze statuette (from the acropolis?), ca. 480–470 bce. Athens National Archaeological Museum X 6447.



Zeus. Bronze statuette from Dodona, ca. 470 bce. Athens National Archaeological Museum X 16546.

Hesiod has a distinctive vision of harmony. The usual view of ἁρμονίη (literally a “fitting together” or “agreement”) in Greek thought is that it represents a moment within flux, a temporary equilibrium between opposites. Such is its meaning in musical theory where the fitting of notes together into a pleasing sequence is defined as a balance of contrasting notes, higher and lower. We see something of the same notion in the figure of Harmonia, a child born out of wedlock from parents of opposite dispositions, Ares and Aphrodite, war and love. Heraclitus’s famous dictum, δίκη is ἔρις (strife is justice), also describes a harmony from opposites as nature swings from day to night and back again. His image of ἁρμονίη as “back-turning, as in a bow or a lyre,” appears to parallel this view of δίκη as a pendulum swing from one extreme to the other (see [Chapter 4](#)).

The *Theogony*’s vision of harmony is of an altogether different sort, a fitting together of peoples in a way such that they peacefully co-exist. This harmony is not of nature but of culture, possible only in a space set apart, an enclosed community of like-minded people who exist in concord with laws and an agreed distribution of honors. When turning from Olympus to just kings in the city ἀγορή, the *Theogony* envisions that idealized harmony filtering down from (the city of)

Olympus to men of the πόλις. The *Theogony*, as I read it, is a paean to that harmony, and as such should be read both as a hymn to Zeus and as an eulogy of the πόλις-like community on Olympus that he creates. This vision of social harmony will later resurface in the works of Aeschylus and Plato.

Concluding Thoughts

As amply illustrated, the *Theogony* is an intensely political poem. It tells the story of creation in the context of a city creation myth. Polytheistic systems are in themselves inherently political as each god is primarily concerned with his or her honors and privileges in relation to others. Hesiod says as much at the end of the proem when he calls upon the Muses to tell about the birth of the gods and “how they divided up their wealth and distributed their honors” (τιμᾶί) (112). Zeus is masterful at just that, and much more. While born into, and part of, nature, as Galen says of the Greek gods, Zeus is able to create a place apart that keeps the more disruptive gods at bay. By no means is he all-powerful. His strength comes from “giving away” power fairly and from creating a system of laws and customs that the Olympians can live by. Concomitant with those innovations is a socializing of ἔρως, redirecting its generative but anarchic powers to the social good. In short, political stability and communal harmony depend upon enlightened statesmanship—in addition to the all-important swallowing of Metis.

Many of the gods and goddesses in Hesiod’s pantheon are of his creation. He mentions all of the familiar Olympians, but most of them hold a very low profile in the poem. A codification of the canonical 12 Olympians happens long after Hesiod. Eleven of the 12 are easy to name—Zeus, Hera, Poseidon, Demeter, Aphrodite (usually identified as Zeus’s daughter, as in Homer), Athena, Apollo, Artemis, Hephaestus, Ares, and Hermes—but the twelfth is more problematic, whether it be Hestia, Zeus’s sister and goddess of the hearth; Hades, Zeus’s brother; or Dionysus, his son.⁵⁵ Regardless, the *Theogony* has little to say about most of them.⁵⁶ Much more prominent in this poem are the personified abstractions whom Hesiod elevates to godhead: Ponos, Eris, Dysnomia, Logoi, Pseudea, Eunomia, Eirene, Dike, Thalia, and Euphrosyne, almost all of them females, especially in conjunction with Zeus’s children and Olympian joyfulness.

This poem of remembering must also be one of forgetting. Despite

Hesiod's identification of Lethe with Eris and of good governance with not forgetting,⁵⁷ there is a place for forgetting in the new order. Forgetting is explicit when Styx casts a god into a coma for a year. There is also an obvious forgetting, or not asking, in the case of Athena. Neither Zeus's daughter nor anyone else in the *Theogony*, or elsewhere in Greek literature for that matter, ever associates Athena, in spite of her obvious wisdom, with her absent mother, and no one ever asks Zeus how he came by his epithets μητίετα and μητιόεις. Furthermore, the *Theogony* is silent about Demeter's rage at Zeus for "giving away" their daughter in marriage to Hades, a fury that the Homeric *Hymn to Demeter* will dwell on at great length. Men in the city ἀγορή may also be engaged in a persuasive forgetting or "turning away" (παραιφόμενοι, 90) when they let go of a great quarrel.

An extraordinary passage at the end of the *Odyssey* depicts one form of such forgetting to attain social cohesion. As the people of Ithaca are about to attack Odysseus and his men, Zeus says the following to Athena: "Now that Odysseus has punished the suitors,/ men should swear an oath that Odysseus rule for the rest of his lifetime,/and let us make a forgetting (ἐκλήσις) of the murder/of the sons and brothers. May they hold each other in friendship (φιλεόντων)/as it was before, and may there be ample wealth and peace (εἰρήνη)" (Od. 24.482–86). At this moment, Zeus is not suggesting anything devious or deceptive but a most difficult letting go for all. It is too much for humans to manage on their own but will require divine intervention in the form of a thunderclap, an epic form of a *deus* and *dea ex machina*, for all to heed.⁵⁸ In the *Theogony*, short of the thunderclap, the letting go is achieved, I propose, by the sacred gift of the Muses to humankind.

As the Truth and Reconciliation Committee in South Africa seemed to understand, justice seems to ask—to a certain extent—for forgetting. Power structures and the privileged few can certainly abuse forgetting to their advantage, but forgetfulness can also lead to healing, and it need not be in every instance the enemy of memory. Not all parties will agree about how to balance the delicate and complicated equation of memory, forgetting, and forgiving. Few, I suspect, could quarrel with the way kings in Hesiod bring concord out of discord. Some might criticize Demeter for eventually being reconciled with Zeus, while others surely will sympathize with Hera for her wrath against Zeus, and who today would not cringe at Metis's fate? If the *Theogony* were to compose a response to such objections, for better or worse, it might take the form of asking people to remember the bloody familial conditions from which this hard-won εὐνομία and εἰρήνη had been forged.

The *Theogony* and Eastern Parallels

City-State Succession Myths?

The *Theogony* tells a Greek story, but, unlike Athena from the head of Zeus, it was not born *sui generis* and full-grown out of the Hellenic imagination. Rather, it belongs to an extensive family of eastern Mediterranean creation myths that stem, ultimately, from Semitic origins in Mesopotamia and (to a lesser extent) in Egypt. With ever-increasing frequency, modern scholars are identifying the extent of Greek indebtedness to its eastern neighbors not only in literature and religion but also in an array of other subjects and arts, ranging from philosophical speculation about nature, mathematics, and herbal medicine to painting, sculpture, and perhaps even indirectly to temple architecture. Two Semitic cosmogonic traditions, a Near Eastern succession myth and an Egyptian-Semitic-Indian-Iranian myth including Eros, may lie behind Hesiod's *Theogony*. I shall concentrate primarily on the Near Eastern tradition as it is more dominant in Hesiod's poem, but reference to the latter shall come to the fore in the discussion of Philo's of Byblos *Phoenician History* (ca. 100 CE) at the end of this chapter.

The question of Near Eastern and Semitic precedents is predominantly a modern one. In the fifth century BCE, Herodotus was of the view that a majority of the Greek gods came from Egypt, but he never contemplated that Homer's and Hesiod's stories about them may have had affinities with Egyptian or Near Eastern counterparts. His contemporary, Hippias of Elis, however, composed a mythology which drew variously from Greek and non-Greek sources, although again there is no indication that he saw inherent parallels between Greek and "barbarian" stories. A century later, Aristotle's student Eudemos of Rhodes compared a number of Greek and Near Eastern theocosmogonies including the *Theogony*, the Akkadian *Enûma elish* from Babylon, and a Sidonian (i.e., Phoenician) story. The few paraphrases

we have from Eudemos's work (made by the Neoplatonist Damascius) make us long for that lost study. Berossus's comparison of the *Theogony* and the *Enûma elish* in his *Babyloniaca* (ca. 289 BCE), however, is less compelling, as shall be discussed further at the end of this chapter.

It was not until the studies of Hans Gustav Güterbock and Francis Cornford, shortly after World War II, that Near Eastern influences upon the *Theogony* were taken seriously. Güterbock focused upon the Indo-European/Hurrian Hittite texts from Anatolia, while Cornford argued that Hesiod's creation poem "reflects the features" of the *Enûma elish* from a Semitic tradition.¹ Such likenesses and reflections led Martin West to declare provocatively in 1966 that "Greek literature is Near Eastern literature," a view that Walter Burkert re-echoed in more tempered tones when he wrote that "the background and context of the so-called Greek miracle, if there ever was one, is to be found" in the "high cultures" of Anatolia, Mesopotamia, the Syro-Palestinian (Levantine) coast, and Egypt, which "spread their achievements to neighboring regions."² More recently, Carolina López-Ruiz, stressing the Hurrian origin of the Hurro-Hittite myths and the important Hurrian presence at Ugarit, identifies a strong Syro-Phoenician influence upon Hesiodic and Orphic cosmogonies.³ In what follows, in agreement with Cornford, I regard the parallels between the *Theogony* and the *Enûma elish*, a Babylonian creation myth circa 1100 BCE, to be the most compelling.

The method and nature of transmission are still far from clear. The time of transmission is a further difficulty. Three periods stand out as most probable: 1400–1200 BCE in the Late Bronze Age when the Mycenaeans had direct contact both with the Hittites in Anatolia and with the West Semitic peoples on the Levantine coast; 1000 BCE in the Iron Age and so-called Greek Dark Ages when Greeks on the island of Euboea were actively trading with the Levant; and the 100 years prior to the purported composition of the *Theogony* (ca. 700 BCE) in the Geometric period when Greek *poleis* were just emerging on the Asia Minor coast. The relevant Hittite texts date to the Late Bronze Age and could have entered Greece at that time or later in the Iron Age through Greek contact either with the Neo-Hittites in North Syria or with the Phoenicians on the Levantine coast.⁴ The *Enûma elish*, on the other hand, could only have entered Greece in the Iron Age, Hesiod (or the Hesiodic tradition) learning of it perhaps through his contacts at Euboea, or via Delphi, or even through his family history at Cyme in the Asia Minor coast.

The first problem with textual transmission from the East concerns translation. Large archives at Ugaritic ports like Ras Shamra ca. 1400–1200 in the Late Bronze Age show that cities along the Syro-

Palestinian coast were also fertile breeding grounds for rich literary and cross-cultural exchange. The Ras Shamra archive contained writings in at least seven languages and in multiple scripts: Ugaritic, Akkadian, Sumerian, Hurrian, Cyro-Minoan, hieroglyphic Egyptian, and cuneiform and hieroglyphic Hittite, but—alas—nothing in Linear B (if, indeed, the Mycenaeans used this script to record literary works). Although there is evidence of bilingual poets who rendered Sumerian and Akkadian cuneiform into a variety of indigenous scripts and of writers who knew Akkadian and Ugaritic, there is no linguistic trail of bilingual poets who knew Greek as one of their languages. As the Akkadian scholar William Lambert pointedly asserts: “Homer did not read Gilgamesh, nor Hesiod the Epic of Creation” (1991: 114). In lieu of better evidence, classicists argue that the Mycenaean Greeks gained knowledge of these Eastern texts from merchant-traders (and their passengers) who circumnavigated the eastern Mediterranean.⁵

It is almost certainly the case that these Eastern, *written* stories reached Greece in oral form. One scholar proposes that for the Greek storytellers the process of absorption was “gradual and on-going” as “themes and motifs [ultimately became ingrained] into the poets’ repertoire of compositional elements ... and [an] inseparable part of the poetic tradition.”⁶ This may indeed be the case, but the nature of this transference of stories, storylines, and ideas from east to west (and vice versa) remains obscure, and the degree of specificity is uncertain. One cannot rule out the possibility that stories were transmitted visually, perhaps even through woven images, as in the example of Helen “weaving [onto a robe] the many struggles” of those fighting on her account (*Il.* 3.126). If Greek literature is Near Eastern literature, reception may be oblique. In the case of Homer, as is especially evident in the *Iliad*, passages that suggest Eastern parallels are spotty and often poorly integrated into the host text.⁷ Of all the early Greek poems, none shows closer ties with Near Eastern songs than the *Theogony*.

Hurrio-Hittite Parallels: Kumarbi, Hedammu, and Ullikummi and Illuyanka

Stories from Mesopotamia and Anatolia suggest a heterogeneous tradition of violent divine succession myths in the eastern Mediterranean that spans almost a century. The Hurrio-Hittite Kumarbi and Illuyanka myths from the mid-second millennium

precede Hesiod by more than 500 years and were themselves influenced by Babylonian myths. In some respects, parallels with the *Theogony* are alluring, in others, not.

The Kumarbi myths belong to a collection of written, anonymous stories today called *Kingship in Heaven*. In the first of these, the *Song of Kumarbi* narrates how “wise Kumarbi,” Alalu’s son,⁸ seized power from the sky-god Anu by grabbing his “loins” and swallowing his “manhood.” Doing so, he becomes pregnant with Anu’s children, including the Storm God (= the Hurrian Teshub, or Tessub) and three other siblings.⁹ In this state, Kumarbi is treated “like a woman of the bed” by midwives, and he gives birth from his “good place.” “Fathered” by Anu and “mothered” by Kumarbi, the Storm God grows up to defeat Kumarbi, avenging Anu’s overthrow, as it appears that Kumarbi had earlier defeated Anu, avenging Alalu’s overthrow. The skilled Ea and Earth initially side with Kumarbi against the Storm God, but the tablet breaks off before we learn how the Storm God (with Ea’s help) prevails. Presumably, unlike those before him, he will retain his power by creating a stable (and just) regime.

Continuing the un-Hesiodic pattern of sons helping defeated fathers, in the *Song of Ullikummi* Kumarbi begets a series of monsters, including the sea creature Hedammu and the stone pillar Ullikummi, who try, unsuccessfully, to topple the Storm God. Both he and Kumarbi are city gods. Kumarbi resides in the city of Urkes (thought to be the first Hurrian capital), where he resolves “the lawsuits of all the lands [satisfactorily],”¹⁰ while the Storm God rules the beautiful Kummiya, a mythical walled city with temples and shrines, about which we know very little.¹¹ As a sign of the Storm God’s superior leadership, he gathers all the gods in “the place of assembly” before attacking the rock monster (p. 65, section 66). An old copper sickle used long ago to separate heaven and earth is now used to topple Ullikummi (whose name appears to mean something like “destroyer of Kummiya”¹²), giving victory to the Storm God’s city and re-establishing the rightful division of earth and heaven.

Some parallels with the *Theogony* are alluring. Both are violent succession myths spanning three or more generations; Kumarbi’s castration of Anu suggests Cronus’s castration of Sky, and his pregnancy is loosely paralleled with Cronus’s swallowing of his children and, perhaps, more distantly, with Zeus’s swallowing of Metis when he becomes the birthing parent. Similarly, the making of Ullikummi rather loosely suggests Cronus’s reliance on the Titans to combat Zeus and the Olympians.¹³ Ian Rutherford (2009) has recently summarized the most pointed similarities: 1) the first ruler, if we are to consider Anu the first, is Sky (although it is worth pointing out that Hesiod never says that Sky is a ruler or king); 2) the “second ruler”

castrates the first: a) Kumarbi by biting, b) Cronus with a sickle; 3) the reigning gods emerge from the body of Kumarbi (by birth) or from Cronus (when he vomits them up); 4) Kumarbi and Cronus spit out stones that become cult objects; 5) the Storm God and Zeus are challenged by monsters (although Typhoeus has little in common with Hedammu or Ullikummi); 6) a copper cutting tool separates Ullikummi's feet from earth, as Cronus separates Sky from Earth with a sickle (although in the Hittite stories this separation happened before these myths); 7) there is a prophecy in both about the arrival of the supreme god.

Obvious differences also stand out. Rutherford mentions: 1) there are two Hittite lines of descent (from Alalu and Anu) but only one line (from Earth and Sky) in Hesiod; and thus 2) the Hittite pattern may be more cyclical than progressive; 3) Kumarbi becomes pregnant with Anu's seed, but Cronus merely retains his children already born from Rhea; 4) unlike Zeus, the Storm God appears to have a number of setbacks before eventual supremacy; 5) the Hittite myths may have been associated with ritual.

In addition to Rutherford's list, other differences are worthy of mention: 6) the Hittite stories are devoid of families and female figures, unless one considers Kumarbi feminized after swallowing Anu's genitals and seed; 7) it is not clear whether the *Kingship in Heaven* series is also a cosmogony or theogony; 8) little in the Hittite fragments suggest that its story of succession is concerned with questions of fair and just rule; 9) Kumarbi does not castrate his father by design; 10) Cronus deliberately swallows his children and desires to keep them within, but Kumarbi is horrified by the ingestion and does his best to spit out Anu's seed.

Another myth from this tradition suggests parallels with the *Theogony's* Typhoeus, the monstrous offspring of Earth and Tartaros. This is the myth of Illuyanka, a venomous eel-snake and adversary of Teshub, the Storm God. Hesiod (*Th.* 820–80) gives no hint of snake-coils sprouting from Typhoeus's thighs as depicted in later Greek vase renderings and in narrative descriptions, but he does suggest his serpentine nature when describing the hundred snake heads that erupt from the one neck. Hesiod describes every imaginable sound coming out of these mouths, one in the form of a god "speaking," another of a bull bellowing, or of a lion roaring, or a dog yelping, or a snake hissing.¹⁴ A fierce creature with mighty hands and tireless feet, "he would have ruled over mortals and immortals, / if the father of men and gods had not thought quickly" (837–38). While challenged, Zeus defeats him masterfully in single combat, relying on "his weapons, / thunder and lightning and the smoking thunderbolt" (853–54) to "lash" and "cripple" him, as Hesiod tells the story. (At *Il.* 2.782–83,

Zeus lashes the earth around Typhoeus, not the monster himself.) In Zeus's fiery victory, the Earth "groans" (858) and "in many places" burns (861). Although "grieved at heart," Zeus hurls the defeated Typhoeus "into wide Tartaros" (868). Pindar and Aeschylus, however, have the enormous monster sprawled under the sea just off the west coast of Italy, his body stretching all the way from Naples to Sicily and his still burning fires manifest in the living flames erupting from Mt. Etna (cf. Aeschylus's *Prometheus Bound* and Griffith, 1983: ad 363–72 and Pindar *P.* 1.20–8). Many authors from Homer to Nonnus (fourth or fifth century CE) tell the story of Typhoeus, and it is a favorite of vase painters.¹⁵ The version found in pseudo-Apollodorus's *Library* (1.6.3) shows how close he came to overthrowing Zeus. Typhon initially cuts away the sinews in Zeus's hands and feet and carries him away to Cilicia before Hermes and Aigipan restore his sinews and bring Zeus back to his fighting strength. Only then can he, with the help of the Fates' guile, defeat Typhon by his might.

The presence of this episode in the *Theogony* is among the most mysterious and unexplained passages in the poem. It enters the story at verse 820 without prior preparation, and, just as abruptly, it disappears from the storyline at verse 880, at which point the narrative resumes the Titan story, as if 881–82 followed 819 without a stitch dropped. Understandably, many editors regard the episode as a later intrusion into the text; those who argue for Hesiodic authorship, however poorly it is incorporated into the *Theogony* as a whole, often look to parallels from Hittite and Babylonian traditions where Typhoeus-like figures are created in last-ditch efforts to overthrow the emerging (male) godhead.¹⁶

Such is the case with *illuyanka* (*illuyankas*), once considered a proper noun, but now read as a common noun, composed of Proto-Indo-European compounds referring to a water serpent whose head brushes against the stars and whose shouts and hisses threaten heaven.¹⁷ The Hittite story of this serpent figure is told in two versions. In both, the eel-snake initially prevails over Teshub, although in one telling the eel-snake defeats the Storm God in a fight and in the other he prevails by trickery when he robs Teshub of his eyes and heart. In both versions, Teshub regains his strength and kills the serpent, but again the versions differ in their details. In one account, the goddess Inara comes to the aid of the Storm God by getting the snake and his children so drunk at a banquet that a mortal named Hupasiyas is able to tie them up with a cord. The Storm God then kills the bound serpent. In the other version, Teshub beds down with the daughter of a "poor man." Their son wins the heart of eel-snake's daughter and demands as a bride-prize the return of his father's stolen organs. Once restored, the Storm God fights the snake,

killing him and his son who insisted that he not be spared.

For the transmittal of this tale from Anatolia to Hellas, Calvert Watkins believes that “the linguistic evidence points unequivocally to the Bronze-Age second millennium.” He further claims that different periods of Greek literature retain different memories of the myth.¹⁸ Watkins stresses the story’s Indo-European roots while others look more to Mesopotamian and Semitic analogues for the Greek myth, especially as seen in the *Enûma elish*.¹⁹

Enûma elish, or the Epic of Creation

Parallels between the *Theogony* and the *Enûma elish* are, to my estimation, more intriguing and will be considered here in some detail. Stylistically, literary Akkadian, like Greek hexameter epic, is an artificial dialect which differed from vernacular speech grammatically and lexically. Like Greek epic, Standard Babylonian poems, in whose company the *Enûma elish* belongs, are often long narrative tales about gods and men which mix third-person reporting with extensive passages in direct speech. Unlike the Greek epic, which grows out of an oral tradition and may even be orally composed, the Akkadian texts were written, yet both are rich with formulaic tropes: fixed epithets for gods and cities, repeated type scenes for such things as banqueting and commands. Contrary to the Greek oral tradition, however, these formulaic phrasings in Akkadian literature are a late feature associated with *writing*.²⁰

The *Enûma elish* is commonly dated to the reign of Nebuchadnezzar I (1125–1104 BCE) and may have been transmitted to Greece then, most likely through the Phoenicians. Although it was not considered a “holy book,” it survived in written form with relatively few variants for close to a thousand years, with copies and commentaries on it found outside Babylon in Hittite and Assyrian libraries. (In Assyrian versions, their supreme deity, Assur, replaces Marduk.) Eudemos of Rhodes’s reference to it in the fourth century BCE is a further sign of its far-flung fame.

Named from the opening words, “when on high,” it is often called the “epic of Creation,” but it might more aptly be called a Hymn to Marduk, a poem that begins as a theogony and cosmogony but culminates in Marduk’s victory over Tiamat and his creation of a stable and harmonious political order. Stability and harmony are suggested at the end of the poem in the recitation of Marduk’s 50

names, which conclude with Enlil, the old supreme deity, calling Marduk “Lord of the World” (VII.136) and with Ea, the old wise god, saying “his name, like mine, shall be ‘Ea’ ” (VII.140). At VI.64, Marduk is also called Anu-Enlil-Ea. The political nature of this stable harmony is marked in Marduk’s building of the first city, Babylon (Abode of the Gods), at the center of which is Marduk’s cosmic home, the Esagila (House on High, or House of the Headraising). The hymn stresses that Marduk’s power comes by the consent of the Annuna-gods (III.113–38) and that his rule consists of a distribution of orders and stations among the nine hundred gods (VI.39–82), in what is presented as a communal political structure. The celebratory quality of these achievements was re-enacted annually when the poem was recited at Babylon’s New Year ceremonies, making the *Enûma elish* not only a hymn to Marduk but also a hymn to Babylon.²¹

The narrative shape of this hymn has much in common with the *Theogony*’s. Both are “city myths” of comparable length (*Enûma elish*, 1092 verses; *Theogony*, roughly 955 hexameters) which narrate the movement from dominant female to dominant male, from earth (or water) to the sky, from familial structures and domestic violence to civic order and social harmony. In both, the primordial mother turns against the future king of the gods before his ultimate victory, although the nature of this gender antagonism is much more pronounced in the *Enûma elish*. In the end, both rulers circumvent regular biological reproduction in the creation of civic concord.

Rather than beginning with *chaos*, or the gap that makes division possible, the hymn opens with the primordial pair of fresh and salt waters, Apsu and Tiamat, respectively, co-mingled. The male Apsu is called the begetter and the female Tiamat the maker (*mummu*) “who bore them all.” The narrator proceeds to name new pairs of deities, again male and female, first Lahmu and Lahamu and then Anshar and Kishar. It is likely that each new pair represents a new generation and marks a further differentiation of the “physical” world, first in the form of sandbars with Ladmu and Lahamu, and then the points on the horizon with the next pair. Sexual reproduction might be inferred as the cause of division and differentiation, but it is not specified; creation is mentioned in the passive voice: “the gods were formed” (*ibbanû*) (I.9). These births suggest the making of the world, but the actual formation of the universe occurs much later when Marduk creates it out of Tiamat’s dismembered body. After Anshar and Kishar, Anshar (with no female partner named) made Anu and he begot Nudimmud [= Ea].

Ea is unlike all those before him: “Profound in wisdom, acute of sense, he was massively strong, / Much mightier than his grandfather Anshar.” He “dominated(?) his forebears” (I.17–19).²² As in Hesiod,

the first violence comes in the form of the “father’s” hostility towards his (male) offspring. In this case, Apsu complains to Tiamat that the children’s “behavior is noisome to me! / By day I have no rest, at night I do not sleep! / I wish to put an end to their behavior, to do away with it! / Let silence reign that we may sleep” (I.37–40). Each new generation of gods adds presumably to a disturbance of the primordial quiet co-mingling of the waters, but it does not seem coincidental that Apsu first feels a desire to eradicate these children only after the wise and mighty Ea is born. In addition to a desire for rest, one suspects he also feared upheaval and displacement.

“Angry” at Apsu’s words, Tiamat “cried out to her spouse, / She cried out bitterly, outraged that she stood alone, / (For) he had urged evil upon her, / ‘What? Shall we put an end to what we formed?,” (I.42–45). As in the *Theogony*, the primordial father introduces “evil” into the world in his desire to undo what he has created (cf. *Th.* 155 and 158). And, as in the *Theogony*, all of his offspring are frozen in silence, except for the last born: “crafty Cronus” and “ingenious, resourceful” Ea. But unlike Earth in the *Theogony* Tiamat has no scheme to stop Apsu, but must rely on Ea to contrive a “master plan” (I.59 and 61, respectively). Ea’s plan also appears dynastic when he “untied [Apsu’s] sash” and stripped off his tiara, taking Apsu’s aura for his own. Ea also assumes his name, calling his new dwelling in the subterranean waters the Apsu.

Up to this point, the broad parallels between the *Theogony* and this myth in terms of generational conflict and violent succession myths seem clear, even if in details the stories differ. Unlike Earth, Tiamat must rely upon Ea’s stratagem to counter Apsu’s evil plot, and unlike characters in the *Theogony*, Ea does not become the future leader when he strips away Apsu’s aura and puts it on himself. Leadership falls to his grandfather Anshar, the Sumerian Heaven figure. But in both myths evil and its attendant fear stem from trying to halt restless evolution, as the primordial father Apsu, like Sky, takes “delight” (I.51) in the “evils he plotted against the gods his children” (I.52). As in the *Theogony*, the struggle for supremacy is generational rather than between siblings. The two myths would suggest that a father’s violence against his descendants is a natural by-product of genealogy.²³ Cronus castrates but does not kill his father in the *Theogony*, while Ea’s castration, if that is the proper word for it, is symbolic in the taking of the tiara.²⁴

However, when Ea gives birth to Marduk, the storylines of the *Enûma elish* and the *Theogony* diverge. Unlike Cronus, wise Ea glories in his son’s superior strength and wisdom. The other male gods do, as well (I.79–81, 87–95, 105–10):

In the cella of destinies, the abode of designs,
The most capable, the sage of the gods, the Lord was begotten,
In the midst of Apsu Marduk was formed,

...

His body was magnificent, fiery his glance,
He was a hero at birth, he was a mighty one from the beginning!

When Anu his grandfather saw him,
He was happy, he beamed, his heart was filled with joy,
He perfected him, so that his divinity was strange,
He was much greater, he surpassed them in every way.
His members were fashioned with cunning beyond comprehension,
Impossible to conceive, too difficult to visualize:
Fourfold his vision, fourfold his hearing,

...

Anu formed and produced the four winds,
He put them in his hand, "Let my son play!" (OR "My son, let
them whirl!")
He fashioned dust, he made a storm bear it up,
He caused a wave and it roiled Tiamat,
Tiamat was roiled, churning day and night,
The gods, finding no rest, bore the brunt of each wind.

Rather, it is the female Tiamat who turns against Marduk, with an immediate and deep-seated hostility. Previously protective of her offspring, Tiamat is now greatly "pleased" (I.125) at the "evil" (I.111) prospect of killing Marduk. As explanation for her shift in mood, Tiamat says: the gods "have been adopting [wicked ways] against the gods [their] parents" (I.128). But why should Tiamat turn against Marduk for something that happened before he was born? Her explanation, like Apsu's, does not seem to convey the full force of her hatred. It seems likely that as Apsu seemed to sense danger in Ea's birth so Tiamat seems to sense from the start—perhaps from the united male joy in his birth—that the all-seeing, all-knowing Marduk is a threat to her authority. In both myths, what initially appears as a generational conflict between fathers and sons masks a deeper conflict between the genders. With the removal of that threatening female (Tiamat, Metis), a stable, political order is created, joining generations and achieving harmony. But the male victory over the female is far

more dramatic in the *Enûma elish* than in the *Theogony*, when Marduk cuts up Tiamat's corpse to make the cosmos, literally giving male design to female form.

Unlike Ea's personal overthrow of Apsu and Cronus' overthrow of Sky, Marduk and Zeus must amass an army to defeat their adversaries (although in the final moment Marduk will resort to magic and weaponry to defeat Tiamat in single combat). As Zeus relied on sharing honors with others and liberating the oppressed to fashion his army, Marduk's army clearly sets him apart from Tiamat and her fighting force. Her army consists of monstrous hybrid creatures like the scorpion-man, fish-man, bull-man, and a rabid dog, all her children. Such conflation of human and bestial categories, as well as of sanity and madness, suggests Tiamat's identity with primordial, undifferentiated beginnings. The savagery of this group is evident in assembly where they are "furious with rage, ... angry, scheming, ... rumbling" (II.12-17). As a further affront to advanced civic ways, she mates with her son, Gingu, and elevates him to be her commander and king: "I make you the greatest in the assembly of the gods, / Kingship of all the gods I put in your power. / You are the greatest, my husband, you are illustrious, / Your command shall always be greatest, over all the Anunna-gods" (I.153-56). When facing Tiamat in combat, Marduk will single out this act as her greatest offense: "You named Qingu to be spouse for you, / Though he had no right to be, you set him up for chief god" (IV.81-82).

Marduk, by contrast, will rise to power by a different route, duly elected to supreme (and absolute) rule in an orderly and joyous assembly of the Igigi-gods. Prior to this election, Anshar as leader of the Igigi-gods had asked Ea and Anu to challenge Tiamat but, in abject fear, they declined. Marduk offers his assistance on the condition that, in his words, the gods "convene the assembly, nominate me for supreme destiny! / Take your places in the Assembly Place of the Gods, all of you, in joyful mood. / When I speak, let me ordain destinies instead of you. / Let nothing that I shall bring about be altered, / Nor what I say be revoked or changed" (II.159-63). Assembled to ordain Marduk their champion and king, the Igigi-gods "were filled with [joy]. One kissed the other in the assembly [], / They conversed, sat down at a feast, / On produce of the field they fed, imbibed of the vine, / With sweet liquor they made their gullets run, / They feel good from drinking the beer. / Most carefree, their spirits rose, / To Marduk their champion they ordain destiny" (III.133-38). Some modern scholars, citing a Sumerian hymn where Enki (= the Akkadian Ea) in a drunken stupor surrenders all his powers to his daughter Inanna,²⁵ suppose that Marduk similarly steals power away from the Igigi-gods by getting them inebriated. Little in

the text supports this reading. First, fully aware of the impending election, the Igigi-gods come to the assembly in good spirits and a mood of good cheer continues well after the banquet: “Joyfully they hailed, ‘Marduk is king!’ / They bestowed in full measure scepter, throne, and staff, / They gave him unopposable weaponry that vanquishes enemies” (IV.28–30). Nor at any time after the coronation, when Marduk creates the universe and Babylon, does the assembly show sign of remorse or protest. It is true that a great fear of Tiamat prompts the gods to grant Marduk absolute power, but every indication suggests that he comes to power legitimately and, once in power, he distributes offices and functions fairly, ruling over a harmonious community of gods.

Rather than see wine and beer as intoxicants that derange rational thought and take the edge off a painful abdication of autonomy, context suggests quite the contrary. Like the prepared grains of the banquet and the deliberative, civil discourse of the assembly, these liquors present the positive attributes of culture, technology, and refinement, in contrast to the angry snarls of Tiamat’s assembly. By comparison, Tiamat appears as a regressive figure who relies on her ancient matrilineal authority and resists the civic and political efforts of the male gods to introduce sovereign order into the cosmos.

The contrast between culture and natural chaos is equally over-determined in Marduk and Tiamat’s weaponry and battle strategy. Relying on spells, Tiamat initially confounds her foe, turning Marduk’s “tactic ... to confusion, / His reason was overthrown, his actions panicky” (IV.67–68). When he regains his composure, Marduk also relies on spells, but more crucially he defeats her with weapons that he manufactured, first the net, and then the bow, which he “made [and] appointed [as] his weapon” (IV.35). Defeating Tiamat, Marduk first lists her offenses: spurning natural feeling, making her son Qingu consort and chief god, and attempting wicked deeds against Anshar. Then, he challenges her to a duel. After Tiamat fails to swallow him, he contains her within his net and then marshals lightning (a natural force in this telling) and 11 winds (4 given to him at birth, plus 7 others) to keep Tiamat’s mouth open. He then slays her with an arrow from his bow, sending it through her gaping mouth.

In a banquet after the victory, Marduk displays his weapons: “The Lord took the bow, his weapon, and set it before them, / The gods his fathers looked upon the net he had made. / They saw how artfully the bow was fashioned, / His fathers were praising what he had brought to pass. / Anu praised (it), speaking to the assembly of the gods, / He kissed the bow: ‘This be my daughter!’ / He named the bow, these are its names: / ‘“Longwood” shall be the first, “Conqueror” shall be the second.’/The third name, ‘Bow Star’ he made visible in heaven. He

established its position with respect to the gods his brethren" (VI.82–91). According to this reading of the cuneiform, the bow is judged as a daughter,²⁶ an intriguing metaphor in itself, as it reveals the creation of a new kind of "womankind," denatured, born without a mother, the instrument of her father's will. As daughter-bow, she seems a distant cousin of Athena, also born of aggression and one parent, devoted to her father's new order.

One of the great surprises of the myth is Marduk's creation of the physical universe out of Tiamat's corpse (IV.137–46):

He split her in two, like a fish for drying,
Half of her he set up and made as a cover, (like) heaven.
He stretched out the hide and assigned watchmen,
And ordered them not to let her waters escape.
He crossed heaven and inspected (its) sacred places,
He made a counterpart of Apsu, the dwelling of Nudimmud.
The Lord measured the construction of Apsu,
The Great Sanctuary, Esharra, which he built, (its) heaven,
He made Ea, Enlil, and Anu dwell in their holy places.

This is certainly a far cry from creation in the *Theogony*, which evolves biologically in large measure and without plan. In the *Enûma elish*, however, Marduk shapes the universe asexually by calculation and measurement, much like Elohîm in *Genesis*, beginning with a separation of the waters to create the first firmament.²⁷ But in a major difference from *Genesis*, there is no mystery in the *Enûma elish* about the raw material of the world. Its substance is female, given form by male design: from Tiamat's corpse Marduk creates the sun, moon, and constellations to demarcate time, as from her breasts he makes the mountains and from her eyes he pours forth the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Nor does the Babylonian creation culminate in the making of a garden, but of the first city: "I shall call [its] name [Babylon], Abode of the Great Gods. / We shall all hold fe[stival]s with[in] it" (5.129–30). Above Babylon is the Esharra, "House of Totality" (Enlil's domain), and at its center is the Esagila, "House on High or House of the Headraising," each built squarely above the Apsu (VI.59–64), raising as high into the heavens as Apsu is below the earth. In short, Babylon is an *axis mundi* joining all layers of the cosmos, and it is the *omphalos*, center of creation.

In other Babylonian myths and in the New Year Festival at Babylon, where the *Enûma elish* is recited, Marduk has a wife Zarpanit and a

son Nabû by her. In the *Enûma elish*, however, his creation is asexual, both in his making of the physical world and in his solitary rule at Babylon. The female in this myth has been thoroughly expunged; biological evolution implied in the first stages of creation has disappeared, replaced and denatured in the second act of creation. It is hard to imagine a more extreme, or violent, expression of the male's appropriation and transformation of the female body and life-force. Even more than the evil Apsu, Tiamat, as it turns out, is the regressive force that threatens to turn the world back into a primal chaos. Her death and reapportionment make cosmos and city possible.

In the polity which Marduk fashions, the violence of the earlier generations, first between "father" and "son" (Apsu and Ea), and then between female and male (Tiamat and Marduk), gives way to a patriarchal world of apparent communal concord in Marduk's governance, feasting, and unbounded fecundity.

The considerable differences in detail between Hesiod's poem and the Akkadian myth indicate that the *Enûma elish* did not directly influence the Greek myth. Although the construction of the city is more explicit in the *Enûma elish* and the change in the mode of creation more dramatic, the narrative pattern in both creation myths is fundamentally the same in the movement from generations of familial violence to the creation of a stable, civic order. Both, ultimately, are praise poems of that city creator and of the city created.²⁸

In the *Enûma elish*, the threatening female figure is transformed by dismemberment and reconfiguration according to male design. In the *Theogony*, she is treated no less harshly, subsumed (1) by Zeus swallowing Metis, assuming her knowledge and name, becoming μητίετα, and (2) by becoming the birth parent of a daughter who will be fully loyal to him, but the Greek myth is considerably more embracing of the female as a crucial figure in the making of a harmonious polity. Multiple examples are available: Themis and Mnemosyne and the daughters they create with Zeus. With the exception of swallowing Metis, Zeus does not defeat or remake threatening females like Night, Discord, and their descendants. Rather, they still permeate the universe, just not within Olympus (except in the case of Zeus's wife, Hera).

Earth and Tiamat also make for interesting comparison. Earth is older than Sky in the *Theogony*, and she is a more complex figure than Tiamat. She takes more initiative than does Tiamat to thwart Sky's evil plan, and she plays a crucial part at every turn in the story in Zeus's successful rise to becoming king. But, when she inexplicably turns against Zeus at the moment before he is elected king and lord of the Olympians, her actions resemble Tiamat's in various ways.

Hesiod's account of Typhoeus's many voices and heads (*Th.* 829–35) resemble qualities of Ullikummi and Illuyanka in the Hittite myths, but also some of Tiamat's hissing, hybrid progeny who “remarkably resemble” (to quote West, 1966: 379) Typhoeus's children by Echidna (or Ceto?): Orthus, Cerberus, Hydra, and Chimaera (*Th.* 265–336). But, perhaps, the Tiamat likeness is most useful for its model of a primordial mother attempting to thwart the powerful new male god on the verge of his creating the new patriarchal order.

Once in power, Marduk and Zeus wield power in very different manners. The differences, undoubtedly, reflect distinctions between Babylonian kingly rule and the rise of shared governance in the early Greek *polis*. Marduk rules with absolute power, having absorbed into himself the primary titles and authority of his predecessors, while Zeus must delegate authority and share his power among a wide variety of gods. While Marduk seems to have freed himself thoroughly from biological regeneration, making the cosmos from the corpse of his defeated female adversary, Zeus has no means of taming all of the cosmos, and, with the remarkable exception of swallowing Metis and giving birth to Athena, he lives within the laws of nature. He cannot make the universe according to his design or fully escape sexual and biological processes of reproduction. Furthermore, Marduk with absolute power lives outside the system of harmonies he establishes, whereas Hesiod's Zeus clearly lives within the system that he creates (with the exception of his relationship with Hera). Indeed, he has power, the *Theogony* implies, precisely because of the εὐνομία he creates, and, unlike Marduk, one has the sense that if Zeus did not distribute honors fairly he could face revolt from the Olympians.

Neither myth has much to say about the creation of humankind, although in a brief passage the *Enûma elish* describes Ea's making of humans from the blood of Tiamat's consort and commander, Qingu. Humans, interestingly the product of rebel blood and a wise maker, are created to service the needs of the gods, relieving them of their burdens. As beasts are to humankind, so humankind is to the divine, a tableau suggesting that the rebel Qingu has been tamed and harnessed. But, of course, there is always the possibility of Qingu's DNA re-expressing itself. By contrast, the *Theogony* is not interested in the creation of man but rather in the activity of Zeus-nurtured kings who, with the Muses' gift of honeyed speech, bring concord to a discordant city. It also describes another divine gift, the creation of the first woman, “a beautiful evil or hardship,” who will introduce mortal males to marriage and the burdens of working the soil.

Once we grant the important cultural differences between the two hymns, comparing the *Theogony* to the *Enûma elish* enables us to articulate more fully how, in addition to being a creation myth,

Hesiod's poem is also a hymn to Zeus and a hymn to Olympus.

The Harab Myth, or the Theogony of Dunnu

The fragmentary *Harab Myth*, composed roughly around 1000 BCE, is a Babylonian creation myth specific to the city of Dunnu (location unknown). Forty verses from approximately 100 survive. It is a story of progressive evolution, divine genealogy, and dynastic history all in one. The primordial couple Harab/Plow and Earth establish “dominion” and make “a family(?)”²⁹ sexually creating Amakandu (= Sumuqan, the Cattle God).³⁰ Trouble begins after “they built [the city] Dunnu.” To quote from Jacobsen’s translation: “[Har]ab gave himself clear title to the lordship in Dunnu, / But [Earth] lifted (her) face to Sumuqan, his son, / and said to him: “Come, let me love thee!” Quick to respond to his mother’s invitation, the Cattle God makes Earth his wife, slays Harab, and assumes the rule.

Over the next six generations, culminating in the rule of Ninurta, the god of agriculture and pastoral fertility, matricide is added to patricide and incest.³¹ In Thorikold Jacobsen’s reconstruction of the ending, the myth concludes with a

peaceful and orderly transfer of power from Enlil [Sumerian for the Akkadian Ellil] to his son Ninurta confirmed by the assenting vote of other gods. It seems a fair assumption in these last sections about Anu, Enlil and Ninurta, which bring the story down to the existing world order, that the gods will finally have left behind them forever the old ways of parricide and probably also the last remaining vestige of incest.³²

For Jacobsen, the *Harab Myth* is both an agricultural story and a moral one. As evolution progresses from a primordial breaking of the soil to Ninurta and from primordial plow (Harab) to the god regularly associated with the plow (Ninurta), so it simultaneously progresses from an initial primitive barbarism, marked by incest and familial violence, to an orderly transmission of power from father to son and presumably to a stable government under Ninurta’s tutelage. The text is too fragmentary for us to know if it ends as Jacobsen suggests, but it is clearly a city myth whose opening echoes the *Theogony* in a number of ways. Like the *Theogony*, violence first enters the universe when the father (Plow, Ouranos) attempts to thwart the mother’s power (Earth

in both poems) and she then turns to her son for assistance. Unlike the *Theogony*, in the *Theogony of Dunnū* the initial struggle is also unmistakably political. But little in the myth distinguishes familial violence from dynastic history, as both family and city emerge almost simultaneously near the beginning of time.

Philo of Byblos or the *Phoenician History*

Identification of Phoenician creation myths is a complex task. Eudemos of Rhodes from the fourth century BCE (through Damascius's much later paraphrase), in addition to his sketch of a Babylonian cosmogony, speaks of a Sidonian one which posits Time (Chronos) before all else. He then says that Desire (Pothos) and Mist/Fog (Omichle) produced Aer and Aura, from whom an egg was conceived.³³ Several centuries after Eudemos, the historian and grammarian Philo (or Philon) of Byblos (ca. 100 CE), in his *Phoenician History*, claims that he is telling in Greek a story told long ago by Sanchuniathon, a name interpreted to mean "Sanchun has given." This figure, Philo claims, lived before the Trojan war and had access to the sacred texts of Taaautos, the inventor of writing and identified with the Egyptian ibis-headed god Thoth. Much of Philo's text is now lost, including the ending, but extensive fragments are recorded in Eusebius's fourth-century *Praeparatio evangelica* (PE). From this telling, the Phoenician myth appears to be interspersed with Zoroastrian and Egyptian beliefs.

As did the Stoics at this time (see Cornutus in [Chapter 5](#)), Philo regards Hesiod as a late source who corrupted non-Greek stories: "The Greeks, who surpass all men in their natural cleverness, first appropriated most of these tales. They then dramatized them in various ways with additional literary ornaments, and intending to beguile with the delights of myths, they embellished them in all sorts of ways. Thence Hesiod and the highly touted cyclic poets fabricated their own versions and made excerpts of Theogonies and Giant's Battles and Titans' Battles, which they carried about and with which they defeated the truth. Our ears have for ages become habituated to and predisposed by their fictions. We preserve the received mythology as a sacred trust, as I said also at the beginning. Assisted by the force of time, [the Greek tradition] has rendered its hold inescapable, so that the truth is regarded as drivel and the bastard tale as truth."³⁴ Also in the spirit of his time, Philo reads old myths in an Euhemeristic fashion, i.e., Ouranos, Cronus, and the other gods were in fact

distinguished historical figures, worshipped by later generations as gods.

Sanchuniathon's myth, as Eusebius records it through Philo, begins with "a dusky and windy air (or a gust of dusky air) and *troubled, dark chaos*" (PE 1.10.15–16). As this is the only Near Eastern creation story that begins with *chaos*, it is tempting to imagine direct Hesiodic influence upon the later Phoenician writer. Furthermore, Philo's word for "dark" modifying χάος is ἐρεβῶδες, the adjectival form of Hesiod's *Erebos*, "Darkness," the male child of Chaos in the *Theogony* who joins in love with his sister Night (*Th.* 123–25). The word translated as "troubled," θολερόν, also modifying χάος, is properly applied to water and may suggest that Philo understood Hesiod's χάος, as did the Stoics, as primordial water. But Philo's "dusky and windy air" (or its alternant, "a gust of dusky air") has no parallel in Hesiod and most closely echoes the reference to the formless void (*tohu-wa-wohu*) and divine-wind (*ruah*), which breathes over the waters at the beginning of *Genesis* "And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God (*ruah*) moved upon the face of the waters" (I.2). As Carolina López-Ruiz has stressed, one cannot assume the direction of influence or point of origin of these multiple correspondences.³⁵ Two traditions, thus, may be conjoined in Philo's construct of the universe's first stirrings.

Next, Eusebius writes "he says" (referring either to Philo or Sanchuniathon) that "the wind was in love with (ἡράσθη) its own beginnings, bringing about a mixture (σύγκρασις), that entwining being called πόθος/Pothos (desire/Desire). This was the beginning of the foundation/creation (κτίσις)³⁶ of everything" (PE 1.10.17–20). The odd phrase, "the wind was in love with its own beginnings" probably refers to the wind seeking itself as in the circular motion of a whirlwind. That both Eudemos and Philo use the same word, πόθος/Pothos, to name this impulse to enjoin suggests that they may be translating the same Phoenician word, whatever it may have been. It is noteworthy neither chose Hesiod's *Eros* or φιλότης/Philotes.

Piecing together elements from Eudemos's Sidonian version and Eusebius's account of Philo's account of Sanchuniathon, plus from a few other threads, West, and more recently López-Ruiz,³⁷ propose a pre-Hesiodic Levantine tradition (separate from the Hittite/Akkadian story of violent succession), with Pothos as an energy source which stimulates life out of a primordial dark watery mass. Eventually Unaging Time, an androgynous figure, made love to itself, generating an egg. From the egg, a radiant creator god made heaven and earth.

In Philo's *Phoenician History*, a truly convoluted succession story ensues which combines Phoenician and Greek names. It reads like a

learned effort to conjoin Hesiodic and Phoenician traditions. Ian Rutherford summarizes the sequence as follows (2009: 12–13): “we seem to see traces of a myth of divine kingship similar to the Hurrio-Hittite one and perhaps derived from it. The differences are that we have a single line of descent (as in Hesiod) rather than two concurrent ones, and the emergence of a new generation in no way neutralizes the previous generations.”³⁸ Epigeios-Ouranus (Sky) eventually becomes king. With Ge (Earth), he has four sons: El/Cronus, Baitylos, Dagon (= Zeus Ploughman), and Atlas.³⁹ El/Cronus usurps power from his father but he is then challenged in the Hittite manner not by his own son but by Dematous, born of Epigeios-Ouranus and a concubine. Still in control, El/Cronus gives the pregnant concubine to his brother Dagon (= Zeus Ploughman). In the midst of these struggles, El/Cronus builds the first city, Byblos in Phoenicia, and, in his suspicion of family members, he casts his brother Atlas down into the depths of the earth, destroys his son Sadidos with his own weapon, and beheads one of his daughters. In a struggle lasting 32 years, Epigeios-Ouranus sends his daughters Astarte (= Aphrodite), Rhea, and Dione to murder El/Cronus, but, not to be denied, he makes each one of them a wife and has numerous children by them. With Astarte, El/Cronus begets Pothos (Desire) and Eros (Love).⁴⁰ He also begets a son named after himself, that is, Zeus Belos, and Apollo, while Demarous engenders Melkathros/Heracles. In the thirty-second year, El/Cronus finally castrates Sky before he consents that the rule pass to the “greatest Astarte and Zeus, called Demarous and Adodos” (i.e., Zeus/Demarous and Adodos = the Syrian Hadad; *PE* 1.10.15–35).

The Reception of These Near Eastern Tales in Greek Authors

The similarity of these tales across time and among various Near Eastern cultures is striking, although it is not possible to identify a single archetype from which all are derived. In addition to the shared stories of incest and violent succession, a dominant theme in some is a city-state orientation, expressing patriarchal ideologies of civic order.⁴¹ Within that frame, each myth expresses characteristics and themes particular to its culture, but the common frame helps us to see how the *Theogony* is much more than a story of family and succession.

Nothing suggests that the Greeks, including Hesiod, responded directly to these Near Eastern literary and religious traditions. Long

after the *Theogony*, when the Greeks start speaking of Babylonian and Egyptian peoples, they only dimly acknowledged their rich debt to their more sophisticated eastern neighbors and to the religious beliefs of these various peoples. Remarkably ethnocentric and intensely conscious of their differences from other peoples, the Greeks tended to credit themselves, or their gods, for inventions or thoughts which in fact entered Greece from foreign shores. Their fascination with the Egyptians, who were able to trace their ancestry back many generations, was the one great exception to this tendency. In spite of his generally intense hellenocentric focus, Herodotus was not the only Greek to lose critical judgment when discussing things Egyptian. Although he visited both Egypt and Babylon, he asserted, rather unreliably, that the names and nature of nearly all the Greek gods originated from Egypt (2.50).⁴² On the other hand, although he equated Zeus with Marduk (whom he calls by his popular name Bel, or Lord, 1.181; cf. 1.183), his silence about Babylonian myth in his extant writings would suggest that he saw little to note about their relation to Greek theogonies.

There are, however, a few exceptions to this general hellenocentric or Egyptian conceit. In a general way, the mythic tradition that Cadmus left his home in Phoenicia in a fruitless search for his sister before he founded the Greek city of Thebes acknowledges, perhaps, the importation of Phoenician objects, ingenuity, and ideas to the Greek mainland.⁴³ Herodotus is also the first to credit the Phoenicians with the invention of Greek letters, which he argued Cadmus (with a band of Phoenicians) brought with them to Thebes 1600 years before his time, or about 2000 BCE (5.58–9). Before Herodotus, the Greeks tended to believe that Greek writing was invented by one of their own, whether a hero or a god, this despite the fact that the Greek word for papyrus, and later for book, *biblos*, derives from the name of the Phoenician city Byblos from whose port papyrus entered Greece around 600 BCE. In the sixth century, Stesichorus attributes the invention, along with that of arithmetic, to Palamedes (213 PMG). At about the same time as Herodotus, the author of the *Prometheus Bound* assigns it to Prometheus and calls writing the “memory of all things, mother of the Muses” (460–61). In the *Phaedrus* (274a–75b), Plato attributes the invention of writing itself to the Egyptian god Theuth, where, contrary to the inventor’s intention, it is revealed to be a substitute for memory.⁴⁴

No Greek author, as far as we can tell, made reference to the Hurrio-Hittite myths, but a number looked to Babylonia. As already indicated, one such figure is Herodotus’s near contemporary, the sophist Hippias of Elis, whose broad study of theo-cosmogonies drew widely from Greek and foreign sources. The opening sentence of his

Synagoge (mostly lost) gives a hint of his approach: "... some of these things have probably been said by Orpheus, some by Musaeus, briefly here and there, some by Hesiod, some by Homer, and some by other poets, some in prose, some by Greeks and some by Barbarians. From those, I have collected what are most important and what belongs together to compose this new and many-sided work" (DK 6 T4, quoted by Clement of Alexandria in his *Miscellanies* 6.2.15). Which barbarian myths he mentioned are unknown. More can be said about Aristotle's student and associate, Eudemos of Rhodes, who showed a detailed knowledge of the *Enûma elish*, referred to not by name but as "Babylonian." Judging from a brief paraphrase of his work which survives in a sixth-century CE source,⁴⁵ he offered a remarkably clear-headed and quite accurate description of the Marduk story (Wehrli, Eudemos von Rhodos fr. 150, p. 71):

Like other Barbarians, the Babylonians pass over in silence the One Principle of the universe but make two, Tauthe and Apason [Tiamat and Apsu], making Apason Tauthe's husband and naming her the mother of the gods. From them an only-begotten son is born, Moymis [Momus or Mummus], whom I consider to be the intelligible world proceeding from the two first principles. From them, another generation is born, Dache and Dachus [Lahamu and Lahmu], and then a third from them, Kissare and Assorus [Kishar and Anshar]; from these, three (*sic*) are born: Anus and Illinus and Aus [Anu, Nudimmud = Ea], and from Aus [Ea] and Dauce is born the son called Belus [Bel = Marduk], whom they consider maker of the world.

The difficulty of transcribing Akkadian names is evident in Damascius's text.⁴⁶

By contrast, Berossus's additions to and allegorizing of the *Enûma elish* make a hash of the creation myth. A priest of Marduk in Babylon, Berossus, wrote in Greek, the *lingua franca* of the day, the *Babyloniaca*, or *History of Babylonia* (ca. 290 BCE), which drew on the *Enûma elish*, *The Sumerian King List*, and a flood account not unlike that which is told in Tablet XI of the *Gilgamesh* epic, among other works. Unlike Eudemos, he used Greek names for the Babylonian deities, rendering Ea as Cronus and Bel (Marduk) as Zeus.⁴⁷ This text states that the universe began from "darkness and water" (Berossus *FGrH* 680 F1b6) and associates them with Tiamat and the Moon. In the subsequent passage, Berossus follows the *Enûma elish* more closely, even as he explicitly allegorizes it (*FGrH* 680 F1b7):

While the world was in this state, Bel (i.e. Marduk) rose up against the woman and cut her in half. Out of the first half he made the earth and

out of the second the heavens. The animals who were in her he destroyed. All this he says, is an allegorical explanation. For when all was water and only monsters were in it, the god cut off his own head, and the other gods mixed the flood of blood with earth and created men. Because of this men have reason and share in the gods' wisdom.

The full meaning of the allegory is not stated: here, at the beginning "all was water," not water and darkness. Man's reason is traced back to his origin from Bel (not from the wise Ea killing Qingu, as in the *Enûma elish*). Bel is prompted to cut off his own head a second time, this time with the help of another god, again in the context of separating earth from sky and creating man (*FGrH* 680 F1b8):

But then Bel, whose name is translated into Greek as Zeus, cut through the darkness and separated the sky and earth from one another and established order in the universe. The monsters could not endure the light and were destroyed. Bel, however, as he saw an empty and barren region, gave an order to one of the gods to cut off his own head and mix earth with the flowing blood and to create men and the animals that could breathe the air.

In this second beheading, the significance of darkness at the beginning of Berossus's tale comes into focus, as the women, water, and monsters are associated with darkness, and Bel (Marduk) is associated with the victory of light. Light is further associated with the separation of sky from earth and with an established order of the universe.⁴⁸ Such additions to and allegorizing of the *Enûma elish* come close to obliterating the myth's narrative trajectory and the possibility of comparing it to the *Theogony*.

The *Theogony* in the Archaic and Classical Periods

Hesiod lived at the beginning of a new age in Greece when cities were just coming into being, an alphabet recently invented, populations increasing, trade on the rise, and mother cities about to send out colonies throughout the eastern Mediterranean, southern shores of the Black Sea, and points west as far as southern Italy, Sicily, and North Africa. In this Archaic period of expansion, new foundations, and writing, the Greeks also began to move away from a myth-based view of the world toward ever-higher forms of rationalism and scientific explanation. In the midst of this growth and change, the *Theogony*, the oldest and most authoritative of the Greek creation myths, remained an important “text” for the Greeks, even as some began to move away from its old mode of thinking.

To study the reception of the *Theogony*—its influences, echoes, and, eventually, its shadows—in the Greco-Roman world comes close to tracing the history of Greek and Roman literature itself. Often, this story is told in conjunction with Homer. In all periods of Greek and Roman literature, these two ancient poets were inextricably linked, sometimes as if they were speaking in unison, at other times as if in opposition. We shall keep our focus primarily upon the *Theogony* as we follow this path, but inevitably discussion of the *Iliad*’s and *Odyssey*’s reception, as well as that of Hesiod’s other poems, will become part of our story. In most instances, Homer was considered the brighter light, but for some, as in the case of the Presocratic philosophers and civic-minded poets like Solon and Aeschylus, Hesiod was a significant ancient poetic voice. Despite the Hellenistic attestation of the Homeric Hymns to Homer, they also show closer ties to Hesiod than to Homer, as does Hesiod’s fellow Boeotian poet, Pindar. Even Plato, whom Longinus called the “most Homeric of all,” actively engages with the *Theogony* in the *Symposium* and *Republic*, especially.

There is no period when the *Theogony* was unknown. The time of its greatest significance was unquestionably in the Archaic and Classical

eras while the *polis* was emerging into its mature form and when Hesiod's mythic constructs were still viable for some. Evidence of its influence or shadows is attested in most poetical and prose genres, from lyric and drama to history and philosophy, to studies of religion, grammar, and style. The genre least interested in the creation story was, perhaps, oratory, although the *Works and Days* and Homer's poems did on occasion make an appearance in that medium when a living witness was not available for direct testimony or legal support.¹

To look ahead to the Hellenistic period when the Greek literary center shifted from Athens to Alexandria (ca. 200 BCE), poets and scholars were also drawn to Hesiod, and especially to the *Theogony*, for a curious set of new reasons. But with the rise of Stoic beliefs in a divine *logos* that permeated the universe and gave shape to all matter, the *Theogony's* view of a late-born Zeus seemed quaint and irrelevant. By the time of the Roman Empire, "pagans" like Ovid and Lucian ridiculed and parodied a Hesiodic theogony, while Christian apologists treated it with contempt, having a heyday with its elevation of Eros to a god and its non-Christian version of divine inspiration. In the emerging Renaissance, figures like Petrarch and Erasmus look to the *Theogony*, albeit sometimes with horror, when trying to convey the Greek pantheon or a pagan idea of divine inspiration. No writer in the Christian era ever engaged with the *Theogony* more thoughtfully than did John Milton, even as he intended in *Paradise Lost* to rise above the Aonian mount (i.e., Hesiod) to reveal the (true) ways of God to men.

The *Theogony* in the Archaic Period

When thinking of influence, one must first ask when we can consider the *Theogony* as something like a "text" that others might quote or imitate in a detailed manner. Such evaluations are, to a degree, subjective. I shall argue from a smattering of evidence scattered across the Greek world that by 600–575 BCE we begin to see other authors "reworking" passages from the *Theogony* and *Works and Days* in something like their present form. Prior to this point, creation stories differ significantly from Hesiod's. We have already seen that Homer calls not Earth but Ocean and Tethys the first of the gods and that he has his own account of the division of the world. The *Titanomachia*, attributed to Eumelus of Corinth (fl. ca. 730), or Arctinus of Miletus, also has its version of origins: "everything comes from αἰθήρ" (aither, the higher, purer air), which is also *Akmon*, Anvil (meteorite?), "tireless fire," the father of Ouranos (Sky). Zeus is born in Lydia. The

Hundred-Hander, Aigaion, is born of Earth and Sea (Pontos), not of Earth and Sky, and Helios is a Titan but he does not fight against the Olympians.²

Bits of evidence from early Sparta suggest that it may have had its own theogonic tradition, although a fragment from Terpander, Sparta's oldest, semi-legendary poet, suggests that he, like Hesiod, viewed music as an expression of and a means to social harmony: kings "set the laws (νόμοι) of the Spartans to music" (Clement of Alexandria, *Miscellanies* 1.16.78.5). The *Suda* (M 701) describes how Terpander brought "the souls [of his people] into harmony and stopped civil war," either by singing with his cithara (lyre) or by playing the pipes.³ Later Spartan poets, however, seem to have deviated from Hesiod's vision of communal harmony. The war poet Tyrtaeus, ca. 650 BCE, appears to have called one of his elegiac poems *Eunomia*, where the term means something closer to "Discipline," to describe the city's political and educational system (cf. Herodotus 1.65.2), rather than Good Governance. We see in the choral poetry of Alcman, Tyrtaeus's younger contemporary, a tendency, like Hesiod, toward abstraction and analytic description of the physical world, but the sparse details suggest little in line with a Hesiodic tradition. One verse reads: "Αἶσα (Portion or Destiny) and Πόρος (Ways and Means/Pathway or Allotment), the most ancient of all, prevailed over (all)" (fr. 1.13–14).⁴ Another has Eunomia, Tyche (Fortune), and Peitho (Persuasion) as daughters of Promathia (Foresight) (fr. 64). According to Diodorus Siculus, Alcman made Sky and Earth parents of the Muses (fr. 67), although in two fragments a Muse is identified as the daughter of Zeus (and Mnemosyne?) (fr. 27 and 28).

Perhaps roughly contemporary with Alcman, Epimenides of Crete is credited with composing a *Theogony* of 5000 hexameters (five times the length of Hesiod's), fragments of which suggest an intermixture of Hesiodic and Orphic components.⁵ In addition to living to a great age (either 157 or 299 years) and having out-of-body experiences, this semi-legendary holy man napped for 57 years at which time he conversed with Aletheia (Truth), Truth being Epimenides' claim to divine authority, perhaps a more reliable source than Hesiod's Muses who can tell the truth but also lies sounding like the truth. Epimenides identifies Aêr (Air) and Night as primordial progenitors, parents of Tartarus.⁶ In Orphic fashion, two unnamed Titans, perhaps generated asexually, emerge out of Tartarus, and they co-mingle, producing the world-egg, from which Earth, Sky, and perhaps Oceanus are born (DK 3 B19).⁷ Differing from Hesiod, this Sky gives birth to Aphrodite, the Fates, and the Erinyes, all through *natural* means. There is one hexameter from Epimenides, however, that is intriguingly close to one in the *Theogony*. This is Epimenides: Κρητες ἀεὶ ψεύσται, κακὰ

θηρία, γαστέρες ἀργαί (“Cretans are always liars, evil beasts, slothful stomachs”) (fr. 1 D-K) compared to *Th.* 26: ποιμένες ἄγραυλοι, κάκ’ ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες οἶον (“Shepherds roaming the fields, evil reproaches, mere stomachs”). Is Epimenides deliberately reworking Hesiod? In contrast to the Muses who in the *Theogony* never tell Hesiod that they are in fact telling him the truth, in this version presumably Epimenides has Truth speak the reproach quoted above as a prelude to her asserting that she is about to convey the full hidden truth.⁸ Parallels between the two poems are closer than what we find from Sparta, but it is clear from all the passages discussed above that the version of creation as told in the *Theogony* was only one of many competing creation stories.

Parallels between Hesiod and Archilochus of Paros suggest to some that the Parian poet was working off of Hesiod (or the Hesiodic tradition). In antiquity Archilochus was often closely associated with Homer,⁹ but, like Hesiod, he was visited by the Muses, in his case as a boy when he was taking a cow to sell at the “Meadows.” In exchange for the cow they left a lyre at his feet, the significance of which would become clear in time. Nevertheless, even the surprising gift of a lyre to a boy seemed more appropriate to his (future) profession than the Muses’ gift of a σκήπτρον to Hesiod in the *Theogony* (vv. 30–32).¹⁰ Archilochus’s epiphany story inverts the Hesiodic model when the Muses insulted the shepherd, as the boy mocks the band of young women and they respond with laughter and banter, a form of harsh wit that surely foreshadows the future poet’s fame for writing “blame poetry.” In antiquity, he is credited with inventing this form of poetry, but clearly we can see an earlier form of it in Hesiod’s chastisement of his brother Perses and corrupt kings in the *Works and Days*.¹¹ Gregory Nagy (1976) has shown how invective and praise poetry are two sides of a shared aesthetic tradition and social convention. Both modes work together to affirm group cohesion and shared social values. Hesiod’s *Works and Days* with its gnomic utterances and vituperative tone means, similarly, to inspire its audience to live by a common notion of justice. But Irwin (1998: 177–82) argues that the Archilochean deviations in the epiphany scenes are deliberate, a pointed polemic to mark the younger poet’s poetic and moral superiority.

But how does the *Theogony* fit into this view of blame poetry, if at all? First, we notice that many of the words which serve to mark invective—μῶμος (blame), νεῖκος (quarrel), ἔρις (discord, or strife), ἔχθος (hatred), ὄνειδος (reproach, censure, blame), in addition to ψόγος (blameable fault)—appear in the *Theogony* as personified abstractions, all associated with “destructive Night” or “hateful Eris.” Momos and Eris are Night’s children, along with “grievous Oizus”

(Misery, Woe, Distress) (214 and 225). Eris is the sole parent of Neikea (the plural of νεῖκος) (229). Collectively, they are antithetical to everything Zeus means to create; indeed, ἔρις, νεῖκος, and ψεύδεια (lies) are barred from entering Olympus (782–85). In that sense, the idealized world of “like-minded” Olympus appears to have been able to isolate itself from invective (Hera’s ἔρις, notwithstanding). But, on earth, “great νεῖκος” enters the city agora (87), and it takes a “Zeus-nourished” king, speaking with a soft voice and straight judgments, to dispel it. The *Works and Days*, however, paints a slightly modified picture. In redefining ἔρις as having either a “praiseworthy” or “blameworthy” form (11–26), Hesiod hopes to turn Perses away from blameworthy *eris* and νεῖκεα in the ἀγορή toward the good ἔρις of ζῆλος (emulation, envy) (27–36). These terms do not conform with the invective/praise paradigm identified above, but, in the spirit of invective, Hesiod hopes that his good challenge of Perses and of unjust kings will correct individual misconduct and lead to good quarrels, good governance, justice, and social cohesion.¹²

Already with Archilochus we see a poet who may be deliberately playing off of Hesiod (or the Hesiodic Tradition) to establish his own identity, but by 575 BCE from a wide spectrum of sources we see numerous signs from a wide variety of sources that suggest that both the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days*, in something like their present form, were widely known, “imitated,” and “reworked.” Focusing on the *Works and Days*, Richard Hunter speaks of a distinctive and insistent “Hesiodic” voice, already recognized within a few decades of its composition as an authority for its quotable maxims, moralizing didacticism, and practical wisdom. In our focus on the *Theogony*, we have already noted parallels between Epimenides fr. 1 (late seventh century?) and *Th.* 26. Even more striking is the remarkable likeness between Alcaeus 347 Voigt-Liberman and *Works and Days* 582–88, which, to many, suggests a playful engagement with Hesiod’s hexameters into a different dialect and meter.¹³ Solon’s poetry (ca. 594 BCE) is also a key witness, as much for the *Theogony* as the *Works and Days*. In the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter*, ca. 580 BCE, the opening three verses closely echo *Theogony* 913–14 in theme and phrasing. At roughly the same time, Hesiod’s cosmogony, “or one very like it,” to quote from Michael Stokes (1963: 14), “had an abiding influence” on the new doctrines of the Milesian cosmologists in the East. In the West, the closeness of Stesichorus (born in the 37th Olympiad; 632/28 BCE) to Hesiod is evident in the tradition which called him either Hesiod’s son or grandson (though, to be sure, others called him “most Homeric”). A link between Stesichorus and Hesiod is further suggested by the writing on the Françoise Vase (ca. 570 BCE), which names the Muses in the same order as they are found at *Theogony* 77–79, with

the exception that Stesichore stands in the place of Hesiod's Terpsichore. The naming and sequencing of the Muses' names on the vase invites the question whether Hesiod, or a singer very much like him, was the source for the naming.¹⁴

Even the distinct Orphic cosmogonies with their unique mélange of Anatolian, Phoenician, Mesopotamian, and Egyptian motifs, making their own unsystematic way into the Greek mythical framework first through Pherecydes of Syros and then a series of late sixth-century poems attributed to Orpheus, took their bearings from the Hesiodic tradition, as Robert Fowler, most recently, reports: "To call Hesiod's the standard theogony of Greece is perhaps to underestimate the variety of theogonies on offer; yet the earliest Orphic theogony, as evidenced by the Derveni papyrus, though differing from Hesiod's in striking ways, remains a response to him, returning after its various novelties to the familiar Hesiodic narrative."¹⁵

This distinctiveness of the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days* by 575 BCE is shared by a similar popularity of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* by this time. By the last half of the sixth century, Homer and Hesiod were clearly already seen as cultural giants. Xenophanes and Heraclitus were the first to name them, singling out both as the chief educators of Greece, a status that clearly took time to develop. When Simonides (ca. 556–465 BCE) was asked to choose between the two, he (allegedly) sidestepped the challenge by saying that Hesiod was the son of the Muses and Homer the son of the Graces, as if one was more inspired and the other more artful (HesiodT 157 Most).¹⁶ He also called Hesiod "a gardner" and Homer "a weaver of garlands, since the former planted the mythologies of gods and heroes and the latter wove the garlands of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* out of them" (HesiodT 16 Most), an account of Hesiod that rather concisely identifies him with the *Works and Days*, *Theogony*, and *Catalogue of Women* all at once. It also implicitly makes Hesiod older than Homer, as the laborer who provided the produce that Homer would shape into artful form.

No piece of evidence cited above is in itself conclusive, but taken together from all parts of Greece and from such a range of authors and genres, they form a picture that suggests that by the first half of the sixth century—for both artistic and educative reasons—Homer and Hesiod were linked as a pair, distinct from all other Greek performers, whose "compositions" were sufficiently authoritative and well known that other performers in multiple genres could rework them and play off of them for their purposes.¹⁷ What set them apart from their many competitors? The first expressed references to them by name singled both out for blame.

The primary charges were ethical and epistemological, not literary. Both performers came under fire for their blasphemous treatment of

the gods, especially when describing god-on-god violence: in the *Iliad*, gods fighting gods, Zeus's violent treatment of Hera and those who aid her, and Hera's physical abuse of Hephaestus, her son, were often chastised;¹⁸ similarly, Greeks frequently recoiled from the *Theogony*'s repeated stories of son-father violence, including Zeus's imprisonment of Cronus and the other Titans. By contrast, Zeus's swallowing of Metis received little notice. Theagenes of Rhegium (fl. 525) is identified as the first to "defend" a Homeric passage by reading it allegorically, that is, by finding an "underthought" (ὑπόνοια) to the surface story (DK 8 A1). In all likelihood he did not invent this form of apology but employed a strategy already in play by the middle of the sixth century.¹⁹ It would remain in vogue for another two millennia.

Xenophanes offers the earliest example of what will prove to be a long tradition of "philosophers" attacking the poets (myth-makers) for their depiction of the gods. A poet himself, dating to the second half of the sixth century, he regarded Hesiod and Homer as cut from the same cloth and censured both for their depiction of the gods:²⁰

Both Homer and Hesiod have attributed all those things to the gods
which in the human world are considered shameful and blameworthy:
to steal, to commit adultery, and to deceive one another.

(DK 21 B11 = HesiodT 97 Most)

Xenophanes has no patience whatsoever for Hesiod's vision of Zeus as a third-generation god who distributes honors and hurls thunderbolts; all that is either too close to the human condition or simply childish, i.e., ancient myth-telling. He regarded these stories as "fabrications (πλάσματα) from former times" (B1.22). He may also have had his sights on Hesiod when he wrote that "it is clear that no man has been, nor will there be a man, who knows about the gods" (B34.1–2). Also his dismissal of divine inspiration may have had Hesiod in mind: "the gods did not reveal all things to mortals from the beginning, but men discover better as they search things out in time" (B18).

For him, writers of poetry must be "good-spirited men," using "pure words (λόγοι) to tell pure myths (μῦθοι)" (B1.13–24).²¹ No reasoning man, he argued, would imagine the divine with a body: "The greatest of gods and men, the one god [was] not at all like mortals in form or in thought" (B23), and no gods should be thought of as wearing clothes, having bodies, and born into time (B14 and 15).²² Xenophanes supposed that a supreme deity must be "wholly seeing, wholly thinking, and wholly hearing" (B24) (and all-powerful?) and who never toils but "shakes all by the thought of his mind" (B25).²³

We cannot say what relation this god figure had to nature, but nothing in the few fragments suggests that he created the world. Xenophanes's vision of the one God is still a far cry from a *theodicy* or *cosmodicy*, but it is a step closer to imagining a rational universe controlled by mind and by a single, nonrepresentational godhead. With each succeeding century, the ancient Greeks will increasingly find fault with the "ancient poets" for their stories about the gods and will be drawn toward a morally coherent "monotheism."

Shortly after Xenophanes, another philosopher, Heraclitus (*fl.* 500), writing in the new medium of prose, attacks Hesiod, not as a poor theologian, but as a poor philosopher, a polymath knowing much but seeing little:

Hesiod, whom most men accept as their wise teacher, did not even know the nature of day and night, for they are one.

(DK 22 B57; HesiodT 113b Most).

Much learning does not teach understanding (*vóoς*); otherwise it would have taught Hesiod, (as it would have taught) Pythagoras, and again Xenophanes and Hecataeus.

(DK 22 B40; HesiodT 113a Most)

Three of these figures—Pythagoras, Hecataeus, and Xenophanes himself—are Heraclitus's near contemporaries and have to be dismissed as rivals in authority for that reason but Hesiod, named first and set apart from the others, was the ancient authority and more established rival. Heraclitus also ridiculed the Greeks for thinking of Homer as "the wisest" when even a child's riddle could expose the superficiality of his thinking (B56; cf. B42). The vehemence and number of those attacking Hesiod and Homer will intensify over the next millennium, a response that attests to the enduring power of these myths in Greek and Roman culture despite the angry passions that they also aroused.²⁴

Both these named attacks and signs of recastings discussed earlier raise the obvious but elusive question: What was it about "Homer" and "Hesiod" such that by 550 BCE, if not earlier, they were linked as a pair and seen as distinct from all others?

It begs the question to say that Hesiod and Homer were perceived as the oldest of Greek poets and gained authority for that reason. Glenn Most proposes five reasons for their pre-eminence: 1) *truthfulness*: "the epic poet, sanctioned by his Muse, really *knows*"; 2) *essentiality of content*: Hesiod's and Homer's songs were about "the largest and most important subjects available to their communities";

3) *comprehensiveness of content*: “Homer and Hesiod ... recognized in the new technology of writing an opportunity for creating works which brought together within a single compass far more material than could ever have been presented continuously in a purely oral format”; 4) *narrative temporality*: their “refinement and ingenuity ... in narrative technique”; 5) *looseness of macroscopic form vs. precision of microscopic form*: Homer’s “rigorous subordination of all parts to ... one central theme.”²⁵ Homer excelled in all five categories, while Hesiod fell short as an artist, in Most’s view: about Hesiod’s artistry, Most claims that his “formal organization seems to be ... strikingly lacking,” and he fails to make “inventive and original use of the traditional stock of epic formulae.”

Most’s five categories address both content and artistic merit, but the first of them does little to distinguish our figures from other singers of their age. Later Greeks and Romans singled out Hesiod and Homer as “most god-like” (*Certamen* 1), touched as it were by “a flash of fire from an invisible flame” (Dio Chrysostom 36.34). Claims of Muse-inspiration, however, would have set them apart from their contemporaries.

But in the other categories, Most is surely right, namely that Homer and Hesiod must have been singled out for their “essentiality of content” and “comprehensiveness,” although there is no reason to insist that their fullness of scope was a priori dependent upon writing. It is easy to see these qualities in Homer, including the unparalleled scale of the *Iliad*, imitated in its monumentality by the *Odyssey*. Aristotle adds the important point that only these epics were artistically arranged, subordinating episodes around a single story with a beginning, middle, and end (*Poetics* 1450b–51). Comprehensive treatment of essential themes, coupled with art, namely Homer’s “narrative refinement and ingenuity” and “rigorous subordination of all parts to one central theme,” speaks to Homer’s distinctiveness.

But what about Hesiod in terms of theme and art? In the *Works and Days*, casting the story of his brother’s transgressions within the context of the five ages of man, Prometheus, and Pandora, may speak to the question of essentiality of content, comprehensiveness, ingenuity, and subordination, but few scholars have found a coherent design for that poem. In regard to the *Theogony*, other creation myths must have been equally comprehensive, even if they may not have been considered as old.²⁶ This leads me to Most’s other categories: essentiality, refinement and ingenuity, and subordination of parts to a central theme. Here, the *Theogony* often falls under attack, not only by Most but by many others. Ancient and modern readers have noted with some irritation that its many genealogies can become tedious and its so-called digressions can make the structure of the poem hard to

follow. But, if we turn this question around, a different argument emerges. If we say that the *Theogony* is about Zeus, and that the story of evolution is subordinated, if you will, to that larger story, then the digressions—all political and Zeus-oriented in nature—help weave the genealogical story into a hymn to Zeus and keep the *Theogony*’s central theme before the reader even as it tells the story of evolution.²⁷ This, the Zeus-theme of Hesiod’s creation myth, may be the explanation for its prominence, as Hesiod subordinated a vast amount of material around a dominant theme. Furthermore, if we think of the *Theogony* as hymnal, as in part it surely is, then it exceeds in length the longest of the Homeric Hymns by twofold. As we have already seen in [Chapters 1](#) and [2](#), Hesiod’s remarkably innovative and original use of formulaic expression in his rather un-Homeric but brilliant use of personifications, punning, and changing definitions of words contributes artfully to the poem’s storyline. Perhaps, then, we can say that the *Theogony*, as well as Homer’s poems in their different ways, surpassed other archaic *epea* for their antiquity, in their vast and comprehensive scope, in their subordination of multiple episodes to a large single, central story, and in their artistic use of formulaic language.

Hesiod’s importance ranges over many categories. As we have seen, like Homer, he was praised—and ridiculed—as an inspired poet, informed by the Muses, and for his antiquity which established him as an ancient authority. Even more than Homer, the “polymath” was important for his “ancient wisdom,” quotable maxims, and call for hard work, his stories of creation and the nature of the universe, his vision of kings, positive and negative, and of social cohesion, his stories about the gods and their many couplings, and not least for his arcane knowledge of far away lands.

Coupled with his moralizing maxims, Hesiod’s significant offering to the Greeks was as an early political scientist, interested in the nature of justice and the making of social harmony. For him, manifestations of good governance are unique to Olympians and humans (cf. *Th.* 65–93, 782–804; *W&D* 225–47). His vision of community harmony, first in the heavenly city, then in the human city, most distinguishes him from Homer, and perhaps as well from his other competitors. In the *Works and Days*, he describes “laws” and “justice” as Zeus’s gift to humankind: “Zeus has drawn up this law (νόμος) for humans: / that fish and beasts and birds / devour one another because they have no justice, / but to humans he has given justice, which is by far / the best thing” (274–80). In that poem, corrupt and self-interested kings abuse that gift, and it requires the moral voice of a poet to remind the people, and kings, of it. In the *Theogony*, however, this gift is called “sacred” and it is transmitted by

Zeus-nurtured kings to men who are struggling with social unrest in the civic center.

This vision of justice was of a significantly different order from that of the natural philosophers like Anaximander and Heraclitus, who used the word δίκη to describe the cyclical oscillation from one extreme to another, as, say, from day to night. In the *Theogony*, by contrast, it describes a social order that is unchanging, internally harmonious, and permanent. To varying degrees of intensity, most subsequent Greeks interested in visions of an idealized polity looked to Hesiod.

In spite of these shared themes between the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days*, the two poems also appealed to different audiences and authors. With its first-person voice and moralizing maxims, the *Works and Days* has links to an emerging sympotic tradition, first in verse in the Archaic period and later in prose in the Roman imperial age. Looking at authors and texts influenced by the *Works and Days*, one turns especially to Alcaeus, Solon, Theognis, Semonides in Archaic poetry; to Xenophon, Prodicus, Isocrates, Plato, and the *Certamen* in fourth-century prose; to Callimachus and Aratus at Alexandria; to Dio Chrysostom, a spectrum of Second Sophistic authors, including Plutarch and Lucian, and to Aesop and Proclus in the imperial era. The *Theogony*, by contrast, was more likely performed in public settings at festivals and athletic games. Its third-person narrative voice, heavy use of personified abstractions and genealogical lists, and attention to creation stories and broad political themes attracted a different set of authors. Only a few of the writers in the list above overlap with those who have a prominent place in a study of the *Theogony's* reception. In addition to Solon and Plato, this list includes in the Archaic and Classical periods: composers of hymns from the Homeric Hymns to the Orphic rhapsodies; writers of other theogonies, in poetry and prose, including Epimenides and Pherecydes; Presocratic philosophers; and figures like Pindar, Aeschylus, and Aristophanes. In the Hellenistic and Roman periods, authors and texts at the top of the list include Callimachus, romances like Euhemerus' *Sacred History*, Crates at Pergamon, a variety of Stoic writers, universal histories from Diodorus Siculus' *Historical Library* to Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, Apollodorus, Lucian and a number of Christian apologists.²⁸ Hellenistic and Roman authors, as a rule, tended to look at only a few isolated scenes from the *Theogony's* long proem, but in the archaic and classical periods, the entire poem was influential, especially for writers who were interested in questions of Olympian harmony and idealized social justice. Our consideration for the remainder of this chapter will focus on these writers and texts.

The Homeric Hymns

These hymns (ranging in date from the Archaic to Hellenistic periods) were assembled and attributed to Homer in Hellenistic times. In terms of content, story pattern, genealogies, diction, and verbal parallels, however, they are considerably closer to Hesiod's *Theogony*, which itself has features resembling a hymn.²⁹ Many of the 33 poems in the collection evoke the *Theogony* directly (or, if one prefers, the Hesiodic theogonic tradition) and challenge, augment, or complement Hesiod's creation myth in telling ways. One hymn (#25)—asserting that singers come from the Muses and Apollo but kings come from Zeus—consists almost entirely of lines also found in the *Theogony* (1, 94–97, 104). Another hymn (#6) embellishes Hesiod's version of Aphrodite's birth from the sea, a genealogy that hymn #10 also seems to follow.³⁰

The four long hymns—to Demeter, Apollo, Hermes, and Aphrodite (hymns #2–5)—usually thought to be among the oldest, play off the *Theogony* in interesting ways. Each of them has at its core a concern for “how each of the gods received his portion” (to quote from the Homeric *Hymn to Hermes* 4.428), a question it shares with the *Theogony* (112). More significantly, each complements and confirms Hesiod's vision of a harmonious Olympus, even as it complicates or challenges that vision, often in charming ways.³¹ Here, I shall discuss the *Hymn to Aphrodite* briefly and concentrate more fully on the hymns to Demeter and Apollo.

The *Hymn to Aphrodite* (#5) (293 lines), perhaps dated between 675 and 630 BCE,³² delightfully pokes fun at Zeus's irrepressible sexual appetite and raises questions, as does the *Theogony*, about the relation between ἔρως and the social order. Much like “limb-loosening” Eros in the *Theogony*, “the most beautiful of the immortal gods, who overpowers the mind and prudent thought in the breasts of all gods and men” (120–22), the Aphrodite of this hymn “rouses sweet desire in the gods and overpowers the tribes” of men, birds, and the creatures of land and sea (5.2–5). In particular she “has led astray the mind of Zeus, who delights in thunder, although he is the greatest and partakes of the greatest τιμή. Even him, whenever she wishes, she beguiles from sagacious thoughts and easily causes him to mate with mortal women” (5.36–39). By the end of the *Theogony* Zeus has become renowned for “his superior understanding and thought” (656; cf. 896) and to some measure for having redefined φιλότης (cf. *Th.* 651), but in the hymn Zeus is defeated again and again by Aphrodite's enchantments until he manages to turn the tables on the love goddess and causes her to fall victim to her own charms. To that extent, the hymn confirms that Zeus is not totally helpless in the face of

Aphrodite's powers, regaining as he does by the myth's end a certain mastery over her.

In both poems, Zeus “know[s] imperishable counsels.” In the *Theogony*, this phrase occurs at 545, 550, 561; in the hymn, it appears at verse 53 in relation to Zeus making Hera his chaste and caring wife, just before he manages to inflict upon Aphrodite a “sweet desire” for the mortal Anchises (53). Her love-making will take place in the wilds of Mt. Ida and outside the bonds of marriage, but the union will produce Aeneas, who will rule over the Trojans, as will his children's children in continuous succession (cf. 196–97). The hymn thus tacitly seems to confirm that Zeus *cannot* fully socialize or tame an irreverent Aphrodite but he *can* turn her sexual energy to serve the city's stability. In this poem, he can also grant “beautiful honor” to a virginal Hestia, untamed by Aphrodite, so that “instead of marriage” Hestia will be worshipped in all houses and in every temple (29). In summary, then, one might say that the Homeric *Hymn to Aphrodite* charmingly exposes weaknesses in Zeus's power that are glossed over in the *Theogony*, even as it agrees with Hesiod's broader portrait of a sagacious Zeus whose rule is secure and even-handed.

One cannot say whether or not this hymn plays off the Hesiodoc tradition or the *Theogony* directly, but for the hymns to Demeter (ca. 600–580 BCE; cf. Richardson, 1974: 5–11 and West, 2012: 239) and to Apollo (composed in two parts ca. 520 and 585 BCE, respectively), the argument for direct allusion appears more probable. Again, Zeus's control over eros and female figures remains a central theme. The verbal parallels between the opening of the *Hymn to Demeter* (#2) (495 lines) and the *Theogony* are striking: the *Hymn to Demeter* 1–3:

Δήμητρ' ἡΰκομον σεμνήν θεὸν ἄρχομ' αἰίδειν,
αὐτήν ἥδ' ἐθύγατρα τανίσφυρον, ἣν Αἰδωνεύς
ἥρπαξεν, δῶκεν δὲ βαρύκτυπος εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς,
Of Demeter, fair-haired, revered god, I begin to sing,
and her daughter, trim-ankled, whom Aïdoneus (Hades)
seized, given away by deep-thundering, all-seeing Zeus,

and the *Theogony* 912–14:

αὐτὰρ ὁ Δήμητρος πολυφόρβης ἐς λέχος ἦλθεν·
ἦ τέκε Περσεφόνην λευκώλενον, ἣν Αἰδωνεύς
ἥρπασεν ἧς παρὰ μητρός, ἔδωκε δὲ μητίετα Ζεὺς.
Then Zeus went to the bed of Demeter who feeds many,

who begot white-armed Persephone whom Aïdoneus
seized from her mother, given away by Zeus lord of wisdom.

The parallels cannot answer the question whether the two passages reflect a common oral source or the later hymn-poet deliberately plays off of the *Theogony*. The abbreviated list of Oceanids at 417–23 also closely parallels the list at *Th.* 349–61.

Regardless, the echo invites comment, as the hymn begins the story where Hesiod ends it, exposing what the *Theogony* glosses over. From the *Theogony* one would never realize that Zeus was at risk when he gave away his daughter in marriage to Hades. Nor might one realize that he neglected to inform either the bride or her mother of the arrangement. In the hymn, however, the bride-gift invokes in Demeter an “anger and terrible wrath (μῆνις)” at all the gods for what Zeus has done (350, 410). It is a wrath which echoes Hera’s “extreme wrath and strife at her husband” in the *Theogony* (928) and the Homeric *Hymn to Apollo* (3.305–55). In contrast to Hera’s ineffectual fury, however, in this story Demeter will wreak havoc upon the earth, mortals, and Olympians alike, and she will compel Zeus to grant her whatever τιμαί she demands.

Zeus may appear in control at the beginning of the hymn when “by the will of Zeus” (9) Earth creates the narcissus flower as a “trick” that triggers Persephone’s seizure, and marriage, but any semblance of his control over the story soon vanishes (*pace* Clay, 1989). In the *Theogony*, μῆδεα (in the sense of council or plan) is associated exclusively with Zeus’s ascendancy and power, but in this hymn “Demeter’s plans” (μῆδεα) (453, cf. 351) dictate the action. He did not foresee Demeter’s wrath at the marriage (90–94, 201, *passim*) or its consequences, including the loss of honors (τιμαί) for the Olympians when Demeter brings famine on the earth (350–54). To a much greater extent than Aphrodite in her hymn, in this one Demeter poses a real and sustained threat to Zeus’s regime. Nor may it be a coincidence that in this hymn Zeus acquired Olympus by lot (lines 85–86; cf. *Il.* 15.189–91), not by principled statesmanship as in the *Theogony*.

The hymn, however, is only partially about Persephone’s (Kore’s) parents. It also tells an intimate story, not found in the *Theogony*, of mothers and daughters and the mysterious transformations of womanhood from puberty to mature woman to one past her years of fertility. This aspect of the myth further doubles as a story about the seasons and serves as a prologue introducing the secrets of the Eleusinian Mysteries. These stories cannot be fully explored in this study but will be rehearsed, in so far as they bear on the hymn’s

relation to the *Theogony*.

This will not be the only Greek story of abduction that is also a story of marriage.³³ What is clearly traumatic for mother and daughter is, in the eyes of the rest of the world, a source of joy and marriage. Both views converge in the description of the narcissus, the flower that allures. Some interpret the flower as a “monstrosity of nature,” its 100 heads analogous to the 100-headed Typhoeus, but in the hymn the narcissus is both a trick and an object of reverence (σέβας) which fills Heaven, Earth, and the sea with laughter (8–14). This springtime bulb-flower, with 100 heads of flowers raising “from its roots” (12), thus appears as a joyous contrivance and a fitting image of a sacred marriage which joins the upper and lower realms. It is also a stand-in for Persephone, or κοῦρη (daughter),³⁴ who is herself described as a girl with a face like a budding flower (8; cf. 79, 108, 420, 427), a likeness that Milton also saw (although he did not know this poem) when he described “Proserpine gathering flowers, / Herself a fairer flower” (*P.L.* 4.269). Her budding sexuality is further suggested by the way she reaches for the flower with both hands but her tender age and sexual innocence are implied when she calls the flower a child’s “toy” (16). It is also part of the Greek wedding that a bride dedicates toys to one of the wedding goddesses.³⁵ Echoes of ancient wedding rites are further suggested by Persephone’s reluctance and screams when abducted, both inscribed in the ancient Greek *epithalamia*. Similarly, Demeter’s grief at Persephone’s “marriage” reflects (more modern) Greek songs where the bride’s mother can regard her daughter’s wedding as a kind of death.³⁶

But there the similarities to a Greek wedding stop. In Demeter’s understandable rage at her daughter’s abduction, she leaves the assembly of the gods (91–92), as Hera does when pregnant with Typhaon (*hApollon* 3.347–48), before she unleashes her full wrath upon Zeus and the earth. This wrath stems from Zeus’s unwarranted giving away of her daughter “in marriage” without the mother’s or daughter’s forewarning, let alone their consent. But Demeter’s transformation into an old woman “long past her ability to bear children or enjoy the gifts of Aphrodite” (101–2) at the moment she learns of Koure’s “marriage” suggests that there may be multiple ways of understanding her wrath, as we shall consider shortly. As an old crone, she comes to Eleusis, where in time she will introduce her Mystery rites, and at the same time bring a “cruel famine” (311) upon the earth. This devastation far exceeds anything that Hera herself or her Typhaon managed to achieve.

The *Theogony* alludes to this complex and Zeus-deflating story with hardly a word. It informs us only that the daughter was seized from her mother, given away by Zeus to his brother Hades. The hymn tells

the fuller story: of female grief, anger, and vengeance, and, as an important contrast to the *Theogony*, of female “plans.” Some argue that the hymn confirms patriarchy as Earth, at Zeus’s request, sets the trick for Persephone and that Demeter returns to Olympus.³⁷ But little in the hymn supports such a one-sided reading, exposing, instead, a far more complex picture of the balance of power between female and male and of the Greek view of marriage. First, we note that Zeus pays dearly for his imposition of giving away his daughter without the mother’s or daughter’s shared involvement in the wedding. Well beyond anything Zeus can control, Demeter, yearning for her deep-bosomed daughter, causes the bountiful earth to lie barren for a most dreadful and cruel year, endangering the human race and depriving the Olympians of their γέρα (prerogatives, offerings) and glorious τιμή (304–12). Demeter, not Zeus, controls whether the Olympians will in the future gain τιμή. Zeus is at her mercy and must “perceive and consider in his heart” (313) how to make amends for this violation. More than the *Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite*, this hymn reads like a corrective to the *Theogony*: Zeus cannot control the family according to his will and he must dispense τιμή at least to this earth/fertility goddess, as she dictates.³⁸

But, at the same time, the hymn also like the *Theogony* tells a “succession story,” this time of mother and daughter, not father and son. It is no small part of the myth that Demeter takes on the persona of a mortal woman past her childbearing years at the moment of her daughter’s sexual maturation. With a hint of wanting to stop change, Demeter wants Persephone to be returned above the earth for the full 12 months as if nothing has altered (393–403). But, of course, there have been enormous changes, including Persephone’s ingestion, whether by stealth (372 and 411) or by force (413), of the pomegranate seed. Persephone is no longer the girl she was before the abduction/marriage, and she cannot return to her former self but must stay in the underworld with her husband for a third of the year. Equally important in the story is the role of Rhea, Demeter’s mother, in getting her daughter to release her wrath and to be re-integrated into the community of gods (441–70). Yielding to her mother, Demeter allows the earth, barren by her plans, to bear fruit once again; she also implicitly accepts her restored honors (τιμαί) and agrees to return to Olympus. This shift in Demeter’s identity from mother to daughter is an essential part of the story, underscored epithetically, I suspect, in the shift of the honorific “fair-haired” (ῥῥκομος) from Demeter at verse 1 (also 297, 315) to Rhea at verse 442 (also 60, 75) at the time Demeter relents her anger.³⁹ The hymn thus hints at the possibility that Demeter’s wrath may spring not only from her daughter’s abduction and “death” but also, as in the male

version of the succession myth, from her own displacement from mature female to crone at the moment of Persephone's "marriage." Rather than displacement in the female version of this generational conflict, in the full cycle of this myth, we witness the three stages of the mystery of fertility in relation to the female body from prefertile girl, to fecund mature woman, to postfertile aged mother. Rhea as Demeter's mother helps bring this cycle into focus. Unlike the male version of the succession myth in the *Theogony*, Demeter lets go of her μῦνις at the moment her own mother intervenes, and the cycle of nature from death to rebirth, associated here with the female cycle from prefertile to fertile to postfertile, is re-confirmed. In the Rhea-Demeter-Kore configuration, Demeter and the audience come to witness the tripartite stages of a woman's fertility, analogous to the corn's rhythm from seed, to full "fair-haired" bloom, back to seed.

It seems wrong, therefore, to read Demeter's return to Olympus as simply one more "payoff" to maintain patriarchy. Compared to the *Theogony*, the hymn offers a counterforce to any single-minded confidence in Zeus and patriarchal rule. It exposes limits to his control over the earth and fecundity and over marriage and female sexuality. But the hymn also tells another story, dramatizing the bond between mother and daughter at the painful moment of the daughter's awakening sexuality and "marriage." Demeter's return to Olympus should be understood in the context of both stories. Whereas the *Theogony* celebrates the movement away from the natural and cyclical to the political, stable and permanent, this hymn explores the complexities and mysteries of the cyclical, in the context of nature's rhythms and of female fertility. In this hymn, all characters have something to learn: Zeus discovers limits to his powers, Persephone cannot return to a childhood with her mother, and the mature Demeter, through her mother, learns the nature of her being both mother and daughter.

The long Homeric *Hymn to Apollo* (#3) (546 lines), like the *Hymn to Aphrodite* (#5), teases the reader with the thought that Zeus's power might be threatened by the arrival of a new god. But his son turns out to be totally supportive of his father, helping him tame the world of dangerous female figures, including those nurtured by Hera against her husband. The hymn appears to join two songs, the first detailing Apollo's birth on Delos (1–178) (ca. 520 BCE), and the second narrating his violent takeover of Delphi (179–546) (ca. 585 BCE). Thematic echoes of the *Theogony* in the second of the two stories, especially, are striking.

When the hymn opens with a description of all the Olympians "trembling" at the arrival of the young god into Zeus's house, one might suspect that the young god will bring trouble to Olympus.⁴⁰

But, by a clever twist of expectations, it will be Apollo's mother, Leto, who unstrings her son's bow, and it will be Zeus who welcomes him to the assembly of gods with a warm toast. Apollo quickly shows himself to be an ever-loyal son. At birth, he rejects his mother's breast and immediately swears his services to Zeus (cf. 131–32). He takes on his familiar role (in all accounts but the *Theogony*'s) of leading a chorus of goddesses and gods—the Graces, Horae, Harmonia, Hebe, Artemis, and Aphrodite (here, Zeus's daughter), Ares, and Hermes—in dance: in the middle of them all, Apollo in a radiance of light plays the lyre and high steps in time to the beat. The faces of Leto and Zeus beam at the sight of their “own son playing among the immortal gods” (206; cf. 186–206).⁴¹

The hymn differs from the *Theogony* in that the serious threat to Zeus's order comes directly from Hera, who feels a burning resentment that Zeus has produced such a powerful son out of wedlock (cf. 95–106) and who suffers an even worse humiliation at the birth of Athena (cf. 305–31). As in the *Hymn to Demeter*, a rage that is alluded to in passing in the *Theogony* (927–28) is in this hymn fully dramatized when Hera (not Gaia, as in the *Theogony*) begets the monster Typhaon. (Once in this hymn at 367, he is called Typhoeus, as his name is spelled in the *Theogony*.) In Hesiod, Gaia mates with Tartarus and becomes pregnant with Typhoeus biologically, while in this telling Hera produces him parthenogenically in anger,⁴² after Zeus “dishonored” (ἀτιμάζειν, 312) her by giving birth to Athena. The intent in both cases is to create a monster who can overthrow Zeus. Hera's effort at revenge is elaborate. First, she protests publicly in the assembly, denouncing Zeus for her humiliation: “Wretched one, crooked cunning. What else will you devise now? How did you dare to give birth to Athena alone. Couldn't I have borne her, I who am at least called your wife?” (322–24). Then, she withdraws from the gods for a year, staying away from her throne and Zeus's bed, until the monster is born. She prays he will be stronger than her husband. After his birth, Hera hands the child over to a female “dragon” (snake), “a well-fed, enormous, savage monster who did many evils against man in the land, against them and their sheep, since she was a bloody bane” (302–4). Like this nurse, the monster Typhaon “did many evils against the famous tribe of men” (355), but he never will come close to threatening Zeus or overturning the order of things, as the narrative at this point abruptly ends the story of Typhaon and describes Apollo killing the serpent nurse.

The hymn frames the story of Typhaon's birth (305–55) twice over, first in a story of Apollo and the female serpent Telphousa (244–76 and 375–87) and more narrowly in the story of the female serpent at Delphi who raises Hera's child (300–4 and 356–74). The transitions in

this intricately woven sequence of tales are abrupt and awkward, and especially so in the case of the Typhaon piece, which enters into and drops out of the narrative without warning. Understandably, scholars have been tempted to regard it as a later intrusion. But far from being unprecedented in oral composition, its double-framing may even suggest its heightened position as a central piece in an elaborate composition designed to highlight the dangerous nature of female and chthonic resistance to Zeus's rule.

When comparing the hymn to the *Theogony*, we are reminded once again how minor a role Apollo plays in Hesiod's poem. But in this hymn the dynamic between father and son changes significantly when the swaggering bow-carrying Apollo takes center stage as the dutiful son eager to carry out his father's work. He turns his back on his mother at birth, twice he slays female serpents (and implicitly Typhaon) who threaten the human world, and he becomes his father's oracular voice at Delphi. To a much greater degree than in Hesiod's poem, the hymn manages to dramatize the full nature of Hera's humiliation and her efforts to regain her lost τιμή as it also reveals how her struggle is utterly futile when Apollo harshly defeats the serpents. Like the Heracles of the *Theogony*, the Apollo of this hymn is cast as the male son who helps free the earth of monstrous, chthonic females, and perhaps for that reason his slaying of the two female snakes is narrated more fully than is Typhaon's death.

Another detail in the hymn is difficult to understand in the context of the *Theogony*. This refers to the content of the Muses' song on Olympus, as Apollo and the other young Olympians dance. The Muses sing of the "gods' immortal gifts and man's sufferings, as many sufferings as men have from the gods, living a witless existence, unable to find a remedy against death or a defense against old age" (189–93). As the song is reported in *oratio obliqua*, it is difficult to detect its tone or the mood of the Olympians as they dance to it. Not all will be convinced by Stephen Halliwell's argument (2008: 59) that gloating runs counter to the Olympians' nature, even when, as he recognizes, they can on occasion exact extreme cruelty against each other or against mortal kind. From the report we cannot tell what was the content or who were the recipients of these divine gifts. Since death and old age are the defining characteristics of mortal weakness and suffering, these songs may refer to the gifts of some goddesses like Eos and Calypso to their mortal lovers to help them escape from one or both of these two shortcomings. Or, perhaps, they refer to the gods' collective gifts in the making of Pandora. Either way, they offer a stark contrast to the Muses' sacred gift in the *Theogony* that helps humankind escape, not from death and old age (children of Night), but from the harsh πόννοι (sufferings) of Eris and her children (*Th.*

93). Nor do these gifts resemble the Muses' gift of song, which helps even an anguished soul to forget his pains (*Th.* 103).

Solon

As both poet and Athenian statesman elected as an *archon* with extraordinary powers for the year 594/93 BCE, Solon is in some ways an historical *exemplum* of Zeus-nurtured kings in the *Theogony*. Like them, he tried to use the power of rhythmic speech (although not always with gentle words) to bring a city of discord back into communal harmony, expressly in an effort to find *Eunomia* in a time of troubled *Dusnomia*.

As numerous verbal echoes in his poetry show, Solon was widely versed in the works of contemporary poets like Tyrtaeus and Mimnermus, and he expresses enthusiasm for Sappho, but the great poetic and visionary model for Solon was Hesiod. As Richard Hunter observes (2014: 140): “an appropriation of Hesiodic themes and (in part) a Hesiodic voice may be regarded as one of Solon’s principal poetic techniques.” In the hundred years that separate him from Hesiod, class conflict had reached a fever pitch that the earlier poet could hardly have imagined. Nevertheless, in the midst of that turbulence, Solon turns to Hesiod for moral, political, and poetic guidance.

A fair number of words appear in Solon’s poetry for the first time in extant Greek. These include terms like στάσις (sedition or civic discord), διχροστασία (double or divided στάσις, sedition), and ἔμφυλος (στάσις) (internecine warfare). Old words acquire new meaning: what once meant satiety (κόρος) comes to mean “excess,” or, even more materially, simply “greed.” πόλεμος, which once almost exclusively referred to wars between opposing states, in Solon describes civil war (as once in Homer, also, at *Il.* 9.64). Hesiod’s ancient terms in the *Theogony*, like Discord, Manslayings, Lies, Quarrels, Words, and DoubleWords, seem tame and outdated in the new age of insatiable greed and class warfare. So does Zeus’s outrage in the *Works and Days* against those who commit adultery, harm a suppliant or guest, or violate the care of an orphaned child or aged parent (cf. 327–34). The intensity of the crisis stems in no small part from the introduction of coinage: with wealth came poverty, social inequity, and a brutal confrontation between the haves and have-nots.

Even in these changing times, Hesiod’s poetry and political vision

provide Solon with a conceptual model for understanding this social unrest and how to rescue the state. Hesiod's struggle in the *Works and Days* against a greedy brother and corrupt kings who threaten the communal well-being speaks directly to Solon's challenge. But the *Theogony* was equally important to him for its vision of collective harmony and distributive justice, not for the benefit of one faction over another, but for the welfare of the whole.

One recent study puts Hesiod's influence on Solon this way: his "reworking of Hesiodic justice does not so much constitute a 'breakthrough in Greek thought', but rather updates Hesiodic thinking, mak[ing] him ready for use in the new polis which is (admittedly) so different *from Hesiod's farming community*. Hesiod is not 'written off' (in an almost literal sense), but rather reborn as an authority on polis-bound justice" (my italics). Furthermore, the Hesiodic context, this author concludes, "is completely forgotten as Hesiod's advice turns out to be equally applicable to the new context of the nascent polis in its classical sense."⁴³ Such a reading of Hesiod as a primitive with small, village concerns is still common in some scholarly circles but hardly recognizes the thoughtful and various depictions of law, strife, speech, and good governance in the *Theogony* and its obvious concerns for harmonious cohabitation within an enclosed community. It also fails to recognize the *polis*-themes of the *Theogony*. Solon's reading of Hesiod, including the *Theogony*, moreover, does not require a rebirth for a new context but the insight that the Hesiodic *polis*-principles apply in a more intensely troubled time. As Joseph Almeida describes it: Solon "recognized the polis idea as the key to a restoration of order in Athens, ... describe[ing] these insights ... in the traditional language of *dike*. However, grafted on to the traditional were new thoughts gleaned from new insights."⁴⁴

The key evidence comes from Solon fragment 4 (West), although other fragments also speak to the point. In Solon's effort to achieve social coherence by distributing γέρας and τιμή equitably throughout the community, he is acting, broadly speaking, in a Zeus-like mode: "I gave the people as much privilege (γέρας) as was fitting, / neither taking away nor over stretching their amount of honor (τιμή); / and for those who hold power and are marveled at for their wealth / I devised that they not have an inappropriate amount. / I stood, throwing a mighty shield over both parties / and I did not allow either side to prevail unjustly" (fr. 5 West); compare *Th.* 393–94, and *passim*. Contrary to the idealized "like-mindedness" of Olympus, however, in the bitter reality of Athenian στάσις the solitary poet and statesman cannot curb the greed of rich citizens. In Solon's Athens, gods will not bring down the city but human excess.⁴⁵

Cast in the language of his day, Solon's litany of the ills that beset

Athens, as described at the beginning of fr. 4, echoes Hesiod's litany of anxieties in the *Works and Days*: "persuaded by money, citizens are willing to destroy the great city in their foolishness, and the mind of the leaders of the people (δῆμος) is unjust" (4.5–7). "Driven by *hybris*, leaders do not know how to restrain their greed or how to order the feast in peace" (9–10). "An inescapable wound has come upon the entire city / ... / and slavery awakens somnolent war and internecine στάσις" (17 and 19). "The august foundation of Dike / observes in silence" (14–15) and in time will exact her vengeance.⁴⁶

His language at the end of the fragment, however, draws from the *Theogony* (as well as *W&D* 5–8) when he evokes Eunomia in a hymn-like prayer to halt *Dusnomia* (4.30–39):

This is what my heart urges me to teach the Athenians,
that *Dusnomia* brings myriad evils to the city,
but *Eunomia* reveals all things well-ordered and fit,
and often it shackles the feet of the unjust,
makes the rough smooth, stops excess/greed, dims *hybris*,
and dries up the blooming flowers of ruin (ἄτη);
it straightens crooked judgments, it softens disdainful
deeds, and it stops the acts of *divided stasis* (διχοστασία),
and it stops the anger of *grievous discord* (ἔρις); under her
all things among men are fitting and prudent.

Dusnomia appears in only two passages in extant Greek literature: here and *Theogony* 230. Solon seems well acquainted with Hesiod's usage. In both places, *Dusnomia* is personified as an abstract force. As in Hesiod's poem, Bad Governance comes at the end of a list, the one term that captures the essence of the multiple forces that harm a community from within. As in the *Theogony*, *Dusnomia* appears before *Eunomia*, a precondition, that *Eunomia* is called upon to put down. For Solon, *Eunomia*'s key function is to stop (παύει) forces of upheaval whether it be ἄτη, acts of διχοστασία, or the anger of ἔρις (cf. 4.34, 37, and 38) as in the *Theogony* Zeus's kings "utterly stopped" (κατέπαυσεν) a great νεῖκος (quarrel) in the agora (*Th.* 87). In both cases, the dominant verb is that *Eunomia* must *stop* social upheaval. In fragment 4, most of the terms for unrest appear as lower case nouns and are not overly personified: ἄτη, διχοστασία, ἔρις, words which in the *Theogony* were deities: *Atê*, *Eris*, *Neikos*, *Logoi*, and *Amphillogiai*.

When Solon does personify, as in the case of *Eunomia*, *Dusnomia*, and *Dike*, he differs from Hesiod in that his personifications are

without genealogy. Thus, they appear less mythical and more like essences or abstract forces.⁴⁷ But they still have anthropomorphic characteristics: Solon's *Dusnomia*, like a warrior, leaps over courtyard walls and penetrates the innermost recesses of a house. His *Eunomia* shackles, dims, dries up, straightens, softens, and stops, and his *Dike* observes all in silence but, unlike Hesiod's *Dike*, she does not answer to Zeus (cf. *W&D* 260–61). Rather, she is an independent agent, observing human behavior to make her judgments and taking action as she deems fit. Furthermore, in Solon she has narrowed her focus to punish the greedy rich who use their money and power to crush their impoverished fellow citizens.

It is frequently proposed that Solon's deliberate polarity of *Dusnomia* and *Eunomia* in verses 31–32 is an advance upon Hesiod, since in the *Theogony* almost 700 lines separate Eris's *Dusnomia* (230) from Zeus's and Themis's *Eunomia* (902), a distance in the eyes of one reader that makes it difficult "to grasp the strong and antinomic relationship that links [them]."⁴⁸ Solon's juxtaposition of the two figures is certainly pointed, but the argument against Hesiod is insensitive to differences in genre and style. Solon's elegiac poem is an exhortation to action, while Hesiod is narrating a long epic tale where themes evolve progressively. Nor is the gap between *Dusnomia* and *Eunomia* in the *Theogony* as wide as some might think: aspects of *Eunomia* were already introduced in the proem when Hesiod described Zeus's good distribution of honors among the Olympians and their life of laws and cherished customs (66 and 73–74; cf. 883–85). Hesiod has also praised the good work of kings who stop a great quarrel with their gentle words and straight justice (80–93). He has pointedly contrasted the bad governance of Eris and her children with the gentle manner of the just Nereus (233–36). And, he has already described how Olympus is free from *eris*, *lies*, and *quarrel* (782–83), lowercase forms of *Dusnomia*'s mother and siblings, all before *Eunomia* is born at 902. Thus, much in the *Theogony* anticipates Zeus's and Themis's creation of *Eunomia* as a foil for Eris's *Dusnomia*.

In sum, Solon does not need to forget the context of Hesiod's poems completely in order to breathe new life into them. Like Solon, but in a much less turbulent time, Hesiod speaks to the conditions of the emerging *polis*. It is also a mistake to think that Solon only learned from the *Works and Days*. Even as social strife a hundred years after Hesiod had reached an extreme of civil war that he could hardly have foreseen, his vision of *Eunomia* "stopping" *Dusnomia* and the manner of political leaders bringing harmonious cohabitation in the city *agora* through straight justice and poetic speech needs little translation to a new time. As in Hesiod, Solon's *Eunomia* represents an idealized and stable political harmony based on equitable distribution. Solon is the

first to recast this aspect of the *Theogony*; Aeschylus and Plato in later times will do so, as well.

The Presocratics: Anaximander and Heraclitus

Not much later than Solon, a new group of thinkers in the Greek East and West are equally influenced by the *Theogony*,⁴⁹ but their vision of justice and harmony takes a very different turn. Again, scholars tend to discuss this modification of Hesiod in terms of intellectual progress, although there is reason to question that view, as we shall see shortly.

Like Hesiod in the *Theogony*, these men of science are interested in the beginning of things and how the world works but, as an advance, they are also eager to discover first principles and to free themselves from the prisonhouse of mythical thinking. Aristotle called this new class of intellectual explorers, φυσικοί or φυσιολόγοι (“those concerned with the nature of things”), to distinguish them from θεολόγοι (“theologians” including “Hesiod and all the cosmologists”) and from those who speak “mythically” (including Homer, Orpheus, Pherecydes, and the Persian Magi, among others) (*Metaph.* III.4, 1000a).⁵⁰ The fourth-century philosopher acknowledged that a “lover of myth” (φιλόμυθος) was also, in a sense, a “lover of wisdom” (φιλόσοφος) as “myth is [also] composed of wonder” (*Metaph.* I.2, 982b). “Myth think,” best characterized by genealogical narrative, however, prevented someone from searching for first principles (ἀρχαί), a key objective in the language of demonstration, scientific λόγος and abstract axiomatic thought. With some notable exceptions, this new breed of investigators did not seek inspiration from the Muses, and they developed a new mode of writing, that is, prose, in place of Hesiod’s wisdom-poetry. When philosophers do identify a god by name, it is usually understood as a shorthand to discuss natural phenomena or abstract principles. Borrowing from Hesiod, these writers were also fond of using personified abstractions, but, like Solon, they disengaged them from genealogy and turned what was a deity into an essence or natural force.⁵¹

Aristotle argued that Hesiod was on the cusp of being a φυσικός when he identified Eros at the beginning of things in the *Theogony* (116–17, 120), an insight that might have positioned him to be “the first to look for [an efficient] cause,” i.e., ἀρχή, as a means to explain “the source of movement in things” (*Metaph.* I.4, 984b; HesiodT 117c.ii Most). The “wisdom of myth,” however, was “spurious” and

kept Hesiod from using “the language of demonstration” (*Metaph.* III.4, 1000a) and discovering “the cause of all order (κόσμος) and arrangement (τάξις)” (*Metaph.* I.3, 984b).⁵² Consequently, Hesiod did not appear “sober” (νήφρων) (*Metaph.* I.3, 984b).

The Presocratic steady advance toward λόγος and scientific reasoning also prompts a new way of thinking about the divine, as we already have seen in the passages quoted above from Xenophanes and Heraclitus. About the θεολόγοι, Aristotle writes: “When making gods and gods-generated-from-gods first principles, they say that anything which did not taste of nectar and ambrosia became mortal ... [These] for me are statements beyond comprehension, for if the gods take these things for pleasure, then nectar and ambrosia cannot be the cause of the gods’ existence. But if they are the cause and the gods are in need of sustenance, then how can they be eternal?” (*Metaph.* III.4, 1000a). The ancient stories are also unsound as it is “an impossibility for the Deity” (τὸ θεῖον) to be “jealous by nature. ... As the proverb says, ‘singers tell many lies’” (*Metaph.* I.2, 982b–983a). Herein lies a central component of the ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy: stories not shaped by reason are untrustworthy.

There are many modern versions of Aristotle’s assessment of Hesiod in relation to the Presocratics; I cite Jean-Pierre Vernant, who, *ala* Aristotle, writes of Hesiod’s myth-thought as a kind of prisonhouse of the mind:⁵³

Despite the attempt at conceptual delineation it represents, Hesiod’s thought remained the prisoner of its mythic framework. Ouranos, Gaia, and Pontos were indeed physical realities, having the concrete aspects of sky, earth, and sea; but at the same time they were divinities who coupled, reproduced, and behaved generally like human beings. ... To break with the vocabulary and logic of myth, Hesiod would have needed a comprehensive idea capable of replacing the mythic schema of a hierarchy of powers ruled by a sovereign. What he did not have was the ability to portray a universe obedient to the rule of law, a cosmos set in order through the application to all its parts of a single order of *isonomia*, consisting of equilibrium, reciprocity, and symmetry.

Like Aristotle, Vernant argues here that the Presocratics, inspired by Babylonian mathematicians, were able, once free from myth-thought, to think axiomatically, enabling them to seek “the cause of all order” or to find the rule of law governing the universe, what Vernant calls “the comprehensive idea” consisting of reciprocity and symmetry.

To turn from these generalizations to specifics, I shall focus primarily on two philosophers from the Ionian East (Anaximander and Heraclitus) and two from the west (Parmenides and Empedocles).

Numerous studies consider Anaximander (ca. 610–546 BCE) directly in relation to the *Theogony*. As one study puts it: “In the sixth century BC, the competition for Ionian theory was not some other scientific or philosophical theory, ... but Hesiod’s account of the world, chiefly in the *Theogony*, but also in the *Works and Days*, that defines the standard view of the world.” (Graham, 2006: 93). Compare Michael Stokes: “Hesiod’s cosmogony or one very like it had an abiding influence on the Milesian thinkers, and that the order of events in the philosophical accounts, in Anaximenes certainly no less than in Anaximander, was derived either from Hesiod or from a source known also to Hesiod.” Of special note was Hesiod’s less-than-systematic account of the birth of Earth, Sky, Night, and Sea (cf. *Th.* 106–7), which “partly anticipated” Ionian efforts to understand natural phenomena according to air, earth, fire, and water.⁵⁴

Views vary whether Hesiod’s Chaos also influenced Anaximander’s conception of the divine τὸ ἄπειρον, “the Unlimited” (a neuter singular noun like Hesiod’s parentless Chaos) that lies outside the cosmos altogether and surrounds our universe and any others, if they exist. Unlike Hesiod’s Chaos, Anaximander saw the divine τὸ ἄπειρον steering the universe, albeit without consciousness or volition.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, Stokes speaks for many when he sees it as a bold reworking of Hesiod. So it may be, but much of what Stokes says about Hesiod’s Chaos seems misguided. He describes it as 1) the source of all things 2) which *surrounds* the Earth (as Anaximander’s τὸ ἄπειρον surrounds the cosmos), 3) composed of “single stuff without mixture.”⁵⁶ None of these claims seem likely: 1) Hesiod does not describe Chaos as the source (parent) of Earth, Eros (or Tartaros?), but only of Erebus and Night; 2) it does not appear to surround the Earth but lies somewhere beneath it; 3) rather than a primal unity Chaos appears to be a primal gap, or first opening, making other divisions possible.⁵⁷

Stokes then describes how Anaximander loosely recasts the *Theogony*’s birth sequence according to five stages of natural evolution: 1) from the τὸ ἄπειρον, a seed of hot and cold emerges, the cosmos coming into being with their separation: 2) *earth* forms from the cold, and 3) a sphere of *flame* from the hot which grows around the cosmos like bark around a tree. Between them is the *air*. In a clear departure from the *Theogony*, 4) the flame breaks off into circles of sun, moon, and stars. These fiery bodies and winds dried up much of the original moisture, 5) resulting in aerial vapors and the *sea* in the areas of the earth’s hollows. Stokes likens the sequence loosely to the *Theogony*’s progression from 1) Chaos, 2) to Earth, 3) to Night, Erebus, Day, and Aither, 4) to the Heavenly bodies from Earth, and 5) to the Mountains, Sea, and Ocean. Graham describes Anaximander as

looking to “a closed system of natural explanation,” involving earth, fire, water, wind, hot, and cold, discovered by “the evidence of experience.” This world was initially generated out of a quasi-biological process via the τὸ ἄπειρον, but in the interaction of the four elements he “replaces biological procession with mechanical process.”⁵⁸

When we turn to Anaximander’s sole surviving fragment, the crucial comparison to Hesiod comes into focus. It is here where we can also consider Aristotle’s view, commonly echoed in modern times, about the impoverished state of Hesiod’s myth-think. In the fragment, the new φυσιολόγος discusses natural processes in terms of “justice,” “retribution,” and cosmic harmony. The expanded text is found in Simplicius’ *Physics* (24.13–20 = DK 12 A9); Anaximander’s words are in italics (= DK 12 B1):⁵⁹

Of those who say the source is one and in motion and boundless, Anaximander, the son of Praxiades, of Miletus, the successor and student of Thales, said the source and element of existing things was *the boundless*, being the first one to apply the term to the source. And he says it is neither water nor any other of the so-called elements, but some other boundless nature, from which come to be all the heavens [*ouranoi*] and the world-orders [*kosmoi*] in them: [B1] From what things existing objects come to be, into them too does their destruction take place, *according to what must be* [i.e. *necessity*], *for they give recompense and pay retribution to each other for their injustice according to the ordering of time* [or Time], expressing it in these rather poetic terms.

Language from the human legal system describes cyclical swings in nature as one natural element overreaches and “pays retribution” (διδόναι δίκην, “gives justice”) to another for its injustice (ἀδικία), i.e., excess. “Time” is the arbiter of this adjudication, presumably in the sense that hot pays for its excess by giving way to cold, or that birth pays for its excess of life by giving way to death. The process is cyclical, everlasting, and without interruption. If Anaximander considered justice in abstract terms, presumably he would have considered it either as the process itself, an oscillation of opposites in a self-correcting system, or as that moment of equilibrium between extremes.⁶⁰

A half century later, Heraclitus (ca. 540–ca. 475), also from Miletus, reduces Anaximander’s extended metaphor of justice into a theorem:

εἰδέναι δὲ χρὴ τὸν πόλεμον ἔόντα ξυνόν, καὶ δίκην ἔριν, καὶ

γινόμενα

πάντα κατ' ἔριν καὶ χρεών.

It is necessary to know that war is universal, justice strife
[discord], and all things

happen through strife and necessity. (DK 22 B80)

While retaining Anaximander's language for δίκη and necessity, Heraclitus refines it elegantly, stripping away the elaborate image of crime and punishment for two terms: δίκη ἔρις, "justice is strife."⁶¹ The formula expresses the full pattern: excess leads to penalty and justice lies in the balance of opposing forces. Elsewhere, he expresses the conflict in militaristic terms: "war is the father of all and king of all" (B53)⁶² to describe the pendulum swing between extremes whether in nature or human societies: "God is day night, winter summer, war peace, satiety hunger" (B67). Fire "will judge and convict all things" (B66). As with Anaximander, legal and political terminology primarily describes natural processes. As Charles Kahn describes it: "There is no split in principle between νόμος and nature. As an institution, law is neither man-made nor conventional: it is the expression in social terms of the cosmic order for which another name is Justice."⁶³

It is likely the case that both φυσιολόγοι draw their language for justice, strife, and the cosmos's violent harmony from Hesiod's personified language even as they argue for a new understanding of nature's laws. In the search for first principles, the Milesian theorists strove to reveal the natural world as κόσμος, that is, as "order." That order took the following form, as Kahn summarizes it (1960: 230): "an organized system, characterized by symmetry of its parts, periodicity of events, and equilibrium between conflicting factors." Without question, the boldness of thought and language is striking, exciting, and innovative, as Aristotle argued, but Aristotle and moderns praise the new at the expense of the old.

Far from wanting to identify justice or Zeus with first principles, in the *Theogony* Hesiod poses ways that Zeus might escape from the "natural world" into which he was born. For Hesiod, justice is contrary to nature and, far from being a universal principle, it is late-born and hard-won.⁶⁴ In the *Theogony*, only a new order can tame or alter the generative but unstable and endemically violent aspects of things as they were. The late-born god cannot change the world, but he can create a space within the world, call it culture or Olympus, which is composed of laws (νόμοι) and cherished customs where the discordant elements of the outer world, like ἔρις (discord) and νεῖκος (quarrel), can be kept at bay. The myth of the two generations of gods

preceding Zeus exposes the need to alter φύσις, or at least to tame it so that Olympians (and humans) can live in communal harmony. Rather than a prisoner of myth, Hesiod *uses* the language of myth and of genealogical succession effectively to establish a pattern of violence in the natural rhythms of biological succession and to expose the need to escape from that pattern. Zeus's achievement is not cosmic but political, not of nature but apart from it. To employ the later fifth-century terms of φύσις and νόμος (nature and law/culture), the *Theogony* celebrates νόμος for harnessing φύσις to the social good.

It is a key concern of this book to reveal how different these two views of justice are.⁶⁵ For Anaximander and Heraclitus, nature's justice and cosmic harmony exist in perpetual flux. As Heraclitus says, "harmonia is back-turning, like a bow or lyre" (B51); that is, harmony is the backward-turning pendulum swing in an ever-recurring vacillation from one extreme in nature to another.⁶⁶ On the musical scale it is comparable to the view of concord (συμφωνία) stemming "from the dissimilars with one another," as expressed in Pseudo-Plutarch's treatise "On Music" (attributed to Plato) (1138d). Hesiod, on the other hand, imagines a form of justice and civic harmony that is stable and permanent. This form of justice is only obtainable on Olympus and in the human *polis*, achieved through a system of good governance and concord. The dance step of the Horai, three as one, Dike with her two sisters, Eunomia and Eirene, reflects well the necessary linking of Justice, Good Governance, and Social Peace for such harmony. It is this Hesiodic vision of justice and harmony that resurfaces in texts like Aeschylus's *Eumenides* and Plato's *Republic*.

Parmenides and Empedocles

For φυσιολόγοι in the West, the *Theogony* also set the standard view of the world. As Xenophanes used poetry, including hexameter poetry, to censure the old poets for their anthropomorphic and irreverent portrayal of the gods, so his reputed student, Parmenides, used epic verse and the language of myth as a critique of Hesiod and those influenced by him.⁶⁷ "Early in the fifth century," Daniel Graham writes, "Parmenides recognizes [that] influence by beginning his poem with a proemium influenced by Hesiod, and by echoing his powers of Day and Night in his own cosmology."⁶⁸

Imitation was less flattery than challenge. Parmenides begins his poem with an initiation scene where an unnamed youth, travelling

beyond the gates of the paths of Night and Day, is guided, not by the Muses, but by the daughters of the Sun (fr. 1.5 and 9).⁶⁹ They introduce him to a goddess who reveals the “unshaken heart of well-rounded Truth / and the opinions of mortals” (fr. 1.29–30), whereas the things “double-headed, know-nothing mortals” (fr. 6.4–5) think contain only traces of the truth.⁷⁰ Like Hesiod’s Muses, then, this goddess speaks both the truth and falsehoods which sound like truth.⁷¹

Two passages in this long introductory and programmatic first fragment closely echo passages from the *Theogony*. In the first, language describing the youth’s passage through the gates of the paths of Night and Day suggests the *Theogony*’s account of Night and Day sharing the same house (*Th.* 748–57). Hesiod focuses on the house’s threshold as he describes one god passing over it on the way into the house as the other departs. But Parmenides emphasizes the passage from the house “into the light” as the daughters of the Sun “lift from their faces the veils” (of darkness and ignorance, we presume) (fr. 1.9–10). He also draws our attention to the sight and sounds of the huge gates (like the mighty gates of a Greek temple) opening as they make a “very gaping chasm” (χάσμι’ἄχανές). Justice guards this opening and closing (fr. 1.11–21). This chasm opens the way to Parmenides’s cosmology of Truth, a truth that is binary: there is only Being and Non-Being, once and forever or never at all.

When taking their initiate on this magical mystery tour, the daughters of the Sun strangely echo the *Theogony*’s description of Zeus-nurtured kings. As Hesiod’s kings “*persuade* (παραιφάμενοι) *with soft words*,” “*knowingly*” (ἐπισταμένως) and easily ending a great quarrel in the ἀγορή (*Th.* 87–90), so these daughters, “*persuade* (παραφάμεναι) *Justice with soft words*,” “*wisely*” (ἐπιφραδέως) and swiftly persuading her to “lift the fastened bolts from the gates” (fr. 1.15–17). Hesiod’s kings speak with “straight justice” (*Th.* 86), while Helios’s daughters lead the initiate’s chariot and horses “straight through” the mighty gates (fr. 1.20–21), where he will learn the “unshaken heart of well-rounded Truth / and the opinions of mortals” (fr. 1.29–30). In Parmenides, Hesiod’s Themis and Dike are not mother and daughter figures, concerned with proper proportion and Eunomia, but the two deities who sent the young traveler “on this path far from the trodden path of men” (fr. 1. 27–28).

Such verbal and thematic likenesses suggest that Parmenides considered the language and imagery of the *Theogony* with some care, adopting it for his own purposes. The truth Parmenides will tell is not about creation, as creation is a misguided human construct. There is only Being, unborn, indestructible, alone of its kind, unshaken, and without end (fr. 8.1–4). Only it exists and only it can be discussed:

non-Being is an impossibility, and mortal opinions about birth and death, becoming and evolution, are double-headed muddledness: “What birth/generation (γέννα) could you seek of [Being]? Whence and how did it grow? I shall not allow you to say or to think that it was from non-being. For what need made it arise at one time or another? It must either be entirely or not at all. ... How could it come into being? ... Thus, [the idea of] γένεσις (birth) is extinguished [i.e., out of the question] and destruction is inconceivable” (fr. 8.6–21). There have been many penetrating studies of Parmenides’s use of epic imagery,⁷² although none that I have seen notice Helios’s daughters imitating the language of Hesiod’s kings. What accounts for this allusion? Perhaps it was to draw from the authoritative poem of creation to refute its mistaken (and mortal) thinking as a way to initiate his own readers to his philosophical verses.

Parmenides’s language of personified abstractions is also within the Hesiodic tradition. But, like Solon, Parmenides avoids Hesiod’s myth-thought that links abstraction to genealogy. Each of the four faces of Being in Parmenides—Necessity (Ananke), Fate (Moirā), Justice (Dike), and Persuasion (Peitho)—is an agent who *actively* assures that Being cannot be other than what it is: strong Necessity *holds* Being firmly within the bonds of limit ... because it is not Lawful that what is should be unlimited (fr. 8.30–33). Fate *fettered* Being to be whole and immovable (fr.8.37). Justice herself *does not loosen* her fetters but *holds* them fast, not allowing generation or destruction to come into existence (fr. 8.13–15). Persuasion *accompanies* Truth (Aletheia) (fr. 2.4). As we have seen, Themis and Justice *send forth* the youth on his journey (fr. 1.28). Parmenides’s Eros is also personified, “the very first god” but not yet the ἀρχή (that distinction, according to Aristotle, belongs to Empedocles, a generation after Parmenides). He is rather “planned by a goddess who herself rules over *bitter* child-bearing and mingling, driving the female to mingle with the male and in turn the male with the female” (frs.12 and 13).

Close to a generation after Parmenides (and, thus, formerly belonging to the Classical period), another Western philosopher-poet, Empedocles, does Hesiod and Parmenides one better, not by claiming that he was visited by a god but that he was himself a fallen god with direct knowledge of the cosmos order. Even with this direct access, he calls upon the much-remembering Muse to enable him to describe what is right for short-lived mortals to hear. Using Parmenides’s logic against itself, he writes that there are four elements—earth, air, fire, and water—which are themselves eternal and unchanging but continually mixing in different combinations to create living creatures in a world of birth and death. The driving forces behind this flux are Love (Philotes or Philia) and Quarrel, or Strife (Neikos), reminiscent

both of the *Theogony*'s Eros (also Philotes) and Eris/Neikea (Strife/Quarrels) and of the Milesian oscillation of all things from one extreme to another. He describes this process in the following hexameters: "It is a twofold tale I shall tell. At one time from many it grew to be only one and at another time it divided from one into many. What is mortal has a twofold birth, and the passing away is twofold; for the union of all things both begets one generation and destroys it. The other is raised and scattered as they are again divided. And these things never ease their continual exchange, sometimes coming together into one by Philotes, at other times again being borne asunder by the enmity of Neikos" (DK 31 B17.1–8). Aristotle is not the only one to find this language a bit of a blurr: "if one were to follow what Empedocles says and attempt to understand it according to its true meaning and not according to its inarticulate mode of expression (i.e., poetic and metaphoric language)," he writes, "one will find that Philotes is the cause of good things and Neikos the cause of bad" (*Metaph.* I.2, 985a). But, for Aristotle, even this muddled expression is an advance over Hesiod's myth-speak as it moves toward abstract principle and explanatory λόγος.⁷³

Pindar

Boeotia's second great poet, Pindar (ca. 518–ca. 445 BCE), responds to Hesiod in a complicated way, but in a manner closer to Solon than to the Presocratics. Like Solon, he is deeply drawn to the *Theogony*'s personified abstractions, idealism of civic harmony and the inherent fecundity that comes from good governance. The most important figures from the *Theogony* for Pindar are Themis and her children with Zeus: Eunomia, Dike, and Eirene. Of the three sisters, Eunomia is often in the lead and the most prominent. At Aegina, "Themis, the savior, sits enthroned by Zeus, the god of hospitality" (*Ol.* 8.22–23); at Cyrene, the Horae are "well-throned" (*P.* 9.60). At Thebes, he calls upon Apollo to "wreath the offspring of the people (of Thebes) with the blossoms of temperate Eunomia" (fr. 52a Snell/Maehler); elsewhere, a city "flourishes with virtues, having Themis and her glorious daughter Eunomia, the savior, as her allotment" (*Ol.* 9.15–16). Another city abounds "with glorious youth because Eunomia dwells there, along with her sisters Dike, the secure foundation for cities, and Eirene, (collectively, the three sisters), the dispensers of wealth for men and the golden children of wise-counseling Themis."⁷⁴ Eunomia by herself "brings joy to the people" (fr. 346). As a

threesome, these goddesses “resolutely prevent Hybris, the bold-tongued mother of Excess” from infiltrating the city (*Ol.* 13.9–10).⁷⁵ Expanding wonderfully upon Hesiod’s inspired conceit of a just city as alive and blooming (*W&D* 227), Pindar imagines such a city as a healthy tree, nurtured by song. “The poet’s song waters the roots of the city-tree and ensures that it will continue to bear its heroic blossom,” as Donald Carne-Ross writes (1985: 36): “Its roots are the ancestral heroes and their foundational acts, the visible tree is the city’s continuing life, its leaves and flowers the city’s sons and their achievements.”

While Hesiod emphasizes the political link between heaven and earth in the figure of the Muses’ gift of a σκῆπτρον and of just kings, Pindar looks to the heavenly charms of choral performance. As Charles Segal writes, this is “a microcosm of divine and aesthetic order,” the poet’s φόρμιγξ, awash in the golden aura of its divine practitioners, linking heaven and earth: “Golden Lyre, jointly shared possession of Apollo and the violet-tressed Muses: the dance-step, beginning of radiance, hears you, singers obey your signals whenever you, quivering in song, fashion the preludes of hymns that lead the choruses. You quench the spear-pointed lightning of (Zeus’s) ever-flowing fire” (*P.* 1.1–6). As Segal puts it, the choral enactment lifts “from earth to the heavens, where it embodies both the order of art and the moral order of the gods working among mortals.”⁷⁶

In the spirit of Hesiodic personification, Pindar imagines Dike as mother of Hesychia (Tranquility), her daughter being “the kindly maker of the greatest cities and holder of the keys of counsel and war” (*P.* 8.1–4). This next-generation goddess in the Zeus-Themis/Horae line helps secure civic harmony: “Let any citizen cast off from his mind wrathful civil strife (στάσις), bringer of poverty and hateful nurse of children, and place the common good in fair weather, seeking the bright light of noble Hesychia” (fr. 109). Such imagery is squarely within the Hesiodic tradition, as is the desire to see a city bloom, free from strife.

Pindar’s perpetual reliance upon personified abstractions especially when writing about social harmony is clearly in the Hesiodic mode, as it is also in the writings of Solon, the Milesian philosophers, Parmenides, and Bacchylides. Attraction to these figureheads continues in the tragedies of Aeschylus and Euripides especially and in Aristophanes’s comedies. For Kenneth Dover, even Plato’s Forms are a progeny of these personified abstractions.⁷⁷ But more than most second-, third-, and even fourth-generation continuators of this tradition, Pindar often retains Hesiod’s mythic mindset by thinking of these figures genealogically.

But, like Xenophanes, Pindar struggles with Hesiod’s (and Homer’s)

degraded stories about the gods. At such times, he does not shy away from correcting the ancient masters. He states the principle as follows: “the tales of men, fashioned with glittering lies, deceive and transgress the language of truth. ... The human role is to eulogize the divine; less is the cause for blame” (*Ol.* 1.28–29 and 35). Rather than mention the Olympians in battle amongst themselves, he stills his tongue: “it is a hateful skill to speak ill of the gods and it partakes of madness to boast unfittingly. Don’t speak such things. May all war and battle be far from the immortals” (*P.* 9.37–41). Pindar even has “the immortal Zeus releasing the Titans” (*P.* 4.291), all except for Atlas who must hold up the sky. He also has Cronus, “the great father,” seated by his wife Rhea and the just Rhadamanthys, presiding over the Isle of the Blessed (cf. *Ol.* 2.70–77).⁷⁸

But Pindar has no trouble with Zeus using force to imprison Typhos in Tartarus. Here, he is closer to Hesiod, even as he again reworks old texts. However, rather than describe the battle itself when Zeus scorched Earth, he tells us about the snake in defeat, bound beneath the earth and stretching from Naples to Sicily. Recent emissions from Mt. Etna shortly before *Pythian* I was performed confirmed the monster’s underground presence. True to song’s soothing power in Pindar, this Zeus quieted Typhos by “music” rather than the thunderbolt (*P.* 1.1–28; cf. *P.* 8.15–18).⁷⁹

Pindar’s most significant deviations from and expansions upon the *Theogony*, however, are in his figures of Metis and Themis. The former is never mentioned in Pindar’s surviving poetry, and the latter he makes Zeus’s “first” wife. When telling the story of Athena’s birth, there is not a word about Metis (*O.* 7.34–39).⁸⁰ From what is commonly called Pindar’s own *Hymn to Zeus* (in fragmentary state), he describes with wonderful ceremony the magnificent wedding procession, as εὐβουλος Θέμις οὐρανία (“heavenly Themis of good counsel”), escorted by the Moirae in their golden chariot, makes her way from the streams of Ocean, up the starry path, to the sacred stair/ladder of Olympus where she will become savior Zeus’s *first* (ἀρχαία) wife (fr. 30.1–5). ἀρχαία seems to pun on its double association with “first” and “ruling.” Opinion is divided whether Pindar was deliberately correcting and cleansing Hesiod, as he does elsewhere, or if, as seems less likely, he was unaware of the *Theogony*’s version.⁸¹ Did he observe that in Hesiod Zeus does not even make Themis a wife? There is reason to believe that in this hymn Metis is never even named.

In an Isthmian ode, it is Themis, not Earth, who intervenes to protect Zeus from giving birth to a son who will overthrow him, and the dangerous goddess in this telling is Thetis, not Metis. As Zeus and Poseidon vie for the sea goddess’s hand in marriage, Themis (again

εὐβουλος) ends their strife (ἔρισαν), making sure that the prevailing power of mind (πραπίδες, Hesiod's word at *Th.* 656) evades ἔρως' ever-destabilizing force (*I.* 8.27–33). By her advice, Thetis marries Peleus.⁸² Once again, we note Metis's absence as Pindar effectively recasts Hesiod's central succession story and dramatically downplays Zeus's vulnerability. Few in antiquity fault Hesiod's story of Zeus and Metis, but from what survives of Pindar's poetry it appears as if he thought it best to ignore stories about her altogether.

From a late source describing the *Hymn to Zeus*, at one of his weddings, perhaps it being even this one to Themis, Zeus asks the assembled gods if they lack anything now that he has “recently ordered everything” (τὸ πᾶν ἄρτι κοσμήσας). In response, they request that he create gods who would arrange (κοσμήσουσι) in words and song all the great works and every arrangement (κατασκευή) he had made (fr. 31). The prosaic terms in this late retelling block us from knowing exactly what Pindar said and how he portrayed Zeus, but it very much appears as if Pindar, blending Hesiodic genealogy and contemporary views of cosmology, presented Zeus as a demiurgic maker of cosmic, not just of Olympian, order. Now that this marvelous order has been achieved, the gods prompt Zeus to create the Muses who in turn will celebrate that order with their own harmonious song and dance. Apollo, it appears, will lead the choral performance. Even with this new story of the Muses' birth,⁸³ Pindar's portrait of cosmic arrangement and Olympian song is deeply in the Hesiodic tradition, namely, that there is harmonious order in Zeus's work, which is embodied and conveyed in the harmonious nature of the Muses' compositions.⁸⁴

The *Theogony* in the Classical Period

The shift from the Archaic to Classical period, as imprecise as the date may be, helps mark the emergence of Athens as the hub of literary and intellectual activity in the fifth century. In this time of intense questioning about myth, nature, culture, humankind, and the divine, scores of writers, scholars, and cultural pundits scrutinized and speculated about Hesiod and Homer in all modes of inquiry. In the heat of this activity, the prominence of the *Theogony* varied. For some, like Aeschylus (in a serious way) and Aristophanes (in a comic way), it was of great importance; for others, like Sophocles and Euripides, less so. For still others, like Thucydides, most orators, and most sophists, Hesiod's ancient views about the gods were of almost no

importance. Socrates's comments in Plato's *Cratylus* at the end of the century would have been shared by many intellectuals: "About the gods we know nothing, neither about them or their names, whatever they be" (400d). Yet even Plato cleverly showed careful reading of the *Theogony*, engaging in meaningful ways with the *Theogony* in works like the *Symposium* and *Republic*, especially.

It is within this turbulent period that Herodotus identifies Hesiod and Homer as "making a θεογονίη for Greeks," giving them the titles (ἑπωνυμῖαι) for their gods, defining their honors and functions/faculties, and describing their appearances (2.53; HesiodT 98 Most). Herodotus seems to be thinking especially of Hesiod's *Theogony*, even anticipating its title by a century, although that poem focuses almost exclusively on Zeus, with only occasional commentary on the other Olympians. As in other lists from this time, Hesiod is named before Homer, perhaps as a sign of his perceived seniority.⁸⁵ This passage is also the first instance in extant Greek to identify Hesiod and Homer as ποιηταί (poets or, more literally, makers, i.e., authors) and not as ᾄδοι (singers). The new term also, most likely, associates "poets" with written texts.⁸⁶

In the next century, learned—and not so learned—critics of Hesiod and Homer cropped up like mushrooms in late summer. Treatises on the poets proliferate and we see the rise of allegorical interpretations to save the ancient mythmakers from their increasingly censured stories about the gods. Criticisms, first aired by Xenophanes and then re-echoed later by Pindar, Aeschylus, Aristophanes, Euripides, and Isocrates, to name the most famous, are heard most vehemently in Plato's revival of the "ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy" (*Rep.* X.607b5–6). These tendencies will only increase in the Hellenistic period. Three of the stories from the *Theogony* stood out as most reprehensible: Cronus's castration of his father, Cronus's swallowing of his children, and Zeus's binding of his father in Tartarus—in short, the crucial father-son events in each stage of the cosmic evolution as recorded in the *Theogony*. There was less concern about Zeus's swallowing of Metis. The *Works and Days* continued to be praised for its moral authority and came increasingly to identify Hesiod as a poet of peace in contrast to the war poet Homer. For the philosophically minded, however, the *Theogony* remained influential, I shall argue, for its depiction of polity and statesmanship.⁸⁷

Aeschylus

No Greek work is more closely engaged with Hesiod's *Theogony* than Aeschylus's *Oresteia*. Comparison to the *Prometheus Bound* is instructive, as in terms of subject matter nothing "comes closer to the *Theogony*" than does this play, as Friedrich Solmsen wrote half a century ago: "It is also one of the few tragedies where personified figures like Bia and Kratos turn into *dramatis personae*, something one imagines Hesiod might have done if he had been a playwright. But in specifics the play differs significantly from Hesiod's treatment of the same story."⁸⁸ Scholars today believe that much of what survives from the *Prometheus Bound* is post-Aeschylean by 15 to 20 years, yet the argument might be made that its deviations from Hesiod, especially in the portraits of a tyrannical Zeus and a sympathetic Prometheus in the first play, are Aeschylean.⁸⁹

In its extant form, Zeus, new to power,⁹⁰ rules in a harsh and autocratic manner, closer to the bullying god of the *Iliad* than to the just culture-king of the *Theogony*;⁹¹ Prometheus, by contrast, is a benevolent deity, a full-fledged Titan and son of "straight-counseling Themis" (*PB* 18).⁹² He helped Zeus "establish his tyranny" (304–6) and "distributes honors to the young gods" (439–41); crucial in this telling, only he and his mother know which goddess will mother the child destined to topple Zeus.⁹³

Prometheus also saves humankind from Zeus's desire to obliterate them (231–36), a position that Zeus reverses some time in the cycle after the *Prometheus Bound*. We may conjecture that Prometheus's gift to humankind of intelligence, understanding, and the arts was instrumental in Zeus' re-evaluation of man's fate. But, contrary to his boasts in the *Prometheus Bound*, Prometheus did not give mortals "all the arts" (506). Notably absent was instruction in the political arts, and it is fair to say that this god was not even aware of their existence. When, in a sequel to the *Prometheus Bound*, Zeus allows the more "artful" human species to be saved, it is most likely that he also gave them "his" arts, that is, the crowning arts of statesmanship (once he learnt them for himself). If the sequel does in fact end in this way, then the vision of Zeus in the play cycle might be closer to what we see in the *Theogony*.

In company with other fifth-century works, the play cycle appears to fault Hesiod for his story of Zeus's imprisonment of the Titans, and of Cronus in particular. In *Prometheus Bound* it is clear that they are imprisoned in the Underworld (219–29), but by the next play they are clearly out [cf. *Prometheus Unbound* frags 190–93 (Radt)]. We may conjecture that Cronus was in their number (as he was in Pindar).

But in Aeschylus' *Oresteia* of 458 BCE, we see the playwright reshaping a popular myth along the structural lines of the *Theogony*. A brief review of that earlier tradition, dating back to the *Odyssey*, will

illustrate just how extensive that reshaping was. Prior to 458, the Orestes myth was in large measure a two-part story: a) Aegisthus, usually aided by Clytemnestra, kills Agamemnon, and b) Orestes avenges the murder by killing Aegisthus. Attention upon Clytemnestra is usually secondary, or sometimes even nonexistent, and there is little need for a third act. Aeschylus recasts the myth as a trilogy, reconfiguring a familial and dynastic story into an idealized *polis*-myth, modeled in broad outline according to the *polis*-centered ideology of the *Theogony*. That is, in the reconfiguration Aeschylus brings Hesiod's cosmological myth down to earth, when Athens mimics Zeus's divine creation of civic order on Olympus.

Some argue that Homer knew two versions of the Orestes myth, where in one of them Clytemnestra was the master schemer and murderer, but the evidence for that in my opinion is poor. In seven of the nine tellings of the story in the *Odyssey*,⁹⁴ attention is primarily on two figures: the tricky-scheming (δολομήτις) Aegisthus,⁹⁵ mastermind of Agamemnon's murder and primary executioner, and Orestes, the avenger. In Zeus's programmatic version of the myth (1.29–47), the god does not even mention Clytemnestra by name. If she has a role in Agamemnon's killing, it is as an accomplice. Twice, however, when comparing his wife to Penelope, Agamemnon says that she “devised” the evil deed (11.429–30 and 24.199), and once he even identifies her as the killer: “Happy son of Latertes, resourceful Odysseus, / what a fine, faithful wife you won / ... / not at all like the daughter of Tyndareus who devised evil deeds, / killing her wedded husbandman” (24.192–93 and 199–200). Rather than suppose, as some do,⁹⁶ that these passages represent a separate version of the myth, it is just as plausible that context and rhetoric explain Agamemnon's attention upon his wife in these passages.

In the revenge story Homer focuses exclusively on Orestes and Aegisthus. He never mentions the matricide, some say from a sense of decorum.⁹⁷ In one passage, Nestor says that Orestes went from Athens to Mycenae to slay “his father's slayer who had ruled over Mycenae, rich in gold, for seven years” and then “on behalf of the Argives set up a funeral feast / for his hateful mother and cowardly Aegisthus” (3.304 and 309–10).⁹⁸ Even here, the focus is on dynastic succession. The funeral could be seen in that context, as a way for Orestes to proclaim his rightful rule over the Argives, or it might be considered his attempt to atone for a mother-killing. Clytemnestra's epithet, hateful, may be a focalizer suggesting Orestes's contempt for his mother and may suggest matricide, but from this passage one cannot rule out that the queen died from other causes, including suicide. The first to mention matricide explicitly is Hesiod, in what survives as a papyrus fragment where Orestes is described as “coming of age and

avenging his father-slayer and killing his excessively manly mother.”⁹⁹ Clytemnestra and the killer are once again differentiated and, again, the queen is an accomplice. Matricide also clearly plays a part in Stesichorus’s frustratingly fragmentary *Oresteia* where Apollo gives Orestes a bow “for striking mightily” (fr. 217), presumably to help Orestes fend off the Erinyes (in the form of snakes?) as they pursue him for matricide.¹⁰⁰ Apollo’s aid certainly suggests that the god exonerated the matricide, but we cannot say if he also ordered it or if his gift was sufficient to free Orestes from the Furies’ pursuit. All these versions suggest that the myth was predominantly a two-part story, as it is also rendered by the Athenian Dokimasia Painter about a decade before Aeschylus’s trilogy,¹⁰¹ where on one side of the vase Clytemnestra runs with axe in hand, eager to help Aegisthus, but *he* alone is the killer; on the obverse side, with axe held high she threatens Orestes as he kills Aegisthus. The two scenes, almost identical in design, visually tell a story of cause and effect, with no suggestion that the story continues after Aegisthus’s death. Clytemnestra is clearly a secondary player and her fate also of secondary concern. In a major departure from Homer, Agamemnon is killed naked and wet, trapped in a net, coming out of a bath, and not in the banquet hall with his men as in the *Odyssey*.¹⁰²

Aeschylus adopts a number of Dokimasia’s motifs, including Agamemnon’s murder in the bath, and the net imagery when Clytemnestra boasts, “How could I set the nets of pain so high he could not leap out. ... I caught him in an unending wrap-around like a fish-net.”¹⁰³ He also associates the queen with the axe when she asks for “a man-slaying axe” upon hearing that Orestes has just killed Aegisthus (*Cho.* 889). As in the vase painting, Cassandra links both parts of the myth together in the *Oresteia*. Aeschylus also adopts a number of post-Homeric innovations, as Electra’s recognition of Orestes by a lock of hair and Clytemnestra’s dream of a snake, both first in Stesichorus. It is disputed whether Orestes’s murder of his mother is depicted in art prior to Aeschylus’s play.¹⁰⁴



The Oresteia: Aegisthus slaying Agamemnon, Clytemnestra holding a double-headed axe in her right hand. Dokimasia Painter, ca. 470–460 bce. Calyx Krater Red Figure. Museum of Fine Arts, Boston William Francis Warden Fund 63.1246.



The Oresteia: Orestes slaying Aegisthus, Clytemnestra holding a double-headed axe in her upraised right hand. Dokimasia Painter, ca. 470–460 bce. Calyx Krater Red Figure. Museum of Fine Arts, Boston William Francis Warden Fund 63.1246.

But Aeschylus appears to be the first to make the “manly-minded”¹⁰⁵ Clytemnestra the sole killer of Agamemnon and to cast her center stage as the mastermind of the plot. At the same time, he womanizes¹⁰⁶ Aegisthus, making him a weak and all-but-invisible accomplice in the planning and execution of Agamemnon’s death. The queen’s central billing in the first play leads to matricide, with all its “problems and agonies” taking center stage in the second.¹⁰⁷ This appears to be another Aeschylean innovation, as A. J. N. W. Prag notes (1985: 43): “It can hardly be a coincidence that after 458 the Death of Aegisthus disappears from Attic art, and is immediately replaced by pictures of Orestes and the Furies.”¹⁰⁸ The centrality of matricide in the second play almost necessitates Aeschylus’s third major innovation: the religious and legal consequences of mother-

killing. Athena realizes that the matter is too great for mortals to judge by themselves; nor is it right (θέμις), she declares, to adjudicate *this* case alone (cf. *Eum.* 470–72) (480–89). While formally accepting the killer as a suppliant (free from pollution, he claims, at 280–81)¹⁰⁹ “into my city” (475), she also recognizes the Erinyes’ antiquity, power, and potential harm to Athens and her land (476–79). She wisely chooses, with the Erinyes’ full acquiescence, to create a trail, juried by “the best of my citizens” (487–88), to test Orestes’s claim of innocence. Some believe that Aeschylus invented the idea of Orestes facing a jury trial; others that he adapted an Athenian legend that the Areopagus council heard Orestes’s case at some time early in its existence.¹¹⁰ Either way, it is generally agreed that Aeschylus invents the idea of the trial as the founding act of the Aeropagus and as something of an origin myth of civic law (cf. Sommerstein, 1989: 5).

Many have noted that contemporary events triggered Aeschylus’s thinking about the myth, but the *Oresteia* is not by any means an historical play. With his characteristic brusqueness, Felix Jacoby made the point long ago: “The simple fact is, and remains, and is apparent throughout the [*Eumenides*], that Aischylos is not concerned with the niceties of the Athenian homicide laws, but (as one among many points) with the great and prior question how to deal with blood guilt, and especially whether the religious purification sufficed for washing off this guilt.”¹¹¹ The *Oresteia* is a political play in the sense that it sees the *polis* as the only setting where humankind can break free from the family’s harsh rhythms and hope in its new milieu to redefine human possibility. In that shift of focus from Aegisthus to Clytemnestra, Aeschylus reshapes a predominantly dynastic and revenge story (Aegisthus and Orestes) into a story of cyclical familial violence (wife killing husband and son killing mother), a cycle of violence that can only be broken by the creation of civic law.¹¹² In this reshaping, Aeschylus appears to have the mythic arc of the *Theogony* in mind where, after two generations of familial violence, Zeus achieved stability, permanence, and social harmony in the creation of civic law within Olympus.

In each play, Aeschylus dramatizes his innovations with flair: Clytemnestra’s elevation to sole killer reaches hair-raising heights with her prideful boast over her husband’s body: “Till now I have made many time-serving speeches: / henceforth I shall not be ashamed to state the contrary. / ... / This struggle of mine, long premeditated, / starting from an ancient quarrel, has been fought at last. / I stand where I struck the blows, with the deeds done” (Ag. 1372–73 and 1377–79).¹¹³ Clytemnestra never suggests that Aegisthus may have assisted her or that she received divine guidance. The act is hers and hers alone. The queen’s audacity earlier in the play may have

prepared the audience for her ecstasy here, short-lived as it is,¹¹⁴ but nothing, either in this play or in the Oresteia tradition, could anticipate her further revelry when she delights in being splattered by Agamemnon's blood. Imagining herself as the Earth impregnated by Sky's semen ("Blowing forth a sharp wound of blood he hits me with a dark shower of crimson dew, while I rejoiced, no less than the crop in the birth pangs of the seed grows bright with Zeus-given rain" 1388–92),¹¹⁵ her thoughts reach a primordial depth, at once imagining herself in a sacred marriage, perverted as it may be, with Sky, and at the same time seeing herself impregnated by her husband's blood as Earth was impregnated by the blood dripping from Ouranus' severed genitals (*Th.* 183–84).

In the second play, Aeschylus equally dramatizes the centrality of matricide when he has Orestes hesitate just at the moment he is about to kill his mother (*Cho.* 899). William Arrowsmith characterizes the humanity of this hesitation: "Orestes kills but first he hesitates, and the whole world and the fate of mankind hang in that act of hesitation" (1959: 40). But, as great as this hesitation is, the fate of mankind hangs in the events of the *Eumenides*, not here. In the third play, Aeschylus highlights the importance of Athens to the story in the striking scene change from Delphi to the city after verse 234.¹¹⁶

Aeschylus reshapes his version of the Orestes myth along the lines of the *Theogony* not only in structure but also in Hesiod's vision of civic justice. There are two visions of justice in the trilogy. In the first two plays, and even in the trial scene, justice is much as Anaximander and Heraclitus described it: δίκην ἔρνν. The language comes from social institutions but the idea of this justice comes from nature as one excess gives way to another. The blood law of the *Agamemnon* and the *Choephoroi* is cyclical and retributive in this manner, as one "just act" is in turn "justly" revenged. Thus, the chorus in the *Agamemnon*: "The plunderer is plundered; the killer pays the price. / ... / the one who acts suffers. It is fixed law" (1562–65; cf. 764–81). The theorem is even clearer in the *Choephoroi*: "Ares will clash with Ares, Justice with Justice," as Orestes says (*Cho.* 461). And the chorus in this play: "the blood of those ancient crimes is resolved by the fresh act of justice" (803–5). "The foundation of Dike is set fast / and sword-making Aisa (=Moirai) is already forged. / The famed Fury (Erinys), brooding nurse, / will bring home the child / to avenge in time the stain / of ancient bloods" (646–51). Such blood justice is similar to the cycles in nature as the Watchman in the opening of the first play enunciates: winter stars give way to summer stars and back again.

But by the end of the *Eumenides*, a new vision of justice has been conceived, the one that will be the longed-for light in the darkness that the trilogy has been seeking from the very beginning. Rather than

cyclical and part of nature, this justice is stable and permanent and contrary to nature. The mark of this justice is concord, and exclusively civic concord, and it comes from a well-run polity, first imagined in Hesiod's mythic vision of Olympus. This, I suggest, is the *Theogony's* most lasting contribution to fifth- and fourth-century thinkers and writers about polity and justice.

As Zeus's success in making Olympus depends upon giving birth to Athena, the *Oresteia polis*-ideology is predicated on the view that all children are conceived exclusively from male seed. Mortal males cannot spring children from their heads but the audience of Aeschylus's day could believe (or argue, at least) that women are not biologically linked to the embryo they carry in their wombs. Humans cannot replicate mythic solutions, but the new science which Apollo introduces at the trial (*Eum.* 657–61)¹¹⁷ can approximate them, and it can be backed up by old myth, as Athena confirms: “there is no mother who bore me ... with all my heart, I truly am my father's” (*Eum.* 736–38; cf. 662–66). For Apollo, the mother's relation to her child is as a “stranger to a stranger,” a view which Deborah Lyons (2003: 126) traces “as far back as Hesiod. ... At best [the woman] is kind of metic, a resident alien, in the *oikos*.” In both texts, male “birth” is the mechanism that makes it possible to break the cycle of reiterative familial violence and, in the case of the *Eumenides*, to force the Erinyes to abandon their pursuit of Orestes. But, it is also true that in both works this new male “biology” is not sufficient in itself to create stability and permanence. That comes from a new concord achieved by the invention of shared governance and new forms of persuasion. In both works that concord has a musical expression: in the *Theogony* it is marked by the like-minded song and dance of the Muses; in the *Oresteia* by the dance of Zeus and Moira at the very end of the trilogy.¹¹⁸ In this penultimate line of the *Oresteia*, the two subjects, Zeus and Moira, are joined by the singular verb συγκατέβα (1046), a lovely expression of the old chthonic goddess and the new sky god joined as one in a shared dance step.

It is a striking feature of the play that the trial by itself does not end the cycle of retributive violence. After the verdict, the Erinyes turn their venom against Athens herself (778–92 and 808–22). Their fury compels Athena to turn to Peitho, the personified goddess of persuasion who has already been frequently evoked in the trilogy but is now imagined in a new light. Previously, Peitho was viewed as a “crafty” and sinister creature, or, even worse, as a “wretched child of Ruin (Ἄρῃ)” (*Cho.* 726 and *Ag.* 385–86, respectively). Revenge-minded parties called upon her to help entrap their prey.¹¹⁹ Even in the trial scene, persuasion intends to sway the jury to one side or the other. But the new Peitho is of a different sort: she is a goddess of

majesty (σέβας) and “holy” whom Athena says gives to “my tongue soothing and charming power” (γλώσσης ἐμῆς μείλιγμα καὶ θελκτήριον; *Eum.* 885–86; cf. 900). Here, Athena’s language is very close to what we find in the *Theogony* when the Muses “pour sweet dew on the tongue” (τῷ μὲν ἐπὶ γλώσσει γλυκερὴν χεῖουσιν ἔερσην) of Zeus- nurtured kings, causing “soothing words to flow from the mouth” (τοῦ δ’ ἔπε’ ἐκ στόματος ῥεῖ μείλιχα) (*Th.* 83–84). What Zeus-nurtured kings do in the *Theogony* when they issue straight judgments with soft words, Athena will do with Peitho’s soothing charms in Aeschylus’s Athens, i.e., stop a “great quarrel” (*Th.* 87).

By the play’s end, Athena attributes the power of this soft persuasion and her ultimate “victory over” (or taming of) the Erinyes to Zeus (970–75):

στέργω δ’ ὄμματα Πειθοῦς,
ὅτι μοι γλῶσσαν καὶ στόμ’ ἐπωπῆ
πρὸς τάσδ’ ἀγρίως ἀπανηναμέννας.
ἀλλ’ ἐκράτησε Ζεὺς ἀγοραῖος.
νικᾷ δ’ ἀγαθῶν
ἔρις ἡμετέρα διὰ παντός.

I gladly welcome the eyes of Persuasion (Peitho)
for having watched over my tongue and mouth
as I countered the Erinyes’ savage rejections.
But Zeus prevailed, the god of assemblies,
And our strife (*eris*) (i.e., the contending of Athena and the
Erinyes) in the offering
of goods conquers for all time.

Scholars debate whether this Zeus of assemblies and persuasion at the end of the trilogy has “evolved” from previous evocations of the god in the trilogy,¹²⁰ and in particular from the Hesiodic Zeus alluded to at the beginning of the *Agamemnon*, albeit in a remarkably elliptical fashion: “He who was once great, bursting in daring to fight any and all comers, will no longer be named. He who was born next is gone, having been floored three times in wrestling falls. But he who eagerly shouts ‘Zeus is victory’ hits the mark squarely, [Zeus] who puts mortals on the path of thinking” (Ag. 167–75).¹²¹ This Zeus is also a “victor,” albeit as a wrestler rather than a champion of persuasion.¹²²

As a final note, in the considerably more sophisticated spirit of

fifth-century Athens, the place of the female figure in Zeus's ultimate victory differs to a degree from Hesiod to Aeschylus. While in both texts female figures are essential contributors to the success of the new order, the fiercely independent female has been greatly diminished, as exemplified in the greatly subordinated role of Gaia in the *Theogony* or of Clytemnestra in the *Oresteia*, who at one point in the *Agamemnon* was even a stand-in for primordial Earth but by the end of the trilogy has become a forgotten person. But patriarchal as both city-myths are, in a departure from Hesiod's Zeus, Aeschylus's Athena does not try to keep figures like Eris, Pseudea, and Neikea (children of Night and Eris) at bay but rather goes to great efforts to bring the Erinyes (children of Night) into Athens' religious and civic life.¹²³ Rather than seeing Zeus suppress figures like the matriarchal Erinyes, Aeschylus shows how the city cannot survive without them.

Comedy and the Other Tragedians

Unlike Aeschylus's serious recasting of Hesiod's creation myth into a *polis* founding myth, the comic playwrights never tired of making fun of the *Theogony* and other Greek creation myths. In the fifth century two comic poets appear to have fun with Hesiod in the *Hesiodoi* by Teleclides and a *Hesiodos* by Nicostratus. In Cratinus's *Wealth-Gods* (*Ploutoi*), a play from the 430s or early 420s, the Titans, freed by the *dêmos* from their Zeus-imposed imprisonment, come to Athens. In one fragmentary passage, they proclaim: "now that the tyrannical rule &is lifted& and the people rule, we have hastened here [to find] our ancient brother ... " (fr. 171.22–24).¹²⁴ Casting Hesiod's succession myth in reverse, the play has Zeus as the unjust, older god, overthrown in a political upheaval. The people of Athens are the liberators and now rule. Linking, it would appear, the succession story with that of Cronus ruling in the Golden Age, the *dêmos* hopes to become rich by the formerly wealthy Titans. As one of the fragments is reconstructed, Cronus "swallowed down" (κατέπιν, also Hesiod's word at *Th.* 459, 467, and 473) all of "&his children& with whetstones" (fr. 171.14) in what must have made havoc of Hesiod's story.

Aristophanes (ca. 455–ca. 386) also relentlessly pokes fun at the high claims made of Zeus and his elevated regime.¹²⁵ In the *Knights* of 424 BCE, an oracle foretells an Athenian succession myth that goes from bad to worse: a hemp-seller in the beginning is displaced by a sheep-seller, who is overthrown by a disgusting leather-seller and he,

in turn, by a sausage-seller, a stand-in for Aristophanes's *bête-noire*, Cleon (128–43). A year later in the *Clouds*, as in Cratinus's *Wealth-Gods*, Zeus's ascendancy is turned upside down by having him and the Olympians be the older gods and (temporally) displaced by the Clouds, who portray themselves as the new and rightful rulers of the heavens.

In Aristophanes's most elaborate creation myth, the birds in *The Birds* (414 BCE) resort to an avian theogony to make the case that they are in fact the primordial gods and rightful rulers of the sky. Their myth, which they assure us is “straight and true,” is a mishmash of Orphic and Hesiodic motifs. It begins with Chaos, winged, of course, followed by Night, also winged. She enfolds within herself a male Erebus (Darkness) and produces asexually (it appears) an unfertilized egg (i.e., a “wind-egg”), out of which Eros, also winged, emerges. Eros mingles with the neuter Chaos “throughout Tartarus,” hatching the race of birds and bringing them into the light (previously unmentioned in this creation story) before he causes “all things to commingle, leading one thing to co-mingle with another,” producing Sky, Ocean, Earth, and the imperishable race of the immortals (*Birds* 693–702). Winged *phalloi* were a popular stand-in at the time for a winged Eros, but the other winged deities are convenient inventions by the birds for their argument. The Hesiodic elements are obvious, beginning with reference to Chaos, a well-known and popular figure in Greek literature by this time, which is always traced back to the *Theogony*.¹²⁶ As did Cratinus, Aristophanes has characters freely adapt creation myths to make absurd claims about legitimacy and power.

In *The Frogs* (405 BCE), Aristophanes has Aeschylus, à la Xenophanes and Pindar, claim that “poets alone teach the youth and should therefore hide wickedness so as not to teach it” (1053–55). Aristophanes, of course, hardly follows this commonplace Archaic advice when he, jumping on the bandwagon of those criticizing Zeus for imprisoning Cronus, has a decadent, irreverent Worse Argument flatly deny that Dike could be a goddess, claiming that if she existed Zeus would have been killed long ago for chaining his father. The hapless Better Argument, while nauseated by the thought, is unable to offer a rebuttal (cf. *Clouds* 902–7).¹²⁷ When the Erinyes in Aeschylus's *Eumenides* (640–43) make a similar criticism of Zeus, Apollo at least offers a counterargument.

We learn from a papyrus roll of another comic plot that lampoons Hesiod's story of Cronus and Rhea, recasting it in the most mundane, run-of-the mill human terms. The joke turns in part on Cronus not only “swallow[ing] down” (ἐκπίνειν and καταπί[ν]ει) his children but also—in a rare move—“eat[ing] them down” (κατεσθίει). In the fragment Rhea is complaining:

Cronus has swallowed (ἐκπίνει) and eaten down (κατεσθίει) all my kids, and doesn't let me have even one of them. But he just waves his hand at me, goes straight off to Megara, sells the child that I have borne, and eats (ἐσθίει) the money. He's afraid, you see, of the prophecy, as <a hare fears> a dog (?), for Apollo once loaned Cronus a drachma and then didn't get it back. So with anger seething in his heart Apollo <would no longer> loan him anything valuable, no, not a utensil, nor, by Zeus, anything, but he prophesized that he would be dethroned by a son. Fearing this, he swallows down (καταπίνει) all <his children>.¹²⁸

In contrast to Aeschylus and Aristophanes, Sophocles and Euripides do little with Hesiod and even less with the *Theogony*. In their dramatizations of the Orestes story, they adapt Aeschylus's primary attention on matricide, but they shy away from his trial scene. Echoing characters in Aeschylus and Aristophanes, and elsewhere in fifth-century writers, Heracles in Euripides's *Heracles Mad* (ca. 416 BCE) vehemently dismisses old stories about his father. When Theseus tries to talk Heracles out of committing suicide, he reminds his friend that even the gods are struck by misfortune and persevere, "if, that is, the stories of the old singers are not false" (1315). He singles out, by way of example, gods bedding down in unlawful unions or chaining their fathers in order to become tyrant/rulers (1316–19). Far from consoled, Heracles fires back (1341–46):¹²⁹

I do not believe that the gods seek illicit unions
and bind each other in chains;
and I do not suppose, nor will I ever be persuaded
that one god is master of another,
for a god, if he is truly a god, needs
nothing. These [stories] are miserable tales of the old singers.

Such sentiments have been in the air for close to a century, first uttered by the lone voice of Xenophanes but heard with ever-increasing fervor and urgency as the fifth century draws to a close: the old singers tell horrendous stories about the gods which cannot be believed; a god, properly understood, is in need of nothing from mortals or another god.

By the end of the fifth century, Homeric and Hesiodic texts were widely available and subject to endless scrutiny about the meaning of words, the interpretation of passages, or the morality of an episode. Homer, typically, was the figure of greater interest. The wealthy Niceratus in Xenophon's *Symposium* (3.5) recounts how his father required him to memorize all of Homer—both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*!—as a prelude to any walk of life, from statesman, to orator, historian, philosopher, biographer, poet, painter, sculptor, or soldier. In Plato's *Ion* (531a1–2), Socrates asks the famous rhapsode if he performed Hesiod and Archilochus, as well as Homer, to which he replies, no. Nevertheless, the question speaks to a popularity of sorts for the two other poets, as well. In Plato's *Laws* (658d6–9), the Athenian stranger says that old men, in particular, like to hear recitations of “the *Iliad*, *Odyssey*, or one of Hesiod's poems.”¹³⁰ Hesiod's *Works and Days* was the more widely cited, mined for its maxims and moral instruction, but the *Theogony* had its own, smaller following. Andrew Ford summarizes well the reception of both poems at this time:

the *Works and Days* was encountered most often in the form of isolated tidbits that were quoted, by sophist and layperson alike, to see if Hesiod's reputation as a wise counsellor was deserved. The *Theogony* was probably more often encountered through presentations by rhapsodes than at school. The poem was acknowledged as one very early and influential account of the gods (for some, influential merely because early), and like most poetry treating such matters, was allegorized, etymologized, and ‘philosophized’ in certain circles.¹³¹

As a group, the sophists accepted Homer and Hesiod as the teachers of the Greeks, on the understanding that the ancient poets offered a compelling fiction which, if properly read, could still be of use. Herodotus's contemporary Hippias of Elis wrote a mythology of sorts drawing widely on Greek and barbarian traditions, as we discussed in [Chapter 3](#). His near contemporaries Protagoras and Prodicus proposed theories about the gods that radically challenged conventional religion, even as they drew from it. If the Protagoras of Plato's dialogue by the same name reflects the historical figure, he offers a myth on the genesis of humankind that includes stories of Prometheus stealing fire for man and Epimetheus playing his part, before Zeus saves humankind by having Hermes give them reverence (αἰδῶς) and justice (δίκη).¹³² Prodicus seems to have a keen interest in Hesiod and cosmogony¹³³ but regarded the gods either as prized mortals who introduced humankind to agriculture and civilized foods or as manifestations of natural and human beneficent forces. In a treatise on

the *Horae*, he maintained “that the traditional gods do not exist and that they lack knowledge.”¹³⁴

Plato

Plato has many faces when it comes to Hesiod and the *Theogony*. Often he enjoys dismissing the old stories out of hand, but like Solon and Aeschylus he also adapts the mythic vision of harmony and justice in surprising ways.

Dismissals are easy to find. Socrates in the *Phaedrus* comments: “If, like the wise men of our day, I didn’t believe in these stories, I wouldn’t be so out of place.” He finds it equally tedious to contemplate the modern sceptics: “All those non-believers employ some boorish sophistication and make everything conform to probability, and they need a great deal of time. There’s no such leisure for me. And the reason is, my friend: I am still not able to ‘know myself’” (229c–e). Similarly, in the *Laws*, the Athenian Stranger is bemused by the *Theogony* and its genre: “We at Athens have accounts preserved in writing (although not in your country, I understand, owing to the excellence of your *politeia*), some in meter, some not, speaking about the gods, the oldest of which relate how the first substance of heaven and other things came into being, followed by a *theogony* and how the gods relate to each other. Because of their antiquity these stories are hard to censure ... but we can pass over and dismiss them: may they be told in a way dear to the gods” (*Laws* X.886c–d). Perhaps Socrates is both playful and serious when he says in the *Apology* that he would willingly die many times over if only he could speak to Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod, and Homer. He also adds (with some humor, I suspect) that he looks forward to speaking to those heroes who have suffered from false accusations (cf. 41a).

On other occasions characters in Plato treat these stories allegorically: a sophist says that poets like Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides used poetry as a “cover for their sophistry” (*Protagoras*, 316d); another figure in the *Theaetetus* interprets Homer’s claim that Ocean and Tethys are the parents of the gods (*Il.* 14.201 and 302) as meaning that “all things are the offspring of flux and motion” (152e). Also in that dialogue, poetry is described as encoded so as to conceal its real import from the common person (180c–d). But, elsewhere, the old myths can cause harm, as when in the *Euthyphro* a son takes his father to court on the grounds that Zeus, the best and most just of

gods, bound his own father for his injustices (5e–6a). It matters little that Hesiod never made such an argument in the *Theogony*.

But Plato famously, brilliantly, and repeatedly creates myths of his own, a good number of which play off of the *Theogony*. In the *Protagoras*, as we saw, he has the title character offer a myth of man's creation. Whether it is a faithful recording of the sophist's myth or (more likely) a parody of it, it appears to play off of Hesiod's Prometheus-Epimetheus story and its vision of Zeus leading men to the political arts. In the *Timaeus*, the title figure again playfully enfolds Hesiod's creation myth into his own story as he means to correct it with a truer account of the universe's goodness.

In what follows, I shall concentrate on the *Symposium*, *Timaeus*, and *Republic*, where Plato's reuse of (or, in some cases, his echoes of) the *Theogony* is most substantive. Throughout these comparisons, it is worth keeping in mind Dover's formulation (1980: 7): "Historically speaking," even Plato's Forms "are the progeny of the personified abstractions who thronged the suburbs of Olympus."

In the *Symposium*'s conversation about Eros, four of the six set speeches—the first two speeches, by Phaedrus and Pausanias, and the last two, by Agathon and Socrates/Diotima—demonstrably rework passages from the *Theogony*. The dialogue, as recently stated (Kanaan, 2010: 157), "is among those Platonic dialogues that are very obviously interested in Hesiod: Plato quotes directly from him and borrows Hesiodic motifs and ideas at crucial points in the text." I shall argue that Phaedrus, Pausanias, and Agathon try to tame Hesiod's story of Eros in ways to make it more socially responsible. Diotima makes it more philosophically palatable.

Phaedrus, "the father of the *logos*" (177d), begins the evening by quoting from the *Theogony*: "then / Earth, broad-bosomed, safe seat of the gods, / ... / and Eros" (*Th.* 116–17 and 120a). It is, as Naoko Yamagata notes (2010: 77), "the only sustained quotation from the *Theogony* in the whole of Plato's *oeuvre*." But in doing so, he also edits Hesiod's text, leaving out what does not support his point, namely that in Hesiod Eros is "the most beautiful of all the immortals, the limbo-loosening god who dominates the mind and steady counsel of all gods and men" (*Th.* 120b–22). These words, however, will find their way back into the dialogue in an intriguing way before the night is over.

In the next speech Pausanias argues that there must be two Erotes as there are two Aphrodites. When he says that "we all know that there is no Aphrodite without Eros" (180d), he is implicitly following Hesiod who has Eros in her entourage (*Th.* 210). In his account of one Aphrodite being born from Ouranus without a mother and the other being the child of Zeus and Dione, he is following the two versions of

her birth as recorded in Hesiod and Homer, although neither is named. When praising the Ouranian Aphrodite and eager to depict her as a socially useful god, Pausanias passes over the grisly details of her birth from Sky's genitals cast into the sea.

Coming last before Socrates's speech, Agathon returns to Phaedrus's Hesiodic genealogy in order to refute it. Even as he does so, however, he leans rather surprisingly on Hesiod's text. Eros, he opens, is the youngest of the gods, and a god of friendship (φιλία) and social peace (εἰρήνη) "such as exists in the world today from the time Eros rules as king over the gods" (195c). He reasons that "if Eros had existed in the early stages of creation there would not have been castrations and bindings and other violences against each other; [such accounts] are the work of Necessity, not Eros, if there is any truth in these stories" (Sym. 195c, repeated 197b). For Yamagata (2010: 78), "the entire passage amounts to a damning indictment of Hesiod, with whom the speeches of the *Symposium* had started; he is among the very first and best known of the poets who did describe Eros, but only inadequately in Agathon's view." Eros, Agathon says, lacks "a poet like Homer" (195d), and Yamagata takes the entire speech as a confirmation that "Hesiod does not now count as 'a poet like Homer.'" This critique, however, does not take into consideration that in Agathon's last words, while praising this youngest god, he unmistakably paraphrases the Hesiodic verses about Eros that Phaedrus had omitted. The paraphrase goes as follows: Eros is "the best and most beautiful leader, whom every man must follow as he hymns beautifully and shares in the songs which *the god sings as he enchants the minds of all gods and men*" (Sym. 197e). As recast, Eros retains his Hesiodic beauty, but rather than dominating the mind of all gods and men (πάντων τε θεῶν πάντων τ' ἀνθρώπων / δάμναται ... νόον, Th. 121–22), he enchants all their minds (θέλων πάντων θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων νοῆμα, 197e4–5). In the speeches leading up to Socrates, thus, the first begins by partially quoting Hesiod and the last ends by paraphrasing the text. Along the way, the god's essential link to Aphrodite is added.

Diotima's genealogy of Eros further reworks Hesiod's version as it was already recounted by Phaedrus. Drawing from all previous speeches, including those by Eryximachus and Aristophanes not discussed here, Diotima explains comprehensively why Eros is linked to Aphrodite. Again, in her completely new myth, Hesiod's version is meaningfully recast to serve the purposes of philosophy. According to Diotima, on the occasion of Aphrodite's birth (her origins not given), the Olympian gods held a banquet in a time before wine (i.e., before the birth of Dionysus). A young god named Poros (Pathway or Resource), son of Metis (the son she never had in the *Theogony*),

attended the festivities and got sufficiently tipsy on nectar to fall asleep in Zeus's garden. A mortal woman Penia (Poverty or Need), "resourceless and without a pathway" (*aporia*), finds a way to lie by Poros and conceive a son, Eros. As the first child born in the age of Aphrodite, Eros is "her attendant and servant" (203c), forever attracted by what he lacks, her beauty. In this regard, Diotima offers a rational way of understanding why Eros follows Aphrodite. Unlike Hesiod's Eros, this one has parents (specified as they were not in Agathon's speech) and he is far from beautiful. But as the grandson of Metis (wisdom, stratagems) and as the son of Poros, he is "brave, a pathfinder, a hunter, and a weaver of stratagems" (203d) and an irrepressible schemer and contriver (ἐπίβουλος) after the good and the beautiful. In this revision, Metis does have a son after all whose own son, Eros, if we accept Agathon's account, "rules as a king over the gods." Before Diotima explores whether this (grand)son would overthrow Zeus and become the new ruler of the gods, she turns from genealogy to philosophy, stressing Eros's pursuit of divine beauty.

I do not mean to imply that in these four speeches the *Symposium* is in any sense strictly molded around *Theogony*'s myth of Eros. Rather, my point is that from Phaedrus's first words in the opening speech to Socrates's report of Diotima's myth, the dialogue recasts, rejects, or enfolds Hesiod's stories of Eros and Aphrodite into what in the end proves to be a philosophically acceptable understanding of ancient myth.¹³⁵ From this vantage point, the *Symposium* illustrates what Socrates says in the *Republic* (II.377a), namely that myths are "false tales with an element of truth within." In his use of the *Theogony*, Plato is far from allegorizing myth by finding new meaning in old forms. Rather, he is a mythographer himself, reinventing the form and some of the language of the old myth, retelling it in a new and philosophically challenging manner.

Plato reworks the *Theogony* in a different way in the *Timaeus*, where, displacing Hesiod's story, he attributes the making of the universe to a beneficent Demiurge. When Timaeus comes to the generations of the lesser gods, Earth, Sky, and their children, he echoes the words of the Athenian Stranger in the *Laws* and says with some irony: "to tell of their birth is beyond my powers; we must be persuaded by those who have spoken in the past, who were, so they said, the sons of gods, and may be supposed to have had a clear knowledge of their parents. Nor must we disbelieve the children of the gods, although they spoke without likely and necessary proof, but we must follow custom and take their words as those of men claiming to be speaking of their kinsmen" (*Timaeus* 40d; HesiodT 116c Most). The sons of the gods are the same as Aristotle's *theologoi*, chiefly among them Orpheus and Hesiod, although Hesiod states quite clearly that he

is a son of a mortal and not of a god. Francis Cornford (1937: 139), I believe, captures the nature of this humor: “The irony is aimed, not at the pious beliefs of the common man, but at the pretensions of ‘theologians’ to know the family history of anthropomorphic deities.”

When following the traditional line, the *Timaeus* mostly follows the *Theogony*: it has Ocean and Tethys as children of Earth and Sky, as well as Phorcys (who in the *Theogony* is born of Earth and Sea, cf. 237), after whom there are “Cronus and Rhea and many more with them; and from Cronus and Rhea were born Zeus and Hera, and all those whom we know as their siblings, and yet more children from these” (40e–41a). As Glenn Most observes (2010: 62): “Plato tends throughout his career (a) to accept Hesiod’s *Theogony* as an authority on the names, genealogies, and etymologies of the gods, but (b) to reject it for its stories of the gods’ dealings with one another.” Even more pointedly, Plato in the *Timaeus* means to set the creation story straight by displacing Hesiod’s account of a random, chaotic, and violent beginning of the universe with a version of a good, harmonious, and designed beginning. Timaeus lists three entities at the outset: the Form of Living Creature (neuter), the Demiurge (the male craftsman and creator), and Reason (masculine) rather than Hesiod’s Chasm (neuter), Earth (female), and mind-bending Eros (masculine).¹³⁶ Contrary to the *Theogony* where goodness (*eu-*) comes late and is hard-won, in the *Timaeus* the Demiurge decides to create the world *because* he was “good” (ἀγαθός) and “desired (being free of jealousy) that all things should be as like him as possible” (29d–e). The late-born Zeus in the *Theogony* can only make part of the universe free from discord and quarrels already in the world, but in the *Timaeus* Necessity and irrational forces are late-born, while goodness exists before the world’s beginning and creation occurs by a well-ordered design.

The notion of harmony, so important for the *Theogony* in the form of the Muses’ singing the laws and customs of Olympus, is also of central importance in the *Timaeus* and also associated with the Muses (47d):¹³⁷

And harmony (ἁρμονία), whose motions are akin to the revolutions of the soul within us, has been given by the Muses to him whose commerce with them is guided by intelligence, not for the sake of irrational pleasure (which is now thought to be its utility), but as an ally against the inward discord (ἀνάρμοστον) that has come into the revolution of the soul, to bring it into order and consonance with itself.

(translation: Pender, 2010: 244–45)

Pender, who speaks so well about the relation between the *Timaeus* and the *Theogony* in most regards, misses one crucial element of comparison. He writes (2010: 245): “At *Theogony* 26, through the gift of the Muses, shepherds may hope to be transformed from ‘mere bellies’ into poets. But for Plato, in a similar but more radical transformation, the gifts of the Muses are one of the many aspects of creation which offer human beings the chance to transcend entirely their physical limitations and thus become divine,” that is, to become divine by attaining inner harmony. This reading does not take into account the Muses’ sacred gift to humankind in the *Theogony* (93), which allows Zeus’s kings, with the speech of the Muses, to dispel the quarrels in the city *agorê* and to bring harmony to the community. The *Theogony* also celebrates how the Muses enable humankind to escape from a discordant existence, but it sees this potential in the context of human relations, civic harmony, and good governance, not in the context of the soul at one with itself.

It is just in this context of harmony, both of the soul and of the state, that the *Republic* and the *Theogony* compare in surprising ways. On the face of it, in this dialogue Socrates would seem to have little use for Hesiod’s myth for, as he says, it tells “the biggest lies about the biggest things” (II.377e) (about father and son violence). There is no place in Socrates’s Kallipolis for the immoral myths of the old poets. And yet we observe that more than once Socrates is aware that his entire endeavor is a form of mythmaking, when comparing the republic (*politeia*) of the soul to the republic (*politeia*) of the *polis*: “Come now, just like those who, at leisure, tell myths in myth (ἐν μύθῳ μυθολογοῦντες), let us [Adeimantus] educate men in speech (λογῷ)” (II.376d).¹³⁸ Socrates describes myth as “a lie, but one in which there is also truth” (II.377a), a characterization which applies well to this dialogue, as Socrates seems to know. When concluding his lengthy comparison of the *politeia* of the soul and that of the state, he comments: “Very well. If we should claim to have found the just man and the just city and what is justice in them, then we would not, I think, seem to have entirely told a lie” (IV.444a). As Hesiod’s Muses can tell lies sounding like truths, so the myth-making of the *Republic* will not be a total falsehood.

The point of connection I wish to make between Hesiod’s old myth and this one gravitates around Socrates’s characterization of δικαιοσύνη, or justice, to refer to persons “doing their own business” and staying within their own borders.¹³⁹ Socrates defines the term as follows (IV.443c–d):

In truth, δικαιοσύνη was something such as this, it seems, not

concerning a person's outer affairs but concerning what is within, what truly concerns himself and the things of the self. He does not allow each part in himself to mind the other parts, nor do the parts of the soul meddle with each other, but each part in fact arranges his domestic concerns well (εὖ θέμενον) and rules himself and composes himself (κοσμήσαντα) and becomes a friend to himself and fits the three parts [of the soul] together, just as the three notes of a harmonic scale, the lowest, highest and middle. And if there happen to be other parts in the middle, all these he binds together and in every way makes one from many, moderate and harmonized.

As greatly as the *Republic* differs from the *Theogony* in argument, this view of justice has much more in common with the *Theogony* than it does with views of cyclical and retributive justice in Heraclitus or other Presocratics. That is, both Plato and Hesiod view justice as something stable and (ideally) permanent, based upon a fair distribution of honors and a community at one with itself (cf. *Th.* 73–74 and 885). In the archaic poem, the threat to the community comes from the outside when a god introduces *strife*, or *quarrel*, or *lies* among the Olympians, whereas in the *Republic* it comes primarily from within, when one part of society (or of the soul) meddles inappropriately with another part. The two very different texts imagine this stability as permanent so long as every part of the community stays within its own boundaries, as it were, making the whole a friend to itself. For the ancient poet and modern philosopher, musical harmony is the primary metaphor or description of this cohesion, whether that be of Plato's harmonic scale or Hesiod's songs of the "like-minded" Muses who sing and dance the laws and cherished customs of Olympus. Only in a civic space freed from factions (στάσεις), hatred (μῖσος), and fights (μάχαι), terms reminiscent of Strife and her children excluded from Olympus in the *Theogony*, is it possible in Socrates's city of speech to live according to δικαιοσύνη.

Several other shared characteristics seem to follow in the wake of this likeness: the displacement of the mother, the need to tame, or denature Eros, and the dominance of wisdom. When Socrates makes the claim that women are equal to men, he is not guided by a concern for women themselves but to take maternity away from them. This is expressed variously in the noble lie, a form of parthenogenic birth when all are born from the Earth (III.414e), and more pointedly when the city takes all children from their mothers (V.460c) and raises them as her own so that citizen and child, city and family, seem to be one and the same (V.470d). These arguments for circumventing biology and for the city's "swallowing" of the mother are made dialectically and along philosophical lines, but the logic is already implied in

Hesiod's account of Zeus giving birth to Athena. Socrates frequently argues that his city in speech is "founded according to nature" (IV.428e; cf. V.456c), but he means, as Eva Brann has said (1967: 28), "the nature of the soul, a most un-natural nature."

In both Hesiod's Olympus and Socrates's city myth, the success of civic creation depends on the taming, or rather the denaturing, of Eros. This most Freudian of themes lies at the heart of Socrates's scheme to make the family coterminous with the city-state and to regulate rigorously the sexual activity of women in their childbearing years.¹⁴⁰ Both similarly emphasize the dominance of wisdom, the point made in the *Theogony* when Zeus swallows Metis in order that she enable him to discern good from evil, and in the *Republic* when wisdom (led by calculation and accompanied by intelligence and right opinion) is needed to distinguish good from evil and to tame desires, pleasures, and pains (cf. IV.431c).

The distance that separates the two "myths" is of course vast, and, in his quarrel against poetry, the philosopher has cause to castigate Hesiod and other poets for the myths they told. His new rationalism is built, nevertheless, upon a Hesiodic foundation, as surprising as that sounds. Here, we might speak of echoes rather than direct influence as these parallels lack the verbal links joining the *Theogony* and the *Symposium* and *Timaeus*. Plato's solutions when envisioning an idealized state, like those solutions of his predecessors, seem to be subject to common cultural limits of what we may consider a closed conceptual field: a vision of stable harmony specific to *polis*-space where justice prevails at the expense of biological laws, family identities, and an anarchic Eros. As in the case of the *Eumenides*, once again we see the rudiments of Hesiod's archaic vision of Zeus's divine order embedded, if re-imagined and recast, in the philosophic vision of the *Republic*.

Isocrates, Allegory, Aristotle, Alcidas: *Paideia* and Hesiodic Scholarship of the Fourth Century

Reminiscent of Mark Twain's scorn for charlatans, Isocrates in fourth-century Athens complains about "loud-mouthed [or common] sophists" (ἄγελαῖοι σοφισταί) lecturing on Hesiod, Homer, and other poets. Chanting epic in full throttle, these blowhards proclaim that they know everything there is to know about the ancient poets when in fact they merely parrot clever comments picked up from others

[*Panathenaicus* 236; Hesiod *T* 123 Most; published 339 BCE]. Isocrates, however, is not far from their company when he has characters like Busiris damn the ancient poets for “blaspheming” the gods with stories more terrible than anything one might say about an enemy. For evidence, Busiris cites the usual suspects: stories of fathers eating children, of sons castrating fathers and binding mothers. He is content to think that Homer’s blindness and Orpheus’s dismemberment by a band of crazed women are fitting punishments for these stories (*Busiris* 38–42). The Hesiod of the *Works and Days*, however, Isocrates commends for being “among the best advisors for the life of men” (*Ad Nicoclem* 43).

The standard strategy of defense, then and for the next 2000 years into Byzantine and Renaissance times, was allegory. In the time of the Roman Empire, Longinus summarizes the motive succinctly: Homeric (and Hesiodic) theomachies with gods wounding gods, quarreling, exacting vengeance, weeping, imprisoning, or in other ways exhibiting unbounded passions are terrifying (φοβερά), utterly irreligious (παντάπασιν ἄθεα), and in violation of what is fitting (τὸ πρέπον), “unless they are taken allegorically” (lit., “to speak in other terms”) (*On the Sublime* 9.6–7). A Hellenistic writer is even more succinct: “Everything is impiety unless it is allegory” (attributed to a Heraclitus, probably from the first century BCE). A common approach was to see the literary account as a concealed representation of phenomena in the physical world, ethical acts, historical events, or even inner spiritual journeys. Or it may require reworking the text, as the fourth-century Derveni author does when transposing words from a fifth-century Orphic poem to show that Zeus, taking “the strength” from his father, never actually acted “contrary to divine decrees” (*DP* col. 8). A fascinating component of this allegorist is that he derives the etymologies of the proper names from verbs, not nouns. It is a shame that the fragments do not include the verb for Zeus so that we could see how he allegorizes the king of the gods.

Aristotle sets a considerably different tone, one that is closer to modern sensibilities, when he speaks of ancient poetry. We recall that he criticized the *muthologoi* for their “drunken” account of how gods really are. but, in general, faults in their stories “can be answered by appealing to historical context or the conventions of the poet’s day,” as N. J. Richardson summarizes Aristotle’s views.¹⁴¹ “Religious beliefs,” Richardson continues, “may simply reflect those of Greek society at that stage of development. ... Alternatively, if something is untrue or historically impossible, it may be justified as idealization.” Like the dynamic mechanisms of plants and animals, a poem should be analyzed according to how well it works, that is, according to how well it tells a story. Like painting, it may be excused for deviating in

minor ways from pictorial accuracy.

Aristotle wrote a *Hesiodic Problems* in one book (lost), parallel to his *Homeric Problems*, which considered contemporary criticisms and problems (or impasses) (ἀπορήματα) directed at the ancient poet. The approach appears to be represented in a highly condensed summary in his *Poetics*, chapter 25, about which Stephen Halliwell writes:

Aristotle marks a new and important phase in the approach to Greek poetry, for he wishes neither to return to the traditional estimation of the poets as wise and knowledgeable guides to life, nor to assent to an outright rejection of poetry of the kind Plato had moved towards. Well used as we now are to various forms of aestheticism, which grant to poetry and the other arts a strong degree of autonomy, it is difficult for us to appreciate the nature of the evaluative problem facing Aristotle in his theory of poetry, or the originality with which he tackled it. The problem was effectively to define the status of poetry in such a way as to free it from the moral and other objections which its critics had brought against it, yet without slipping back into a conventional account of the privileged nature of poetic knowledge.” (1987: 177)¹⁴²

Aristotle can excuse what he calls an absurdity in a narration, as for example when Odysseus does not wake up when left on Ithaca, if in other respects the poet has made the scene seem plausible (*Poetics* 1460a).

After Aristotle, in an intense burst of literary study lasting over 200 years, judges of poetry began calling themselves κριτικοί. Many in the first wave of these critics were Aristotle’s students, including Heraclides Ponticus (fl. 350 BCE), who wrote “On the Age of Homer and Hesiod” in two books (stolen from Chamaeleon, another Peripatetic, according to Diogenes Laertius 6.92), Hecataeus of Abdera (slightly later), who wrote *On the Poetry of Homer and Hesiod*, and Megacleides, who examined the representation of Heracles in Homer, Hesiod, and Stesichorus. The most unusual of these was Aristotle’s student and associate, Eudemos of Rhodes, who compared a number of Greek and Near Eastern theo-cosmogonies (see [Chapters 3](#) and [5](#)).

It is within this milieu that Alcidamas composed his *Mouseion*, or *Temple of the Muses*, the forerunner of what was eventually known as the *Contest of Homer and Hesiod*, or *Certamen* (dating in its final form to the Hadrianic period). Earlier versions may go back to Hesiod himself, who in the *Works and Days* describes sailing to Euboea to take part in a poetic competition. The Greek tradition of “judgment” (κρίσις) regarding poets and poetry is, thus, as long as the tradition of poetry itself.¹⁴³ The tradition of the *Contest* shows that the Greeks from the earliest times imagined Homer and Hesiod as contemporaries

(i.e., equally ancient and revered) and worthy of a poetic face-off.¹⁴⁴ Contrary to the will of the people, the king Panedes (All-Knowing?) gives the victory tripod to Hesiod on the grounds that a poem about peace and farming is more useful to them than one on war and slaughter. In the *Contest* social and ethical criteria trump aesthetic ones. A case can be made that already by the end of the fifth-century poets, critics, and orators were also identifying Homer and Hesiod as poets of opposing styles, one grand and full, the other thin and didactic.¹⁴⁵

Drawing on this verdict, Hugo Koning argues that Homer and Hesiod were evaluated according to three categories: content (fighting versus farming), ethics and politics (king versus people), and the effect on the audience (emotion versus reason):

It is my general thesis that these three watersheds make the most important distinctions between Hesiod and Homer not just in the tradition of the contest but in the ancient reception of the poets as a whole. The crucial role of the judging authority and its socio-political orientation, for instance, reflect the appropriation of the poets by all layers of society *throughout* antiquity. The distinction between the morally sound (but poetically poor) Hesiod and the sweeping power of Homer's poetic genius, moreover, is arguably the greatest watershed between the poets as they were constructed by the Greeks." (2010a: 268) (his italics)

I would amend these comments by saying that when one thinks of watersheds, one needs as well to consider the *Theogony's* vision of idealized governance.

In Summary

As the Hellenes made clear in the *Certamen*, any Greek of the Archaic and Classical periods would have proclaimed Homer his most cherished epic poet, but when it comes to literary influence, an argument can be made for Hesiod's enduring presence. Examples come from the Homeric Hymns; Solon; Presocratics like Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides; Pindar; Aeschylus; and even in certain ways Plato. The reason for this is not hard to find: Hesiod's concern for social justice and concord. Even with Longinus's claim that Plato is the "most Homeric" of all (*On the Sublime* 13), Proclus is also right

when he observes that Plato often made use of Hesiod (cf. *In Remp.* II 208, lines 2–4). Plato's indebtedness to Hesiod and the *Theogony* extends far beyond his conception of the Forms.

From Hesiod and the Presocratics we can see that the Greeks had two visions of justice. For the natural philosophers justice was sister to strife and flux, manifest in nature's perpetual oscillation from excess to counter-excess. But for Hesiod νόμοι and δίκη set humankind apart from nature (*W&D* 274-80) and aligned them with the Olympians. Uniquely for man of the city and for the gods on Olympus, justice was associated not with flux but with Dike's sisters Eirene (Social Peace) and Eunomia (Good Governance). Justice of this sort and the harmony associated with it are not found in nature but apart from it. It is just for these reasons, I believe, that Hesiod's creation myth had an enduring influence on writers like Solon, Aeschylus, and Plato, as he provided them with the idealized mythic model of the forms and principles of social cohesion that they sought to obtain in more sophisticated (and troubled) times. By the fifth century many thinkers had rejected the ancient depiction of the gods, but Hesiod's vision of Zeus's stable and harmonious Olympus continued on in a number of surprising ways, even as myth gave way to a philosophy of the soul which was in harmony with itself.

Echoes of the *Theogony* in the Hellenistic and Roman Periods

A generation after Athens' defeat at the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 BCE, the literary center of the Greek world migrated from Athens to Alexandria. In this new world of scholar-poets and pharaoh/kings a new literary aesthetic arose in which the *Theogony* and Hesiod gained a certain prominence. As Glenn Most writes in the introduction to the Loeb Hesiod: "It was in the Hellenistic period ... that Hesiod reached the acme of his literary influence in ancient Greece: he provided a model of learned, civilizing poetry and a more modest alternative to pompous martial epic that made him especially prized by Callimachus" (2006: lxxv). This assessment is only partially true, however, as the enthusiasm for Hesiod and the *Theogony* was quite selective and piecemeal. Under Stoic influence, people at this time were not inclined to think of Zeus as a late-born god but as the maker of the universe who ruled over all things by law and reason.

Many centuries later in the time of the Roman Emperor Trajan, Dio Chrysostom expresses a sentiment also felt throughout the Hellenistic and Roman periods. King Philip asks his son Alexander: "But what about Hesiod, do you judge him of little account as a poet?"¹ To which Alexander replies, "No, not at all, although he's not for kings or generals, but for shepherds, carpenters, and farmers." Reminded that Hesiod defeated Homer in the *Contest between Homer and Hesiod*, Alexander replies (contrary to what our text of the *Contest* says) that the outcome could have been different if kings had been judges and not farmers, private citizens (ιδιώτης), and effeminate Euboeans. Hesiod, he claims, is for women, not for men, as his *Catalogue of Women* shows. In an age of Ptolemaic kings and later of Roman emperors, when rulers fancied themselves on the way to becoming gods, the *Theogony's* portrait of a Zeus gaining power by sharing it with others meant little. Pressed, Alexander concedes that the *Theogony* is of limited use to kings when it shows them soothing a turbulent crowd with words and straight justice.

Alexandrian poets were drawn to Hesiod's short, discontinuous narratives and certain scenes from the *Theogony's* proem but there was much criticism of the violence in the poem, especially in the context of sons against fathers. Cronus's castration of Sky and Zeus's imprisonment of Cronus were considered by many to be blasphemous.² Hesiod's depiction of monsters like the Chimaera, the Gorgon, and the Harpies did little to enhance the reputation of the Muses. Later, Christian apologists had great fun ridiculing Hesiod's claim that these daughters of Zeus were a source of heavenly knowledge. Gianpiero Rosati's thesis that there were two Hesiods in this period is very much on the mark: on the one hand, he was a learned poet of mythic and far away places who was only marginally linked to truth-telling. The concrete, everyday realities in the *Works and Days*, on the other hand, were more kindly received.³

Scholars on the *Theogony*: Alexandria, Pergamon, and Rhodes

Hellenistic scholarship changed the way Hesiod and other ancient Greek poets were received. At the new *megalopoleis* of Alexandria on the Nile Delta and Pergamon in Asia Minor, vast libraries were built, modeled more on the great libraries of Near Eastern kings than on any system of learning in Athens or other Greek cities. Each center had its distinct brand of scholarship and approach to myth studies.

On Rhodes, Eudemos, (ca. 350–290 BCE), at first Aristotle's student and then associate at the Lyceum, left Athens for the eastern island after Aristotle's death in 322. There he continued his teacher's interest in genre studies and comparative analysis. Interested in the movement from μῦθος to λόγος and from θεολογία to philosophy, he compared theogonies throughout the eastern Mediterranean, from the Orphic tradition to Homer, Hesiod, Acusilaus, Epimenides, and Pherecydes of Syrus on the Greek side, and Babylonian, Persian, and Phoenician theo-cosmogonies in the east.⁴ The Babylonian myth he analyzes is the *Enûma elish* (unnamed), making this the oldest Greek reference to that myth known to us. The later paraphrase of this work by the Neoplatonist Damascius suggests that it may have been unusually clear-headed, precise, and objective, in contrast to another retelling of the same myth by Berossus, a priest of Marduk, in his *Babyloniaca*, written in Greek in Babylon ca. 289 BCE. It is our loss that only glimpses of Eudemos's writings survive; it would be fascinating to

know what, if anything, he had to say about the Akkadian myth in relation to the *Theogony*.

At Alexandria, within a generation or two of the Library's conception, there were over 500,000 papyrus rolls (roughly 100,000 books) in stock. The scholars there were of a different stripe from Eudemos. Calling themselves γραμματικοί, a term once used to describe broadly learned men, this bookish group engaged in textual criticism, the editing of texts, and the writing of commentaries about them, in addition to authenticating authorship and texts, establishing relative chronologies, and classifying texts by meter and genre.⁵ Their greatest and most influential work was on establishing a Homeric text, but they also produced critical texts and commentaries on Hesiod, and other early poets like Archilochus, Sappho, Anacreon, and Pindar. In addition to his antiquity, Hesiod was highly valued for his interest in origins and genealogies, for the wealth of information that could be gleaned from him about geography, ancient peoples, religion and cult and for his nonlinear mode of composition.

Zenodotus of Ephesus, the first head of the Alexandrian library (ca. 284–ca. 270 BCE), is credited with editing or correcting (διόρθωσις) a text of Homer.⁶ He also created an alphabetical, Homeric *Glossary* and may have been the first to divide Homer's poems into 24 books. We can infer some of his Homeric readings from Aristarchus's later work, but we know next to nothing about his extensive work on the *Theogony*, which may have included a διόρθωσις of that text.⁷ It is less likely that he also produced one for the *Works and Days* and Hesiod's other poems. In his arrangement, the *Catalogue of Women* followed the *Theogony*, a sequencing that proved meaningful for later writers of universal histories, as already indicated.⁸

The second head of the Library, Apollonius Rhodius, also offered textual and interpretative comments on Hesiod. The third head of the Library (from 236 to 194 BCE), Eratosthenes, a poet, geographer, mathematician, and athlete, influenced many when he argued that Hesiod came after Homer, on the grounds that he had a more advanced knowledge of Greek and foreign geography (gained from merchants).⁹ The fourth head of the Library, Aristophanes of Byzantium, produced a διόρθωσις of the *Theogony* and was the first to claim that the *Shield of Heracles* was not by Hesiod.

Aristarchus of Samothrace (ca. 216–ca. 145 BCE), head of the Library after 153 BCE (HesiodT 49 Most), was admired as “the most grammatical of all.”¹⁰ A contemporary described him as “a μάντις (seer) who knows the meaning (διάνοια) of Homer” (cf. Athenaeus 15.671f and 14.634c, respectively), although the accolade may have been tinged with irony, as it comes from a student of his archrival, Crates of Mallus, at Pergamon. In addition to Aristarchus's two

διόρθώσεις and explanatory notes (ὑπομνήματα) on Homer, he produced a διόρθωσις of the *Theogony* and wrote a monograph entitled *On the Age of Hesiod*. He and the other Alexandrian scholars were extremely alert to divergent versions of a myth in the two poets, including the different stories of Aphrodite's and Hephaestus's births, of Medusa (*Th.* 276–86), of Hesiod's personification of figures like Nemesis (*Th.* 223), and the like. Schroeder suggests that such comparison was “one of Aristarchus's interpretative strategies” (2006: 128). Drawing on Erasthenes's work, the Alexandrian also concluded that Homer, whom he dated to 1000 BCE, was Hesiod's senior by 300 years (dating Hesiod, as we do, to circa 700 BCE).¹¹ Perhaps in part for reasons of chronology, he shunned the Greek fancy of Homer and Hesiod in a poetic face-off.¹²

Aristarchus's extremely influential work¹³ was recorded by Aristonicus (in the Augustan Age), who also wrote extensively on Homer and Hesiod. His *On the Critical Signs in the Theogony of Hesiod* examined Aristarchus's διόρθωσις of the *Theogony*. His contemporary Didymus, nicknamed “Brass-guts” for his huge productivity, similarly collected and responded to Hellenistic scholarly works, as did Seleucus in the time of Tiberius. Much of what appears in the Homeric and Hesiodic scholia, assembled centuries later, can be attributed to these three scholars.¹⁴

Crates of Mallus, associated with the library at Pergamon and a very different kind of scholar than the Alexandrians, was Aristarchus's great rival.¹⁵ Considered brilliant and idiosyncratic in his judgments, his interests ranged widely from poetics to grammatical parallels to the search for authentic passages. He regarded himself a κριτικός more than a γραμματικός, and as a critic was prone to interpret ancient myths as allegories of the physical world. Little of his writings survive but, if Erika Simon is right, we can glean some of his allegorical readings of the *Theogony* in the sculptural program for the Pergamon Altar (discussed below). At *Th.* 126 (Broggiato fr. 79 and commentary, p. 240), Crates felt that he had exposed a difficulty in the poem when Earth is said to have made Sky equal to herself, a problem he felt was resolved if the two were considered equal in shape (that is, spherically), but not in size.¹⁶

Crates was not alone in reckoning that the short (and end-rhyming) proem of the *Works and Days* was spurious, but he was alone in claiming the same for the *Theogony*'s long and influential proem.¹⁷ One cannot rule out personal antipathy against the Alexandrians (and its current chief librarian), as the Alexandrian poets drew especially from two passages in the proem, namely Hesiod's account of divine inspiration (explicitly imitated in Callimachus's prologue to his *Aetia*) and the verse which says that “kings come from Zeus” (quoted in

Callimachus's *Hymn to Zeus*). Crates's reasoning seems particularly flat-footed as he claims that the short proems of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* summarized the chief points of their poems, whereas those in the *Works and Days* and the *Theogony* did not. This is a strange claim to make about the *Iliad*'s proem as Troy is not even mentioned in the first seven verses; nor does the proem of the *Odyssey* have much to say about Ithaca or Penelope. By contrast, the proem to the *Theogony* introduces points about Zeus's rule which resound throughout the main body of the poem, as we have already seen. To say that the *Theogony* begins with Chaos at verse 116 and ends (presumably) with Zeus's creation of Olympus turns it into a linear story rather than the one which we have today that begins and ends with the Muses and Zeus's achievements.¹⁸

Tourism

In the Hellenistic period, the spot where Hesiod was thought to have been visited by the Olympian Muses became an internationally popular theme park.¹⁹ Organizers were quick to institutionalize and systematize the exact locale—and time—of the encounter. A boundary stone marked the entry into “the holy land of those who sacrifice to Hesiod's Muses” (*Inscriptiones Graecae* VII 1785 = Most T104). Springs, some named in the *Theogony* and others not, were enfolded into the mythology of the place. Crowds flocked to musical and poetic competitions at the grove (and to other athletic and poetic contests at the nearby Erotica), well into the Roman era until Constantine I closed it after his “conversion” to Christianity in 312 CE. In the Renaissance, European and British travelers once again became enthralled by the thought of Helicon's springs percolating poetic inspiration.

Not foiled by Hesiod's vagueness (the Muses “washed their tender skin in Permessus, or the Hippocrene, or very holy Olmeius,” *Th.* 2 and 5–6), the park declared that Hesiod encountered the Muses at the Hippocrene, a spring created when the winged Pegasus struck the earth with his hoof. Even more, visitors were assured that inspiration came from *drinking* “the pure water of the nine Muses,” as one epigram has it,²⁰ especially if it was drunk at noontime (*PA* 9.64.1–6 = HesiodT 93 Most), the magical hour in Plato's *Phaedrus* for the divine to communicate with humans. One epigram, speaking in the voice of Mt Helicon, prophesizes that “for mortals who are persuaded by Hesiod's precepts” (ὕποθῆκαι)/there will be good governance (εὐνομία) (not personified here) and their lands will be heavy with

fruit.”²¹ The poem seems to have the *Works and Days* in mind, although εὐνομία appears only in the *Theogony*. At some point the entire *Works and Days*, without the proem, was inscribed on lead tablets and placed near the Hippocrene.

When Pausanias visited the site in the second century CE, Hesiod’s village of Ascra was in ruins but the sanctuary was going strong, although the tablets inscribed with the *Works and Days* were in poor condition. Statues “by the old masters” of each of the nine Muses adorned the sanctuary, as did likenesses of Apollo and Dionysus (associated with poetry and inspiration), and of the poets Hesiod (with a kithara, not a σκῆπτρον), Arion, and Orpheus, alongside Telete (Initiation Rite). No source says a word about a statue to Homer, as if here at least Hesiod was free from comparison with his great competitor. Not surprisingly, however, a first-century poet has Homer drinking from the Hippocrene.²²

From Pausanias we also hear a strange claim that has long puzzled Hesiod scholars, namely that the “Boeotians around Helicon” proclaimed that Hesiod only wrote the *Works and Days*, a view unattested elsewhere in the ancient record. On page 153, I explain why I suspect that this is a late, not an old, claim by a local population wishing to distance themselves from the ever-growing attacks on the *Theogony*.²³

The Alexandrian Poets

At the Mouseion, or Sanctuary of the Muses, connected to the Library at Alexandria, a community of scholar-poets (under the auspices of the Ptolemaic kings, most likely) regarded Hesiod as something of a guiding light.²⁴ Callimachus (ca. 310–ca. 240 BCE), bookish, witty, learned, and their leading spokesman, championed the pure springs of a “slender Muse” over the muddy waters of long, martial narratives, and regarded Hesiod as his poetic model. He was drawn to what he saw as his polished and well-rounded verse in contrast to Homer’s thunderous grandeur, as well as to his small scale, nonlinear and discontinuous narrative. His didacticism, interest in origins, genealogies, geography, and learned stories of the love affairs between gods and mortals equally suited the tastes of this group of poets. The *Catalogue of Women* and the *Works and Days* enjoyed considerable appeal, but, as indicated above, two passages from the *Theogony*, both from the proem, were of special interest: the poet’s autobiographical

account of poetic inspiration (although all imitators substituted something other than a σκῆπτρον as the object of the Muses' gift to Hesiod) and the claim that "kings came from Zeus" (*Th.* 96).

Callimachus traced his inspiration directly to Hesiod but drew from him selectively, as he cut his own poetic pathways. His signature poem, the *Aetia* ("Origins") of roughly 7,000 lines in four books, opens with a dream sequence describing himself being transported as a young man to Mount Helicon, where he meets the Muses, as Hesiod had before. There, they inform him about the origins of Greek customs, history, and religious rites [*Callimachus* i (1949) fr. 2 Pfeiffer = HesiodT 87a Most]. The fragment survives as follows:²⁵

ποιμένι μῆλα νέμοντι παρ' ἵχνιον ὄξέος ἵππου

Ἡσιόδῳ Μουσέων ἐσμὸς ὅτ' ἠντίασεν

μ]έν οἱ Χάος γενεσ[

]έπι πτέρνης ὕδα[

τεύχων ὡς ἐτέρῳ τις ἐῷ κακὸν ἥπατι τεύχει

]ῷ ζῶειν ἄξιον α[

When the swarm of Muses encountered Hesiod,

a shepherd tending his flock by the hoof-print of the swift horse

[they told him of the birth?] ... of Chaos

... water

[and that?] he who devises evil against another devises evil for
his own liver

... to live worthily(?) ...

Even in this fragmentary condition, we see how economically Callimachus alludes to Hesiod's *two* principal poems: a reference to Chaos and a learned paraphrase of *Works and Days* 265 about evil coming back to harm its perpetrator. When he is stirred awake from his dream at the end of Book II, Callimachus re-echoes these verses, closing the dream sequence. Much that lies between prologue and epilogue in the *Aetia* involves each of the nine Muses answering questions that the inquisitive Callimachus has poised (i.e., why a custom in a certain place?, or the like).

Typical of the Alexandrian delight in geography and erudition, Callimachus identifies the exact spot of the epiphany at the "hoof-print of the swift horse." He also calls the spring Aganippe (not in Hesiod) "the maiden daughter of Aonian Permessus,"²⁶ and identifies Aonië as a nymph of the region, names he may have gleaned from

local Boeotian lore. Both names will attract the scholia's attention and have a celebrated afterlife in Roman and Renaissance poetry, including Milton's *Paradise Lost* (I.6–16) when he invokes the Heavenly Muse to soar above the Aonian Mount to pursue things unattempted yet in prose or rhyme.

The word “swarm” (ἐσμός) in the above quotation is usually thought to convey a sense of being overwhelmed by the Muses, but in his learned and clever way Callimachus may be alluding to the *Theogony's* description of the Muses “pour[ing] sweet dew on the tongue” of Zeus-nourished kings, causing “soft words to flow from their mouths” (*Th.* 83–84). This reading is reinforced if Callimachus thought (correctly) that μέλιχος (soft or gentle) etymologically derives from μέλι (honey) (see his praise of Aratus, discussed below). A later tradition describes bees visiting the infant Hesiod in his cradle, some of them landing on his lips and others drinking his already sweet breath, as a sign of his future eloquence (cf. Vacca on the *Life of Lucan* at HesiodT 26 Most).

But Callimachus certainly never shies away from treating Hesiod with irony or skepticism. Rather than being accosted by the Muses as was Hesiod, Callimachus's Muses serve his purposes by answering a multitude of antiquarian questions. Frank Nisetich (2001: xli) nicely captures the poet's playful tone: “Unlike Hesiod, who got his theme and his power to present it from the Muses, Callimachus tells the Muses what he wants to hear, and there are indications in both the scholia and the fragments that his questions are those of a person who is considerably informed on these matters already. He is not, like Hesiod, starting from scratch. A good deal of the poet's mischievous ingenuity peeps out at us, then, in those two fragmentary phrases, ‘remind me ... of the answers.’”

Elsewhere, Callimachus seems even to caution that Hesiod must be read with a discriminating eye.²⁷ When praising Aratus's didactic song the *Phainomena* (on constellations and weather signs) for being “Hesiodic,” he notes that the old master must be cultivated selectively (*Callimachus* i, Epigrams 27 Pfeiffer = HesiodT 73 Most):²⁸

Ἡσιόδου τό τ' ἄεισμα καὶ ὁ τρόπος οὐ τὸν
 ἄοιδόν
 ἔσχατον, ἀλλ' ὀκνέω μὴ τὸ μελιχρότατον
τῶν ἐπέων ὁ Σολεὺς ἀπεμάξατο· χαίρετε λεπταὶ
 ῥήσιες, Ἀρήτου σύμβολον ἀγρυπνίης.

The song is Hesiod's and so is its style, but not

to the last drop. No, the man from Soli [i.e., Aratus] has

skimmed off only the most honeysweet of verses and left the rest.
Hail,

delicate discourses, token of Aratus's sleepless night-labor.

The Hellenistic slender Muse, we gather, knows what is best to take from Hesiod and what is wise to leave behind. It is in Callimachus's *Hymn to Zeus* that we see this selective reworking of the *Theogony* at its most clever and dramatic. The hymn was composed in 285/4 at the Festival of Zeus the King when Ptolemy I "Soter" (Savior), nearing the end of his reign (from 323 to 283 BCE), had selected his youngest son Philadelphus to be his co-regent (co-regent from 285–283, ruler from 283–246 BCE). At such a time, the question of succession was an anxious matter. Addressing these anxieties, Callimachus bends the old poem to new meanings. Freely reworking Hesiod's felicitous phrase "kings are from Zeus" (*Th.* 96), he uses it in this hymn to praise Ptolemy I, and perhaps Philadelphus, at the same time.²⁹ Callimachus's Zeus is "always great, always lord" and the "one who issues laws," δίκασπóλος (not a word found in Hesiod) (vv. 2–3). This Zeus does not acquire power from a statesman's fair distribution of honors and shared governance, but is rather an all-powerful god in complete control of the cosmos. He refers to this power in verses 66–67:

Lots did not make you king (bee)³⁰ of the gods, but the deeds of
your hands,

your power (βία) and might (κράτος) which you have placed
near your throne.

Rather surprisingly, outside of the *Theogony* (vv. 368–88) only here and in Aeschylus's *Prometheus Bound* are Bia and Kratos associated with Zeus (although editors oddly do not capitalize them in this hymn). Some think that these lines allude to Zeus's defeat of the Titans and Typhoeus, but they may just as likely refer in Stoic fashion generically to Zeus's ever-present strength.³¹

Quoting from the *Theogony* (96), Callimachus's "kings come from Zeus" (v. 79), the best example being Ptolemy (whether only Ptolemy I or his co-regent, too). "What is not under the strength of a ruler?" he asks. "There is nothing more god-like / than Zeus's kings" (vv. 75 and 79–80). Callimachus shows little interest in Hesiod's vision of kingship, but only in the phrase legitimizing the link between "our" Ptolemy (v. 86) and Zeus.³² As Richard Hunter and Therese Fuhrer have noted, in this new political landscape, "Zeus and the good king

are, at least potentially, fused together ... *almost* [like] ... one paradigm, rather than two related figures” (authors’ italics).³³ Callimachus’s use of Hesiod is radical in the root meaning of the word; that is, he goes back to a primary source to establish a new vision. For Callimachus, Zeus’s greatest gift to humankind is not communal harmony in the city ἀγορή as in the *Theogony*, but wealth, safety, prosperity, and a sense of excellence (vv. 91–6).³⁴ Callimachus also adds, interestingly, that no singer “has been born, or will be born, who could sing the works” of Zeus (vv. 92–3).

Callimachus’s *Hymn to Zeus* is also remarkable for the way it keeps Cronus out of the limelight in its story of Zeus’s birth and his rise to power. Departing from the *Theogony*, Zeus is born in Arcadia and reared in Crete (vv. 10–54). In this lengthy narrative, Cronus is mentioned only once and that in a subordinate clause when the Corybantes are described as making noise in a shield dance “in order that Cronus hear the rattle of the shields, and not you (Zeus) crying like a baby” (vv. 53–54).³⁵ Nor does the hymn mention that Zeus takes power from his father. Silence about these stories may stem from a hesitation to bring up the more disturbing parts of the Hesiodic tradition, but it may also be the case that Callimachus means to shy away from any hints of political upheaval or violence, especially at this time of co-regency.³⁶

In a further distancing from the *Theogony*, Callimachus playfully acknowledges that the “ancient singers (Callimachus uses αἰδοί, the Homeric/Hesiodic term for poets) did not entirely tell the truth” (v. 60), and he hopes that his own “lies may be plausible fictions” (literally, that “may they persuade the listener’s ear”) (v. 65). Perhaps in verse 60 Callimachus is alluding to the inconsistencies found in the divinely inspired poets, but at verse 65 he discounts the veracity of all myth. Here, he is explicitly critical of Homer (*Il.* 15.187–93) and Pindar (*Olympian* 7.54–61) for reporting that Cronus’s sons divided their domains by lot. The plausible fiction is Hesiod’s version that Zeus acquired Olympus by merit, not by lot,³⁷ although Callimachus’s emphasis on Zeus’s force ignores Hesiod’s description of how Zeus gained power.

Callimachus also distances himself from Hesiod in his representation of poets. No longer do the Muses pour sweet words on the tongues of kings and poets alike, as Hesiod has it (cf. *Th.* 83 and 97), but poets are “from Apollo” (v. 78). In Callimachus, only all-powerful kings are from Zeus and they do not share the public arena with poets. Lower human enterprises, such as trade, warfare, and poetry, are the concerns of lesser gods, as befits Callimachus’s court status, as well. In sum, even as he goes back to an ancient source, Callimachus is offering a new perspective on Zeus, kingship, and

poetry.

When we turn to Theocritus (first half of the third century BCE), Callimachus's near contemporary and fellow Alexandrian, we see an even more selective use of Hesiod. For Theocritus, Homer was the more important poet, even as Theocritus shared many of the Alexandrian poetic aesthetics. Although Hesiod, encountering the Muses while tending his flocks, became the eponymous figure of bucolic poetry, for the Hellenistic writers his story of poetic inspiration was quickly becoming a literary *topos* only distantly connected to the *Theogony*. When imitating it in his programmatic *Idyll*, #7, Theocritus has the urban poet Simichidas taking a walk in the country, when "thanks to the Muses" (v. 12) he encounters the goat-herding poet, Lycidas, at the noon hour.³⁸ First, the goat-herding poet rebukes his urban counterpart (in a friendly manner) (vv. 21–26) and then presents him with a rabbit stick (rather than with a σκῆπτρον), calling it "a gift from the Muses" (v. 129; cf. v. 43).³⁹ In this adaptation, both men are already poets and neither is overtly divine. Unlike Hesiod's being introduced to a mythic-cosmogonic landscape, Simichidas learns to recognize that music can be found even in the simplest of things, in this case the pebbles beneath one's feet which spin and sing at every turn (vv. 25–26). Demythologizing his ancient model, Theocritus offers a reduced, rusticated epiphany which delights even in the small beauties underfoot.⁴⁰

We see something of the Callimachean fusing of Zeus and the Ptolemaic king in Theocritus, as well. When wrestling with the relation between power and art, Theocritus plays with the same Hesiodic conceit as did Callimachus that "kings are from Zeus." *Idyll* 17 begins: "From Zeus, let us begin, and, oh Muses, end with Zeus, / the best of immortals, all this when we sing. / And of men let Ptolemy be named first, / and last and in the middle, for he is most excellent of men" (vv. 1–4). The first of gods is like the first of men, a point of comparison re-enforced by the fact that Philadelphus, Ptolemy II, married his sister as Zeus married Hera (vv. 130–34). For Theocritus, Ptolemy II is not "like a god" but a "semi-divine" ἄναξ and βασιλεύς (cf., *Idyll* 17.135–36), directly descended from a god and he gets his great wealth directly from Zeus. Both Callimachus and Theocritus describe the Ptolemy's kindness, or benefaction, when dispensing wealth among their subjects, as an εὐεργεσία, the same term Hesiod used to describe Zeus's kindness when releasing the Cyclopes from bondage (*Th.* 502–3). In exchange for Philadelphus's lavish support of religion, culture and the arts, probably including patronage (vv.115–16), the bucolic poet offers his gift of poetic praise.⁴¹ Like Callimachus, Theocritus reduces the Muses' role, disassociating them from kings and seeing them exclusively in the realm of the arts,

helping poets.

Hesiod's presence is even further occluded in Apollonius Rhodius, the last of the great Alexandrian poets, Callimachus's pupil and Zenodotus's successor as head of the Library (from ca. 270–245). As a librarian he worked on Hesiod, but as a poet in his *Argonautica* he only occasionally referred to Hesiod in cameo appearances. As with other Hellenistic writers, he passes over—almost in silence—Hesiodic references to the violent succession of kings, although once, driven it would seem by an irresistible impulse to tell a naughty aetiological tale, he refers—in a verse and a half—to Cronus's pitiless castration of Ouranus. But before doing so, he asks the Muses for forgiveness (compare 4.984–87 and *Th.* 162, 179–80), and he is quick to offer another, longer, less objectionable version (cf. 4.982–92; cf. Callimachus, *Aetia* 2, fr. 43.68–71). In this tiny aside, he appears to be having fun, being learned and telling off-color tales from the old timers.⁴²

Apollonius's greatest borrowing from Hesiod, however, comes in a passage that he attributes not to Hesiod but to Orpheus, one of Jason's shipmates. It runs as follows (*Argo.* 1.496–511):

He sang how the earth and sky and sea,
once fitted together all in one form,
before each part was separated from the other by destructive *neikos*
(quarrel);

and how the stars and moon and paths of the sun
hold ever fixed markers in the aither;
and how the mountains rose up, and how the rivers resounding
with their nymphs came to be and all the creeping things, too.
He sang how first Ophion and Eurynome,
daughter of Ocean, used to hold power on snowy Olympus;
and how by force and hands he yielded his honor to Cronus,
and she to Rhea, and they fell into the waves of Ocean;
and the other two meanwhile used to rule over the blessed Titans,
while Zeus—still a child and still knowing childish thoughts—
was living in the Dictaeon cave; and the earth-born Cyclopes
had not yet armed him with the thunderbolt,
thunder and lightning; for these things attend Zeus's glory.

Deliberately no doubt, there is hardly any Orphic theology in Orpheus's cosmogony.⁴³ Reference to Ophion and Eurynome holding Olympus draws freely from Pherecydes of Syros, while the conceit of Zeus's arms being manufactured by the Cyclops is Hesiodic (cf. *Th.* 504–5 and 141 = Orphic fr. 179), although this song does not anthropomorphize earth and sky. Its movement from unity (and Love?) to νεῖκος appears to be more Empedoclean than Hesiodic.⁴⁴ But if we are to assume that Zeus will bring the cycle of union (Philotes?) and Strife to an end and introduce stability to Olympus (as the poem will restore friendship to the quarreling Argonauts), then one might argue that the implied thought of stable harmony after upheaval owes more to Hesiod than to Empedocles, where Love and Strife exist in perpetual oscillation.

Philosophy/Religion

In soil made fertile for philosophy by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, Athens remains the epicenter for philosophical schools in the Hellenistic period. Tradition has it that when as a boy Epicurus (341–271 BCE) asked his teacher “what preceded Chaos” in Hesiod's *Theogony* and no answer was forthcoming, he turned to philosophy [Diogenes Laertius (= DL) X.2; cf. HesiodT 118 Most]. In time, he founded his Garden near Plato's Academy and professed a set of beliefs that turned its back on political discourse, denied the immortality of the soul, and claimed that the gods did not concern themselves in any way with human activity. The founder of Stoicism, Zeno of Citium (ca. 335–ca. 263 BCE), formalized a philosophy of a single, all-powerful creator that dismantled traditional views of polytheism, already attacked by earlier philosophers and others, and made Hesiod's vision of Zeus seem small, quaint and obsolete. The creator-Zeus's rationalizing λόγος permeates a divine and rational κόσμος.⁴⁵ In ways that might have perplexed Hesiod, the Stoics defined the good in man as being in harmony with nature. As Gisela Striker describes it:⁴⁶

A good human life, being the life of a rational creature, will have to be organized in accordance with the perfect order of the universe. Knowledge of the laws of nature will make one capable of organizing one's life so as to exhibit the orderliness that will make it a good life. Since happiness consists precisely in leading a good life, the Stoics could then even define the good for man as living in agreement with nature.

Nevertheless, Zeno and the Stoics still had reason to read the *Theogony*. What J. Tate says in regard to Stoic views of Homer applies just as well to Hesiod. Hesiod was not regarded as omniscient but an original thinker, nonetheless, “who expressed sound doctrine in the mythical style proper to the primitive times” in which he lived. At times he spoke “according to the truth,” at times “according to opinion.”⁴⁷ It is still debated whether Stoics saw these early poets as proto-Stoics who veiled their philosophy in mythic form, or whether these poets, unbeknownst to themselves, happened to express half-truths which required philosophers to decode (mostly by finding embedded truths in names and epithets).⁴⁸ So A. A. Long (1992: 62 and 66, respectively): “however Zeno read Homer, he certainly sought to demythologize Hesiod by means of etymology ... [unearthing truths about the universe] whose validity [was] quite independent of anything Homer or Hesiod may have thought.” Arguing against von Arnim (1903: 71–72), Keimpe Algra (2001: 562) says that Zeno did not write a line-by-line commentary on the *Theogony* but drew from the text piecemeal, “not so much to defend the (consistency of the) old poet, nor to provide a sophisticated and enlightened version of traditional religion, but rather to ‘appropriate’ Hesiodic myth and to use it in support of his own Stoic cosmology and cosmogony.”

While the Alexandrian poets mostly drew from the *Theogony*’s proem, Zeno (like the Milesian Presocratics) looked at the earliest stages of creation, rereading the myth according to the Stoic view that the cosmos, once divided, was composed of four natural elements. So, for Zeno, Χάος was derived from the verb for flowing (χείομαι) or the noun for stream (χύσις) and referred to primal water (the first of the four elements). Rather than Earth being born *after* Chaos as she is in Hesiod, for Zeno earth originated *from* it as a later element. Eros, interpreted as the third element in Hesiod’s cosmos, was fire. (Either Zeno’s text of the *Theogony* did not contain verse 119 about Tartara/Tartarus or Zeno regarded it as part of Earth.) There is little in Hesiod’s account to stand in for *air*, the element usually coming after water.⁴⁹ The Stoics similarly read the Olympians as aspects of the physical universe: Zeus was aether, Hera was air, Hephaestus was fire, Poseidon was water, and so on. In true allegorical fashion, some Stoics even read Hesiod’s story of Styx, an Oceanid and the first to come to Zeus’s side, as an account of primal water separating from the whole (SVF 2.573, recorded by the scholia at Th. 397).

A *Hymn to Zeus* by Cleanthes (311–232 BCE), Zeno’s successor and a contemporary of Callimachus, shows how far the Stoic conception of Zeus is from Hesiod’s and Homer’s. Like Callimachus’s Zeus, the Zeus of this hymn is the “all-powerful,” invincible “founder of nature,” ruler of all creation, and god of reason. I offer here verses 1–21 and

Most renowned of immortals, many named, all-powerful always,
 Zeus, the first cause and ruler of nature, you who govern all things
 with law (νόμος),

Hail! For it is right that all mortals call upon you.

For from you we came into being and have a likeness of god,
 only we, of all the mortal creatures that live and creep on the
 earth;

therefore, I shall hymn your praise and always sing your might.

The entire universe here, spinning around the earth,
 obeys you, wherever you lead, and by you is willingly ruled.

So great is the servant you hold in your invincible hands,
 the two-edged, fiery, always-living thunderbolt.

For by its strokes all works of nature &are accomplished&;
 with it you make straight the universal λόγος, which moves
 through everything, mingling with the one great light and with the
 small ones;

&because of this you are great&;, the loftiest king forever [or,
 of everything].

Not one deed happens on earth¹⁵ without you, God,
 neither in the divine ethereal sphere, nor in the sea,
 except for those things which bad people (κακοί) do in their
 mindlessness.

But you know how to make the uneven even
 and how to order the disorderly; and what is un-dear to you is
 dear.

For thus you have fitted together²⁰ all things into one, the good with
 the bad,

so that naturally there comes to be one ever-living λόγος for all
 things.

...

But Zeus, giver of all, wrapped³² in dark clouds, bright with the
 thunderbolt,

rescue human beings from destructive ignorance;
 scatter it, father (πάτερ), from the soul; grant that they obtain
 the understanding in which³⁵ you trust when governing all things
 with justice,

so that we, having been honored, may in return honor you,
 forever hymning the praise of your works, as is fitting,
 one being mortal, since there is no greater privilege for mortals
 or for gods than to hymn the praise—always—the universal law
 (νόμος) in justice.⁵⁰

As Hesiod's *Theogony* may be considered a hymn to Zeus, so Cleanthes's *Hymn to Zeus* tells a creation story (perhaps attempting a Stoic's reconciliation with conventional religion), although its language has almost nothing in common with the *Theogony* or with traditional polytheism. This is not a late-born Zeus, restricted in the ways he can create stability and harmony, but both the first principle of the universe and the ruler of it, succinctly expressed in the phrase φύσεως ἀρχηγέ, "the first cause / ruler of nature." Like Elohim of *Genesis* 1, he is the singular god, creator of the universe, which, Cleanthes says, he governs in its entirety by means of universal law (κοινὸν νόμον, vv. 24 and 39) and a universal, ever-living word/reason (κοινὸν λόγον ... αἰὲν ἔόντα, vv. 12 and 21). His governing fiery thunderbolt is both the enforcer and the rational force of fire that permeates all things. All other gods exist within his singularity, as this Zeus, of many names, has fitted all things into one. Only he and his λόγος survive the Stoic cycle of conflagration, creation, back to conflagration. Like Hesiod's Zeus, this one is king (βασιλεύς) (v. 14) but of the whole universe. The confines of Olympus now extend to the edges of the universe, seen as something like a cosmic city. But unlike Hesiod's Olympus, in the cosmic city there is no counteracting disharmony within the household. Nor do Eris's Λόγοι (Words) (*Th.* 229) flutter about; there is only the singular λόγος, word and reason. Without a true polytheism and without conflict on the divine level, the hymn's attention turns to humankind, just as does Yahweh's attention in *Genesis* 2 and 3. Like *Genesis*, but in the reverse of the *Theogony*, at the outset all in the universe is good (just, lawful, and reasoned) and would remain so were it not for humankind who can be bad (κακοί), mindless, wretched (δύσμοροι), and without regard to the good (ἄνευ καλοῦ) (vv. 17, 22, 23, and 26). Hesiod's Zeus was primarily political, but this God is largely moral, the one who can guide the misguided to the path of rightness. But perhaps in a Hesiod-like manner at the close, the hymn ends with an image of choral harmony, a collective song that is both a celebration of cosmic harmony and an expression of that harmony, here remarkably shared by humans and gods alike.

Chrysippus (ca. 280–ca. 207 BCE), Cleanthes's successor at Athens and a contemporary of Apollonius in Alexandria, has much the same view of the creator god: "Zeus is the principle of reason that rules over everything." But he also considers him according to the *Theogony*'s deities: "Eunomia and Dike and Homonoia and Eirene and Aphrodite and everything of this sort are all the same being."⁵¹ Chrysippus is probably the author of a fragment which ranks Hesiod among "the ancients who established order (διακοσμήσαντες) for the whole (i.e., entire universe, τὰ ὅλα)" (*SVF* 2.501). As Hugo Koning writes (2010a:

199), “this is perhaps the neatest description of Hesiod the natural philosopher: a meticulous organizer who has categorized and ordered the entire cosmos.”

Zeno uses the same verb διακοσμεῖσθαι to describe the re-establishing or re-ordering of the cosmos after its purgative fire (ἐκπύρωσις) (*SVF* 1.27), and it appears again much later in the writings of Dio Chrysostom (ca. 40–120 CE) when he referred to the whole κόσμος as a “divine city or regulated order” (διακόσμησις). The *Theogony*’s concept of ordering and polity could not be more different. For Dio, Zeus is both Father and King of the whole and the κόσμος in its entirety is his “house” (οἶκος τοῦ Διός) and “city” (πόλις), filled with “friendship and harmony” (φιλία καὶ ὁμόνοια) (*Orationes* 36.27–37).⁵² The Hesiodic harmony of Olympus has expanded to every corner of the Stoic universe. Yet, even in this universe, there is a shadow of Hesiodic conflict, as a fragment from a Stoic cosmogony (Pap. Oxy. 2816, dating perhaps from the Hellenistic period) shows, when it describes Zeus as eager to unite the unbounded cosmos, lest νεῖκος rise among the gods and return the world to Chaos. The word νεῖκος is associated both with Empedocles and Hesiod, but in the Hellenistic period, and even into the Roman period, any allusion to Chaos is almost certainly a shorthand reference to the *Theogony*.⁵³

Chrysippus is also the first person in antiquity to identify the *Theogony* by name, although it is certainly a possibility that either one of the Alexandrian librarians, a generation earlier, or even Zeno himself, had already assigned this title to Hesiod’s poem. The reference comes from Galen (*On the Opinions of Hippocrates and Plato* III.8.8) (Galen: 129–216 CE, from Pergamon) in an important passage that quotes at length Chrysippus discussing two versions of Athena’s birth (III.8.3–19). One of the passages, Galen says, comes from the *Theogony* in verses identical to our modern text: 886–890, 900, and 924–26 (Zeus marrying and swallowing Metis, and then giving birth to Athena). Galen also quotes a second version of 19 hexameters which Chrysippus claims is also from Hesiod telling an alternate story of Athena’s birth (one which Chrysippus prefers). West accepts Chrysippus’s claim that both versions are by Hesiod, proposing that the variant may have come from Hesiod’s *Melampodia*, where Zeus and Hera argue about which sex derives greater pleasure from sexual intercourse (1966, *ad* 886–900). But as I shall argue at the end of this section, I think a sixth-, or even a fifth-century date is more likely for the variant.

It begins: “on account of this strife (ἔρις) she [Hera] gave birth to Hephaestus ... without Zeus” (vv. 1–2). Unfortunately, Chrysippus does not identify the source of Hera’s ἔρις. Whatever its cause, it can

have nothing to do with Zeus's giving birth to Athena, as in this version Zeus swallows Metis and gives birth to Athena *after* Hera's anger.⁵⁴ Also, the anger (simply an ἔρις) is far less imposing than the "intense raging filled with strife" that describes Hera's wrath at *Theogony* 928. The passage has a number of other interesting twists: (A) Hera gives birth to Hephaestus "without aegis-bearing Zeus" (v. 2) before Zeus beds down with Metis and then with Themis.⁵⁵ Perhaps out of respect for Hera's queenly station, in this version she appears to be Zeus's first (and only?) wife, rather than being Zeus's seventh consort (and second wife) as in the *Theogony*. Metis is not called Zeus's "wife" in this passage. (B) she resists Zeus's efforts to ingest her (v. 6), as if, true to her nature, she foresees his evil intent. (C) This version also avoids the gap in the *Theogony* between the time Zeus swallows Metis (at verse 899) and the time he gives birth to Athena (at verse 924 after Zeus marries Hera).⁵⁶ (D) This passage, however, presents a number of narrative problems of its own: a) rather oddly, Metis becomes pregnant with Athena either *just as* or immediately *after* Zeus swallows her (vv. 10–1); b) while Athena is still inside Zeus, Themis crafts the aegis for her (v. 18); and c) "with the aegis, Zeus bore Athena holding her warlike armor" (v. 19). How that all works is not clear.

There are also a number of verbal or stylistic peculiarities in the variant reading: (1) Metis is called "Athena's mother" (v. 14), something that never happens in the *Theogony*, nor in any other extant Greek or Roman literature known to me (nor, as far as I know, is Athena ever called Metis's daughter); (2) Metis is said to remain in Zeus's σπλάγχνα (entrails), a word that does not appear elsewhere in Hesiod; (3) stylistically, it is not characteristic of Hesiod to end four lines in a row with an epithet (vv. 2–5) or to begin three verses in a row with a nominative participle (vv. 6–8).

As mentioned above, Chrysippus prefers this version of Athena's birth to the *Theogony*'s. His reasons are allegorical. As a Stoic, he is not concerned with Zeus's effort to evade his fate or to preserve his regime. Rather, he wants to use Hesiod to illustrate that one must swallow and store wisdom (φρόνησις) and practical art (τέχνη) in one's belly before τέχνη, like a daughter from a mother, can be brought out through the mouth by way of the head (cf. III.8.4 and 15–9). For his purposes, thus, the unique reference to Metis (i.e., φρόνησις) as the mother of Athena (i.e., τέχνη) is especially useful. To my ear, the many oddities in logic, style, and vocabulary of the variant poem argue against Hesiodic authorship. In my estimation, it more likely comes from one of the numerous retellings of the *Theogony* in the sixth and fifth centuries, where the language of the *Theogony* was imperfectly imitated and the tensions between Zeus and

Hera softened.

Whatever its source, this version of Athena's birth finds its way into pseudo-Apollodorus's *Library* of the first or second century CE and into Theophilus's Christian apology of the second century, as will be discussed under each author below.

Greek Treatises and Romances/Universal Histories

At this time, there were a growing number of texts *On Piety* (or *Godliness*) and *On the Gods* that criticize both traditional religion and ancient mythology.⁵⁷ Today, little more than titles survive but we presume a great number of these works were directed against the *Theogony*. And at the same time, fanciful romances and histories recycled the *Theogony*, typically demythologizing, trivializing, and taming it.

A prime example is Euhemerus's novelistic *Sacred History* (ca. 300 BCE) about a fictitious island in the Indian Ocean, called Panchea (All-Genuine, or All-Good), which takes Hesiod's anthropomorphism rather literally, turning Sky, Cronus, and Zeus into mortal kings, later deified by a grateful populace.⁵⁸ Martin West attractively describes it as "the last true Greek theogony, though it is a theogony without the gods" (1966: 13). While Euhemerus's book is in accord with the rationalizing proclivities of his day and the increasing number of ruler cults at this time, Albert Henrichs has shown that the thought is not original to Euhemerus but can be traced back at least to Prodicus, and perhaps to other authors, as well, in the fifth century (*vide* Prodicus in chapter four). Callimachus denounces this work as "evil" (fr. 191.10 Pfeiffer), but it does not appear to have reached a wide audience until the Roman period, when Ennius translated it (now mostly lost) into Latin. In the time of Caesar and Augustus, Diodorus Siculus quotes from the *Sacred History* extensively in the sixth book of his *Bibliotheca historica* (Historical Library) (in Greek), taking the romance, it appears, for fact. A few centuries later, Christian writers like Lactantius and Eusebius latch onto the text for obvious reasons.

Following Euhemerus, Diodorus calls Ouranus the first king, a moderate and beneficent man, knowledgeable about the stars and the first to sacrifice to the "heavenly gods" (whence Ouranus's name) (VI.1.8). Also following Euhemerus, he makes Cronus the oldest, not the youngest, of the Titans who, as oldest, naturally became king. In this true (and sanitized) version of Hesiod, there was no strife between

father and son. This good Cronus leads human beings from a rustic to a cultivated life (βίος ἡμέρος) (is Euhemerus punning on his own name?) and introduces them to a life of justice and a simplicity of the soul (V.66.4).⁵⁹ Diodorus offers two versions of Zeus's rise to power: in one, "Zeus acquired kingship after Cronus departed from men into the company of gods, not by out-muscling his father by force but in a just and customary manner by being deemed worthy of that office. ... But others mythologize," he goes to say, "that Cronus, terrified by an oracle, repeatedly hid away (ἀφανίζειν) his children as they were born" (V.70.2). Even here, Diodorus substitutes the mythic and terrifying act of Cronus "swallowing down" (κατέπινε) his children with a more palatable hiding them away. The suspect, mythic account goes on to explain that Rhea, grieving over Cronus's actions but unable to deter them, managed to conceal Zeus on Mt. Ida in Crete, where he was raised by Nymphs.

The language Diodorus uses to praise Zeus's rule would indicate that he was, for all his cleansing of Hesiod's myth, a close reader of the *Theogony*. Zeus, he says, "was the first to show men rules regarding acts of injustice, to teach humans how to deal justly with each other, how to refrain from acting violently, and how to settle disputes by appeals and law courts; in short, he showed man how to live according to εὐνομία and εἰρήνη" (V.71.1). Hesiod's Horai are here embodied in Zeus's kingly manner. Later, Diodorus specifically refers to the Horae as Zeus's children, and names them individually and in the same order as in the *Theogony*: Eunomia, Dike, Eirene (V.72.5). He further praises Zeus "not only for hiding away (ἀφανίσαι, V.71.6) (from ἀφανίζειν) the impious and wretched people from humankind but also for distributing honors (τιμαί) as merited among the best of gods, heroes and men. And for the magnitude of his kindnesses (εὐεργεσίαι) and the superiority of his power, all men with one voice granted him both the kingship for all time and his dwelling on Olympus" (V.71.6). Characteristic of Diodorus's shying away from violence in ancient myth, he calls Zeus "wise-counseling" (μητίετα) without mentioning Metis, and he says without elaboration that Athena "was born from Zeus" (V.72.2–3). In short, Diodorus and Euhemerus appear to be reading Zeus in the *Theogony* in the same way as we are in this book, namely as the creator of an idealized polity, but they have recast the story to make it politically correct.

Diodorus's *Bibliotheca historica* also exhibits another way that the *Theogony* had a curious effect on a certain kind of history writing. Probably both the Epic Cycle, offering a "continuous" narrative from a theogony to the death of Odysseus, and the Alexandrian arrangement of the *Theogony* followed by the *Catalogue of Women*, also offering a

“continuous” narrative of sorts from the beginning of time to mortals born from deities, help give rise to the writing of universal histories. Such is the case of Diodorus’s historical narrative from mythological times to the cusp of Caesar’s Gallic Wars in 60 BCE (cf. Hardie, 1986: 7 and West, 2013: 7).

But if Hesiod is the original source for such universal histories, Diodorus expressly says that he is following Euhemerus’s *Sacred History* and not what he calls the “rather monstrous fabricated myths” in Homer, Hesiod, and Orpheus (VI.1.3). Even so, he says that he will “briefly discuss” their works (VI.1.11) and he credits Homer and Hesiod (although not Orpheus) with being “the most distinguished of men” (IV.7.2).

The Arts

In the fourth century BCE, the renowned painter Apelles on several occasions drew from the *Theogony*’s account of Aphrodite’s birth from the sea. Reports have it that he came up with this vision by watching the courtesan Phryne swimming nude in the Aegean. Alas, the paintings have vanished but they live on in at least five Hellenistic epigrams and one wall mural at Pompeii inspired by them. One of the paintings, much damaged, was brought to Rome and hung in Julius Caesar’s temple.⁶⁰ And indirectly it has reached us today as Pliny’s description of it fueled Poliziano’s imagination in the Renaissance in his poem *Le Stanze*, which in turn inspired Botticelli’s *Birth of Venus* (1485) (and may have inspired Titian’s *Venus Anadyomene*, 1525). Such is increasingly the nature of the *Theogony*’s influence, a dimming star in the galaxy of stars whose light reaches us flickeringly.

Another refracted visual rendering of the *Theogony* may perhaps be seen in the massive Pergamon Altar, now at the Pergamonmuseum in Berlin. Commissioned by Eumenes II (died ca. 160 BCE), the altar depicts the struggle of the Olympian gods against the snake-footed children of primordial Earth, not told in the *Theogony* but parallel to its Titanomachy and a popular theme in art since the Archaic period. Erica Simon proposes that this rendering of the battle between the Olympians and the Giants was inspired by Crates’s Stoic interpretation of Hesiod’s poem. She divides the sculpture into three familial groups—Gaia and Sky, Nux, and Pontos (cf. *Th.* 106–7) and a Stoic allegory of a battle for cosmic harmony.⁶¹ If Simon is right it is only a distant likeness to the *Theogony* because the Giants’ threat to the universal

order causes the Titans to fight alongside the Olympians. Also, Aphrodite is the daughter of Zeus and Dione, as in Homer, so as to avoid Hesiod's gruesome story of her birth.

Also deviating from the traditional telling of the Gigantomachy, Athena (patron goddess of Pergamon), and not Heracles, is responsible for the Olympian victory. The Gaia in this program is like the Gaia of the *Theogony* who begets Typhon in a last ditch effort to prevent Zeus from ultimate victory (vv. 820–68), not the Gaia in the rest of the poem who guides Zeus every step along the way to his ascendancy. The marvelous tableau of the climatic panels depicts Zeus and Athena fighting against Gaia and several Giants. With an eagle hovering overhead, Zeus battles the leader of the Giants, Porphyrion (= Typhon, according to Simon), while Athena pulls a winged Giant by the hair, trying to separate him from his mother. In most depictions of the Gigantomachy Gaia supplicates Zeus directly on behalf of her children, but in this program she supplicates Athena. Nike with victory wreath in hand hovers by Athena's side, signifying that Gaia's plea will go unheeded. The three females are thus locked in a triangular struggle: Gaia at the base (half immersed in the ground, in a unique pose), Athena on the ground, and Nike aloft, as Zeus's virginal daughter defeats elemental Earth on behalf of the new male order. As a Stoic allegory of the *Theogony*, it may refer to an all-powerful Zeus, with his daughter, unifying the *cosmos*, even as it may at the same time commemorate in general terms Eumenes II's victories over a variety of adversaries.⁶² If Simon is right about the *Theogony*'s prominence in the allegorical messages of the battle scenes, few other examples from the Hellenistic and Roman periods—perhaps with the exception of the Christian attacks against the *Theogony*—will engage so energetically with Hesiod's ancient poetry.



Athena defeating the Giant Alkyoneus as his mother Gaia, rising up out the earth, tries to save him. Nike is about to crown Athena with the victory wreath. Frieze. Pergamon Altar, second century ce. Berlin, Pergamonmuseum, Staatliche Museum.

Education

In the schools, Hesiod's poems were most often taught in segmented pieces, excerpted in anthologies and handbooks, in addition to school commentaries. Rarely, thus, was the *Theogony* read in full. Sometimes catalog lists of names from the *Theogony*, like those of the Nereids and Oceanids, would find their way into these texts, but, with the exception of the lists of proper names in Aratus's *Phainomena*, Hellenistic poets tended to avoid this characteristic of Hesiod's poetry. Perhaps educators did as well.⁶³ Thus, the verbal play in genealogies and narrative often seen in the *Theogony* was probably lost in these anthologies. The *Works and Days* was more popular and often mined for its maxims, judged to be useful for guiding young men. Identified with this work, Hesiod was considered the poet of peace and farming, as Homer was considered the poet of war. The text most likely to be read in schoolbooks was the *Iliad*, and even this was often limited to Books I and II, while the *Odyssey*, like Hesiod's poems, might be excerpted in anthologies.⁶⁴ Hellenistic educational practices known as

the “encircling education” (ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία)—a pedagogy which Zeno regarded as useless—survived relatively unchanged for Greeks and non-Greeks alike until the fall of the Roman Empire. In a catalog of 3,026 papyri fragments of Greek and Roman texts from third-century BCE Egypt, 467 of the fragments come from the *Iliad*, 138 from the *Odyssey*, 77 from Euripides, 76 from the lesser Homeric, and, next in order, 60 from Hesiod, 16 of which are from a wide spectrum of passages from the *Theogony*.⁶⁵ Quintilian (10.1.52) recommends the *Works and Days* for precisely its maxims, but despairs that “a great part of Hesiod’s work is filled with names” (he must have the *Theogony* at least partially in mind). Judging from the frequency of citations in authors like Plutarch, the *Works and Days* was well known in the Roman period, as was the *Theogony*, but to a lesser extent. Lucian (ironically) singles out Hesiod for being divinely inspired and goes on to mention that he, like Homer, “was picked utterly to pieces” by the school grammarians (*Hesiodus* 1 and 5).

In Rome, an Ironic *Theogony*

The Romans do not show a great interest in the *Theogony*. There is some truth to Joseph Farrell’s characterization that before Vergil “there is no indication that Roman poets were at all interested in Hesiod *per se*.”⁶⁶ Even then, the interest was far from great. The one author to buck the trend was, in my judgment, the *enfant terrible* of Latin letters, Ovid. This is especially true in the *Metamorphoses* where he uses the *Theogony*, largely in jest.

In the Republican period, allusions to Hesiod and the *Theogony* are found here and there, although even these are often second-hand. From the earliest period of Roman letters, reference to the Muses as *novem Iovis concordēs filiae sorores* (“nine daughters of Jupiter, daughters of like mind”) intriguingly appears to echo Hesiod’s ἡ δ’ ἔτεκ’ ἐννέα κόῦρας, ὁμόφρονας (“she bore nine daughters of like mind” (Naevius, *Carmen Belli Poenici* 1 and *Th.* 60), but this need not be a direct borrowing. Slightly later in time, when Ennius (239–169 BCE) relates how Homer (not Hesiod) comes to him in a dream and informs his poetry, he is rewriting Callimachus’s imitation of the *Theogony*, and not the *Theogony* itself. His didactic poem, *Epicharmus*, on the gods (Earth as Ops) and the four elements owes nothing to Hesiod, and his translation of Euhemerus’s *Sacred History* into Latin further suggests how far he was from Hesiod. In the next century, the stage poet and scholar of the theater, Accius (170–ca. 86 BCE), claims

in his *Didascalica* that the Romans of his day were actively absorbed in the perennial question of Hesiod's and Homer's relative dates. Perhaps so. Our source for this, Aulus Gellius in the *Attic Nights* (3.11), finds Accius's arguments for dating Hesiod as the older of the two (and therefore of more authority?) to be particularly weak.

Although familiar with Hesiod's poetry, the Latin didactic poet/scientist Lucretius (ca. 99–ca. 55 BCE) as an Epicurean philosopher shows little interest in it. He posited that, along with primordial matter, “intangible space, void, and vacuity” (*locus ... intactus inane vacansque*, *De Rerum Natura* 1.334) has existed from the beginning of time. Like Hesiod, this vacuity between atoms makes motion—and division—possible but, unlike Hesiod's χάος (a word never used in the *DRN*), Lucretius's void is not a beginning point but a very present condition. Like Hesiod, Lucretius imagines the birth of *terra*, *mare*, and *caelum* (earth, sea, and sky), but there is nothing divine about them. They, like the universe (*mundus*) itself, are the result of accident, the unintentional unions of atoms created without intelligent design (*DRN* 5.416–31), and like all things born they will also die.

Lucretius mentions Homer, Empedocles, Democritus, and Ennius by name, but never Hesiod. Like Ennius, he curiously adapts Hesiodic motifs but, following Ennius, he uses the motif to honor Homer, not Hesiod, even calling Homer the “one and only to bear the scepter” (*unus Homerus/sceptra potitus*) and placing him amid “the companions of the Heliconian maidens” (3.1037–38). As far as I am aware, only here in extant Greek or Latin literature is a poet other than Hesiod identified as bearing a scepter. Elsewhere in the *De Rerum Natura*, Lucretius is at pains to belittle, demythologize, and naturalize a) Hesiod's myth of the Golden Age, b) his story of evolution, and c) his description of fanciful hybrid figures like the Chimaera (5.783–1457). Perhaps in a further ridicule of Hesiod's falsifying poetry, he describes those who claim that the soul resides throughout the body in a kind of “harmonia” as “musicians [who] carried down such ideas from lofty Helicon” (3.132–34). Thus, there is much to support the view that Lucretius as a philosopher was “anti-Hesiodic,”⁶⁷ as Monica Gale characterizes this Roman poet.

But in one respect we might suppose that Lucretius drew something from Hesiod. Like him, Lucretius sees poetry as honeyed and sweet, possessing a magical charm capable of persuading and healing: in the *Theogony* this view is exemplified in the form of kings who, speaking with “honeyed voice” and straight justice, can dispel even a great quarrel in the city center and bring about communal tranquility (*Th.* 80–93); in the *De Rerum Natura* this comes out in the form of poetry as “sweet honey of the Muses,” much like the “sweet juice of golden honey” around the rim of a cup filled with philosophy's bitter

medicine (*DRN* 1.947 and 938, respectively), capable of turning even a reluctant reader toward a true understanding of *Natura* and of inducing tranquility in the mind (1.933–50).⁶⁸

Even when we turn to Vergil, we only see faint traces from the *Theogony*, although he engages more with Hesiod's *Catalogue of Women* and *Works and Days*. These traces, as we might suspect, are heavily filtered through Alexandrian aesthetics. In marvelous ways this Latin master refits those poems to the reed pipe and pastoral themes of the *Eclogues* and to the political/agricultural themes of the *Georgics*. In the confessedly Callimachean (*deductum ... carmen*, 6.5) *Eclogue* 6, Hesiod is referenced as the "Ascrean" poet (70). Ioannis Ziogas has nicely brought out how Silenus's anti-Homeric song "replicates the narrative sequence" from the *Theogony* to the *Works and Days* to the *Catalogue of Women*, even as he is also presented as an Orphic figure whose singing can lead ash trees down a mountain.⁶⁹ The singing scientist Silenus (31–81) offers a cosmogonic story, creation emerging through the vast void when seeds of earth, air, sea and fire are conjoined. In ways that influenced Ovid surely, Vergil depicts these early unions as metamorphosing into stories of unhappy love. Vergil also turned to the didactic *Works and Days*, although more occasionally than one might suspect.⁷⁰ The *Theogony* was even less prominent in the *Aeneid*, although one episode from the *Theogony*—Zeus's subduing Typhoeus—served as a model for Heracles defeating the fire-breathing Cacus in *Aeneid* VIII, itself a scene which may be read allegorically as Augustus staving off chaotic counter-forces in his effort to bring back a Golden Age to Rome.⁷¹

Nor does Horace (65–8 BCE) appear to have much use for the *Theogony*, even though he, like Hesiod, was concerned with the relation between language, idealized images of power, and wise rule. When writing about style in the *Ars Poetica*, Horace names Orpheus, Amphion, Homer, and Tyrtaeus among the oldest poets who simultaneously served as priests, civilizers, and lawgivers, but Hesiod goes unnamed. The closest one comes to a Hesiodic echo in Horace is *Ode* III.4, which opens with an invocation to Calliope. That ode further speaks of Jupiter's just defeat of the Titans and the Olympian defeat of the Giants, within the context of Jupiter as a moderate ruler (cf. *vim temperatam*, 66). Such passages have a Hesiodic patina, but, *pace* Rosati and others (2009: 371–72), there is little reason to say that they are modeled on Hesiod directly. The one exception may be when Horace speaks of the nurturing Muses "giving gentle advice" to Jupiter (vv. 41–2), a passage that may loosely be drawing from the *Theogony*'s vision of Calliope "attending" revered monarchs and bestowing sweet dew on the tongues of Zeus-nurtured kings (*Th.* 80–84).

This picture of the *Theogony*'s general neglect changes with Ovid

(43 BCE–17/18 CE). Heralding his literary début at *Amores* I.15.11–12 (= Most T92), Ovid identifies Homer with war and Hesiod with agrarian peace: Homer will live as long as Tenedos stands and “the Ascræan poet as long as the grapes swell and the grain falls.” Nothing is distinctive in this, but in that same collection of poems, he urbanely refashions Hesiod’s epiphany, recounting how elegant Lady Elegy, with one foot longer than the other, approaches him in an ancient forest, replete with a sacred spring. Rather than immediately inspiring the young Ovid, Elegy bids him to accompany her rather than Tragedy (*Amores* III.1). In another work, he has the Muse Polyhymnia, sitting at the Hippocrene, tell her version of creation. She begins with Chaos (a clear Hesiodic allusion) and ends with Maiestas (Majesty, daughter of Honor and Reverentia), flanked by Pudor (Shame) and Metus (Fear) on Olympus. Much of the *Theogony* is imitated here: not only the beginning from Chaos but also Jupiter’s defeat of the Giants (modifying the Typhoeus story) and the vision of Maiestas sitting peacefully at Jupiter’s side, holding his scepter. As in the *Theogony*, this Muse, perhaps with a bit of irony, celebrates in song a just and stable regime.⁷²

But it is the *Metamorphoses* (8 CE), its own form of a universal history, beginning from *chaos* and ending with Caesar Augustus, which most fully exploits, with wit and merciless irony, I would say, the *Theogony*’s visionary message. What Ioannis Ziogas says about this influence bears repeating: “The Hesiodic character of the *Metamorphoses* is one of the most underdiscussed aspects of Ovid’s multifaceted epic” (2013: 57). For him, this means that the full epic poem opens with a theogonic reference to Chaos, but quickly diverts course, teasing the expectations of the reader, to a *Works and Days* sketch of the five ages of man (for Ovid reduced to four, with the age of heroes deleted) (*Met.* I.89–150), before finally settling on its themes of metamorphosis and amorous epic, in the tradition of the *Catalogue of Women*. Ziogas tells his story brilliantly throughout, but as the “pivotal aspects” of *Theogony* are for him “sexual intercourse, violence, genealogy, and succession myths” (59) Ziogas narrates Hesiod’s influence only in part, not in whole. What he misses is the bizarre tag at the end of the epic to Jove and Caesar, where, as we shall see, Ovid’s ironic use of the *Theogony* comes into full bloom.

But back to the beginning. Evocations of Hesiod jump out at the reader immediately when Ovid announces in his remarkably brief proem (I.1–4) that he will tell a tale from “the world’s first beginning / to our time” (I.3–4). Verse three places the poem in the tradition of the *Theogony* proper; the next verse, across the enjambment, places it in the Hesiodic mode of offering a universal history from cosmogony to historical times.⁷³ Ovid’s request that “the gods breathe (*adspirant*)

on his beginnings" (I. 2) also stands out, as nowhere else does he use this Hesiodic verb for poetic inbreathing (cf. ἐνέπνευσαν at *Th.* 31).

Ovid's emphasis on the physical world—*mare, terrae, caelum* (I.5)—places this creation myth in the context of Orpheus's "scientific" creation song at *Argonautica* 1.496–511 and the opening of Silenus's song at Vergil's *Eclogue* 6.31–40, but when the storyteller says that the world emerged out of *chaos* (I.7), he brings the reader back to the primogenitor of creation myths. But unlike Hesiod's χάος, Ovid's *chaos* does not refer to a gap but to a "rough, confused mass" (*rudis indigestaque moles*, I.7). Beginnings from such formless matter allow Ovid to posit a maker who can arrange what once was artless (*iners*, I.8) into form. Initially, he identifies this maker as a dual force, an unnamed god and a better (and kindlier?) nature (*deus et melior ... natura*, I.21), a demiurge of sorts, who from "the discordant seeds of things" (*discordia semina rerum*, I.9) and a world of "strife" (*lis*, I.21)⁷⁴ composed "concordant peace" (*concor's pax* 1.25).⁷⁵ This rapid-fire story of creation gives the impression of a new order that is balanced, stable, permanent, and with discrete boundaries (cf. I. 32–88), notions which the story of the four ages of man will in short order dispel. But at the outset there is a sense, temporary though it may be, that a Hesiod-like pattern of harmony, stability, and permanence (*concor's pax*) has emerged out of Χάος (*Chaos*), ἔρις (*discordia*), and νεῖκος (*lis*).

At the beginning of the epic, Ovid rather slyly refers to "a god," "whoever he is" (I.32), and to a better nature as the stimulus for a better world. He also calls this figure the "fabricator of the world" (*mundi fabricator*, 1.57) and an "artisan of things" (*opifex rerum*, I.79) who marks out the world with careful planning (cf. *cura dei*, I. 48).⁷⁶ Then, surprisingly and with little warning, after stories of great passion, commotion, upheaval in book after book of the *Metamorphoses*, suddenly at the end of the epic the identity of the concord-bringing god is boldly announced as Caesar Augustus, the savior who brings peace and order to a chaotic world. Many, including Ziogas, note Ovid's allusions to the *Theogony* at the beginning of the poem, but they overlook those at the close.⁷⁷

Without much justification or preparation, and parodying the *Aeneid*, Ovid's world of change, upheaval, and metamorphoses, perhaps something like Hesiod's poem of violent generational change, gives way at the end to a stable universe. In language suggestive of Hesiod's praise of Zeus, the Olympians, and Zeus-nourished kings (*Th.* 65–93), Ovid's Jupiter prophesies to an anxious Venus that "with peace given to the earth, a most just founder or progenitor (*iustissimus auctor*) will turn his attention to the rights of citizens (*civilia iura*) and will bring laws (*leges*), and by his own example will guide men's

customs (*mores*)” (15.832–34). Compare *Theogony* 66–67: the Muses celebrate πάντων τε νόμους καὶ ἡθεα κεδνὰ / ἀθανάτων, “all the laws and cherished customs of the gods.” For Ovid, this figure will not be Jupiter but Augustus, a ruler and soon-to-be god, nor will the place be Olympus but Rome. At the beginning of the poem, and with unabashed mockery, Ovid portrayed Olympus, with its *summa arx*, *plebs*, *potentes*, as “the Palatine of high heaven” (1.163–76), a heavenly copy of Rome. Now at the end of the poem *Jupiter* calls Rome “our Capitol and forum” (15.841; cf. 15.858–60). Like the *mundi fabricator* who brings *concor*s pax to a world of strife at the beginning of time, Augustus will bring peace, concord, and stability to a world of wars and upheaval. In effect, Ovid’s “comedy” validates Hesiod’s implicit argument that Olympus is a model for the well-governed human city when with wit and a wink he relocates the *Theogony*’s proud claims of Olympus down to Rome. In the new *theogony*, the rulers Augustus and Jupiter (and the *mundi fabricator*) will bring peace, law, and cherished customs to a world long ravaged by chaotic war and pitiless Amor.⁷⁸

My argument is, then, that in the overall shaping of his poem, Ovid shows himself to have grasped the broad trajectory of the *Theogony* and to have used it, unsparingly, for his own ironic purposes.⁷⁹

Throughout, we also see signs of Ovid in the *Metamorphoses* being drawn to Hesiod stylistically. Ioannis Ziogas discusses how Ovid often “imitates Hesiod’s *figura* closely” (2013: 61). Here, I shall mention two instances. One is a *figura etymologica* in Hesiod when he says that Πήγασος (Pegasus) was named for his birth by the πηγᾶς (waters) of Ocean (*Th.* 281–82), a verbal play which Ovid captures by playing on the two meanings of *fons*: *fountain* and *origin*: “the rumor is true,” he reports, “*Pegasus huius origo / fontis*” (“Pegasus is the origin of the fountain/source”) (*Met.* 5.262–63). The other passage is a close and witty rendering of “οὐδὲ ξείνος ξεινοδόκῳ καὶ ἑταῖρος ἑταίρῳ” (“a guest with a guest-host will not be like-minded, nor a comrade with a comrade,” *W&D* 183), which Ovid captures by playing on the two meanings of *hospes*: “*non hospes ab hospite tutus*” (“a guest is not safe from a host,” *Met.* 1.144) (cf. Ziogas, 2013: 89 and 61, respectively). I draw attention to these close renderings of Hesiod because, I believe, Ovid also imitates Hesiod’s narrative play with personified abstractions. Take, for example, the way he moves between the god Amor, the common noun *amor*, and the verb *amo*. When telling his version of creation, Ovid—in his most teasing manner—says not a word about Amor and the role of sex in creation, that is until I.452, *Primus amor*.⁸⁰ For the next five books, Amor/Cupid, Venus’s “impudent boy with a man’s weapon” (1.456), wreaks havoc on the lives of gods and mortals alike and may fruitfully be compared to Hesiod’s archaic “limb-loosening Eros who overpowers / the mind and

prudent sense of all gods and men" (*Th.* 121–22). The first victims of Cupid's far-from-blind arrows are Apollo and Daphne, although they certainly will not be the last. Ovid has little interest in imitating a Hesiodic progression in which a world leader harnesses an anarchic god to the social good, but he does, like Hesiod, take delight in integrating proper nouns into the narrative description. So, in the Apollo and Daphne episode, the word *amor* itself metamorphoses, appearing now as a god, now as a common noun, now as a verb or participle (I.452–567).

The odd delay of any account of the Muses until Book V in the *Metamorphoses* may show yet again Ovid's witty and ironic reading of the *Theogony*. A far cry from Hesiod's awe-inspiring and censorious Muses, these goddesses are timid and beset. One Muse fears that Helicon is not safe and confesses to Minerva that "everything terrifies our virgin minds" (V.273–74). All nine had already been the victims of an attempted rape during a rainstorm by the Thracian king Pyreneus. Seemingly making fun of Hesiod for having his Muses suddenly change from the Heliconian Muses to the Olympian ones (*Th.* 25), Ovid says that there are in fact two separate groups of Muses, one from Helicon and the other from Pieria (or Olympus), and he has them compete in a poetic face-off to see who is better. Both sing a Gigantomachy. The Pierian Muses fail to complete their song because the thought of Typhoeus fills them with fear and they flee to Egypt, hiding out disguised in various animal forms (V.319–31). For the Heliconian Muses, Calliope offers the traditional ending of the Gigantomachy with the Olympian gods prevailing but then Calliope sings a very un-Hesiodic tale about Ceres and Proserpina. In Ovidian fashion, she emphasizes Venus's power and empire, even over Pluto and the Underworld (V.341–661). The poor Pierian Muses are defeated, less for the inferiority of their artistry than for their portrayal of cowardly Olympians hiding out in Egypt. Defeated, they are turned into magpies. Ovid's treatment of the Muses forces readers to question what is truth and what is fiction and where if anywhere can one find divine authority in epic poetry. More than most other poets, Ovid *means* to lend credence, it seems, to Hesiod's admission that the Muses can tell lies that resemble truths. To make matters worse, at X.28 Calliope's son, Orpheus, questions the reliability of his mother's tale.⁸¹

Not long after the *Metamorphoses*, Manilius (first century CE), observing "the work of heavenly reason," sets for himself the task of explaining the ways of the stars, a realm "hidden and far above men and gods." Writers of such arcane matters "will inevitably fight" he notes, (*Astronomica* I.145–46),⁸² in whose number he includes Hesiod: some say that the universe is without beginning or end, others that it

is born from Chaos, or that it is composed of atoms, or fire, or water, or the four elements.⁸³ But when Manilius gets down to summarizing Hesiod's poetry (II.11–24 = Most T47), he speaks of "Chaos giving birth to the lands" (not quite what Hesiod says), and then mentions the Titans, Jove, Bacchus (born "a second time from his father"), and the Nymphs, before referring to Hesiod's poems about farming and the heavenly lights. One scholar has proposed that Manilius, rather than making a mishmash of Hesiod, deliberately or not, was referring to his poems in the order that they appeared in Roman books: the *Theogony*, followed by the *Catalogue of Women* (Bacchus's second birth and the Nymphs, from sections of the poem now lost), the *Works and Days*, and then the *Astronomy* (now lost).⁸⁴

Sanitizing the *Theogony*, Apollodorus's *Library*

It is in this environment that we must discuss the *Bibliotheca*, the *Library*, attributed to Apollodorus, which takes the Epic Cycle as its "mythical framework" (West, 2013: 13). Composed in the first or second century CE, it fully warrants James Frazer's evaluation: "a dull compilation of a commonplace man ... a plain unvarnished summary of Greek myths and heroic legends ... (derived) from books alone."⁸⁵ But, dull as it is, its opening chapters need to be looked at in some detail as they rarely stray far from the *Theogony* and were extremely influential and popular in the Renaissance. The *Library* never cites its primary sources, which in our section are primarily the *Theogony* and the Homeric hymns with veins of Orphism spread throughout the Hesiodic bedrock. When it does cite a source, it is usually to indicate a variant tradition (as, for example, its references to Homer at I.iii.5 and to Pherecydes of Skyros at 1.iv.3 and 1.v.2). Invariably, the variant is cited to clean up an unpalatable tale from Hesiod, especially if it concerns Ouranus, Cronus, Zeus, or Hera.

Creation in this rather Stoic and popularizing account passes over Chaos, Eros, Night (Nux), and Eris, and simply begins with Ouranos (Sky), "the first to rule over the entire *kosmos*." This king "marries" Earth, who begets the Hundred-Handers, the Cyclopes, and the Titans (13 in all, not Hesiod's 12).⁸⁶ Without comment, the narrator adds Dione to their company, for reasons that will soon become apparent in the text (cf. I.i.1–3). In the *Library*, Earth persuades the Titans collectively to attack Sky, and all but Oceanus agree to do so. Cronus is the one to "cut off his father's genitals,"⁸⁷ and, as in Hesiod, he throws them into the sea. In Hesiod, the drops of blood fall to the

Earth, and from them the Furies are born. Apollodorus mentions the blood and the Furies in this context, but not the Earth, and from this point forward Heaven's genitals vanish from the story. Further on in the narrative the *Library* recounts Aphrodite's birth from Zeus and the Titan Dione (I.iii.1).⁸⁸

Cosmic rulers in the *Library* always marry. As Sky was married to Gaia, so Cronus "marries" Rhea and Zeus "weds" Hera. The *Library* further makes it clear that Zeus did not marry anyone else ("he wedded Hera ... but he had intercourse with many women, mortals and immortals," I.iii.1). Ironically, the *Library* is closer in this regard to the *Theogony* than are modern translations of Hesiod's poem, which invariably make the mistake of saying that Zeus marries each of his first seven partners. In a rather odd twist, the *Library* says that when Cronus castrated Ouranus "the gods dethroned Ouranus and brought up their brothers who had been cast down in Tartarus and they made Cronus their ruler but he bound them again and shut them up in Tartarus before marrying Rhea" (I.i.4–5). This complex scenario allows Zeus, as in the *Theogony*, to free the Cyclopes, again on Earth's advice. Zeus does so by calling on Metis who fed Cronus a drug to induce the discharge of the other Olympians and the swallowed stone. Expanding upon the *Theogony* (141 and 501–6), the freed Cyclopes "give" thunder, lightning, and the thunderbolt to Zeus, the cap of invisibility to Pluto, and the trident to Poseidon (cf. *Library* I.ii.1), but, departing from Hesiod (and following the *Iliad* and the *Titanomachia*, without citation), Zeus, Pluto, and Poseidon cast lots for government (I.ii.1). There is no sense in the *Library* that Olympus is a special place of fair rule and harmonious order or that Zeus is an ideal ruler.

In the *Library* Zeus first marries Hera (as he may also have in the Chrysippus variant), and then in rapid-fire succession he mingles first with Themis and begets the Horae and the Moirae, then with Dione and begets Aphrodite, then with Eurynome and begets the Graces, then with Styx and begets Persephone (more on this shortly), and lastly with Memory and begets the Muses.⁸⁹ Clearly borrowing from the Chrysippus variant (unattested) and not the *Theogony*, the *Library* has Zeus "mix with" Metis *after* Hera conceives Hephaestus "apart from the bed" of Zeus.⁹⁰ But even here the *Library* leaves out any reference to Hera's ἔπις, offering instead the comment that "according to Homer Hephaestus was one of her children by Zeus." Again following the variant, the *Library* describes Metis turning into many shapes in an effort to avoid Zeus's embraces. As soon as she becomes pregnant, Zeus swallows her (as in the *Theogony*, after Earth's advise), and straightway she gives birth to Athena.⁹¹ The *Library* also refers to Demeter's anger at the abduction of Persephone, but again with an odd twist. Although Persephone is here uniquely Styx's child (I.iii.1),

Demeter inexplicably is the one to get angry [ὀργιζομένη (I.v.1), a weak form of anger compared to her μῆνις (wrath) in the Homeric *Hymn to Demeter* at 350 and 410]. Characteristic of the *Library*, the anger is *not* directed against Zeus, but “at the gods;” nor is there a word in the *Library* about the famine that Demeter brings upon the earth or about Zeus’s necessary reconciliation with her to assuage her fury. In keeping with the *Library*’s sanitized version of the old stories, Pluto is said to “have fallen in love” with Kore when he seized her (I.v.1). In these many variations from the *Theogony*, we can see the author of the *Library* trying to clean up and make more palatable to a contemporary audience the violent, morally questionable, and socially explosive elements of the ancient creation myth.⁹²

The *Library*’s synopsis of the *Theogony* and of other texts gains great favor in the Byzantine East and then later in the Latin West. The first reference to this text comes from Photius I, the renowned ninth-century patriarch of Constantinople, later canonized as a saint in the Orthodox Church. Possessing the complete text of the *Library* and speaking in its voice, Photius writes: “Draw your knowledge of the past from me and read the ancient tales of learned lore. Look neither at the page of Homer, nor elegy, nor tragic muse, nor epic strain. Seek not the vaunted verse of the cycle; but look in me and you will find in me all that the world contains.”⁹³ He feels no need to mention Hesiod. Photius’s enthusiasm for the work is shared by others; the text is frequently cited by the twelfth-century learned Byzantine grammarians John and Isaac Tzetzes, and it becomes a valued resource in the West, thanks to the great Byzantine scholar, turned Papal Cardinal, Basilios Bessarion (1403–1472), who had it copied and deposited in Venice’s public library, the Biblioteca Marsiana. Printed editions followed in 1555 (by Benedetto Egio in Rome), with an improved version in 1559 (by Hieronymus Commelinus in Heidelberg), and a later important edition in 1782–83 (by Christian Gottlob Heyne in Göttingen). As Frazer observed, the author of the *Library* gets more or less “right” the facts of these myths from the *Theogony*, the Homeric hymns, and elsewhere, and to that extent he may be considered a reliable witness. But a reader of the *Theogony* will find it an anguishing experience to read the *Library*, where, in the interest of maintaining a sense of decorum for the ruling gods and their spouses, archaic myth has been made bland and bloodless, deprived of the *Theogony*’s hard edges, political focus, and superb artistry.

Fun Times with Hesiod

Learned Discourses, the Second Sophistic, and Christian Apologists

For Greek and Roman writers alike in the time of the Roman Empire, Homer—and Pherecydes—were increasingly regarded as the authorities on myth.⁹⁴ Homer had so far displaced Hesiod that he had even become the exemplar of themes and subjects, such as inspiration, once associated with Hesiod.⁹⁵ Stylistically, Hesiod was identified with the “middle” style, distinguished for his polish, elegance, musicality, and finely meshed smoothness,⁹⁶ but lacking in Homer’s sublimity, weight, and exceptional range of expression.⁹⁷ Quintilian (born ca. 35 CE) singles out Hesiod’s maxims (in the *Works and Days*) as useful for moral wisdom but he has little time for the names and lists in the *Theogony* or the *Catalogue of Women* (X.i.52 = Most T125; cf. T42). Nor did he have much use for myth (*fabula*), distinguished from fiction and history: it “is removed not only from truth but even from the form of truth” (*Inst.* II.4.2).

Writing in Greek in the Neronian period, Annaeus Cornutus (born ca. 20 CE) argued that ancient poets and their “fabulous additions” corrupted early religion: “Hesiod, as I think, took over some things from those more ancient than himself, and in more mythic style added others of his composition, in which manner very much of the ancient theology was destroyed.”⁹⁸ For writers of diverse philosophical and religious persuasions—including Cornutus (a traditional Stoic), Plutarch (more a Platonist than a Stoic), Maximus of Tyre (a Middle Platonist), and Philo (a Jew)—there was little sympathy for multi-various polytheism and even for pluralism, in general. This was an age that preferred providential hierarchy, a coherently ordered universe, and a benevolent creator, not one aspect of which the ancient poets could offer.⁹⁹

Of all the major figures in the Second Sophistic (Aelius Aristides, Dio Chrysostom, Herodes Atticus, Philostratus, and Lucian), the one most sympathetic to Hesiod was Plutarch (ca. 46–ca. 126 CE). His four-book commentary on the *Works and Days* has vanished, but in his extant writings there are over two hundred references to Hesiod and his works,¹⁰⁰ with commentary ranging from the relative ages of Homer and Hesiod to maxims, myths, genealogies, and individual words found in the *Theogony*, *Works and Days*, and (especially) the *Catalogue of Women*. When thinking of Hesiod in terms of philosophy, religion, and science, he sees Hesiod’s Eros as more scientific

(φυσικώτερος) than Parmenides's (*Mor.* 56), and he describes *Theogony* 116 about the birth of Chaos "as amazingly popular" (*Mor.* 678). But, even for this Hesiodic sympathies, Plutarch feels that Hesiod and Homer must be used with caution. Like others of his age, he believes that religion is older than the oldest of the Greek poets and that he can extract nuggets of those beliefs from them. Thus, Homer, he notes, consists of "healthy and true theological doctrines," as well as "fabricated ones" (*On How to Study Poetry* 19–20), much as Zeno distinguished between Homeric truth and opinion. In the same treatise, he criticizes those who think they are saving ancient stories of divine immorality by resorting to astronomical or cosmogonic allegory (20), arguing instead that the names of the gods sometimes refer to the deity and at other times are a shorthand for a natural state or condition (Hephaestus as fire, Ares as war, Zeus as fate, etc.) (23–24).¹⁰¹ When writing about the Egyptian gods Isis and Osiris, he comments that the "matter of the cosmos is full and closely joined with the good and the pure and the well-ordered (κεκοσμημένον) ... and it may be that Hesiod also, when he makes the first things of all to be Chaos, Earth, Tartaros, and Eros, can be thought to take no other first principles than these, if we apply these names as already disposed, namely Earth to Isis, Eros to Osiris, and Tartaros to Typhon, for he seems to lay Chaos under all, as a kind of territory or place of everything" (*De Iside* 56–7).¹⁰² Without Hesiod's genealogies or personifications, he describes Zeus as the "maker of good-governance and justice" (δημιουργὸς εὐνομίας καὶ δίκης) (*Mor.* 550).

When thinking of Hesiod in a literary way, Plutarch can be quite charming. In a delightful account from his *Quaestiones Conviviales* (9.14.1; Most T86), he describes friends in a round-table discussion of the Muses. The evening begins with the participants offering libations to the goddesses and a song to Apollo (as the Muses' leader), and then they pick up the *Theogony*, singing from it with a lyre accompaniment about the Muses' birth. This was the era when many fancied Homer and Hesiod in a poetic face-off (the *Certamen* in its current form comes from this period), but the blatant absurdity of such an idea irritates to no end one of the speakers at a dinner party (cf. *Quaest. Conviv.* 674–75).¹⁰³ In his treatise *On How to Study Poetry*, Plutarch delights in discussing poetry's seductive charms but advises how those pleasures can also serve philosophy, if one is aware that poetry sometimes lies for dramatic effect and sometimes out of wrong-headedness (16–17).

But a figure like Lucian (ca. 125–180 CE), on the other hand, never tires of ridiculing the old stories of the gods with their ungovernable passions and preposterous powers. The delightful mockery of the *Theogony* stems in large measure from Lucian's deadpan, literalist reading of the poem. Ignoring both Quintilian's and Plutarch's

warnings that myth is removed from truth and that poets intentionally lie, he takes everything Hesiod says at face value and imagines that the masses treat his words as law (*De Luctu* 2). In one dialogue, poor Menippus is hopelessly confused since as a boy he learnt from Homer's and Hesiod's depictions of the gods that quarrels, adultery, and abductions were acceptable behavior, but now as an adult he finds out that such actions are illegal (*Icaromenippus* 3). Elsewhere, he has somebody commend Hesiod, "the best of poets," for his stories about the past: "the birth of the gods up to Chaos, Earth, Ouranus (sic), and Eros; the virtues of women; and farming advice,"¹⁰⁴ but complain that what he really wants is to hear "your second promise, (namely) to sing of the future." Now that, he says, would be useful (*Conversation with Hesiod* I).¹⁰⁵ He mocks the account of Hesiod's encounter with the Muses, having the pathetic poet stammer when asked if his poetry is truly divinely inspired, and having a public orator, a profession far below that of a poet, ask if he couldn't forsake his hard training and education and simply ingest a leaf or two of the laurel to become an orator (*Demosthensis Encomium* 12; cf. *Professor of Public Speaking, or Rhetorum Praeceptor*, 4). In Lucian's hands, Hesiod is ignorant of most everything important, including his inspiration, his art, and the future.

Lucian also takes aim at the *Theogony's* main storyline. In the guise of Cronus's priest, the narrator runs into Cronus himself at his winter festival and seizes the moment to ask the old god—respectfully, of course—if the stories he hears from Hesiod and Homer are true. "All the rest of humankind fairly well believe" them, he assures Cronus, but he wants the word firsthand. Cronus responds with questions of his own: "why do you think that shepherd, that impostor, has any sound knowledge of me. ... Would any man (I will not say god) willingly eat his children, that is, someone other than a Thyestes. ... And if he did, wouldn't he know the difference between a stone and a child?" (*Saturnalia* 5–6). Cronus goes on to say that he certainly was not overthrown by Zeus (as his presence at the Saturnalia makes perfectly clear, that is, to anyone who is not blind) but that he handed power over to Zeus voluntarily.

Elsewhere, Lucian has a "sophist" hopelessly entangle Zeus within his own contradictions. The interrogator, quoting from Homer and Hesiod, wants to know once and for all whether Zeus is, or is not, bound by Fate (in *Zeus Catechized*). In several of Lucian's dialogues, Zeus can do little to justify his punishment of Prometheus. In *Zeus Rants*, Zeus withers under an Epicurean's doubts about the gods' existence or their ability to foretell human affairs. In the *Icaromenippus* (27), when Menippus visits Olympus, he sees Apollo play the lyre, Silenus dance wildly and the Muses sing from Hesiod's *Theogony* and the first song in the Hymns of Pindar. The joke appears to be that the

tables have turned; rather than Hesiod singing a song inspired by the Muses, they are singing his song.¹⁰⁶

Lucian's satiric treatment of Hesiod and Homer invites the question whether anyone in his day with half a brain could take their archaic fabrications seriously. But many appear to do just that. Two polymaths, one in Latin, Aulus Gellius (ca. 125–ca. 180) in *Attic Nights*, and the other in Greek, Athenaeus in *Deipnosophistae* (*The Learned Banqueters*) (published after 192 CE), recount contemporary *intelligentsia*, often quoting from Homer and Hesiod, engaged late into the night discussing esoteric topics.¹⁰⁷ The Greek Pausanias in his multi-volume *Description of Greece* (published ca. 180 CE) is eager to report all the local legends and religious traditions he encounters in his extensive travels. When talking about the local Boeotians who live on Hesiod's Mt. Helicon, he lets out that they only regarded the *Works and Days* as genuine Hesiod (9.31.4–5 = Most T42).¹⁰⁸ Because the claim comes from Hesiod's home terrain, one may be inclined to think that it was based upon a local tradition, reflecting a long-standing tradition, as Cingano is inclined to think (2009: 93). But rather than take this as an ancient view, a reverse possibility strikes me as more plausible. Given that the *Theogony* was increasingly coming under attack (especially by the Stoics) in Hellenistic and Roman times, and being ridiculed (by the likes of Lucian), for its portrayal of the gods, I am inclined to think that the local Boeotians may have wished to distance themselves from the text and to take credit only for the socially more acceptable agricultural poem that promoted honesty and hard work.

For the Christian apologists, the *Theogony*, already under heavy assault by the pagans, was grist for their mill. Points that Lucian treated in jest, for them were serious business and deeply felt. In that sense, these writers engaged more vehemently with the *Theogony* than many had for decades, or even centuries. Christians delighted in Hesiod's claim that the Muses could tell lies sounding like truth. Any claim that the Zeus-born Muses could tell the tale of creation was an easy target. For a Christian or a Jew, nothing could be more absurd than to hear that the world began from Chaos, when *Genesis* made it clear that all matter came from God, and only he could say anything about the beginning of time.¹⁰⁹ Christians also were perplexed how any people could elevate sex to a primordial god or believe in a religion with a child-eating god. Numerous paradoxes suggested themselves: How can gods who are born be immortal; or, why don't they overpopulate the world? Why are there different versions of the same myth? Why worship statues made of bronze and stone? Who is right: believers, Platonists, Stoics, or Epicureans? If gods are detached from human affairs, why and how are they worshipped; if god and

matter are coeval, how can God be the δημιουργός or maker of matter? By contrast, Christians praised Euhemerists for believing that the pagan gods were really men.

Paul is the first to correct pagan thinking when he praises the Athenians for their altar to an unknown god: “what you worship as unknown, I proclaim to you. The god who made the κόσμος and everything in it—he who is the lord of heaven and earth—does not live in hand-made temples nor is he served by human hands. ... As some of your poets have said, ‘For we are his offspring’ [Aratus, *Ph.* 5]. Since we are his offspring, we should not think that the deity is similar to gold, silver, stone, an image from art and the human imagination. God has overlooked the times of ignorance, but now he orders that all humans everywhere repent, because he has fixed the day when he intends to judge the world in justice by a man he has appointed. When raising him from the dead, he provides faith in him for all” (Acts 17.23–25, 28–31).

At the same time as Paul, Philo of Alexandria (ca. 20 BCE–ca. 50 CE), a Jew writing in Greek, felt the need to contend with Hesiod and the bastard tales of the Greeks. He expresses the dilemma elegantly:

The Greeks, who surpass all men in their natural cleverness, first appropriated most of these tales. They then dramatized them in various ways with additional literary ornaments, and intending to beguile with the delights of myths, they embellished them in all sorts of ways. Thence Hesiod and the highly touted cyclic poets fabricated their own versions and made excerpts of Theogonies and Giants’ Battles and Titans’ Battles, which they carried about and with which they defeated the truth. Our ears have for ages become habituated to and predisposed by their fictions. We preserve the received mythology as a sacred trust, as I said also at the beginning. Assisted by the force of time, it has rendered its hold inescapable, so that the truth is regarded as drivel¹¹⁰ and the bastard tale as truth.

(*Praeparatio evangelica* 1.10.40–41, as translated by Attridge and Oden)

In the following excerpt, he refutes that bastard tale:¹¹¹

Some think that the poet Hesiod is the father of Platonic doctrine, supposing that he calls the universe created and indestructible, created because he says “Chaos being born first of all,” and indestructible because he never declared its dissolution or destruction. Chaos in Aristotle’s opinion is a place because a body needs something in place to receive it. And some Stoics think that is water and that the name derives from χύσις (“flood”). But, whichever is right, Hesiod declares most clearly that the universe is created, but long before Hesiod Moses, the lawgiver of the Jews, said in the holy book that the universe was

Fifty years after Paul and Philo, Justin Martyr (100–165) proved to his satisfaction that Moses was older than all the Greek poets whose myths were “told by wicked demons in order to deceive the human race and to lead it astray” (*First Apology* 54–58). In the next generation, the Athenian philosopher and Christian Athenagoras (ca. 160) calls Hesiod a “prince of matter.” In an effort to demonstrate the rather obvious point that divine and worldly wisdom differ, he proceeds to misquote him as saying “we [Greeks] know we frequently speak lies looking like truths” (*A Plea for the Christians* 24).

Clement of Alexandria (ca. 150–ca. 211 CE), deeply learned and versed in Greek literature, often employs language from Hesiod and Homer, sometimes to promote Christian doctrine, at other times to turn Greeks away from their “old song” to the “new hymn.” His *Exhortation to the Greeks* demonstrates both techniques:¹¹²

Let us bring the truth in her brightest wisdom down from the heavens to the holy mountain of god and to the holy chorus of the prophets. Let the truth ... shine on those enclosed in darkness ... and may those who have raised their heads abandon Helicon and Cithaeron and dwell in Sion; ‘for out of Sion will come the law and the word of the lord from Jerusalem’ (quoting *Isaiah* ii.3), that is, the word from heaven, crowned on the stage of the whole κόσμος. ... These are not the strains of Terpander or of Capio, nor in the Phrygian or Lydian or Dorian mode, but the eternal strain of a new harmony from god, the new song of Moses, ‘without grief or anger and one which causes a forgetting of all ills’ (quoting *Odyssey* 4.221), the sweet and true medicine of persuasion” (1.3).

Earlier in this exhortation, Clement has referred to Orpheus, Amphion of Thebes, and Arion, “deceivers all,” but the central images of divine inspiration in this passage—the divine word coming from the mountain and the “holy chorus” revealing divine law—come from Isaiah and the *Theogony* although he quotes from Isaiah and the *Odyssey*. Adapting and cannibalizing the *Theogony*’s vision, he uses it both to argue that the old tradition is benighted and as a vehicle to carry his audience to a true understanding of the light that shines from Mt. Sion.¹¹³

Clement certainly knows of Hesiod and his creation poem. In the *Exhortation*, he calls him the Boeotian (2.35) and “Hesiod of Ascrea” (7.62), and he uses Hesiod’s name as a stand-in for the *Theogony*

(2.22). In the passage quoted above, when referring to song's ability to erase the memory of pain it would have been more apt for him to quote from the *Theogony* (vv. 102–3) than from the *Odyssey* (4.221), as the Odyssean passage refers to the effect of drugs on memory, whereas Hesiod refers to the power of song to ease pain. Quoting the *Odyssey* may show that Clement was more familiar with Homer than with Hesiod or that he thought his audience was. Elsewhere, however, Clement shows an intimate knowledge of the *Theogony* (unnamed) when railing against pagan lustfulness, lechery, and licentiousness. Highlighting Hesiod's description of Aphrodite as φιλομμηδέα (*Th.* 200), he is appalled at the idea of a people worshipping a “genital-loving” goddess (2.13), honoring a lecherous Zeus (cf. 2.23), or making “unbridled lust” a god in the form of primordial Eros (3.38).¹¹⁴

Also in the second century, and perhaps a bit earlier than Clement's *Exhortation*, another convert alludes frequently to the *Theogony*. In this instance, Theophilus, Bishop of Antioch (ca. 170 CE), tries to turn the polytheist Autolycus (Lone Wolf, also the name of Odysseus's grandfather) to Christianity. Theophilus alludes briefly to numerous Greek authors, including Plato and Homer (“I shall use a few of your own histories which you read—but perhaps do not yet understand—to make the truth clear to you,” he explains; *Ad Autolycum* II.1), but his quotations from the *Theogony* are often extensive, and always offered with disdain. When he quotes from the *Theogony*'s account of Zeus's violent overthrow of Cronus (*Th.* 73–74), he implicitly criticizes a religion which honors warring gods; when he quotes from the *Theogony*'s summary of events (*Th.* 104–10 and 112–15), he questions how the Muses could describe events before they were born; and when he quotes from Hesiod's description of the first stages of creation (*Th.* 116–23 and 126–33), he criticizes him for not explaining who gave shape to matter and for not revealing whether a sovereign principle existed before Zeus (cf. II.5–6).

Like Clement, Theophilus dismisses pagan inspiration. Hesiod relied upon his “imagination and error.” “Demons” puffed him up with impure breath (II.8). Christian prophets, on the other hand, are possessed by the Holy Spirit and “speak through wisdom about the creation of the universe” (II.9). And yet, it is just here when referring to the true creation that Theophilus, like Clement, borrows from the *Theogony*, even as he heaps scorn on it. More precisely, his language comes both from the *Theogony* and the Chrysippus's variant.¹¹⁵ When paraphrasing John, Theophilus says that “Through the Logos, God made all things,” but he then begins to anthropomorphize the pre-creation Godhead, describing him as having “vomited forth his own innate Logos which was lodged in his σπλάγχνα (innards)” (II.10). As

John and other Christian writers tend to locate God's Logos within his κόλπος (bosom or womb), it is odd for Theophilus to place the Divine Word in God's σπλάγχνα (innards; later, he also places the Logos in God's heart).¹¹⁶ Because the Christian Logos is inborn in God, the Divine Word cannot be swallowed but—more in a Hesiodic mode than in a Hebraic or Christian one—it (he?) can be “vomited forth.” This image appears to come from Hesiod's creation myth, not from *Genesis* or John, and Theophilus's σπλάγχνα comes from Chrysippus's variant of Zeus placing Metis in his innards. Theophilus further describes the Logos as God's counselor (σύμβουλος), mind (νοῦς), and intelligence (φρόνησις), language that comes generally from the Stoics and is used explicitly for Athena and Metis in the lines which Galen quotes from Chrysippus (*On the Opinions of Hippocrates and Plato* iii.8.4 and 16). Theophilus's Christian message wonderfully fuses Hesiodic themes (read through Chrysippus) with scripture, perhaps in an effort to guide the noninitiate through the language of the old and familiar—that is, through Hesiod—to an understanding of the true and unfamiliar. In this way, Theophilus can expose the old as false and give it new currency when that language refers to the unveiling of the true mystery of God.¹¹⁷

From these Christian writers, we can understand why the Emperor Julian passed an edict in 362 CE prohibiting Christians from studying poetry, rhetoric, or philosophy. “‘For,’ he said, ‘in the words of the proverb, *we are shot with arrows feathered from our own wings*, for it is from our own books that they take arms and make war against us.’”¹¹⁸

A Tour de Force

By luck out of the sands of Egypt, a clever late third-century take off on the *Theogony* survives (P. Oxy. 3537 = Most T95): a (complete?) poem in Greek and in dactylic hexameters where the first letter in every line is an acrostic, spelling out a Homeric (not Hesiodic) phrase: “and answering him, he said.” But the “he” is Hesiod, who is responding to the Muses on the day when they “shook me and sent a divine breath [into me]” (v. 1), paraphrasing the thought but not the language of *Theogony* 31. Drawing on the language from *Theogony* 30, it describes the Muses giving him “luxuriant branches of the laurel” (v. 4) (here branches are in the plural and Hesiod's challenging description of it as a σκῆπτρον is omitted). Inspiration in this poem comes from drinking the waters of “the Aganippe” (v. 14), which arouse in the rustic shepherd a yearning to hear about the race of the gods, the wars of the Giants, the genealogy of heroes and the tribe of

women, and the “universe, [which never] have I seen with my eyes” (v. 7). The poem ends, charmingly, with Hesiod eager to sing as he looks through “the heavenly gates / ... into the gods’ halls” (vv. 22–23). A bit later, Quintus of Smyrna (fourth century) also draws from Hesiod’s story of divine inspiration and again in the context of Homer. In this instance, when calling upon the Muses to name the heroes about to enter the Trojan horse, he reminds the goddesses of the time when they first visited him as a beardless lad while he was tending his flock in Smyrna (12.308–13). Even this allusion to Hesiod is indirect, as it is filtered through Callimachus’s imitation of the Hesiodic scene, and it perhaps has a touch of Archilochus, too, who first met the Muses as a boy.¹¹⁹

According to a database of papyri (the Mertens-Pack), approximately 120 papyri between the first century BCE to the fourth century CE) pertain to Hesiod: 51 in reference to the *Catalogue of Women*, 39 to the *Theogony*, 29 to the *Works and Days*, and 9 to the *Shield*. Two papyri from the fourth century list three titles from Hesiod, in the order of the *Theogony*, *Works and Days*, and *Shield*. The longer *Catalogue of Women* is apparently left out.¹²⁰ This triad in this order, without the *Catalogue of Women*, will become the canonical set of Hesiod’s poems in the Medieval period. Eventually the full text of the *Catalogue* will disappear, although as late as the *Suda* (tenth century CE = Most T1) the four are listed together, with the *Catalogue of Women* mentioned last.

Access to the Mind of God

Our trace of the shadows of the *Theogony*’s light in the ancient world will end with a look at the Neoplatonists, staunch defenders of the old faith, but only casual enthusiasts of the *Theogony*. Despite Plato’s war against the ancient poets, the Neoplatonists, beginning with Plotinus (205–270 CE), saw imperfect manifestations of their mystical metaphysics in the early cosmogonies.¹²¹ Their systems would shape Renaissance and Romantic hermeticists right up to Blake.

The primary guide for the Neoplatonists was Orpheus, more than Hesiod or Homer, and their primary concern was the soul’s purification, not with civic or political visions. So, for example, Proclus (412–485 CE), known as Plato’s successor, writes: “All of Greek theology is the child of Orphic mystagogy: Pythagoras was the first to receive initiation from Aglaophamos, Plato in turn received

from the Pythagorean and Orphic doctrines perfect knowledge concerning the gods.”¹²² And between Hesiod and Homer, Homer was far and away the more important figure. In Robert Browning’s words (1992: 135): “the systematic search by the Neoplatonists for a deep and hidden meaning in the [Homeric] poems marks the climax of a long process of elevation of Homer from the status of an inspired poet to that of an equally inspired—and infallible—prophet, a man who had privileged access not only to the secrets of the universe but to the mind of God.” Thus, by way of example, as Robert Lamberton writes (Lamberton and Keaney, 1992: xx): “For readers such as Porphyry in the third century and Proclus in the fifth, the true subject of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* was the fate of souls and the structure of the universe. The first poem recounted the descent of souls into this world of strife. ... The second related the difficult return of one of those souls, plunged into the sea of matter and embroiled with deities presiding over it, until he at last would achieve the state of ‘dryness’ promised by Teiresias and finally free himself of all memory of the material universe.”

But even with this emphasis on Orpheus and Homer, Proclus can call Hesiod “the theologian of the Greeks” and write that Plato “without doubt often makes use of Hesiod.”¹²³ So, Plotinus finds a way to use the *Theogony*. In his hierarchy of realities, the One (*Hen*) was an ineffable unity beyond language or thought and only capable of comprehension by describing what it was not. In a kind of holy trinity, first Mind (*Nous*) (intuitive thought) and then Soul (*Psyche*) “overflow” from the One, in descending order and gradual diminution of the One toward the intelligible. From Soul, Nature (*Physis*) is generated, before the ineffable became matter at the lowest level. Motivated primarily to understand references to Zeus in Plato’s *Phaedrus*, it seems, Plotinus was willing to understand the temporal generations of the gods in Hesiod’s poem metaphorically: Ouranos stood for the One, Cronus for Mind, and Zeus for Soul, in a step-by-step transition from the unity of the One toward intelligibility.¹²⁴ So, Proclus associates Sky’s castration with the severance of the Titanic chain from the ordering principle which holds the world together. Zeus’s binding of Cronus (not mentioned by Hesiod) is interpreted as the binding (or union) of creation.¹²⁵

Damascius (ca. 462– ca. 538 CE), Proclus’s successor and the last head of the Academy, argued, from Eudemos of Rhodes, that all Greek, Babylonian, Persian, Phoenician, and Egyptian cosmogonies were in essential agreement but of limited use as, unaware of the One, they only saw lower levels of intelligibility and fractured examples of cosmic unity. Damascius’s own comments on Hesiod are uttered in a code, unintelligible to most:¹²⁶

But Hesiod, it seems to me, when he narrates that Chaos was the first born, regards it as the incomprehensible and perfectly united nature of the Intelligible. From this he deduces Earth as a kind of first principle of all the generation of the gods, unless it is that Chaos is regarded as the second subsistence of the two principles, and Earth and Tartarus and Eros as the three-fold Intelligible, with Eros standing for the third subsistence, considered according to its power to convert [towards the primary source].

In this remarkable rococo of metaphysics, Hesiod's figures of Chaos, Earth, and Eros are recast so as to deduce something of the mysterious trinity of the Intelligible.

Theogonic Shadows

Byzantine, Medieval, and Renaissance; Milton's *paradise lost*

By Late Antiquity in both the Latin West and Greek East, the *Theogony* had fallen into the shadows of literary history. Both for the Christian Byzantines scholars in the East and the Latin writers in the West, Hesiod was most read for his *Works and Days*, admired for its maxims and ethic of hard work, but the *Theogony* remained a considerably more difficult text to assimilate because of its concern with false gods. This tendency would take a remarkable deviation in Milton's *Paradise Lost*.

In Europe prior to Petrarch, knowledge of the *Theogony* had all but disappeared. Hesiod's name is not even recorded in *La Divina Commedia* (1305), even though the Greek-less Dante includes exotic figures like Linus and Orpheus strolling in Limbo alongside Homer, the *poeta sovrano* (*Inferno* iv.88). Due to Petrarch's efforts to bring Greek back to the Latin West, Boccaccio (1313–1375) in Florence gained a limited knowledge of the language. When composing the much-used *Genealogy of the Gods of the Gentiles*, he mentions Hesiod, rendering his name variously as Essiodo, Esyodus, and Exiodus, but shows no direct knowledge of the *Theogony*. In this work, citing Theodontius as his source, he identifies the non-Hesiodic grim demon Demogorgon (“by its very name a frightful figure”) as “that sluggish forefather of all the pagan gods” (*veternosus ille deorum omnium gentilium proavus ... nomine ipso horribilis*).¹

As would be the case with many other pagan figures, Hesiod's reception in the West changes with Petrarch (1304–1374). In 1354 at the age of 50, he was elated to receive from Constantinople a manuscript of Homer in Greek, thrilled that he could at least touch the legendary poet. He responded to his Greek friend, Nicholas Sygeros, as follows: “Without your voice, your Homer is dumb to me, or rather I am deaf to him. Nevertheless I rejoice at his mere physical presence; often I clasp him to my bosom and say with a sigh: ‘O great man, how

gladly would I hear you speak! But death has stopped one of my ears, and hateful remoteness has blocked the other.’”² The gift prompted Petrarch to write Homer directly (in Latin; *Fam.* xxiv.12) and to request from Sygeros more manuscripts, especially of Hesiod and Euripides: “If you want anything that I can provide, feel free to call upon me without hesitation. You will see that I call freely upon you. And since the success of a prayer begets still bolder prayers, I ask you to send me, if available, a Hesiod; and send me, I beg, Euripides” (*Fam.* xviii.2).³

But it is in his *Africa* that Petrarch begins to bring Hesiod back into the literary imagination of the West. Attempting to revive Latin epic, he breaks with the long-established Christian tradition of rejecting the Muses as false prophets and opens the *Africa* with a classically inspired invocation to the Muse (and later the Muses). Drawing upon traditions he learnt from Latin authors, he seeks permission from these Sisters to drink from the sacred fountain on Helicon in the hope that they may grant him, as an inspired bard (*vates*), both his song and needed spirits (*animi*) (I.1–10). Remarkable as this invocation was for its time, Petrarch does not rely on pagan inspiration alone, but follows this appeal with one to Christ (“the victor / over the gods”), that is, “if songs are pleasing / to you” (I.15–16). Characteristic of his anxiety when turning to his beloved classics, Petrarch thus withdraws into a protective Christian stance even as he breaks new ground in reviving old traditions. And, ever a practical man, he follows his appeal to Christ with one to King Robert of Naples, his patron. Near the end of the *Africa* Petrarch comes back to the Muses in a passage that draws on Ennius when he describes the Roman poet telling Scipio Africanus, the *Africa*’s protagonist, about a dream in which Homer *informs* Ennius that the lone man they see sitting in a valley is none other than “the Franciscus” (Petrarca), who will in the far-off future call the long-exiled Sisters of Helicon into his own time (IX.229–36). By this conceit, Petrarch has managed both to recall the Muses into the re-born genre of epic and to write himself into that tradition.

In the Byzantine East, reaction to the classics went through a number of pendulum swings. In Syria, Egypt, and the cities of Constantinople and Thessalonica, schoolboys were trained on Homeric texts, until the Iconoclast movement (from Emperor Leo III in 718 until 843 CE) put a freeze on pagan texts. The period marked a “complete stagnation, if not of actual persecution, for Classical Studies,” as Davison describes it (1962: 25). In the ensuing era of classical revival (sometimes called the Comnenian Renaissance in honor of Alexius Comnenus), again Homeric studies flourished. In the *Alexias*, written by Comnensus’s daughter, “quotations from Homer are almost as frequent as her quotations from the Bible, and they are

more accurate,” as Gareth Morgan describes them (1983: 165). The oldest surviving Homeric manuscript, the *Venetus Marcianus*, complete with Aristarchus’s comments, dates from this period, as does the vellum codex, *Ilias Ambrosiana* (now incomplete) in 52 folio sheets, illustrated by 58 miniatures. This period would come to a burning halt when the Fourth Crusade sacked Constantinople in 1204.

During this Renaissance, the *Theogony* was a lesser light. In its early phase, the learned ninth-century bibliophile Photius I was less drawn to it than to the Stoically tamed pseudo-Apollodorus’s *Library*. The latter he praised for being chock-full of “all that the world contains.” John Tzetzes (ca. 1110–ca. 1180), a “lovable buffoon,” as West characterizes him (1978: 69), was, above all, “a teacher of Homer, for Homer was still the basis of education” (Morgan, 1983: 169). He did write on Hesiod as well, but in his popular *Genealogy of the Gods* (ca. 1143) he, like Photius, relied as much, if not more, on the *Library* than on the *Theogony*. As scholars had been doing for over a thousand years, he resorted to allegory to make palatable the ancient stories of the gods. The more violent stories about them he tended to interpret either as disguised manifestations of natural or astrological phenomena or as moral lessons. By way of example in the *Iliad*, he considered Apollo’s priest in the Troad, Chryses, a wizard, astrologer, and magus in control of the sun and weather. What Homer calls Chryses’s σκῆπτρον, Tzetzes calls a wand, or augur’s staff (λίτυον Greek for the Roman *lituus*). Concerning the *Theogony*, he scoffed at Hesiod’s claim of divine inspiration. The nine Muses for him were nine local Boeotian maidens who fed Hesiod laurel twigs.⁴ He was incredulous at the idea that Hesiod should beat Homer in a poetic competition: “O, what insanity! O, what folly! O, what lack of education! Excellence of words, and education, aren’t you crying?”⁵

With the Greek return to power in Constantinople in 1261, a new wave of Byzantine scholarship gets under way, the famed Palaeologian Renaissance. During this time, Demetrius Triclinius from Thessalonica edited the most important Byzantine manuscript of Hesiod. The first volume (in 1316) included the *Shield*, followed by the *Works and Days*, with scholia for the latter compiled and augmented by Manuel Moschopulus of Crete. The second volume (1319) included the *Theogony* with ancient scholia, supplemented by Triclinius’s own allegorical commentary. It was characteristic of his approach that he interpreted Zeus’s victory over the Titans as a taming of destructive winds and natural forces.⁶

Due in large measure to the remarkable teaching of Manuel Chrysoloras (in just three years from 1397 to 1400, and primarily in Florence), Greek was re-introduced to the West. Judging from the interests of Chrysoloras’s students, he included Hesiod in his

teachings, with attention falling again primarily on the *Works and Days*. Leonardo Bruni (1370–1444) uses a passage from the *Works and Days* (cited in Greek) in his Latin translation of Aristotle's *Economicus* Book I to chastise Aristotle for distorting Hesiod's view of wives. Elsewhere, Bruni shows little knowledge of Hesiod and there is no evidence that he read the *Theogony*. In his *Life of Dante*, he describes Hesiod as a coarse and unlearned shepherd who became a supreme poet by drinking the waters from the Castalian spring in Delphi. Two of Chrysoloras's other students opened schools which read the *Works and Days* both for its practical reflections and for its comparison to Vergil's *Georgics*. We cannot say with certainty whether the *Theogony* was read at all and, if so, what passages were highlighted.⁷

By way of comparison, in the late medieval and early Renaissance periods, roughly 260 manuscripts of the *Works and Days* (in whole or in part) are known, compared to 70+ of the *Theogony* and 60 of the *Shield* (West, 1978: 78).⁸ A similar ratio is seen in Erasmus's *Adagia*, a collection of pithy sayings from the ancient and modern world. In its final edition (1536), I calculate that 37 of the 4,151 *adages* were from the *Works and Days*, while a mere 6 come from the *Theogony*.

At about the same time in the 1470s, the *Theogony* and *Works and Days* were translated into Latin hexameters: first the *Theogony* by Boninus Mombritius (Bonino Mombrizio) in Ferrara in 1474, and then the *Works and Days* by Niccolò della Valle (also written Valla) three years later. The first Greek edition of the *Works and Days* appeared ca. 1482, published by Bonus Accursius in Milan and edited by the Athenian Demetrius Chalcondyles.⁹ The *editio princeps* of the *Theogony* appeared a decade later in 1495, edited by Manutius Aldus (Manuzio Aldo) for his renowned Aldine press, where Theocritus is the lead author, followed by numerous others, including Theognis and Phocylides, with Hesiod's poems at the end in the order of the *Theogony*, *Shield of Heracles* (*Scutum*), *Works and Days* (Hesiod in this company follows the tradition in Byzantine manuscripts.).¹⁰

Nowhere in Europe did the *Theogony* receive more attention than in Florence, due in large measure to Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499), the Neoplatonist hired by Cosimo de Medici to open the Platonic Academy. But, as a Platonic mystic, he was more taken with the Orphic hymns than with Hesiod. Learning Greek at the age of 23, he translated into Latin the Orphic *Argonautica*, the Orphic hymns, the Homeric hymns, and Proclus's Neoplatonic hymns, as well as the *Theogony*, but he took care that these efforts not circulate widely lest “by chance I seem to be calling readers back to the ancient cult of gods and demons rightly refuted long ago.”¹¹ He kept up a life-long interest in Orphism, demonstrated in part by the many Orphic quotations in the *Theologia Platonica*, but rarely does he refer to the

Theogony. In one of those references, we see him struggling with Hesiod's violent story of Venus's birth, which in his commentary *In Philebum* XI he allegorizes as follows: "it is to be understood perhaps as referring to the fertility—hidden in the first principle of things—needed for creating all things. The divine intelligence first drinks it down and unfolds it inside herself; then she pours it out into the soul and matter which is called 'sea' because of motion and time and the moistness of procreating. When the soul is first abundant with that fertility, it produces intelligible beauty in itself by turning towards higher things."

Venus's birth also attracted the attention of Ficino's friend, Angelo Poliziano (1454–1494). Drawing heavily from the *Theogony* as well as from ancient reports of Apelles's paintings of Aphrodite emerging from the sea, the poet charmingly recounts viewing artwork on a door relief in the Palace of Venus depicting the goddess's birth. In one scene on the door frame, he sees old Sky being castrated by his son with a scythe, and in another Sky's genitals being tossed into the Aegean, blood dripping from them and falling onto the Earth, giving birth to the Furies, Giants, and wood Nymphs. While in the salty sea, the beautiful goddess is born from the genitals themselves. Poliziano then narrates the scene that Botticelli was to immortalize in his *Birth of Venus* (ca. 1480), describing how the west winds blow the goddess, riding on a conch shell, toward the Hours who are waiting for her on the shore (cf. *Le Stanze* I.97–104). On the opposite door panel, Poliziano narrates seeing gods tormented by Venus's son, Amor. In verses reminiscent of the *Theogony*, Amor is described as "the fraudulent archer who often changes a lover's will and hue and subjugates the sky, earth, and waters" (I.120.4–5) as he catches god and man alike in his merciless snare (I.125.4). This depiction of Venus and Amor marks the first serious engagement with any aspect of the *Theogony* in well over a thousand years. As is characteristic of the circuitous routes by which the *Theogony* gets recast according to a Renaissance palette, Botticelli's inspiration comes from Poliziano's poem and not from Hesiod directly.¹²

Theogonia. 251

HESIODI ASCRÆI
THEOGONIA, BONINO
MOMBROTIO PATRICIO
MEDIOLANENSI INTER
PRETE.

INCIPIAM à Muffis, Heliconis, carmen, alumnis,
Quæ iuga sacra colunt montis, spaciofaq; terga:
Nunc fontem folitæ circumfaltare nigrantem,
Nunc Iouiam choreis ambire procacibus aram,
Et vel Termefsi, vel fluctibus Hippocrenes,
Vel formofa tuis Holmi diuine sub vndis
Membra lauant: summas Helicon qua verberat auras,
Mobilibus per ftagna choris, dulciq; corona
Exultant, pedibusq; ruunt hinc inde decoris.
Denfior has operit liquidis è fontibus aër.
Nocte meant, pulchra nec eunt sine voce canentes
Aethereumq; Iouem, cultæ & Iunonis in Argo
Numina: congesto foleis hæc vitur auro,
Additur his Pallas, magnus cum Pallade Phœbus,
Et quæ noctiuagis gaudet Diana fagittis.
Teq; canunt Neptune pater qui numine terram
Sæpe moues: magnamq; Themis, pulchramq; Dionen:
Quamq; Venus nigra nimium formofa pupilla,
Quamq; fit auratis Hebe fpectata coronis.
Nocturnis memorant Lunam, Solemq; diurnis
Ignibus, Oceanumq; senem, Terramq; parentem.
His fubit Iapetus, nigra Nox, Latonaq; mater,
Quæq; diem crocea defert Aurora quadriga.
Te neq; prætereunt grauior Saturne, nec vllum
Quem genus à cœtu fcierint duxiffe deorum.

T 5

Hæ

First page of Bonino Mombrozio's Latin hexameter translation of Hesiod's Theogonia, first published in Ferrara, 1474. This edition was printed in Leipzig, 1577.

(Courtesy of Harvard University, Houghton Library Hollis 005745861)

ΤΑΔΕ ΕΝΕΣΤΙ ΕΝ ΤΗ ΔΕ ΤΗ ΒΙΒΛΩ.

Θεοκρίτου εἰδύλια ὡς τὴν μικρὰ ποιήματα
τριάκοντα.

ὡς αὐτοῦ Γένος ἑπεὶ δὲ ῥίσιος τῶν μουσικῶν.

Κάτων ὅς ὡμαις γινώμαι ὡς αὖτε τῆς ὁδοῦ.

Γινώμαι ἐπὶ σοφῶν.

Περὶ Φθόνου.

Θεογνίδος μεγαρέως στικελιώτου γινώμαι ἐλεστικαί.

Γινώμαι μονόστιχοι κατὰ λέξιν φάλακα συντεταγμέναι
ἐκ διαφόρων ποιητῶν.

Χρυσῆ ἐπὶ τοῦ πενθαζόρου.

Φωκυλίδου ποιήματα πενταζόρου.

Στίχοι σιβύλλας τῆς ἐρυθραίας περὶ ὡς κενεῖς ἡμῶν.

Διαφορὰ Φωνῶν.

Ἡσίοδου θεογονία.

Τὸ αὐτοῦ ἀσπίδος ἡρακλέους.

Τὸ αὐτοῦ ἐργα καὶ ἡμέραι.

Hæc insunt in hoc libro.

Theocriti Eclogæ triginta.

Genus Theocriti & de inuentione bucolicorum.

Catonis Romani sententiæ paræneticæ distichi.

Sententiæ septem sapientum.

De Inuidia.

Theognidis megarensis sæculi sententiæ elegiacæ.

Sententiæ monostichi per Capita ex uariis poetis.

Aurea Carmina Pythagoræ.

Phocylidæ Poema admonitorium.

Carmina Sibyllæ erythrææ de Christo Iesu domino nro.

Differetia uocis.

Hesiodi Theogonia.

Eiusdem scutum Herculis.

Eiusdem georgicon libri duo.

A.A.

The first printed edition of Hesiod, edited by Manutius Aldus (Manuzio Aldo). Venice, 1495. The title page lists the table of contents (in both Greek and Latin) beginning with Theocritus's Idylls, followed by 10 other texts, including poems by Theognis and Phocylides. Hesiod's works come at the end in the order of Theogonia, Scutum, Opera



✱ ἩΣΙΟΔΟΥ ΘΕΟΓΟΝΙΑ ✱



ΟΥΣΑΩΝ ἑλικωνιάδων ἀρχ-
 χόμεθ' αἰδέεσθαι
 Ἀθελικῶνος ἔχουσιν ὄρος μέ-
 γατε, ζαθέοντε.
 Καί τε πεικρήνην ἰοφθαλὰ πρὸ
 σάπαλοις
 ὄρχεῖσθαι, καὶ βωμόν ἐρατεινός

κρονίων.

Καί τε Λοεσσάμηναι τέρενα χόρα τερμησίῳ
 Ἡΐωπον ἐρήμης, ἡ ὀλμφοῦ βαθείοιο
 Ἀκροτάλῳ ἐλικῶνι χοροὺς ἐνεποίησαντο,
 Καλούς ἰμφοέντας· ἐπεξέωσαν γὰρ δὲ πρῶτες.
 Ἐνθεν ἀκρυνύμηναι κεκαλυμμέναι ἡεὶ πολλῶ.
 Ἐννύχαι σείχον περικαλλέα ὄσαν ἰεοί.
 Ὑμνῶσαι δὲ αὐτῶν γόχοι ἐπ' ἰωνίαν ἤελον
 Ἀργεῖον, χρυσόοισι πεδύλοισι ἐμβριβαῖα
 Κέρων αὐτῶν γόχοι δὲ οὐκ ἔλαυνον ἀθήρην.
 Φοῖβοντ' ἀπ' ἡλίου, ἐλ' αὖτε μιν ἰοχαιραρ.
 Ἡδὲ ποσειδάωνα γαίης χον ἐνρυστάειον
 Καὶ θέμιν αἰδύλῳ ἐλικουλέφαρόν τε φροδῆτιν
 Ἡβλῶν τε χρυσοσέφανον καλῶν τε δῶν
 Ἡώτ' ἡελίον τε μέγαν, λαμπρὰν τε σελήνην.
 Λητώτ' ἄπ' ἑρῶν τε, ἰδὲ κρόνον αἰγυλομήτην.
 Γαῖαν τῶν ἑλίων τε μέγαν, ὃν νύκτα μέλαιναν

(Courtesy of Harvard University, Houghton Library, Hollis 005735333)

But, for most, the *Theogony* presented a serious dilemma. The most renowned scholar of his time, Desiderius Erasmus (1466?–1536), captures the difficulty well. On the one hand, as a humanist and man of letters, he recognized that Hesiod's poem was required reading: "For the proper understanding of the poets, one must know the stories of the Gods and Heroes, for which Homer, Hesiod, Ovid, and the Italian Boccaccio should be read," *De Ratione Studii* 523a (1511). (Pseudo-Apollodorus's *Library*, interestingly, does not find itself on this list.) But as a Christian he felt disdain for polytheism, especially in its Hesiodic and Homeric form. Witness what he says in the *Tongue* (*Lingua* LB 705):

The gentiles (*gentes*) prefer to worship evil spirits (*daemonia*) rather than the true God, because [a believer] detests all foulness but they favor vices and nourish corrupt desires and are not offended when such gods are found in the kinds of entertainments and tales that no good man would wish to find his son or wife in—or even his servant. Such gods are pleasing to them because under such deities, as they think, it is permitted without recrimination to wench, to commit adultery, to deceive, to thief, to have a tyranny, and to stir up revolution as Jupiter is said to have done when he seized power, having ousted and gelded his father (*exacto et execto patre*), and just as the rest of the gods did when they raised a mutiny and drove out Jupiter along with his supporters. Perhaps these days you would not easily find blasphemy of this type among Christians, although finding it at all is monstrous. For certainly it is found; nor can the great severity of laws heal or discipline this frenzy of the tongue.

Perhaps from haste, Erasmus conflates Saturn's and Jupiter's crimes against their respective fathers when he says that Jupiter (i.e., Zeus) gelded his father. Living at the same time as Luther's challenge to the Church, Erasmus certainly acknowledges the possibility of Christian misdeeds, but there can be no mistaking the scorn Erasmus felt for those who do not follow the true faith. In the tradition of Xenophanes, Lucian, and the Christian apologists, he is especially horrified by events told in the *Theogony* and uses them as a pretext to condemn Greek religion. Like others in this period, he was more drawn to the Christian-like maxims of the *Works and Days* than to the mythically rich *Theogony*.

HESIODI ASCRAEI

Deorum Generatio.

Musas Heliconiades incipiamus canere.
Qua Heliconis habuit mons, magnamque
diuturnaque.

Et circa fontem nigram pedibus caeris
Saltant, araque praepentis satoni.
Atque abluere cenero corpore in Periclyso,
Aut in Hippocrene, aut in Olivo sacro,
Summus Heliconis clivus dicitur,
Pulchra et amabile, fortiterque propinquat pedibus.
Inde cunctae, velatae vere multo
Nectunt inaequales, per pulchram vocem emittentes,
Celebrantes ioveaque agida sacra, et utpote andros
Arginatos, auris calcamentis incedunt: (innotens
Famaque Aegleus ionis, carulis oculos habentibus
Almeus.)

Amymenē, Apollinem, et Dianam sororis gaudens,
Argē, Neptunum, terrarumque parentem, et ceteros omnes:
Et Themis videt melior, et ubi oculis viderem,
Habentque aurea corda decorata, formosamque, Diomētem,
Auroramque, Solemque, magnamque splendidamque Lunam,
Latosque, laetissimosque, et Saturnum non sippellens,
Terrarumque, Oceanumque, valentem, et Nodum astrum,
Alcyonem, immortaliūque sacrum genus semper exister-
junt.

Quae

ΗΗΣΙΟΔΟΥ ΞΑΣΚΡΑΙΟΥ

Θεογονία.

Mουσάων Ἑλικωνιάδων θυγατέρας ἀνδρῶν,
ἀλλ' Ἑλικῶντος ἔχουσιν ἕξουσιν μέρη τέλει.
Ἰδὲ καί.

Καί τ' αὖτις ἀρχήν τε καὶ τέλος ἀπειλείσιν
Οὐρανῶν, καὶ βιωμένους θεοὺς καὶ ἄνθρωποι.
Καί τ' ἐλαττάμεναι τίματα γένεσιν Περικλυσῶν,
ἢ ὑποπτήρῃς, ἢ Ὀλμυρῶν ἑλίου,
Αὐροράς τε Ἑλικωνίης προῖος ἐκπαύουσιν.
Καλέουσι μάλιστα ἑσπερίων τε καὶ ἑωθινῶν.
Ἐνθεν ἀσπόμεναι κακὰ λυγρὰ καὶ ἄλκιμα ποιεῖσιν.
Ἐννέγκουσιν γὰρ καὶ ἀνέκασιν δόξας ἰσότητος,
ἤ μιν δὲ δία τέρας ἰσότητος, καὶ πᾶσι τιμαί.
Ἑρμῶν τε καὶ ἑσπερίων τε καὶ ἑωθινῶν.
Καὶ ἑρμῶν τ' ἀνέκασιν δόξας ἰσότητος ἀνέκασιν.
Θαῖον τ' ἀσπόμεναι, ἢ ἑσπερίων ἰσότητος.
Ἦες Περικλυσῶν γένεσιν, ἐκπαύουσιν.
Καὶ ὅσμιαι ἀνέκασιν, ἢ ἑσπερίων ἰσότητος.
Ἦες.

Ἦες τ' ἑσπερίων τε καὶ ἑωθινῶν.
Ἦες τ' ἑσπερίων τε καὶ ἑωθινῶν.
Ἦες τ' ἑσπερίων τε καὶ ἑωθινῶν.
Ἦες τ' ἑσπερίων τε καὶ ἑωθινῶν.
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Ἦες τ' ἑσπερίων τε καὶ ἑωθινῶν.
Ἦες τ' ἑσπερίων τε καὶ ἑωθινῶν.

A Renaissance Loeb. The Hesiodic verses 1–21 from Daniel Heinsius' Hesiodi Ascræi Opera quae quidem extant, omina. Leiden, 1613. Many Renaissance texts of Hesiod included a word-for-word Latin translation on the facing page, copied in edition after edition often without any variation and without authorship attested. From early on, Theogony 29 ὥς ἔφασαν κοῦραι μεγάλου Διὸς ἀρτίεπειαι ("so the eloquent daughters of great Zeus spoke") was rendered "Sic dixerunt filiae Iovis magni veridicae" ("so the truth-speaking daughters of great Jove spoke"), as if to confirm that the Muses were speaking the truth to Hesiod. This translation comes later than Mombrizio's first Latin verse rendering of the poem (1474), which printed: "Sic doctae magni Musae Iovis incluta proles" ("so the learned Muses, famed offspring of great Jove, [spoke]").

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In the *Praise of Folly* (1516), Erasmus comes back to Hesiod when Moria recounts her birth from Plutus: "I didn't have Chaos, Orcus, Saturn, Iapetus, or any other of those obsolete, moldy old gods for a father, but Plutus, Wealth himself, the only father of gods and men, regardless of what Homer and Hesiod and even Jupiter may say" (Moriae Encomium LB 403). Given the satiric nature of this work, it is difficult to distinguish what is playful conceit and what may be deep-seated contempt for Hesiod's genealogies.

While Aldo's 1495 printing of Hesiod's poems was in the order of *Theogony*, *The Shield of Heracles* (*Scutum*), *Works and Days*, numerous later printed editions followed the late medieval practice of placing the *Works and Days* first, followed by the *Theogony* and the *Shield*, but

by the 1540s, especially in Swiss and German printing houses, the order was modified, with the *Shield* second and the *Theogony* last.¹³ The lowly status of the *Theogony* may be reflected in the “Praefatio in Hesiodum” by Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560), who was Luther’s colleague and friend at the University of Wittenberg. While he profusely praises the *Works and Days* for its philosophic wisdom, moral precepts, and useful guidelines for virtuous living, he says not a word about Hesiod’s other poems. After a magnificent folio edition of Homer (1583), replete with an extensive, moralizing commentary, Jean de Sponde (Spondanus, 1557–1595) in 1592 published a similar edition of the *Works and Days*, in a volume totaling 227 pages. He showed no interest in editing Hesiod’s other poems.

Using Spondanus’s edition, George Chapman (1559?–1634) gives the English-speaking world its first taste of Hesiod, in a volume he called *The Georgicks of Hesiod* (1618).¹⁴ Chapman’s first love was Homer, having translated the *Iliads* (in 1611) in thunderous and rhyming fourteeners and the *Odysseys* (in 1614–1615) in more measured rhyming pentameters. After the *The Georgicks of Hesiod*, also in rhyming pentameters, he translated the *Battle of Frogs and Mice* and the Homeric hymns (in 1624) and, when finished, wrote “and now my work is done.” As was the norm in the Renaissance the Greek texts of Homer, Hesiod, and other ancient authors had an *ad verbum* Loeb-like Latin prose translation on the facing page.¹⁵ Spondanus’s edition was no different. It is thanks to this practice that the word Windfucker finds its way into Chapman’s *Iliads*. While far from being Greekless, when translating Homer and Hesiod he on occasion drew his language from the Latin aid, provoking the outcry, as he puts it, of “a certaine envious Windfucker, that hovers up and downe, laboriously engrossing al the aire with his luxurious ambition and buzzing into every eare my detraction—affirming I turne Homer out of the Latin onely, etc.—that sets all his associates and the whole rabble of my maligners on their wings with him to beare about my empaire and poyson my reputation” (“The Preface to the Reader,” 157–63, to his *Iliads*).

Relying on Spondanus’s and Melanchthon’s Christianizing commentaries of the *Works and Days*, Chapman was by no means alone in seeing it as a precursor to Virgil’s *Georgics* (Niccolò della Valle identified it as a “Georgicon Liber”) and as a manual for better living. Chapman’s title page reads: “Translated Elaborately out of the Greek: Containing Doctrine of Husbandrie, Morallitie, and Pietie; with a perpetuall Calendar of Good and Bad Dates; Not Superstitious, but necessarie (as farre as naturall Causes compeil) for all Men to observe, and difference in following their affaires.” In note #48, he sees Hesiod’s views as “truly religious and right Christian.”

In the time of Chapman and Shakespeare, few English scholars or translators showed an interest in the *Theogony*. It would be another hundred years before there was an Englished *Theogony*, this by Thomas Cooke in 1728, in *The Works of Hesiod, translated from the Greek*. Cooke's work is almost exactly contemporary with Alexander Pope's *Iliad* (1715–20) and co-authored *Odyssey* (1725–26), although the two men were far from friends. Cooke's effort gained him some renown and the popular nickname Hesiod Cooke.

In England, as in much of Europe, the literary response to the classics was much like Andrea Palladio's in architecture. That is, English writers borrowed, transformed, and recreated at will a handbook of themes from multiple pagan texts, much as in his buildings Palladio translated, improvised, and re-invented classical forms into harmonious neoclassical designs (as he did as well in his treatise, *I Quattro Libri dell'Architettura*, 1570). Among these Palladian-like writers is Edmund Spenser (1552?–1599), about whom Henry Lotspeich writes: "Like any educated Renaissance poet, Spenser decorates his poetry with classical similes, invocations, and graceful allusions to the antique mythology" (1932: 13). The most prominent classical poets for Spenser were Ovid, Virgil, Homer and Hesiod, and Apollodorus. In Douglas Bush's assessment, Spenser's casual treatment of mythology and genealogy would have made him "more at ease with Chaucer than with Dryden" (1957: 88–91). The *Theogony* seems most useful to Spenser for its genealogies, although even here he freely makes them up as he sees fit.¹⁶ When he does paraphrase from the *Theogony*, he relies more on Mombrizio's Latin translation than on the Greek.¹⁷ Witness, for example, the following verses about Nereus at *Fairie Queene* 4.11.18 from *Th.* 233–36:

Of all which *Nereus* th'eldest, and the best,
Did first proceed, then which none more upright,
Ne more sincere in word and deed profest;
Most voide of guile, most free from fowle despight,
Doing him selfe, and teaching others to doe right.

Alliterative phrasing like "Most voide of guile, most free from fowle despight" may be drawn from Mombrizio's play with "u's" and "l's" in "nullus in illo / Sit dolus: & culpa vitam non inficit ulla," but mostly Spenser's lines show his creative imagination at work.

A generation after Spenser, the neo-classical poet Robert Herrick (1591–1674) quotes verses 27–28 of the *Theogony* in Greek on the frontispiece of his *Noble Numbers* (1647): "I know how to tell many

lies similar to the truth, and if I wish to hymn the truth.” While in other volumes Herrick shows himself to be an urbane man of the cloth capable of writing charming love poems, in this volume his wit seems more circumspect and the citation of Hesiod appears to be used in the hope that his poem might speak the truth and be free from impure thoughts: “For Those my unbaptized Rhimes, / Writ in my wild unhallowed Times, / For every sentence, clause and word, / That’s not inlaid with Thee, (my Lord) / Forgive me God, and blot each Line / Out of my Book, that is not Thine” (2.1–6).

Milton

Considering the centuries of abuse, ignorance, and indifference with which the *Theogony* had been received,¹⁸ it is startling to come upon Milton’s poetry. Even before he entered Trinity College, Cambridge, John Milton (1608–1674) was steeped in Hesiod, and the *Theogony* in particular. From the pantheon of Greek poets, he regarded Homer, Hesiod, and Callimachus as his three favorites, and of Hesiod’s poems the *Theogony* the most challenging. He first encountered Hesiod in Greek (in texts that included a Latin prose translation on the facing page) at St. Paul’s School in his early teens and the experience stayed with him all his life.¹⁹

In an essay written while at Cambridge, Milton already plucks a genealogy from the *Theogony* when discussing Night and Day, but then—perhaps in jest—expresses the need to pull back in caution: “But the more cultured Muses and Philosophy herself, the neighbour of the gods, forbids us to place entire confidence in the poets who have given the gods their forms, especially the Greek poets” (translated from the Latin).²⁰ We see Hesiodic genealogies continuing to work upon his teenage imagination when he laments in Latin verse the death of Nicholas Felton, Bishop of Ely. The poem’s narrator rebukes himself for supposing that Death was the daughter of Night and Erebus (or the Erinyes) and grandfathered by Chaos, since the death of his friend has made it clear that starry heaven sent Death to gather God’s harvest (*In obitum Praesulis Eliensis* 31–36). For those tracing sources, this allusion presents some difficulties, as in the *Theogony* Night is the sole parent of Death (*Th.* 211–12) but in Hyginus’s *Fables* she is the child of Night and Erebus. Other classical conceits in this work—that the Horae come from Zeus and Themis, that sinful souls descend into Tartarus (not into Hell), and that blessed ones reach the shining doors of Olympus (not of Heaven)—clearly have a Hesiodic

tone.

But it is near the end of his life when writing *Paradise Lost*²¹ that we see Milton most engaged with the *Theogony*, writing through and against the pagan poem as he imagines the divine powers that govern our lives. What Francis Blessington says about Milton's enfolding of Homer and Vergil into *Paradise Lost* could just as well be said of Hesiod: "The classical background of *Paradise Lost* is not confined to Satan but stands behind every aspect of the poem, even the loyal angels, the Son, and the Father—a point not treated by criticism, except in the case of Raphael." Charles Osgood recognized this Hesiodic influence long ago but few have followed through on its significance: "There are four poets from whom [Milton] certainly derived more help than from any others. These are Homer, Hesiod, Vergil, and Ovid. Hesiod, in proportion to the body of his poetry, probably furnished Milton with the greatest amount of material, and nearly all of this comes from the *Theogony*."²² As Osgood's book is primarily an index of proper names with references and brief discussion, it is a useful source book inviting further commentary.

Starting from the proem, Milton has the *Theogony* in his sights (i.6–16):²³

Sing Heav'nly Muse, that on the secret top
Of Oreb, or of Sinai, didst inspire
That Shepherd, who first taught the chosen Seed,
In the Beginning how the Heav'ns and Earth
Rose out of Chaos: or if Sion Hill 10
Delight thee more, and Siloa's Brook that flow'd
Fast by the Oracle of God; I thence
Invoke thy aid to my advent'rous Song,
That with no middle flight intends to soar
Above th' Aonian Mount, while it pursues 15
Things unattempted yet in Prose or Rhyme.

In characteristic fashion, Milton's myth-making draws from multiple sources, often, as here, enfolding the pagan into the Christian. One steeped in Christian lore might identify the shepherd with Moses who—when herding his father-in-law's flock—was led to the mountain (perhaps Mt. Oreb or Mt. Sinai) where the Lord's angel would appear to him in the form of a burning bush (*Exodus* 3:1–2). But there is much of the *Theogony* here, too. Anyone familiar with Hesiod's poem would instantly recognize the likeness of this scene to that of the

heavenly Muses inbreathing (ἐνέπνευσαν) a mountain shepherd with a divine song about Heavens and Earth rising out of Chaos. Indeed, a classicist might feel that pagan allusions in these lines overshadow those from *Genesis*. That Milton's sights are squarely on Hesiod becomes explicit a few verses later when he says that he "intends to soar / Above th' Aonian Mount." This is Milton in his Alexandrian mode, learnedly using the Vergilian (and Callimachean) term for Boeotia, as a stand-in for Mt. Helicon.²⁴ But even as Milton draws on Hesiod to launch his creation story, he means to upstage him, rising above the Hesiodic middle flight, the way of didactic poetry, to travel the high road of epic and to tell the true story of God's creation, not the false tales of pagan antiquity.²⁵

The closeness of Milton to Hesiod seems even to be at the level of trope as he marks the mysterious transition from mortal darkness to divine illumination in the transition from verse 7 to verse 8, just as in the *Theogony* the inbreathing of divine voice into the mortal shepherd occurs in the enjambment from verse 31 to 32. Here is Milton (i.22–27):²⁶

What in me is *dark*
Illumine, what is low raise and support;

That to the height of this great Argument
I may assert Eternal Providence,
And justify the ways of God to men.

And here is Hesiod: ἐνέπνευσαν δέ μοι αὐδὴν / θέσπιν (they, the Olympian Muses, "inbreathed for me a *human voice* / *divine*") (*Th.* 31–32).

The first direct allusion to a story from the *Theogony* happens less than 30 lines later when Milton reworks Hesiod's description of the Titans in Tartarus, in defeat having fallen as far below the earth as it would be for a bronze anvil to fall from the sky for nine days (*Th.* 720–43). So, he has Satan, along with his horrid crew, fall "Nine times the Space that measures Day and Night" "to bottomless perdition, there to dwell" (i.50 and 47). Milton alludes to this fall again in Book ii (ii.931–38) before he unleashes his full narrative powers for the entirety of Book vi when he has Raphael tell Adam just how God and his forces waged battle against the rebellious foe, leading to their precipitous descent. At the end of the story, Hell herself, while frightened by the noise and sight of those falling, nevertheless perform yawns wide and encloses round them (vi.867–77):²⁷

Hell heard th' unsufferable noise. Hell saw
 Heav'n ruining from Heav'n and would have fled
 Affrighted; but strict Fate had cast too deep
 Her dark foundations, and too fast had bound. 870
 Nine days they fell; confounded Chaos roar'd;
 And felt tenfold confusion in their fall
 Through his wild Anarchy, so huge a rout
 Encumber'd him with ruin: Hell at last
 Yawning receiv'd them whole, and on them clos'd, 875
 Hell their fit habitation fraught with fire
 Unquenchable, the house of woe and pain.

This rendering is Hesiodic both in the detail of the nine-day fall and in the identity of Hell as the final resting place for the vanquished. Milton's Hell is Hesiod's Tartarus, as the poem tells us clearly enough, describing it as "the Gulf / of Tartarus which ready opens wide / His fiery Chaos to receive their fall" (vi.53–55). As Hesiod's Tartarus is surrounded by a bronze wall and "a triple line of darkness" protected by a bronze gate and the Hundred-Handers, "the trusted guards of aegis-bearing Zeus" (*Th.* 726–27 and 732–35), so with typical Miltonic expansion and elaboration Hell is similarly enclosed in triplets: "thrice threefold the Gates; three folds were Brass, / Three Iron, three of Adamantine Rock, Impenetrable" (ii.645–47) and protected by guards of "formidable shape" (ii.649).²⁸

Milton's account of the battle itself (vi.296–866) also has a strong pagan, and Hesiodic, flavor, much to Lord Bryon's disapproval:

The thunder of the clouds would have been as ridiculous and vain in the hands of the devils, as the "villanous saltpeter"; the angels were as imperious to the one as to the other. The thunderbolts become sublime in the hands of the Almighty not as such, but because *he* deigns to use them as a means of repelling the rebel spirits; but no one can attribute their defeat to this grand piece of natural electricity: the Almighty willed, and they fell; his word would have been enough; and Milton is as absurd (and in fact, *blasphemous*) in putting material lightnings into the hands of the Godhead, as in giving him hands at all. The artillery of the demons was but the first step of his mistake, the Thunder the next, and it is a step lower. It would have been fit for Jove, but not for Jehovah. The subject altogether was essentially unpoetical; he has made more of it than another could, but it is beyond him and all men.²⁹

It was no secret to Bryon's contemporaries that the Lord was not a

particularly devout man or even much of a Christian, but his offense, if we are to take it as a genuine offense, would seem to be aesthetic as the sublime divine is beyond human and even metaphoric compare.

Milton seems no less aware that he ran the risk of such censure and twice tried to ward off scandal by having Raphael proclaim—both at the beginning of this narrative (vi.296–303) and then again at the end (vi.893–96)—that in talking to Adam he was compelled to measure Heavenly matters by Earthly materials in order to communicate “what might have else to human Race been hid” (vi.896). Even with these protestations, we note that the devout Christian poet devotes well over 500 verses to this most pagan-like story of Jove at war—deities dueling with swords, mountains awhirl, lightning flying, and thunder crashing. We also sense Milton’s delight in having the opportunity to imitate his ancient masters, including Hesiod and Homer (cf. the *Iliads’s theomachia* at 21.388ff), as they imagined the Olympians and Giants in fierce combat.³⁰

But if Milton found those narratives irresistible, he took pains that his audience also be assured that the pagan model could only be taken so far, and no further. Even in this combat, Milton plays off the *Theogony* to show how inferior the ancient king of the gods was to the true God. In Hesiod’s narrative, Zeus and his Olympians fought the Titans for 10 long years, neither side gaining the upper hand (Th. 629–38), before the thunder hurling Zeus, advised by Earth, releases the Hundred-Handers from bondage and assumes victory with their alliance. But in *Paradise Lost*, the Almighty Monarch and his forces toy with the rebels for a brief two days (*P.L.* vi.684–85) before he honors his Anointed Son by transferring “all power” of this war to him (cf. vi.669–78). Hardly breaking into a sweat, the Messiah, showing considerable self-control, dispatches Heaven’s foes when merely exerting “half his strength” (vi. 853–55):

Yet half his strength he put not forth, but check’d
His Thunder in mid Volley, for he meant
Not to destroy, but root them out of Heav’n

Thus, by the end of this conflict, no reader could make the mistake of thinking that the pagan stories were anything but a distant likeness for God’s victory over his Adversaries.

Even the Father’s transfer of the war powers to his Son has a curious Hesiod echo. The Almighty explains his motive as follows (vi.701–5):³¹

that the Glory may be thine
 Of ending this great War, since none but Thou
 Can end it. Into thee such Virtue and Grace
 Immense I have transfus'd, that all may know
 In Heav'n and Hell thy Power above compare

Whether knowingly or not, these words mimic another passage from the *Theogony* when Zeus lets his mortal son, Heracles, kill the eagle that has been tormenting Prometheus. In Hesiod, Zeus's motive is described as follows: "that the glory of Theban-born Heracles be still wider over the earth than it was before" (*Th.* 530–31), quite like God's desire that the Power and Glory of his son may be known in Heav'n and Hell beyond compare. To extend the comparison further, Heracles, after death, will ascend to Olympus, where he will dwell "happy after having accomplished his great deeds, [living now] among the immortals, unharmed and ageless all his days," as Hesiod tells the story (*Th.* 954–5), an entry that pales when compared to Christ's triumphal return to Heaven after "disburd[ing]" it of the rebel revolt (vi.878):

Sole Victor from th' expulsion of his Foes 880
 Messiah his triumphal Chariot turn'd:
 To meet him all his Saints, who silent stood
 Eye-witnesses of his Almighty Acts,
 With Jubilee advanc'd; and as they went,
 Shaded with branching palm, each order bright, 885
 Sung Triumph, and him sung Victorious King,
 Son, Heir, and Lord, to him Dominion giv'n,
 Worthiest to Reign: he celebrated rode
 Triumphant through mid Heav'n, into the Courts
 And Temple of the mighty Father Thron'd 890
 On high: who into Glory him receiv'd,
 Where now he sits at the right hand of bliss. vi. 880–92

In triumph, Christ has come back as the Victorious King, given the seat at the right hand of bliss, the worthy Son, Heir, and Lord. Much in this long war narrative of Book vi draws from Hesiod and other pagan writers, as Milton also upstages old stories of gods at war to exalt the true Lord and his Son. With that upstaging, no reader could

miss how great a gap there is between Jove and the Lord and in that light perhaps Milton was not overly blasphemous after all.

Elsewhere in *Paradise Lost*, Jove is nothing like Jehovah and closer to a Satan figure, depicted both as a late-born god (not the primogenitor of the world) and a rebel who has seized power from his father without legal right. When telling the story of the *Theogony*, Milton describes how “the younger Saturn,” both stealing the birthright of the eldest born and seizing power from his father, found like measure in his own son: “So Jove usurping reign’d” (i.514). Also like Satan, Jove needs to form alliances for “strength and counsel” (vi.494) when the true God can face down his adversaries alone and with minimal strength. At one point, Milton even has Jove serve as a lowly squadron leader in Satan’s army (i.507–23). Milton equally reduces Jove’s Olympus to a trifle. In one instance, in an Hesiodic manner, unblemished Eden is “knit with the Graces and the Hours in dance” (iv. 268), as if there were a Hesiodic touch of Olympus about it, but Olympus itself, Zeus’s snow-covered mountain, is merely a “Hill,” located in “middle Air,” a place now “old” and “cold.” God’s residence, by contrast, is in the “Heav’n of Heavens.”³² Olympus will also be the future home of the fallen angels in *Paradise Regained* (ii.117) (1671).

As in *Genesis*, in *Paradise Lost* anything city-like is far from God and the Heavenly realm. The only “city” in the poem lies deep within Hell, a place that is described as more magnificent than Babel, Babylon or even Cairo (i.694, 717, and 718). The enthralling politics of Satan and Pandemonium (The Place of All Devils) draw from many sources, including *both* from Royalist’s attack against Cromwell *and* from republican protests against Charles I. One cannot call Milton’s Pandemonium an image of Hesiod’s Olympus rendered hellish, but the various terms for it—“Royal State,” “Assembly,” “Stygian Council,” and “high Capital / of Satan and his Peers” where “a thousand Demi-Gods on golden seats” gather—certainly ask the reader to see it in civic and political terms.³³ But rather than evoking a single allegorical likeness, Milton means to suggest something more general and that is an uncomfortable similarity between Satan’s realm and earthly politics. Sometimes these scenes call to mind images of Rome and its Caesars; at other times Renaissance princely tyrants or despotic courts of oriental Sultans. The lengthy debate of Hell’s numerous leaders in Book ii initially rather attractively suggests contemporary parliamentary deliberation as a prelude to action, but by the end we come to understand, disturbingly, that the process is nothing but a sham when the “dread Emperor with pomp supreme ... prevented all reply” (ii.510 and 467, respectively). Nothing from this scene echoes the εὐνομία of Hesiod’s ideal politics or a Hesiodic vision of the

Olympian gods living in *civic* harmony.

Instead, what we see in *Paradise Lost* is a perpetual interplay between a hellish pagan polytheism and Christian monotheism. The multiple gods in Pandemonium do what gods in polytheistic systems often do; that is, they contend and behave politically, while Milton's Christian monotheism, even in the complex form of the holy trinity, is above and beyond politics and conflict. His heaven is duly a place of rejoicing and jubilee, rendering the "earthly" models of Pandemonium a sad parody of the "happier state / In Heav'n" (ii.24–25), that happier state being a state of being rather than a State, and it is a place of God's grace.

Milton also creatively plies Hesiod's genealogical tools to describe in Hell an unholy trinity. It begins with Satan giving birth to Lady Sin from his head.³⁴ The daughter describes her birth this way (ii.752–58):

All of a sudden miserable pain
Surpris'd thee, dim thine eyes, and dizzy swum
In darkness, while thy head flames thick and fast
Threw forth, till on the left side op'ning wide, 755
Likest to thee in shape and count'nance bright,
Then shining heav'nly fair, a Goddess arm'd
Out of thy head I sprung;

Oddly, the allusion here to Athena's birth from Zeus's head is sometimes overlooked, but Henry Fuseli's rendering of the "armed" goddess as helmeted with shield in one hand and spear in the other as she springs from Satan's head clearly captures the classical allusion well (e.g., Fuseli's painting, *The Birth of Sin* [ca. 1796–1799]).³⁵ While Hesiod's Athena resembles her father in strength and wise understanding (*Th.* 896), Milton's Sin is "miscreated" (ii.683), womanly and fair to the waist but ending foully in scaly folds and serpent tail (ii.650–53). The pagan noble pairing of father–daughter is further demonized into a grotesque instance of familial violence as Satan, narcissistically, sexually assaults the daughter born from his own mind, a rape that results in a most foul trinity when Sin, after fierce labor pangs, gives birth to Death. True to the spirit of this trinity, her son is also her "inbred enemy" (ii.785). Although shapeless, indistinguishable "in member, joint, or limb" (ii.668), he somehow manages, "more, it seems, / Inflam'd with lust than rage" to rape his mother "in embraces forcible and foul." Her impregnation

engenders “yelling Monsters that with ceaseless cry” surround their mother and threaten to devour her (ii.790–96).³⁶ A passage from *James* (1:14–15) shows that this fallen trinity has echoes of a Christian Allegory of the Flesh: “Every man is tempted, when he is lured by his own lust, and enticed. / Then when lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin: and sin, when it s finished, bringeth forth death.” But in this telling Milton’s use of genealogy, both in the form of cephalic birth and biological begettings, and this violent family romance give that allegory a distinctly Hesiodic flavor. In a further echo of the *Theogony*, Satan and Death face off in a bitter father–son hatred, Sin being forced to step between her rapist father and her rapist son: “O Father, what intends thy hand / Against thy only Son? What fury O Son, / Possesses thee to bend that mortal Dart / Against thy Father’s head?” (ii.727–30). From the *Theogony* Milton has extracted the raw ingredients for unholy unions and fallen families, using those stories to illustrate how those separated from the one true God might behave. But at this point, he leaves aside other lessons that he might have drawn from Hesiod as he certainly has no use for a pagan vision of Olympian political harmony. Rather, his God, through heavenly Grace, will enable fallen man to regain Heaven.

Milton’s imitations and parodies of pagan polytheism and empire supply great entertainment; they are also help paint a picture of life on earth in a post-Edenic era. But stories from Hesiod, Homer, Vergil, Ovid, and other pagan authors can also be intermixed with accounts from *Genesis* to speak of God’s glory. Again, we see Milton’s love for Hesiodic genealogy and personified abstractions. Witness the invocation to light at the beginning of Book iii, a passage that picks up the metaphors of bird and prophet, of blindness and sight, found in the invocation of Book i. To quote iii.1–12:

Hail holy light, offspring of Heav’n first-born,
 Or of th’ Eternal Coeternal beam
 May I express thee unblam’d? since God is light,
 And never but in unapproached light
 Dwelt from Eternitie, dwelt then in thee, 5
 Bright effluence of bright essence increate.
 Or hear’st thou rather pure Ethereal stream,
 Whose Fountain who shall tell? before the Sun,
 Before the Heavens thou wert, and at the voice
 Of God, as with a Mantle didst invest 10
 The rising world of waters dark and deep,

The charmingly apologetic opening genealogy (“may I express thee unblam’d”), which hails holy light as the offspring and first-born of Heaven, conceived by the voice of God, owes as much to Hesiod as it does to *Genesis*. The passage goes on to speak of legendary Greek poets and prophets, including Orpheus (iii.17), the blind Thamyras, the blind Maeonides (Homer), Tiresias, and Phineus (iii.35–36), while Hesiod goes unnamed, but his presence is felt nonetheless when the narrator confirms that he forever wanders where the earthly Muses haunt the clear spring and sunny hill (of Mt. Parnassus and Helicon), a description that resembles the opening lines of the *Theogony* (*Th.* 1–9):

Yet not the more
Cease I to wander where the Muses haunt
Clear Spring, or shady Grove, or Sunny Hill,
Smit with the love of sacred song; iii.26–29

Milton’s Eden and Eve also have something of the pagan in them, although at first sight it only seems to be so by negative comparison (iv.264–75):

The Birds their choir apply; airs, vernal airs,
Breathing the smell of field and grove, attune 265



Johann Heinrich Fuseli (1741–1825), John Milton's Paradise Lost. Satan and the Birth of Sin (Book ii.746–58). Painting number 6 from the Milton Gallery. Dallas Museum of Art. Foundation for the Arts Collection, Mrs. John B. O'Hara Fund. Accession Number 1996.104 FA

The trembling leaves, while Universal Pan
Knit with the Graces and Hours in dance
Led on the Eternal Spring. Not that fair field
Of Enna, where Prosérpine gath'ring flow'rs,
Herself a fairer flow'r by gloomy Dis 270
Was gather'd, which cost Ceres all that pain
To seek her through the world; nor that sweet Grove
Of Daphne by Orontes, and th' inspir'd
Castalian Spring might with this Paradise
Of Eden strive ... 275

In the manner of *Genesis*, Milton locates sweet and harmonious singing and dancing with the Garden before the time of cities, not with the hard-won (city of) Olympus as Hesiod would have it, but to marvelous effect he darkens that joyous image by comparing Eden to what it is not. This negative simile is among the most haunting and beautiful in the whole poem.³⁸ It begins forcefully with Not, and, it is true, Milton's Eden will never turn into an Enna (in Sicily), but in time the other dissimilarities will turn into tragic likenesses. Eve, in time, will become a Proserpina (in Hesiod, Persephone). Like her, she will "be ravished," as C. S. Lewis observed, "by a dark power risen up from the Underworld."³⁹ But Eve, one might argue, is far more responsible for her own fall than was Proserpina and when expelled she will bring death and pain down upon herself, her spouse, and all their descendants to a degree that would seem to exceed Ceres's (Demeter's) terrible pain at Hades's abduction of her daughter. But in a surprise twist, Eve like Proserpina will be restored to life by God's Grace at the end of time.

Eve is also "O too like / in sad event" another Hesiodic figure, Pandora (cf. *Th.* 570–616 and *W&D* 42–104). In this case the likeness probably owes more to Ovid than to Hesiod, even as it also deftly blends Hebrew lore (iv.708–19):⁴⁰

Here in close recess
 With Flowers, Garlands, and sweet-smelling Herbs
 Espoused Eve deck't first her Nuptial Bed, 710
 And heav'nly Choirs the Hymenean sung,
 What day the genial Angel to our Sire
 Brought her in naked beauty more adorn'd
 More lovely than Pandora, whom the Gods
 Endow'd with their gifts, and O too like 715
 In sad event, when to the unwiser Son
 Of Japhet brought by Hermes, she ensar'd
 Mankind with her fair looks, to be aveng'd
 On him who had stole Jove's authentic fire.

If God had really made Eve as the Olympians made Pandora, then we would have to conclude that the Almighty meant to lead Adam into temptation and that we should think of this man as a rather foolish Epimethean figure. As David Quint puts it: "The Pandora-Eve of the simile seems to occasion the crime for which she is the instrument, if we understand the stealing of fire by Prometheus as a figure of

original sin" (2014: 227). After the fall, Adam himself sees Eve in Pandora-like terms: a "fair defect / Of Nature," with the "innumerable / Disturbances on Earth [coming] through Female snares" (x.891–92 and 896–97). But by the close of Book x, Adam's misogyny has turned and he comes to acquit, and even to forgive, his disparing wife, lifting the Pandora-mantle from her shoulders (x.1010–15): "But Adam ... / To better hopes his more attentive mind / Labouring had rais'd, and thus to Eve repli'd. / 'Eve, thy contempt of life and pleasure seems / To argue in thee something more sublime / And excellent than what thy mind contemns.'" In the case of both similes, then, Milton evokes a classical model but offers a Christian salvation.

But it is Hesiod's personified abstractions, sometimes coupled with genealogies, that I feel most captured Milton's poetic imagination. Here, we see one poet learning from another. To be sure, his near contemporaries, like Spenser, had already resorted to such personifications, but a number of passages from *Paradise Lost* suggest that Milton learned from Hesiod directly. In his cosmology, Chaos, a composite figure drawn as much from Ovid, Lucretius, and other ancient poets as from Hesiod, is both a place and a divinity.⁴¹ What in the *Theogony* appears to be a dark and murky place or region in, or above, Tartarus in *Paradise Lost* is an "intractable Abyss," "spacious Empire," and "the hoary Deep—a dark Illimitable Ocean" (x.476, ii.974 and 891, respectively) above Hell through which Satan must travel on his way "up to light." A quasi-personified being in Hesiod, Chaos is the only neuter noun in the *Theogony* to generate life, the parthenogenic begetter of black Night and Darkness (Erebos) (*Th.* 123), as the young Milton himself noted. In this later poem, Milton builds marvelously upon Hesiod's text. Now a male figure, Chaos sits as "Umpire" over that vast and confused "Eternal Anarchy" above Hell, where "next him high Arbiter / Chance governs all" (cf. ii.961 and 907–10).⁴² Perhaps weaving Hesiodic and Orphic mythology into his own myth, Milton has "unoriginal Night" (i.e., unoriginated Night, x.477) be, *not* Chaos's daughter, but his consort and queen. Did he hope as well that an attentive reader with Hesiod in mind would realize that this hellish couple is also incestuous? Only in Milton are they a pair, the "Ancestors of Nature" who in a most unchristian sense are at the beginning and end of life, the "Womb of nature and perhaps her Grave" (ii.895 and 911).⁴³

But most Hesiodic of all, I would say, is Milton's vision of personified Discord. As in *Genesis* and the *Theogony*, Milton sees creation through division ("The waters underneath from those above / Dividing," vii.268–69), with some of that division leading to discord.⁴⁴ Multiple classical sources from Homer to Ennius, Vergil, Statius, and Hyginus lie behind his Discord. But again the *Theogony*

plays a part in Milton's imagination.⁴⁵ Discord makes her entrance late in the poem, initially appearing after Adam and Eve have eaten from the apple and joined together for the first time in "foul concupiscence" (ix.1078), so unlike their prelapsarian ecstatic and selfless lovemaking. Now fallen, the couple begins to weep and to experience a new range of sensations (ix.1121–26):⁴⁶

They sat them down to weep, nor only Tears
Rain'd at their Eyes, but high winds worse within
Began to rise, high Passion, Anger, Hate,
Mistrust, Suspicion, Discord, and shook sore
Their inward State of Mind, calm Region once
And full of Peace, now tost and turbulent

Commentators point to *Iliad* XI when noting how Discord makes havoc of the first couple's "inward State of Mind." So, in Homer, Eris disturbs the peace when "Zeus hurls [her] on the swift ships of the Achaeans, that destructive one who holds in her hands the portent of war" (*Il.* 11.3–4). But Milton's cataloguing of Discord as the last to be named in company with Passion, Anger, Hate, Mistrust, and Suspicion is certainly Hesiodic in tone, reminiscent of Hesiod's own cataloguing where Eris is in company with figures like Deceit, Nemesis, Toil, Grievs, Forgetfulness, and Quarrels (cf. *Th.* 224–32).

In time, Milton gives Discord her own genealogy, identifying her as the daughter of Sin. As no father is mentioned, one may wonder if she, like the *Theogony's* Eris, might be parthenogenically born. Like Discord in Book ix, she appears here midst high winds and turbulence, both outer and inner. First, Milton describes the winds, "corrupt and pestilent ... and outrage from lifeless things" (x.695 and 707), before he turns in Hesiodic mode to Discord herself, her parentage, and her (brother?) Death (x.707–9):

... but Discord first,
Daughter of Sin, among th' irrational,
Death introduc'd through fierce antipathy.

Discord is personified after the Fall, but the prefix dis- has been present from the beginning: "Of Man's First Disobedience, and the Fruit / Of that Forbidden Tree ..." (i.1–2). This offers the clearest example perhaps of another feature of learnt Hesiodic poetics, namely,

the endless play between personified abstractions and lowercase nouns, adjectives, and verbs. Milton never tires of playing off the rich possibilities of this prefix in both its heavenly and hellish affinities.⁴⁷ A concentration of terms converge at ix.1–8:

No more of talk where God or Angel Guest
With Man, as with his Friend, familiar us'd
To sit indulgent, and with him partake
Rural repast, permitting him the while
Venial discourse unblam'd: I now must change 5
Those Notes to Tragic; foul distrust, and breach
Disloyal on the part of Man, revolt,
And disobedience

Discourse, once venial (lovely) and leisurely, through disloyal revolt and disobedience has introduced to the world foul distrust. Before an agreeable pastime, discourse has turned disagreeable, and its opening monosyllable reaches an inglorious crescendo when it becomes its own free-standing noun, the Latin word for Hades now Englished as Satan's "gloomy Dis" (iv.264–75).⁴⁸

Not that fair field
Of Enna, where Prosérpine gath'ring flow'rs,
Herself a fairer flow'r by gloomy Dis
Was gather'd

The negative simile, with economy and irony, depicts the fate awaiting Eve and her progeny after her dissent. By contrast, Heaven after Satan's defeat will be "disburde'n'd" (vi.879). And, as we have seen, after the fall, this Hesiodic riff on *dis-* becomes a figure, Discord, Sin's daughter. This is Milton at his Hesiodic best.

But even here there is Christian redemption. Expelled from an Edenic calm, Adam and Eve are beset by the winds of Passion, Anger, Hate, Mistrust, Suspicion, and, in summary, Discord. In the throes of these winds, the fairest of creation, last and best, will on a sudden become "defac't, deflow'r'd, and now to Death devote" (ix.901).⁴⁹ But again such despair will not be everlasting, as Adam comes to learn, to his great wonderment, that God will forgive all humankind at the second coming. This prompts Adam to say, xii.469–73:

Oh goodness infinite, goodness immense!
That all this good of evil shall produce,
And evil turn to good, more wonderful
Than that which by creation first brought forth
Light out of darkness!

“The scope of the epic does not permit Satan ever to realize, dramatically, that good is brought about through his evil,” as Arnold Stein writes (1953: 8). “[Satan] does not experience, at least in *Paradise Lost*, the truth that Adam inherits blessings through [his] crime against him.” At the Last Judgment, Satan and his world will “dissolve.” New Heavens and a new Earth will be born, “founded in righteousness and peace and love, / to bring forth fruits Joy and eternal Bliss” (xii.546–51).

Compared to such rewards, the new state that the *Theogony* envisions is far less transcendent or uplifting. It does not promise perfection, salvation, or divine love, rather it offers a political haven, a place set apart from the surrounding turmoil, where Olympians can enjoy a life of laws and peace and where the individual feels in harmony with the communal whole. In its limited way, bad is also turned to good, as diverse powers learn to live together in a public setting, although in this instance the dross of violence and familial tensions cannot be completely purged, as Zeus’s two wives, Metis and Hera, know all too well. Even so, there is something to lament with the passing of this polytheism, as more than any monotheistic system can, it is able to depict the very human concern of divergent and competing figures eager to forge a way to live in collective harmony. So with some remorse I note that, with the passing of ancient Greek polytheism, the memory of this pagan vision of Olympian paradise, however flawed, has been mostly lost.

{Notes}

Introduction

1. “An Autobiographical Study, Postscript” (1935), in *Standard Edition*, hereafter *SE*, 20: 72. Freud liked to describe the shared pattern of evolution between the individual and civilization according to the popular formulation that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, i.e., that the development of the individual from embryo to adult resembles the evolution of its remote ancestors. Cf. Freud, 1913: 90 and Gould, 1977: 157–66.

2. For the importance of biology and Darwinian theory in Freud’s understanding of “the instinctual, and, above all, the non rational in human behavior,” see Sulloway, 1979: 276 (more broadly 238–76). For Freud’s “manifestly un-Darwinian” death instinct, see Sulloway, 1979: 407 (more broadly 407–9). On Eros and Thanatos, also see Brown, 1959: 77–86; cf. 44–54 and 98–109. For the paradox of Freudian psychoanalysis depending upon “self-governing reason,” even as it assumes a psychic determinism (the instincts), see Tauber, 2010: 116–45: “the very structure of Freudian psychoanalysis sits on a deep fault line, namely, the paradox of *inferred* psychic determinism and the governing *conviction* of choice and liberation ... [As] evidenced by the psychoanalytic enterprise itself, Freud opts for human reason, heroic struggle, and assertion of human potential ... within the humanistic context” (p. 144) (*italics in the original*).

3. In the most expansive studies of the two texts to date, Richard Caldwell (1989 and 1990) concerns himself almost exclusively with the family dynamic between the gods in the *Theogony* and has little to say about the relation between family psychology and political structures.

4. E.g., “what a potent obstacle to civilization aggressiveness must be, if the defense against it can cause as much unhappiness as aggressiveness itself” (*SE* 21: 146) When first formulating this theory in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920), Freud wrote that he was “seek[ing] to solve the riddle of life,” in *SE* 18: 61.

5. This imperative “is the strongest defense against human aggressiveness and an excellent example of the unpsychological proceedings of the cultural super-ego. The commandment is impossible to fulfill; such an enormous inflation of love can only lower its value, not get rid of the difficulty” (*SE* 21: 123).

6. In a similar vein: “If civilization is an inevitable course of development from the group of the family to the group of humanity as a whole, then an intensification of the sense of guilt ... will be inextricably bound up with it, until perhaps the same guilt may swell to a magnitude that individuals can hardly support” (*SE* 21: 121–22).

7. Oddly missing from this gender-sketch is the Athena-figure who in other contexts deeply captured Freud's imagination.

8. "The Acquisition and Conquest of Fire" in *SE* 22: 185–93.

9. "Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defense" in *SE* 23: 278. The work is signed January 2, 1938; Ernst Jones (vol. 3: 255) says that it was "written at Christmas, 1937."

10. Cf. "Civilization ... obtains mastery over the individual's ... desire for aggression by weakening and disarming it and by setting up an agency within him to watch over it, like a garrison in a conquered city" (*SE* 21: 123–24). For Freudian revisionists taming of Freud's tragic view of humankind and civilization, see Roazen, 1968: 268–69. Cf. Marcuse (1955: 4–5): "repressiveness is perhaps the more vigorously maintained the more unnecessary it becomes. ... The notion of a non-repressive civilization ... is justified on two concrete and realistic grounds: first, Freud's theoretical conception itself seems to refute his consistent denial of the historical possibility of a non-repressive civilization, and, second, the very achievements of repressive civilization seem to create the preconditions for the gradual abolition of repression." For modernist and postmodernist revisions of Freud's social theory, see Tauber, 2012.

11. Long after his first publications of the Eros-Thanatos theory, Freud discovered that Empedocles had similarly seen the universe as a dualistic alternation between *Philia* and *Neikos*. Extolling Empedocles as "one of the grandest and most remarkable figures in the history of Greek civilization," Freud says (in 1937) that his theories and Empedocles's might seem "identical, if it were not for the difference that the Greek philosopher's theory is a cosmic phantasy while ours is content to claim biological validity. At the same time, the fact that Empedocles ascribes to the universe the same animate nature as to individual organisms robs this difference of much of its importance," in "Analysis Terminable and Interminable," *SE* 23: 243 and 245–46, respectively.

12. For a study of the classical tradition and its reception (and receptions), from which some of the language in this paragraph draws, see Silk, Gildenhard, and Barrow, 2014: 3–9.

Chapter 1

1. For a review of this debate and bibliography, see Koning, 2010a: 28–39; Judet de la Combe, 1993; Most, 1993; and Griffith, 1983. For Hesiod as a historical figure, see Fraenkel, 1973: 94–96; Arrighetti, 1975; West, 1978: 55; Stein, 1990: 6–54. For him as a poetical *persona*, see Lamberton, 1988: 1–37; Nagy 1990a: 47–51 and 67–79; Lardinois, 2003; Allan, 2006: 27n127. Homer offers no autobiographical detail whatsoever, opening up the possibility for seven Greek cities to claim him as their own. In the Hadrianic period, Apollo declined to reveal Homer's birthplace, so as not to compromise his universal appeal. Only two places contended for Hesiod's remains: Orchomenos in Boeotia and the nearby Locrians. Tradition has it that Hesiod was killed by jealous brothers who erroneously thought that he had violated their sister; cf. Most, 2006–2007, vol. 1, Testimonia (hereafter HesiodT Most) 30–34.

2. For proposed etymologies of Hesiod's name, see Meier-Brügger, 1990. Hesiod tells a good deal more of "his" personal story in the *Works and Days*: his father, driven by poverty, sailed from Aeolic-speaking Cyme in Asia Minor (just north of Homer's alleged hometown of Old Smyrna) to mainland Greece, settling in Ascrea in Boeotia, a small community near Mt. Helicon. For Hesiod, it is a "sorrowful village (κῶμη), hot in summer, cold in winter, never good" (*W&D* 639–40). Although not inclined to travel, he takes a boat to the nearby island of Euboea in order to compete in a poetic contest at the funeral games for Amphidamas. Winning the victory tripod, he dedicated it back home to the Heliconian Muses who "first launched me on the road of clear-sounding song" (*W&D* 659).

3. Most, 2006–2007: xv, Songsender from "he who sends forth a path (of words)," ἦσι ὁδόν, or "he who sends forth a song," ἦσι ᾠδὴν, analogous to his description of the Muses who "send forth their voice," ὅσσαν ἱέσται, *Th.* 10, 43, 65, 67; cf. *Od.* 12.192 describing the Sirens "sending forth a lovely voice." For ancient interpretations of Hesiod's name, see HesiodT 27–29 Most. For Mt. Helicon as "full of cultivated trees," see Pausanias 9.28.1.

4. The *Catalogue of Women* or *Ehoiai* ("or her like") (in five books) narrates the stories of mortal women, up to the time of Helen, impregnated by gods. It was probably a sixth-century BCE poem, made as a sequel to the *Theogony*. The opening story about Zeus impregnating Alcmene (1–56) links the *Shield* to the *Catalogue of Women*, but the rest of the poem, narrating how Heracles killed Ares's son, Cycnos, is clearly later. An extended passage describing Heracles's shield (139–320) gives the poem its title. Alexandrian scholars were the first to question its authenticity.

5. The idea of poetry as a making first appears in Solon (in the sixth century) when he says that "I remade" or "I remodeled" someone else's verse: μεταποίησον (fr. 20.3).

6. For ancient testimonia related to the dating of Homer and Hesiod, see HesiodT 1–24 Most; on Aristarchus's monograph *On the Age of Hesiod* (first half of the second century BCE), see Schroeder, 2007. Questions of dating continue today: West (2012: 635–38) argues that Hesiod is older than Homer and should be dated to 680–660 BCE; Janko (1982: 98 and 231) proposes a date between 700 and 660 for Hesiod, and certainly a full generation after Homer. For an extended discussion, see Graziosi, 2002: 101–10 and Koning, 2010a: 40–55. Observing that the stay-at-home Hesiod knew more than Homer about both the western Mediterranean and the Black Sea, Eratosthenes (ca. 285–194 BCE) argued that he gained this knowledge from

reports by contemporary merchants or colonists after the time of Homer. In a similar vein, Debiasi (2008) argues that Hesiodic references to the West reflect Euboean exploration and colonization.

7. For phonological differences between Hesiod's language and that found on the Boeotian Mantiklos epigram (CEG 326), dated earlier than 675 BCE, see Cassio, 2009. Martin (1992: 27–29) makes the fascinating point that Hesiod employs dialectical stand-outs for rhetoric effect, including occasional imitations of Delphic oracular hexameter. Nikolaev (2013) observes the absence of thematic aorist infinitives ending in *-έειν* in Hesiod (while common in Homer): such endings “were unknown in the school of epic poetry where Hesiod may have been trained.”

8. Ford 1992: 13–56. For a discussion of the two schools and bibliography, see Koning, 2010a: 28–39. On strategies for reading oral poems, see J. M. Foley, 2002.

9. Contrary to many Homercentric studies today, in antiquity Hesiod and Homer were often discussed *together*. For recent studies that discuss the two in relation to each other, see Graziosi, 2002: 164–84; Graziosi and Haubold, 2005: 27–47 and 65–75, especially; and Koning, 2010a: 1–126, *passim*, although his claim that the *Theogony*'s limited reception in the Archaic and Classical periods (pp. 18–22) is unreliable as he only looks at explicit references and citations to the *Theogony*, neglecting to consider other important indicators of influence such as lexical echoes, imitations, similarities in patterns of action, and the like.

10. The work seems inspired from *W&D* 650–60. Nagy (1990a) and Rosen (1990) propose that when Hesiod says that he has sailed only once, and that the short distance to Euboea “from Aulis, where once the Achaeans / waited through the winter, having gathered a great host / to sail from holy Greece to Troy with its beautiful women” (*W&D* 651–53), he is challenging Homer, boasting that in making the short voyage from Aulis to Euboea he won the poetic contest, beating a poem about the Greeks sailing from Aulis to Troy. In a fragment attributed to Hesiod (which contradicts his claim only to have sailed once), Hesiod and Homer are named as having performed at Delos in the middle of the Aegean Sea: “On the island of Delos for the first time Homer and I sang as singers (ᾠοῖδοί / μέλομεν) about Apollo, stitching together a song (ᾠοδῆ) with new hymns (ὕμνοι)” (fr. dubia 357 M-W = fr. 297 Most).

11. For those who think that Hesiod wrote or dictated his poem, see West, 1966: 40 and 1978: 30–33 and Most, 1993 and 2006: xix–xxv. For Hesiod as an oral poet, see Janko, 1981, Griffith, 1983, Lamberton, 1988, Nagy, 1990a and 2009, and Stoddard, 2004. Others, like Clay (2003), are reasonably agnostic. For the important point that oral composers might memorize extensive sections of a song and “creatively” employ formulaic language, see Jensen 1980: 112–24. On “stable” forms of oral songs, see Rutherford 2012: 155.

12. When Herodotus refers to the poets describing the forms of the gods, he appears to be referring to their anthropomorphic beings: wearing clothes, having bodies, speaking. The other poets would be figures like Orpheus, Musaeus, and Linus.

13. Solmsen 1949: 9, more generally 3–75. Koning (2010a: 63–81) proposes that the poets' power to give epithets equates them with Greek lawmakers who have the authority to define peoples and circumstances.

14. On whether the naming of Hesiod first indicates seniority, see Koning, 2010a: 52–55. Herodotus is the first to refer to the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* by name, but the first reference to the *Theogony* by this name occurs 200 years later in the writings of the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus ca. 250 BCE.

15. DK 22 B11 = HesiodT 97 Most. For more on Xenophanes and Herodotus, see [Chapter 4](#).

16. Cf. the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* 357–58 where Hades “smiles with his brow” when instructed to send Persephone back to the upper world; on the two passages, see Richardson, [1974](#): ad 357f.

17. A good illustration of the contrast between the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* in the way Zeus interacts with the other Olympians is seen in a comparison of *Il.* 4.14–29 and *Od.* 24.474–86. In both passages, the question is asked: Which do you prefer, “evil war and terrible fighting or friendship (φιλότις)”? In the war poem Zeus asks the question to provoke Athena and Hera (4.5–6) into breaking the truce and to bring on the fall of Troy. There is no intention of serious dialogue in the question. In the *Odyssey*, Athena asks the question of Zeus in what is the opening of a serious dialogue where Zeus and Athena seek mutual resolution and, finally, peace for Ithaca.

18. Many note that Hesiod’s sense of justice exceeds Zeus’s rough hand in the *Iliad*; cf. Claus, [1977](#); Athanassaki, [1992](#); Sissa and Detienne, [2000](#): 5–7.

19. Homer mentions the imprisonment of Cronus and Iapetus (*Il.* 8.477–81); Hesiod does not name Cronus but speaks more broadly of imprisonment of the Titans (*Th.* 729–35 and 811–19).

20. The *Theogony* also depicts a wrathful Hera (928), angered at her husband for usurping the female power of birth when he produces Athena out of himself. In contrast to the *Iliad*, however, Hera’s wrath does not have the power to disrupt the general mood of Olympian harmony. Hesiod never says whether Hera’s rage dissipated.

21. Many of Homer’s rare cosmogonic observations occur in *Iliad* 14 and 15 and appear to stem from Semitic, Near Eastern origins, as does the Homeric account of Aphrodite being the daughter of Zeus and Dione, which is traceable to the Phoenician account of Astarte and to the Babylonian story of Ishtar. Homer’s claim that the gods originate from Oceanus and Tethys echoes the story of the gods’ birth from Apsu and Tiamat in the Babylonian *Enûma elish* and the creation story in *Genesis* 1. The Homeric epithet for Oceanus, ἀψόρροος (*Il.* 18.399 and *Od.* 20.65), interpreted by the Greeks of the historical period to mean “back-flowing,” may originally have been a Greek transliteration of “Apsu”—flowing. For Plato, Homer’s cosmogony made “all things the offspring of flux and motion” (*Theaetetus* 152e). Clay ([1992](#): 132–37) notes that the cosmogony depicted on Achilles’s Shield (*Il.* XVIII.483–89) resembles Hesiod’s version.

22. For this argument, see most recently Allan, [2006](#). He sees Zeus as the ultimate guarantor of cosmic order that, he argues, includes punishing Troy for its transgressions. Allan has little to say about the heavy hand of Zeus among the Olympians in the *Iliad*.

23. When Zeus reveals his plan for the poem (and beyond) at *Il.* 15.59–77 and 592–602, he says nothing about justice or retribution.

24. Cf. Scully, [2003](#) and [1991](#): 16–40 and 118–27.

25. Kirk, [1960](#): 66; West, [1966](#): 73. For a list of derogatory remarks on Hesiod’s style, see Koning, [2010a](#): 29n13. For a more appreciative assessment, see Martin, [1992](#): 11–33. On the variety of Hesiod’s narrative styles, see Rengakos, [2009](#). On ancient assessment of Hesiod’s style, see Hunter, [2009](#) and [2014](#): 282–315, and

Schroeder, 2006: especially 139–47.

26. Cf. φιλότης at 14.163, 198, 207, 209, 237, 295, 306, 314, 331, 353, 360, and 15.32. On personification in Homer, see Edwards, 1987: 143–48; Janko, 1992: *passim*, esp. 180 and 185; more broadly in Greek literature and cult, see Detienne and Vernant, 1978; Parker, 1996: 228–37; Stafford, 2000; Stafford and Herrin, 2005; Murray, 2005: 147–53; Parker, 2011: 77–79.

27. Thalmann 1984: 123; cf. West, 1966: *ad loc.* 76. For Hesiod’s subtle and witty ways to play upon the gods’ names in the *Theogony* and for the graceful interplay between narrative and genealogical catalogues, see Faraone, 2013; Arnould, 2009; Pucci, 2009: 39–41; Rengakos, 2009: 203–12; and Tsagalis, 2009.

28. Λόγος in the singular does not appear in the *Theogony* although it appears once in the *Iliad*, the *Odyssey*, and the *Works and Days*. Most’s translation (2006) of Logoi as “Tales” seems off the mark. Faraone (2013) discusses the importance of the child named last in a list.

29. Miller (2001: 261) calls Hesiod a “keen etymologist and cultivator of word-play.” Koning (2010a: 227–33) discusses Hesiod’s style in terms of etymology and genealogy but not personified abstractions. On ancient readings of Hesiod’s style, see note 36, *infra*.

30. The sounds are the same, but Pseudea is a neuter plural noun in the accusative case and ἀψευδέα is a masculine singular adjective, also in the accusative case.

31. Merkelbach, 1956; West is also very good on this passage (1966: 232–33).

32. In this list the child named first receives greatest significance, but see Faraone, 2013, for other arrangements.

33. Benardete (2000: 14) similarly notes the “movement of the poem from sex to mind, μήδεα to μήδεα.”

34. For Menander Rhetor, see HesiodT 126 Most; for Dionysius of Halicarnassus, see HesiodT 124b Most, from the *Epitome* of his work *On Imitation*.

35. Cf. his *De compositione verborum* 6.114 and *De Imitatione* 2.2; also see Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria* 10.1.52 and 12.10.58–9. Also see HesiodT 124a and 125 Most.

36. Hunter, 2009: 253–56 and 2014: 286–89, and more broadly 282–315. Also see O’Sullivan, 1992: 8–14 and Koning, 2010a: 350–77, 366–68, and 376–77. See also pages 151–52 in Chapter 5.

37. Pausanias 9.31.4–5. See HesiodT 42 and 49 Most. In all times—from Archaic Greece, to the Roman and Byzantine periods, to European authors, the number of references to, and citations of, the *Works and Days* has always exceeded those to the *Theogony*. Its moral instruction and gnomic phrasings explain much of this popularity. Cf. Koning 2010a: 18–22.

38. For ancient Jewish views of monotheism, see Fredriksen, 2006, esp. 241–44; for pagan views of monotheism, see Athanassiadi and Frede, 1999.

39. Numenius of Apamea (second century CE), quoted by Clement of Alexandria, *Miscellanies* I.22.

40. For the gradual Israelite movement toward monotheism, see Zevit, 2001 and Smith, 2001: 149–94 and 2008, esp. 131–85. In Greco-Roman context, see West, 1999; cf. Wells, 2010.

41. *Elohim* is the basis of such titles as *El Elion* (God Most High), *El Olam* (God Eternal), *El Shaddai* (God the Mountain), and *El Ro'i* (God All-Seeing); cf. Smith, 2008: 11–15. The version dates to after the building of the Second Temple in Jerusalem in 538 BCE and is known as the Priestly tradition (or P).

42. The writing of *Genesis* in prose was intended, most likely, to distance it from the many fictitious, polytheistic verse versions already in existence throughout the Near East. On possible Assyrian influences on *Genesis* I, see Halpern, 2009.

43. Cf Fishbane, 2003: 11 and Graf, 1993: 1–3; for myths staking out cultural boundaries, see Detienne, 1986: 1–21.

44. Many scholars compare these two religious myths; I especially follow Averintsev, 1999, and Strauss, 1967.

45. “Sad is eros, builder of cities, / and weeping anarchic Aphrodite” concludes Auden’s “In Memory of Sigmund Freud” (1939).

46. In some Orphic theogonies, Zeus will give way to his son Dionysus.

47. By Aristotle’s time, τὸ κακόν clearly is able to mean evil, and maybe it does to some extent mean that as far back as Homer. But I suspect its primary meaning up to the fourth century—that is, the time of Plato and Aristotle—was closer to “trouble” or “harm” than “evil.” The connotation of evil may always have been in the word, but it takes centuries of Greek thought for that meaning to come to the fore. Galen regarded the idea of an omnipotent god as irrational; see Mattern, 2013: 169–71 and 177–78.

48. Leo Strauss puts it this way: “According to the Bible, the beginning of wisdom is fear of the Lord; according to the Greek philosophers, the beginning of wisdom is wonder” (1967: 5). In his “On the Nature of Man” (ca. 390 CE), Nemisius, Bishop of Emesa in Syria, was one of the first Christians to overlay Platonic conceptions of the soul upon *Genesis*’s placement of humankind (above the plants and animals and below god, angels, and demons).

49. All aspects of the physical world—earth, sea, sun, and moon—are of god, but are not themselves gods. Occasionally in *Genesis* 1–3, one can find traces of a deified and anthropomorphic universe, as in the command that the greater and lesser lights in the firmament should “rule” day and night or that the earth should “sprout forth,” but these are mere figures of speech, the heavenly bodies and the earth herself having been demythologized and separated from their divinity.

50. In addition to violating the second commandment by depicting an image of God, in this illumination God creates the universe with a compass, not by the voice. He also creates the sun and moon before the firmament and earth. But in many ways the illumination wonderfully captures God’s magnitude and priority, including by having his right foot extend beyond the picture frame.

51. The word holy (*qadosh*) is first used in creation for the seventh day, the Sabbath, the day of rest and observation. As Heschel writes (1966: 10): “the Sabbath, independent of the lunar calendar or nature, is defined exclusively by creation and is detached from the world of space. ... [The day is set apart] to share in what is eternal in time, to turn from the results of creation to the mystery of creation, from the world of creation to the creation of the world.” Walton (2009) associates the seven days of creation with Near Eastern temple inaugurations, with the deity being enthroned in his temple on the seventh day.

52. Yahweh is especially associated with time—fitting perhaps for a wandering

people who in their early years did not yet have a place or a nation or a temple.

53. Cf. Strauss, 1967; for other discussions of the six-day sequence, see Fishbane, 1979: 6–9. With dominion comes responsibility, although the added dimension of free will is not dramatized until the story of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden.

Chapter 2

1. For the political focus of the poem, see especially Raaflaub (1988, 1993, 2000) and Brown (1953); for the poem as a Hymn to Zeus, see Cornford (1952). At *W&D* 2, Hesiod calls upon the Muses to “hymn about Zeus, your father.”

2. Hades also has πύλαι. Hesiod uses ἐντὸς again when referring to the “justice that a city holds within” (δίκην πόλις ἐντὸς ἐέργει; *W&D* 269).

3. For an assembly being called a θέμις, see *Il.* 11.807. With terms like ὀμήγουρις, ὀμηγερέες, and θῶκοι (a term typically used for seats in the council place), many early poets refer to the Olympians gathering in assembly. The *Odyssey* (1.27) also describes them as ἄθροοι, assembled in close order. Cf. the common references to Olympus as the “seat of the gods” (θεῶν ἔδος), a term used frequently for a πόλις, ἄστυ or large territory. Alcaeus (fr. 130.3) also refers to ἄγοραί. See further Scully, 2009: 98–100.

4. For feasts, with their ordered distribution of meats in a social setting, as establishing and confirming the communal order in the Archaic period, see Tandy, 1997: 144.

5. Scholium A (derived from Aristonicus, most likely) at *Il.* 1.497.

6. Adkins, 1985: 49 and 59, respectively. That βασιλεύς in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* means “king,” leader of a πόλις, not “big man,” see Carlier, 1984: 222–30 and 2007: 126.

7. Mortals, Hesiod says, “will never cease from work (κάματος) and distress/hardship (οἰζύς) by day, and from being oppressed by night” (*W&D* 177–78). “Being oppressed” (φθειρόμενοι) is a long-accepted emendation; Most has recently proposed “being worn out” (τεϊρόμενοι, a word that does not otherwise appear in Hesiod, but is common in Homer). In the *Theogony*, κάματος only appears in the context of the new invention of women who, like drones, devour the labor of others (599); “painful Oīzus” is a child of Night. For humankind, the combination of labor, fields, and community can yield strange and wonderful metaphors of πόλις “blooming and its people flowering” (*W&D* 227), but when Hesiod describes the Graces within Olympus as blooming, this flourishing is purely social.

8. Gantz, 1993: 122.

9. From this perspective, one might say that for the politically less advanced Greeks such political terminology should be regarded figuratively.

10. Unlike the Zeus of the *Iliad*, Hesiod’s Zeus never claims that he is stronger than all of the other Olympians combined (cf. 8.19–26 and 15.180–81) and he does not rule over the Olympians by might, pure and simple. Also see Chapter 1, p. 13.

11. With the exception of 74, up to 900, all words with a root of φραδ- have been associated with Earth (160, 162, 471, 475, 494, 626, 884, 891, 892); at 901ff, by Earth’s advice, Zeus himself gains access to this form of wise counsel through an internalized Metis. See note 15 *infra*. As with a number of words in the *Theogony*, the quality of μῆτις changes as the universe evolves. Zeus’s μῆτις, unlike Cronus’s, will presumably be straight rather than crooked.

12. At *Il.* 5.749=8.393, the Horae guard the gates of Olympus. Hesiod is the first to identify the Horae by their individual names and to make them Zeus-born. A

nonpersonified εὐνομίη appears once in Homer, also in a social context (*Od.* 17.487). At *Works and Days* 225–37, good statesmanship leads to fecund fields and flocks; cf. West (1966: ad 902): “cities flourish under (Peace’s) rule.” In cult, the Horae are always associated with agriculture; cf. Detienne and Vernant, 1978: 107–109. Hesiod and Homer associate Themis with activities of the ἀγορή and the πόλις. She represents a time-honored system of rules and norms to maintain an equitable distribution of portions, lots, and laws (μοῖραι and τιμαί); cf. Farenga (2006: 119–25), in conjunction with Corsaro, 1988. Also see Ruiperez, 1960, and Karanastassi, 1997.

13. I accept van Lennep’s emendation (1843) reading νόμους (“laws”) for the manuscripts’ ὁμῶς (“equally”). Modern editors are divided between the two readings. My translation, “well in each of the details,” comes from West’s rendering of the difficult phrase εὖ δὲ ἔκαστα. On this passage, also see Raaflaub, 2000: 35–36, and 1988: 1–32. For a discussion of Muses and the arts, see Murray, 2004 and 2005.

14. Hoekstra (1957: 220–21) plausibly suggests that Hesiod reworked a formulaic expression, “the pasturelands and animal abodes,” to designate social behavior. On νόμος first meaning law or custom in Hesiod, see Pohlenz, 1948, and Lesky, 1986: 5–7. Νόμος in names like Amphinome, Ennomos, and Eurynome from the *Iliad*, and Amphinomos and Eurynome from the *Odyssey* suggest a meaning of law.

15. After Zeus, Earth is the most important, and complex character in the *Theogony*. She is “very holy” (300), “boundless” (187), “broad bosomed” (117), and frequently “huge” (πελώρη). Pace Lamberton (1988: 72–77), her stratagems and advice (sometimes in conjunction with Sky’s) are crucial at every turn in Zeus’s ascendancy to power: in tricking Cronus to swallow a stone instead of the infant Zeus (cf. 471, 475, and 494); in Zeus’s liberating the Hundred-Handers as a means to Olympian victory over the Titans (cf. 626); in urging the Olympians to make Zeus king and lord (884); in advising Zeus to swallow Metis (891 and 892). Earth also kept the Cyclopes’s thunder and lightning hidden before Zeus freed his uncles (505). See note 11 *supra*. For her effort to overthrow Zeus in the creation of Typhoeus, see Chapters 3 and 5 (pp. 54, 62, and 226n92); Hera assumes this role in the *Homerica Hymn to Apollo* (Chapter 4, pp. 84–5). For Night and her children and for female figures in the poem, see notes 19–20 and 40–42, *infra*.

16. For “return-χάρτις,” see MacLachlan, 1993: 5–12, 80–81, and 81n8. This conceit, that the thunderbolt and lightning are manufactured objects given to Zeus in gratitude, is rare in Greek; for another account of this, see Apollonius Rhodius, *Argonautica* 1.509–11 and 733–34. On the range of depictions of the Cyclopes, see Fowler, 2013: 35–36 and 53–58.

17. Cf. Brown, 1953: 19–21. For an antithetical view, see Stanford (1966: 21): “Hesiod in his *Theogony* traced the gods themselves from savagery to civilization, or rather to a peak of absolute control. The *Theogony* is a story less of succession than of suppression, of fantasies acted out in filial brutality. Kronos suppressed his father, Ouranos, by castrating him. Zeus suppressed his father, Kronos, blasted him and the Titans with lightning and shackled them in Tartarus. Zeus ruled on high, not because he was good but because he was beyond good and evil, too strong for the law of retaliation that consumed his forebears. He was the invincible masculine will, the Father who triumphed over Mother Earth. His justice, his *Dike*, was the way of Might Makes Right. His way towards men was the way things are—not in the golden age when men and gods were equal but in this iron age where we grind out a subsistence, sons and fathers at each other’s necks, belaboured by the gods with

massing hardships.”

18. The Athenian invention of political ostracism is dated to 487 BCE. There is no evidence that the Athenians had Hesiod’s 10-year form of exile from Olympus in mind but their fixed-period banishment may have resonated for them with the mythic, Olympian precedence.

19. Most modern translations translate Eris as Strife, but Discord, as she is sometimes rendered, more effectively sets her apart antiphonally from the harmonious song and dance of the Muses on Olympus. On her children, see Philippson, 1936; Brown, 1953; Nagler, 1988 and 1992; Theunissen, 1992; and Thalmann, 2004.

20. On this passage, see Rammoux, 1986; Arrighetti, 1989–1990; Pucci, 2009: 55–58. Night is the other great primordial and fecund female power in the *Theogony*. At *Il.* 14.259–61, Zeus shows great reverence for, and even fear of, Night. In some myths, she is Earth’s senior and can even be her mother, but in the *Theogony* she is an important but one-dimensional figure, not the equal of Earth in force or complexity. Her few epithets, “dark,” “black,” and “destructive,” perhaps stem from her sole parent Chaos (123) and her hateful offspring. At 124–25, she begets Aither and Day sexually with Erebus, but her hateful children are all her own, including Death, Destruction, Blame, Woe, Sleep, Dreams, the Moirae, painful Grief, pitiless Doom (Keres), Retribution (Nemesis), Deceit, Philotes, Old Age, and hateful Eris (211–25).

21. Verses 782–804 help reenforce a key contrast in the poem between Zeus’s and Themis’s Horae: Eunomia, Dike, and Eirene (901–3) and Eris’s Dunsomia, Lies, Quarrels, and Wars (226–32). Ostwald (1969: 62) argues, wrongly I believe, that 226–32 is too far from 901–3 for recall. See Solon in Chapter 4.

22. The digressions include: Heracles’s (Zeus’s son) defeat of various monsters (289–332); Styx aligning herself and her children with Zeus (383–403); Zeus and Hecate (411–52); Zeus freeing the Cyclopes (501–6); Zeus’s clash with Prometheus and the creation of women (520–616); Styx again and the Olympian exile of those who quarrel (775–806), all this narrated before the Olympians make Zeus their king (881–85). Clay (2003: 13, 20–24, 53–54, and 105–106) speaks well of the thematic purpose of the *Theogony*’s digressions.

23. Cf. Pender (2010: 242): “In contrast to the uproar of the mighty succession battles, the Muses symbolize the concord, peace, and friendship of Zeus’s new order. Thus the Muses, and therefore the poem itself, celebrate Zeus’s civilizing influence over primitive strife.” Cf. Pindar’s “the god-built sound of νόμοι” (fr. 35c Snell/Maehler).

24. Heubeck, 1989: *ad loc.* 9.5–11. In the *Theogony*, Hesiod turns these lower case nouns and adjectives into deities, εὐφροσύνη being Euphrosyne, one of the Charites (Graces), daughters of Zeus and Eurynome (*Th.* 907–11). Euphrosyne’s sisters, Aglaia (Splendor/Delight) and Thalia (Bloom), are implicitly present, also. Hesiod links the Muses and Charites at *Th.* 60–5.

25. For the *Theogony*’s silence about the creation of man, see Burkert, 1999: 101. Clay (2003: 97) argues that Hesiod alludes, albeit obliquely, to man’s birth (and woman’s birth, we should add) from the Meliai at 187. I see little in the poem to suggest that Hesiod either knew of this story or found it pertinent to his own. By contrast, he has much to say about the birth of the first woman, a “καλὸν κακὸν” (585).

26. Solmsen (1954) regards the Muses' interest in politics as a Hesiodic innovation, as does Gagarin (1992). Pucci (1977: 17–18, 50–55; cf. 23–34), Thalmann (1984: 40, 134–43), Kirby (1992), and Brillante (1994: 14–26), among others, see it as more traditional with the poet's and king's functions overlapping. Roth (1976) underlines the importance of memory for kings in an oral culture and proposes kings may have put their laws in verse. Also see Ledbetter, 2003; Laks, 1996; Duban, 1980; Puelma, 1972: 94–95; Havelock, 1963: 108–109. For Homeric association of leaders with honeyed speech and gentle reverence, see *Il.* 1.249 and *Od.* 8.167–77, respectively; cf. Solmsen, 1954, and Martin, 1984. On kings and bards at *Od.* 3.263–72, see Scully, 1981. Clay (2003: 74n88) adds *Od.* 7.71–4 where Queen Arete dissolves disputes even among men. A few generations after Hesiod, the word for law (νόμος) will refer to a musical mode (cf. Alcman 40 PMG).

27. West, 1966: 181–82 and Clay, 2003: 74, respectively. West adds: “Why are the kings introduced at all? They are not usually regarded by the Greeks as being dependent upon the Muses, except for the celebration of their renown.”

28. Pucci (1977: 18) argues that the participle, παραπράμμενοι at *Th.* 90, translated here as “persuading (craftily),” carries a pejorative meaning of persuading “by deception and deviousness,” with smooth words “softening ... the truth.” It is worth noting that Parmenides, imitating this passage it appears at fr. 1.11–4, uses παραπράμμενοι in a positive sense. Also see the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* 336 and Athena's evocation of Peitho to persuade the Furies at Aeschylus's *Eumenides* 885–86. In the Hesiod passage, it is uncertain whom the king means to persuade. Is it the victorious or the downtrodden? The wrongdoers or the wronged? Those who feel they are in the right or those on the losing end? Or does the king speak to all parties without distinction? Stoddard (2003: 3) argues for the wronged; Walker's attractive description of kings “carry[ing] off the mind of the fractious crowd on the stream of honeyed discourse” (2000: 7) suggests that these kings speak to all parties.

29. As Benardete (2000: 8) notes: “The Muses are not needed for kings to know what is right; but they are needed to establish the right in spite of the opposition to the right by those who believe they are in the right.” In an Iliadic passage suggestive of *Th.* 85–6, Zeus rages against men who “in the ἀγορή pass crooked decrees (θέμιστες) and drive away justice (δίκη), not caring for the gaze of the gods” (*Il.* 16.487–88). For the etymology of δίκη and its range of meanings, including justice, in Homer and Hesiod, see *Lfgre* (Schmidt) and Dickie, 1978. According to Hesiod (*W&D* 276–80), Zeus only grants δίκη to humans.

30. Pace Koning (2010a: 19), who, restricting his analysis to explicit ancient references to Hesiod, argues that the ancients only focused on a few episodes in the poem and at the beginning of creation and did not see the *Theogony* in its broad scope about Zeus's rise to power. Talmann (2004: 391) sees political utility in the naming of two Erides in the *Works and Days*, the two offering a model, he suggests, “for the developing πόλις to keep violence at bay [and, if it must occur, to direct it] out of the community, [channeling] the energies of human aggression creatively for its own ends.” Cf. Brown, 1953, and Hunter and Fuhrer, 2002.

31. Elsewhere in the poem, Hesiod plays with a paradox that Μνημοσύνη (Memory), the mother of the Muses, instills λημοσύνη (forgetfulness), a word not found in Homer. In this case, it is a forgetfulness of cares and grief (54–55), brought on by the pleasures of song (97–103). Hesiod's penchant for punning may lead to these seemingly opposite stances: memory as necessary for not-lying and for truth-telling (233–36) and song as a vehicle for forgetting (54–55); cf. Pucci, 1977: 27 and Clay, 2003: 59. Walsh (1984: 33–36) sees similarities between Hesiod's description of Pandora and the poet's power to tell falsehoods. For *Th.* 233, a Hellenistic

scholiast sought to distinguish lying (telling a falsehood for an advantage) from forgetting.

32. Cf. Chapter 1, note 31.

33. As Eris's children come only from herself, so Nereus is said to be born from Pontos, as if Pontos conceived Nereus without a sexual partner. If so, he would be the only male to conceive a child by himself, but the point is hardly stressed. In Apollodorus's *Library* Nereus is said to be the offspring of Pontos and Earth (1.2.6), and in the *Theogony* after Nereus Pontos begets four children with Earth (237–39), so it would be unwarranted to claim that Nereus is born from Pontos alone.

34. For the Orphic tradition see 58 (Kern); Apollodorus's *Library* 1.1.1. For examples of scholars who mischaracterize Zeus's many couplings as marriages and in general apply the term loosely throughout the poem, see Bonnafé, 1985: 92–102; Ramnoux, 1987; Miralles, 1993: 17–44.

35. In Hesiod and Homer, the phrasing for marriage is fluid. The phrasing for Zeus “leading” Themis (901) may imply marriage (and Pindar will explicitly describe that marriage in his so-called *Hymn to Zeus*), but this phrase in the *Theogony* is significantly less pronounced than the language for marriage at 886 and 921. Nothing in the phrasing of 907, 915, 920, 941, or 944 implies marriage. Between 116 and 955, a variety of expressions are used to describe sexual coupling, the most common being with φίλότης: 125, 177, 306, 333, 374, 375, 380, 405, 625, 822, 920, 923, and 927. There is one exception to this “rule,” that at 409–10 when “Perses / lead (Asteria) to his great house to be called his dear wife (ἄκοιτις).” Much about this passage is anomalous and suggests an independent, local tradition.

36. Stokes (1962: 36) writes that good and evil here refer to cleverness. Adkins (1985: 60) writes: Hesiod “does not portray a Zeus who became ruler of the gods because he was just and Cronus was not, or because he was more just than Cronus.” By contrast, Faraone and Teeter (2004) argue that the internalized Metis enables Zeus to regulate force to serve justice and the social order: “It would seem, therefore, that in the *Theogony* and in fragment 343 Hesiod ... distinguishes Zeus's current reign from those that have preceded it, for he avoids both the violence and hybris of Ouranos's kingship [*sic*] and the deceit and ‘crookedness’ of Kronos ... Thus as a result of Zeus's very different kind of ingestion, he is able to establish a kind of just rule of which his father and grandfather were incapable.” Fragment 343 refers to the (Hesiodic?) variant of this passage as found in Chrysippus (discussed in Chapter 5, under Stoics).

37. In the *Theogony*, only Zeus is called a husband or spouse (“one who sleeps beside”): παράκοιτις (328) and παρακοίτης (928).

38. Hesiod says that Ares brings Panic and Fear into the world when he beds down with Aphrodite (933–36); in Homer, Eris is Ares's sister (*Il.* 4.440–41) and Panic and Fear his companions in war (*Il.* 4.439–40 and 15.119–20). In the *Iliad*, Zeus says, “Ares, to me you are the most hateful of all the gods who hold Olympus, / for ἔρις, wars (πόλεμοι), and battles (μάχαι) are dear to you” (5.890–91). In the *Theogony*, wars and battles are children of Eris and Eris herself the child of Night.

39. Clay, 2003: 162–63.

40. Parker (2007: 393) is the latest to make the important point that the account of the gods in myth differs from what one sees in cult. Without doubt, the most telling example is the marriage of Zeus and Hera, always fraught with ἔρις and νεῖκος in myth, but in cult the model of the institution of marriage. Hera's and

Zeus's daughter, Ease-of-Child-Birth (Eileithyia), speaks to Hera's important role in human marriages.

41. At 904–5, the Moirae (“portion,” “division,” or “allotment”) are children of Zeus and Themis, but at 217 they are the parthenogenic daughters of Night. Is this double genealogy a slip in memory on Hesiod's part or a kind of rebirth into the Olympian fold? Perhaps the latter, so that they may grant “good and evil” to mortals (905–6). As a possible parallel, one could note that one of Eris's children, Oath (231–32), also serves the need of Olympus, as a feared but indispensable goddess under the jurisdiction of Styx (784–806); cf. Blickman, 1987. Often in later Greek literature, the Moirae are represented alongside the Horae and/or Themis, as befits their association with order, allotment, and regularity.

42. The key ingredients of civilized order are embodied in numerous female figures from Earth, to the Titans Themis and Mnemosyne, to Zeus's cousin, Styx, and to his daughters, including the Horae, the Charites (Graces), the Muses, and, ultimately, Athena, born of himself. For the pattern of masculine (cultural) values expressed by feminine words and forms, see Stafford, 2000: 27–35 and Yaguello, 1978. For example, for his statue of Zeus at Olympia, Pheidias placed the Horae and Charites on either side of the seated Zeus (Pausanias 5.11.7).

43. In the Archaic period, the numerous accounts of Olympians dancing include Apollo in the mix, usually as the lead. In its description of the Muses dancing, the *Theogony* alone fails to mention Apollo in their number; cf. Scully, 2009.

44. Such is the role he enjoys in the *Titanomachia*, presumably after the Olympian victory over the Titans: “in their midst the father of gods and men danced” (Athenaeus 22c).

45. By contrast, the first mortal woman is closer in nature to the figures of Night and Eris and their children than she is to the blessings of Zeus's daughters, as the phrases describing her show: as “destructive Night” and “hateful Discord” brought *Keres* (Specters of Death), *Old Age*, *Ponos* (Labor/Pain), Lies, and Logoi (*Th.* 218, 225, 226, 229) into the universe, so the “destructive race of women” (*Th.* 591) (a verse often bracketed) “gave men the κῆρες (the specters of death), made them *grow old*, and introduced them to diseases and πόνος” (*W&D* 90–3). Nemesis is a “burden to mortal men” (*Th.* 223); Pandora is a “burden to men (*W&D* 82; *Th.* 592). Hermes set *lies* and wily λόγους in her (*W&D* 78). In short, what the children of Night and Eris do for the universe, the first mortal woman does for mortal man. The *Works and Days* also shows that it is possible for man to escape hunger (λιμός) and ruin (ἄτη) (in the *Th.* personified as Eris's children) in the “just city” where peace (εἰρήνη) abounds and men work as if they were at festivities (θαλάται) (in the *Th.* Zeus's daughters) (*W&D* 225–31). Clay (2003: 125) argues that Zeus's sole intent in creating woman was “to rid Olympus of noxious forces and foist them on mankind,” but, following the lexical trail, a different scenario may be proposed, namely that, post-Pandora man, subjected to a life of hunger, toil, lies, discord, and familial strife, may find concord and blooming fecundity in the ἀγορή (*Th.*) and the just city (*W&D*). If Hesiod had any or all of these patterns in mind, he does not say so directly. Within the Prometheus frame, the creation story of women emphasizes a different point, namely that “it is not possible to deceive or go beyond the mind of Zeus” (*Th.* 613). For commentary on this creation, see Vernant, 1974: 179–86; Arthur, 1982; Marquardt, 1982; Judet de la Combe, 1996; Saintillan, 1996; Vernant, 1996; Zeitlin, 1996; Brown, 1997; Bremmer, 2000; Lyons, 2003: 97–99; and Beall, 2005–6.

46. Without specifics, Benardete (2000: 5) discusses “the defeat of Eros” in the

Theogony.

47. It is not clear whether Hesiod invented Eros as a deity or if Pausanias should be believed that Eros was worshipped “from the beginning” in the form of a stone in a local Boeotian cult at Thespieae (9.24.3 and 27). For the possibility of Egyptian-Semitic origins, see West, 1994. After Hesiod, Eros is found in a number of cosmologies, including the Orphic Eros-Phanes, Zeus-Eros in Pherecydes, Acusilaus, Aristophanes’s *Birds* (693–702), and Eumelos (according to West); cf. West, 1971a, 1983, and 1994, as well as Zeitlin, 1999, and Kovaleva, 2005.

48. Cf. Athena who is described as “having strength and sensible counsel like her father” (ἴσον ἔχουσαν πατρὶ μένος καὶ ἐπίφρονα βουλήν, 896).

49. West’s reading (1966); others, including Solmsen (1970), print “sensible counsel”: ἐπίφρονοι βουλή.

50. It is a striking feature of the *Theogony* that only once does the word for sexual union stem from Eros, that when Zeus ἐράσσατο (loved) Mnemosune, resulting in the birth of the Muses. Rather most words for sexual coupling derive from φιλέω, a word with a much wider range of meanings (from love making to befriending). One might speculate that Hesiod chose this word precisely to play on that lexical range.

51. While a mortal, Heracles rids the earth of fierce, often hybrid creatures, including the Nemean Lion whom Hera nurtured to be a bane to humans (326–29) and the Hydra whom she raised to kill Heracles (313–18). Clay 2003: 158–74 and Pucci, 2009: 57–58 discuss well this section of the poem. To bring glory to his son, Zeus has Heracles free Prometheus, after killing the bird that torments him (532–33). West (2013: 17) suggests that these incidents may come from a variety of songs rather than a single *Herakleia*.

52. Before verse 955, Hestia is only mentioned once; Demeter, Artemis, Ares, Hermes, and Dionysus are mentioned twice, Hephaestus 3 times, Hades 5 times, Poseidon 6 times, Athena 7 times, Aphrodite 9 times, and Hera 11 times. After Zeus (named 62 times), Earth is named 51 times, while Sky is a distant third, named 34 times, and Night comes in fourth at 16 times. The number of times a character is named, of course, is by no means the only way of determining significance, but the numbers do tell a story. For Apollo’s low profile in the *Theogony*, see Scully, 2009. For the poem ending at 955, see Hamilton, 1989; Northrup, 1983; and Janko, 1982: 85–87, 221–23, although various ancient scholia, perhaps going back to Aristarchus, athetized 940–55 for genealogies that mixed mortal women with gods (cf. Schroeder, 2006: 246–47, frags. 53–5). For the endings of archaic epics as “fungible,” see Edmunds, 2009: 95–96.

53. Jeanmaire (1956) argues that in the earliest tradition Athene was indeed conceived without a mother; cf. Ballabriga, 1990: 19 and Bonnard, 2004: 32–35.

54. Stocking (2013: 193) writes: “Where Kronos consumed the Olympian children, Zeus exercises a much greater control over reproduction by consuming the very source of that threat of succession, the mother herself.” But, mistakenly in my view, he regards Zeus becoming “father of gods and men” as the poem’s “major narrative focus” (183). For structural parallels between Cronus’s and Zeus’s actions, see Detienne and Vernant (1978: 72). Muellner (1996: 70) appears to equate Cronus’s νηδύς with Rhea’s.

55. Hestia was goddess of both the household hearth and (figuratively) of the πόλις hearth. Dionysus is usually regarded as too unbounded to be included within the Olympian order. Zeus’s brother, Hades, the god of many names and feared by

all, is rarely included among the Olympians, but at *Il.* 15.193 the Earth and Olympus are said to be held in common by Zeus, Poseidon, and Hades.

56. See note 52, *supra*.

57. On this theme, see Chapter 1, pages 16–8; and pages 40–1 *supra*.

58. Heubeck (1992: 412) notes that Zeus’s “plan is of the greatest importance in the history of ideas [as it] established a new political order based on justice and law,” but he says nothing about the role of forgetting in this achievement; cf. Heubeck, 1954: 44 and Moulton, 1974: 165–66. See note 28, *supra*.

Chapter 3

1. Cf. Güterbock, 1946 and 1948, and Cornford, 1950.

2. West, 1966: 31; Burkert, 2004: 4, respectively. Cf. Walcot, 1966.

3. López-Ruiz, 2010: *passim*, esp. 23–47 and 171–202. The Hurrians were a Bronze Age peoples who lived in Anatolia and Northern Mesopotamia.

4. For the importance of the Syro-Palestinian ports as places of cultural exchange in the Late Bronze Age, see Aruz, Benzel, and Evans, 2008; for their importance in the Iron Age, see Lehmann, 2005, and Lemos, 2005. Lane-Fox (2008: 259–67) notes that the Greeks at the small but important Iron Age harbor of Al Mina (home for Greeks, Phoenicians and local Syrians) at the mouth of the Orontes River in North Syria refer to the nearby mountain by its older Hurro-Hittite name (Mt Hazzi) rather than its Phoenician one (Mt Kasios) (known as Mt Zaphon in the Bible).

5. The recovery of a Bronze Age boat shows that merchants carried mixed cargoes from many eastern Mediterranean origins, including Greece; cf. Pulak, 1997 and 2008, and Bass, 1998. Burkert (1992: 9–33) makes the case for itinerant specialists (δημουργοί), including charismatics, who disseminated Near Eastern ideas and poetry. Bachvarova (2009) expands upon this view. López-Ruiz (2006: 94–100) stresses that “theogonic craftsmanship” passed through family circles, although Hesiod never suggests that his poetic skills were part of a family tradition. More recently (2010: 282–202), she identifies cosmogonic poets as “holy men” and “cultural mediators.”

6. Mondt, 1990: 150. Cf. Finkelberg, 1998, and López-Ruiz, 2010: 84–87 and 125–29.

7. The *Iliad*’s “exotic” reference to Ocean as the “origin of the gods” and his partner Tethys as their “mother” (*Il.* 14.201; cf. 206) resonates closely with an important passage about the primeval couple in the *Enûma elish*. From the same section of the *Iliad*, Poseidon claims that Zeus acquired Olympus by lot (15.190–93), which appears to be drawn from the Akkadian epic *Atrahasis*, but in this case the point fits in well with Poseidon’s other complaints against Zeus.

8. For translations, see Hoffner, 1998. Alalu is a shadowy figure, associated with the netherworld and Dark Earth where he goes in defeat but he is also called “king in heaven.” In the *Song of Kumarbi*, p. 42, section 4, after Alalu flees to the Earth, Kumarbi is called “Alalu’s offspring.” For the fullest discussion of these myths, see Haas, 2006.

9. Kumarbi spits out what he can of Anu’s seed, resulting in the creation of a mountain, perhaps dimly parallel in the *Theogony* to Sky’s seed falling on the earth and begetting the Erinyes, Giants, and Melian nymphs. But Teshub, the river Aranzah (Hurrian for Tigris), and two “terrible gods” remain within Kumarbi, who waits out his pregnancy in a state of high anxiety in the city of Nippur, the Mesopotamian cult center of Akkadian Ellil = Sumerian Enlil (p. 44, sections 16–17). In a fragmentary section of the text, it appears as if Kumarbi wishes “to eat up Teshub” (p. 44, section 14), but is given a stone instead, which will be vomited out and in time become a cult object.

10. See the *Song of Silver*, Hoffner, 1998: 49, section 4.1; cf. 57, section 4; about this city, see Buccellati and Kelly-Buccellati, 1997: 77–96.

11. For Kummiya's city gates and enclosed temples, see *The Song of Ullikummi* p. 62, section 43 and p. 65, section 69, respectively; for the Hurrian origins of its name, see Goetze, 1940: 5 n21; cf. Hoffner, 1998: 111.

12. Gurney, 1954: 192.

13. Kirk argues that the correspondences between these myths are so extensive that the two draw from a “pre-Hurrian koine” version (1970: 219). Cf. Heubeck, 1955, but Walcot (1966: 1–26) is less enthusiastic about the parallels. López-Ruiz (2006: 71–79) observes that in many ways the Greek Orphic tradition shows closer affinities with the Hurrio-Hittite myths than does the Hesiodic version.

14. Goslin (2010) contrasts these chaotic, undifferentiated voices of the monster with the ordered, like-minded voices of the Muses and their successful (hierarchical) communication between gods and mortals. For other discussion of these voices (often in relation to the Muses), see Blaise, 1992: 361–63; Ford, 1992: 190–91; Leclerc, 1993: 43–45; Collins, 1999: 244–46.

15. For an account of all the sources and their divergences, see Gantz, 1993: 48–51. Watkins (1995: 449) divides sources about Typhoeus into three groupings: archaic epic (*Il.* 2.781–83, *Theogony* 304–307, 820–68, and the Homeric *Hymn to Apollo* 300–40, Stesichorus 239 PMGF and a black-figure hydria circa 550 BCE); fifth century (primarily Pindar, *P.* 1.20–8 and Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound* 351–72); and Hellenistic and Roman (Apollodorus, *The Library* 1.6.3, Oppian, *Halieutica*, or “On Fishing,” 3.15–25, and Nonnus, *Dionysiaca* Books 1 and 2). The name appears variously as Typhoeus, Typhaon, and Typhon. Also see under *Enûma elish* in this chapter, the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* and Pindar in [Chapter 4](#), and *The Library* in [Chapter 5](#).

16. For its authenticity, see West, 1966: 381–83; Blaise, 1992: 350–54; and Goslin, 2010. For arguments against, see Solmsen, 1982. For the passage as a rhapsodic synthesis of varying versions, see Ballabriga, 1990. Blaise (1992) argues that this fight is concerned with the lower world, the Titanomachy with the upper realm; Clay argues that in the *Theogony* Earth sides with the last-born male child (2003: 25–26).

17. Katz, 1998. For the myth, see Beckman, 1982, and Porzig, 1930, who was the first to notice parallels between the eel-snake's initial victory over the Storm God and Typhon's initial victory over Zeus in Apollodorus. For a translation of the myth, see Goetze, 1969: 125–26. Few accepted the possibility of Anatolian “influences” upon the Greek myth until the decipherment of the Kumarbi and Ullikummi myths almost twenty years after Porzig.

18. Watkins, 1995: 448. In Hesiod and Homer, the Greek word for *thong* (ῥάβδος, ῥάπτ-), with which Zeus lashes Typhoeus (*Th.* 857; cf. *Il.* 2.783), retains a verbal memory of the Hittite word for *rope* (*ishimâs*, *ishimân*), with which the Storm God binds the serpent monster, but neither poet seems to have been aware of the binding story, although later writers like Pindar (*P.* 1.19 and 27) and Aeschylus (*Prometheus Bound* 365) refer to Typhoeus being bound up in defeat and pressed under the weight of Mt. Etna in Sicily.

19. Watkins, 1995: 448–59. Walcot finds more compelling similarities between the *Theogony* and the *Enûma elish* (1966: 27–54), as do West, 1966: 379–83 and Fontenrose, 1959: 148–64.

20. Cf. Vanstiphout, 1992. Similes abound in both stories, but there are no

extended ones in the *Enûma elish*.

21. For the distinction of Near Eastern creation myths being recited in a ritual context, unlike their Greek counterparts, see Bremmer, 2004.

22. For the cuneiform text, transliteration, translation, and glossary, see Talon, 2005. Unless otherwise noted, all translations here are from Foster, 2005. For other English translations, see Dalley, 1989: 228–77; Bottéro and Kramer, 1989: 602–79; and Speiser and Grayson, 1969: 60–72 and 501–503, respectively.

23. Jacobsen, 1984: 18 and Caldwell, 1989: 81 have objected that the Oedipal nature of the father–son conflict in the *Theogony* (and the *Theogony of Dunny*) is lost or deflected in the *Enûma elish*, as several generations separate Ea from Apsu, and later Marduk from Tiamat. These objections do not take note that in the *Enûma elish*, the words for son (*maru* and *bukru*), as for father, easily cross generations, as seen at II.52–53 and 59–61, for example, and Tiamat refers to all the offspring as “what we formed” (I.45).

24. As an analog, one might cite David’s “cut[ting] off a corner of Saul’s cloak” as he is relieving himself in a cave. In David’s case the cutting is purely symbolic, as he spares Saul’s life and allows him to keep the throne (1 Samuel 24:4).

25. *Inanna and Enki: The Transfer of the Arts of Civilization from Eridu to Erech*, translated by Kramer and Maier, 1989: 57–68. Sober, Ea is not able to regain his lost authority. There is also a Northwest Semitic myth where El (= Cronus) in an Ugaritic poem gets so drunk at a banquet that he cannot get out on his own two feet; cf. Lewis, 1997.

26. I print Foster’s translation, which corresponds with Speiser’s translation in ANET. Dalley interprets the idiom to mean “May she go far!,” a reading that seems better suited for an arrow than the bow. Cf. West, 1966: 23 and *ad* 845.

27. For parallels between the Akkadian and Israelite creation stories, see Smith, 2008: 170–80. Clifford argues that “attempts to show that *Genesis* 1 is directly dependent on *Enûma Elish* cannot be judged successful” (1994: 140). Gmirkin (2006: 89–139) argues that *Genesis* 1–11 is directly influenced by Berossus’s *Babyloniaca*, rather than by the *Enûma elish*. See Halperin 2009: 427–42. In numerous ways, the *Enûma elish* and *Genesis* 1–11 move in opposite directions, including the story of naming: the Akkadian myth moves from a time before names to Marduk’s harmonious assimilation of 50 names, while *Genesis* moves from Elohim’s naming of the universe into (good) being to the Lord confounding human speech so that humankind can neither agree on names nor name things truly.

28. For somewhat different reasons, Cornford (1950) makes much the same argument.

29. Dalley, 1989: 279; see also Jacobsen, 1984; Grayson, 1969: 517–18. Like the *Theogony*, the poem is rich with etymological puns, seen at the start in the punning between Plow, Harab (*harbu* II), and virgin soil (*harbu* I): he plowed her and she cropped.

30. What Lambert and Walcott translate “by themselves bore” (1965: 67), Dalley translates “The Furrows, of their own accord, begot the Cattle God” (1989: 279)

31. Having married Earth, Sumuqan then marries his older sister, Tiamat, and together they beget Lahar, the Flocks God, who kills his father Sumuqan and marries his mother Tiamat. Tiamat in turn murders her mother Earth. No doubt following a lunar calendar, on the sixteenth of Kislimu (in December), Lahar takes dominion, when his son (name uncertain) marries his sister River, and murders both parents

(Lahar and Tiamat), in an ever-recurring pattern until “at the New Year Festival [in April] Hayyashum took over his father’s dominion, / But did not kill him, and seized him alive. / He ordered his city to imprison his father. ...” Here the text breaks off, with approximately 38 lines missing, followed by 20 more in extremely fragmentary condition, although several names of prominent Akkadian gods stand out, including Nusku (god of light and vizier of Anu and Ellil, Lord of the Winds) and Ninurta (a god of agriculture and son of Ellil). As Bottéro (2001: 76) notes, the integration of Earth, Sea, and River in this myth of origin connects cosmogony and theogony.

32. Jacobsen, 1984: 17.

33. For Eudemos, see Wehrli, *Eudemos von Rhodos* fr. 150, p. 71–72. West assumes that Eudemos acquired the story from an oral source (1994: 291). Also see Eudemos discussed in Chapter 5 under Neoplatonists. Damascius discusses another Phoenician cosmogony by Moch(os) identifying Aither and Aer as first, from whom Oulomos was conceived. He, having intercourse with himself, conceived first Chousoros the Opener and then an egg, which, breaking into two, produced sky and earth.

34. *PE* 1.10.40–41, as translated by Attridge and Oden. In spite of Philo’s professed ties to Egyptian sources, modern scholars often look to find Hurrio-Hittite parallels in Philo’s text and give some credence to his claim of pre-Greek sources. For possible Egyptian sources, see West, 1983: 201.

35. Cf. López-Ruiz, 2010: 99–100, 106–107, 125–27. West argues that the duplication of windy air or wind of dark air comes from Eusebius (1994: 296). For the translatability of Near Eastern stories into Greco-Roman contexts, see Smith, 2008: 252–73. Aither and Chaos are a pair in some Orphic cosmogonies.

36. κτίσις in classical Greek means foundation, but in the Septuagint and New Testament it means creation. For text and translation, see West 1994: 295–96; for a commentary, see Baumgarten, 1981.

37. West, 1994: 305 and López-Ruiz (2010: 107 and 125–26), who stresses a Northwest Semitic (Canaanite or Syro-Phoenician) component. Cf. Kovaleva, 2005: 139–43. The Greek Orphic hymns are much closer to this construct than is Hesiod’s *Theogony*. According to Proclus, *In Timaeum* 2, Pherecydes of Syros writes that Zeus was changed into Eros when he was about to create. Perhaps drawing from *PE* 1.10.50, the Suidas claims that he had access to the “the secret books of the Phoenicians.” Baumgarten (1981: 258) suggests that Philo “may be at his usual game of claiming priority for the Phoenicians.”

38. López-Ruiz (2010: 100) suggests that, in Hesiod’s direct line of Ouranus–Cronus–Zeus conflict, “it is far more logical that Hesiod would have simplified a complicated succession story than that Philo would have complicated a simpler [Hesiodic] one.”

39. From the wind Colpia and his wife Baau (= Night) were born Aeon (which can be masculine or feminine in Greek, but here is masculine) and the male Protogonos (with clear Orphic parallels), “mortal men, so called ... from whom were born Genos (masc.) and Genea (fem.), settlers of Phoenicia” (the first land mass in the cosmos). Their mortal children included Light, Fire, and Flame (*PE* 1.10.7–9). In time, Elioun-Hypsistos joined with Berouth, near Byblos, before he was killed by animals, to be replaced by his son Epigeios-Ouranos (Sky), who with Ge has four sons: El/Cronus, Baitylos, Dagon, and Atlas.

40. This Pothos (Desire, *PE* 1.10.24), child of Astarte (= Aphrodite), may be

distinct from the primordial *πρόθοος* at *PE* 1.10.1. Hesiod also posits two deities associated with sexual energy, a primordial Eros (*Th.* 120–22) and Philotes (*Th.* 224), born of Night. Hesiod also says that when Aphrodite is born, Eros and Himeros (Desire) attend her (*Th.* 201).

41. With that understanding, it hardly seems accidental that none of these myths come from Egypt, which did not have a similar city-state structure.

42. In addition to Egyptian lore and religion, the Greeks sometimes said that philosophy, mathematics, astronomy, and medicine, especially in the realm of drugs, originated in Egypt, even when modern historians are more likely to find the origins of these arts and modes of thought coming from the Near East. For bibliography, see Scully, 1997: 247–51. In part, the Greeks were impressed by the Egyptian ability to trace their ancestry back many generations when Herodotus (2.143) despaired that the Greeks could only go back three or four generations. Endless political upheaval in Mesopotamia made such genealogical trees impossible there.

43. Similarly, the belief that Pelops, namesake of the Peloponnesos, and father of Atreus and Thyestes, arrived from Lydia in Asia Minor testifies that not all Greeks believed that they were *autochthonic*, “issued from the (Greek) soil.”

44. Thucydides (1.12) dates the Phoenician migration to Boeotia to 60 years after the Trojan War. Gorgias (*Defense of Palamedes* DK 82 B11) also credits the invention to Palamedes, although the scholia of Euripides’s *Orestes* (at 432) say that he learned the letters from the Phoenicians. Herodotus (5.58) says that the Ionian term for papyrus rolls, “animal skins,” is a holdover from an earlier time when the Greeks wrote on skins. Orpheus, Musaeus, and Linos are also credited with inventing Greek letters. Like Socrates in Plato’s *Phaedrus*, a fragment from Euripides (fr. 578N) calls writing a “drug of forgetfulness, voiceless but speaking.”

45. See Chapter 5, under the Neoplatonist Damascius. It is uncertain whether Eudemos compiled this material, perhaps drawing on Hippias’s work, in book form (perhaps under the title “History of Religion”) or (less likely in my opinion) he alluded to them incidentally in other writings.

46. Burkert, taking Tiamat from the form *taw(a)tu*, sometimes used for her in the poem, finds an “exact transcription” in Tethys, mother of the Oceanids (1992: 93). The Homeric epithet for Oceanus, ὠψόρροος, may originally have been a Greek transliteration of “Apsu-ρέω” (Apsu-flowing) (cf. West, 1997: 148).

47. Cf. Verbrugghe and Wickersham, 1996: 62–63.

48. Here, I follow Gmirkin’s analysis of Berossus (2006: 96–100), although he is interested in the relation of the *Babyloniaca* (and the *Enûma elish*) to *Genesis* 1–11, not to the *Theogony*.

Chapter 4

1. Perlman (1965) identifies 25 quotations from poetry in the Attic Orators, with 5 each from Hesiod, Homer, and Euripides. Aristotle advocates calling on ancient poets as “witnesses” at court (*Rhetoric* I.13–5). For the reception of Hesiod in antiquity, see Koning, 2010a; for a sketch of Hesiodic reception in literature and art up to modern times, see Ciccolella, 2012. See also Hunter, 2014, and Montanari et al., 2009. For distinctions between reception(s) and the classical tradition (reflexes of, reconstructions of, responses to the classical past), see Silk, Gildenhard, and Barrow, 2014.

2. West, 2003: Eumelus, fr. 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Cf. Janko, 1992: 230–31. The *Epic Cycle* may have had its own stand-alone creation poem, if the cosmogonic details in the *Titanomachia* did not fulfill that function. According to Clement of Alexandria (*Miscellanies* 6.26.7), Eumelus converted Hesiod to prose.

3. Terpander is said to have come to Sparta perhaps as early as 680 BCE. In some traditions, he was a descendant of Hesiod; in others, he traced his pedigree back to Homer. As none of Terpander’s fragments are considered genuine, it is impossible to tell to what extent his language, thought, or genealogies conforms to the *Theogony*. Other fragments read: “let us make libations to the Muses, daughters of Memory, and to their leader, the son of Leto,” and “Zeus, the first principle or beginning (ἀρχή) of all, leader of all, Zeus, to you I send this beginning (ἀρχή) of my hymns.” To speak of Zeus as an ἀρχή is post-Hesiodic.

4. “Most ancient” may also be translated “most reverend.” Alcman may be stressing the gods’ strength and authority, not their antiquity (Most, 1987: 13). Ferrari (2008: 20–67) associates Aisa and Poros with the myth of Phaethon as he transgresses the ordered limits of the cosmos. Some in antiquity associated Poros with Hesiod’s Chaos, perhaps as an initial means for division. *Iliad* 20.127–28 also personifies Aisa. Most (1987) has shown that the language of fr. 5 belongs to an allegorizing commentator, not to Alcman himself: in it, the primordial goddess Thetis (setting in place?) first ordered “Πόρος (Ways and Means) like a beginning” and then “Τέκμων (Limit) like an end” to be “born” from disorganized primal matter (ὕλη).

5. See Fowler, 2013: 7–9 for the theogonic fragments and 649–52 for the difficulties in identifying the historical figure. On Epimenides’s *Theogony*, also see Bernabé, 2001, and West, 1983: 45–53 (who dates him to the fourth century).

6. ἄηρ is usually associated with lower air close to the earth’s surface, but Hesiod associates it, undeified, both with Tartarus in the phrase Τάρταρον ἠερόεωτα, “gloomy Tartarus” (*Th.* 119, 682, 721, 736, 807, and *Il.* 8.13) and with destructive Night, said to be “covered in a gloomy cloud” (*Th.* 757).

7. Cf. Damascius, *De principiis* 124, from Eudemus (DK 3 B5); Philodemus, *de pietate* 137.5.

8. Very early on, the word-for-word Latin translations facing the Greek text in printed editions confirmed that the Muses were speaking the truth by rendering κοῦραι μεγάλου Διὸς ἀρτίεπειαι (*Th.* 29) as “filiae Iovis magni veridicae,” translating “the eloquent daughters of great Zeus” as “the truth-speaking daughters of great Zeus.” See image on p. 168. For the tradition of divine authority in Greek literature, see Calame, 1995, Chapter 1. For fine discussions of Hesiod’s encounter

with the Muses, see Thalmann, 1984: 134–43 and Clay, 1989 and 2003: 56–67. On γαστέρες, see Vernant, 1989: 50 (to mark the human condition); Stoddard, 2004: 75 (to distinguish Hesiod as poet); Arthur, 1982: 75; Zeitlin, 1996: 85; Clay, 2003: 119 (in contrast to its meaning as womb and a woman’s power to give birth); Katz and Volk, 2000 (an old formula, misunderstood by Hesiod, having to do with inspiration).

9. For Longinus (*On the Sublime* 13), Archilochus was “most Homeric” along with Stesichorus, Herodotus, and Plato; cf. Heraclitus fr. 42 and Dio Chrysostom 33.11. On the date of Archilochus, in his prime 650 BCE, give or take 20 years, see Jacoby, 1941. Like Homer and Hesiod, he was honored in later years by a local hero cult; see Clay, 2004. See West, 1974: 22–39 for the generic quality of his persona and characters.

10. Other differences in the epiphanies: the Muses visited Archilochus before first light and in disguise; the significance of their gift became clear after Archilochus’s father visited the oracle at Delphi. Hesiod’s Muses visit him in their full Olympian form, at an unspecified time of day, and bring about an immediate transformation. See Clay, 2004: 14–16 and 74–76. For Archilochus’s epiphany as a polemic against Hesiod’s story, see Irwin, 1998: 177–82. The Muses’ gift to Hesiod of a σκήπτρον is unparalleled as a gift to a singer, and not to be confused with a singer’s ῥάβδος or a shepherd’s staff. For varying views, see Koning, 2010a: 47n96; Haubold, 2010: 21–22; Clay, 2003: 73–75; Hainsworth, 1999; Laks, 1996: 89–91; Segal, 1992: 27–28; Puelma, 1972. Stoddard (2003: 6–9) and Nagy (1990a: 52–53), rightly, I think, associated Hesiod with kings.

11. For Archilochus knowing, and playing off of, an oral or written version of *W&D* 592, see Nikolaev 2014. A Hellenistic poem characterizes Archilochus as the first to “dip a bitter Muse in snake-venom and stain gentle Helicon with blood” (*Palatine Anthology* 7.71).

12. Archilochus, some argue, may be taking direct issue with Hesiod in one of his animal fables when a fox seeks revenge against an eagle who has made a meal of her children. Praying directly to Zeus, the fox reminds him that he concerns himself with the insolence (ὑβρις) and justice (δίκη) of wild beasts as well as the villainous and law-abiding works among man (West, *IE* Archilochus fr. 177), whereas in the *Works and Days* (276–80), Hesiod says that Zeus gave justice (δίκη) to man alone.

13. Hunter (2014: 124) sees Alcaeus’s “recasting” as an “early glimpse of Hesiod being used as an authority.” Edmunds (2009: 94) calls the fragment a “metaphrasis across time, genre, and performance context.” Bowie (2009: 119) explains the imitation by suggesting that Alcaeus composed the poem at a Boeotian symposium. Cf. Kassel, 1981: 11–18. In his typically lawyerly manner, Page (1955: 306) overstates the case about the “imitation”: “Nowhere else in Greek poetry, except in deliberate parodies, is so extensive and close a copy of one poet by another to be found.” Others argue that Alcaeus is drawing from a common repository of shared material; cf. Nagy, 1990a: 462; Martin, 1992: 22–23; Hooker, 1977: 81–82. For a thoughtful discussion, see Petropoulos, 1994. Regarding the *Works and Days*, Hunter (2014: 3), citing the *Works and Days*’ “ancient wisdom” and quotability, argues that “interest” in the poem “start[ed] not many decades after [its] composition.” On likenesses between Hesiod and Theognis and Alcaeus, see Hunter, 2014: 126–39; on Hesiod and Semonides, see 157–66; on *W&D* 582ff being echoed at Hesiod’s *Shield* 393–97, see 146–49. Also see Janko, 1982, Loraux, 1978, and Lloyd-Jones, 1975, and more broadly see West, 1978: 61 and *ad* 702–703, and Koning, 2010a: 140–44.

14. For Stesichorus as Hesiod's (grand)son, cf. scholium on *Works and Days* 87–92 (Tzetzes) (HesiodT 2 Most) and 271a (HesiodT 19 Most), Cicero, *De republica* 2.20 (HesiodT 20 Most) and Suda 1095 (4.433). For him being Homeric, see Longinus, *De Sublime* 13.3; cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus *De compositione verborum* 6.121, Quintilian, *Inst.* 10.1.62, Athenaeus 4.172. Stewart (1983) suggests that the naming of Stesichore on the vase was an acknowledgement to Stesichorus, a claim challenged by Haslam, 1991. West (2013: 71) asks whether the *Cyrpia* also named the Muses.

15. Fowler, 2013: 3. Betegh (2004) regards the *Theogony* as the primary comparandum for the Derveni papyrus. Sider (2006: 169) asks if the *Theogony* had yet attained this authoritative status. My description of Orphism draws from López-Ruiz, 2010: 169–70 and West, 1994: 289. On early Orphism, see Parker, 1995. West (1966: 12) identifies over a dozen cosmogonies/theogonies in the Archaic period. Some survive in name only. They include the poet of the *Titanomachia*, Orpheus, semi-legendary writers like Aristeeas from the Propontis and Abaris from the far north (both shamanistic figures associated with Apollo who wrote fabulous travelogues and theogonic-cosmogonic tracts), Acusilaus of Argos, “a transcription [of Hesiod], except where it came to Argive myth” (Fowler, 2013: 627), and Hecataeus of Miletus (in prose) (see HesiodT 121–122 and T113a Most, Frs. 6, 75, 296, respectively). Epimenides, Linus, Thamyris, and a *Cosmopoiia* by Palaephatus round out the list. Cf. Kovaleva 2005: 140–43.

16. Koning (2010a: 288–89 and 317–18) argues that Hesiod's lineage associates him with truthfulness and Homer's with beauty. Many argue that Homer's “blindness” was associated with superior insight.

17. Regarding the *Works and Days*, this is a major theme in Hunter, 2014: 26–32, 123–66, and *passim*. A fragment from the Hesiodic corpus (fr. 235a Most) says that “Peisistratus removed a verse from the works of Hesiod” that did not flatter Theseus. Slings (2000: 74–75) doubts the claim; Koning (2010a: 47–48 n99) accepts it. Cf. Cingano, 2009: 98. Arguments made by Jensen (1980 and 1999) that the Homeric poems were dictated and created in Athens at Peisistratus's request (circa 530 BCE) do not take into consideration that Homer and Hesiod were already considered cultural icons at this time.

18. Cf. *Il.* 21.67–74 (and *Il.* 8.18–32) for warring gods; cf. *Il.* 1.587–94 and 15.18–24 for Zeus's violent threats; cf. *Il.* 18.394–99 for Hera's harsh treatment of her son. In the fragmentary *Homeric Hymn to Dionysus*, Hephaestus took revenge on his mother by binding her in a magical chair, a favorite theme in Attic Black-figure vase paintings (cf. Pausanias 1.20.3).

19. Cf. Tate, 1927: 215; Ford, 2002: 72: Theagenes may be “revolutionary less in critical method than in publicizing his skill.” Tate (1934: 107) argues that allegory was initially “positive, not defensive, in its aim, ... practiced in order to make more explicit the doctrines which the students of the poets [including the early philosophers] believed to be actually contained in the poets' words, and not simply to defend the poets against censure.” Also see Richardson, 1975, Most, 1989, Lamberton and Keaney, 1992, and Naddaf, 2009. For the history of ancient allegory, see Buffière, 1956; for the problem allegorists faced in standardizing Homer's symbolism, see Murrin, 1980: 1–9.

20. Homer is first mentioned in extant Greek in a Hesiodic fragment, but its authenticity is questioned: fr. 357 M-W = fr. 297 Most. In the mid-seventh century, Callinus from Ephesus is alleged to have named Homer as author of the *Thebais* (Pausanias 9.9.5). Herodotus (ca. 430 BCE) is the first to refer to the *Iliad* and the

Odyssey by title; the *Theogony* is not named by title for another 200 years, although Herodotus (2.53) uses the term *theogoniê* to describe Hesiod and Homer's accounts of the gods.

21. For the range of interpretations of μῦθοι and λόγοι in this passage, see Leshner, 1992: 48–49. Also see Leshner's comments about translating verses 13–14 and 23–4 from fr. B1.

22. Xenophanes also exposes the relativism of anthropomorphic gods: “Ethiopians & say that & their gods are snub-nosed and black; the Thracians that they are grey-eyed and red-haired” (B16).

23. Some modern editors emend “shakes all” to “accomplishes all” (cf. Leshner, 1992: 107). When Hesiod says that the “eye of Zeus sees and perceives all things” (W&D 267), he seems to anticipate Xenophon's sentiment. On Xenophanes's skepticism and didacticism, see Morgan, 2000: 46–53 and Leshner, 1992: 155–69, with bibliography, and Heitsch, 1966a. Ford (2002: 46–66) places this idiosyncratic thinker within the context of his time. Cf. Wright, 1995: 165–68.

24. For a sensitive treatment of this story, see Feeney, 1991: 5–56.

25. Most 1999: 342–46. He assumes that both figures wrote their poems, although only one of his categories depends upon that assumption. For the “possibilities of intertextuality in oral performance culture,” see Andersen and Haug, 2012: 6–18, as well as Burgess, 2012, Currie, 2012, and Rutherford, 2012. Koning (2010a: 69–81) stresses how Homer and Hesiod had the authority of law. For Homer as an authority, see Graziosi, 2002: 251–55 and 162–63. Griffin's argument about the uniqueness of Homer (1977) is flawed for overlooking the fantastical elements in the *Iliad*: horses talking to Achilles, armor made for him by a god, that armor lifting him up as if it were wings, Achilles being fed nectar and ambrosia, a river jumping its banks and chasing Achilles across the plain of Troy, all these events occurring between Books 18 and 22.

26. Cf. note 15, *supra*. The *Theogony* in its original form probably ranged from Chaos to the birth of the first mortal, Heracles. When the *Catalogue of Women* followed it, as happened in the Hellenistic period, the two poems together spanned history from Chaos to the story of goddesses giving birth to heroes.

27. Zeus's son, Heracles, freeing the world of monsters (289–332), Styx aligning herself and her children with Zeus (383–403), Zeus and Hecate (411–52), Zeus freeing the Cyclopes (501–6), Zeus's clash with crooked-minded Prometheus and the creation of women (520–616), Styx again and the exile from Olympus of all who bring discord (775–806), all these narrated before the Olympians make Zeus their king (881–85). For others on the *Theogony*'s design, see Philippson, 1936; Brown, 1953; Hamilton, 1989; and Clay, 2003: 9–30; for criticism of its structure, see West, 1966. For attempts to find a design for the *Works and Days*, see Kumaniecki, 1963; Hamilton, 1989: 47–52; and Clay, 2003 31–48; for its lack of design, see Ercolani, 2010. On the lack of strict chronology in the *Theogony* and on the poem's prologue, see Nünlist, 2007: 39–48.

28. On the audiences for the two poems, see Aloni, 2010, and Hunter, 2014: 125–30 and 150–51; cf. Koning, 2010a: 141–44. The list of authors most influenced by the *Works and Days* comes from Hunter, 2014.

29. Originally hymns served as προοίμια, or “preludes,” for long narrative epics, although the four long hymns may not have served as preludes. Many of the hymns are tied to particular cult centers from the Troad to the Peloponnesus. Interpreting

the *Theogony* as a Hymn to Zeus might help explain why there is no significant hymn to the king of the gods in the Homeric hymns and it would give us a way to understand the *Theogony*'s own lengthy proem to the Muses (lines 1–115) as a kind of prelude hymn to the Zeus-hymn. This “hymn,” however, is more pan-hellenic in nature than some of the Homeric hymns.

30. There is at least one poem to each of the major Olympians. The only major god without a poem is Hades. Aphrodite has three hymns (5, 6, 10), as does Apollo (3, 21, 25) and Dionysus (1, 7, 26). Hestia has two (24, 29), as does Demeter (2, 13), Athena (11, 28), Artemis (9, 27), and Hermes (4, 18). Gaia has one (30), as does the Mother of the Gods (14), Helios (31), Selene (32), Hera (12), Poseidon (22), Zeus (23), Ares (8), Hephaestus (20), and Pan (19). There is also a hymn to Heracles (15) and to Asclepius (16) (both mortals made divine) and two hymns to the Dioskouroi (17, 33). Hesiod calls on the Muses to “hymn your father Zeus” (*W&D* 2).

31. Cf. Clay, 1989: 15. Johnston (2002) argues that the hymns were written to be performed at a specific festival and that their variations are linked to concerns of that festival.

32. Cf. West, 2012: 239. Also see Allen, Halliday, and Sikes, 1936: 350–51; Janko, 1982: 151–52, 158, 162–63, 179–80; Richardson, 2010: 30. It is often called the “most Homeric” of the hymns with over 20 verses, in full or in part, also found in Homer. But at least five verses (5, 14, 29, 108, and 258) have parallels with the Hesiodic tradition. None of the parallels are so compelling as to suggest that the hymn was building upon Homer or Hesiod directly. References to Aphrodite as Cyprian and Cytherea, as well as the persistent use of the “Hesiodic” epithet for her as laughter-loving (φύλαομειδής), suggest that the song writer follows the Hesiodic account of Aphrodite's birth from the sea (*Th.* 188–207) and not the Homeric story of her birth from Zeus and Dione. Contrary to the *Iliad*, which calls Hera the oldest of Cronus's children (cf. 4.58–61), the hymn parallels the *Theogony* in calling Hestia both the oldest and the youngest of his children, i.e., first to be born and last to be regurgitated (cf. *Th.* 454, 495–97). Its account of Aphrodite's love for the mortal Anchises on Mt Ida, also told at *Il.* 2.819–21 and *Th.* 1008–10, echoes neither Homer nor Hesiod.

33. Cf. Deacy, 2013: 404–9 esp., Thornton, 1997: 11–47; Barringer, 1995: 87–94; Sourvinou-Inwood, 1987.

34. The Attic spelling, κόρη, and usual cult title, is only used at 439; see Richardson, 1974, *ad loc.*

35. For the narcissus as a monstrosity, see Clay, 1989: 214. For Persephone as a “wife” and Hades as a “not unworthy son-in-law,” see 79 and 83–84. For parallels with the human marriage rite, see Foley, 1994: 104–8. For brides giving away a toy at their wedding, see Sappho 44.9, *Anthologia Palatina* 6.280, and Oakley and Sinos, 1993: 14. For the plucked flower as a symbol of a bride's death, see Seaford, 1987: 106–107 and 113–14 and Alexiou, 1974: 56–58, 105–107, 155–57, 178, 195–96 (with ancient texts quoted).

36. In a nineteenth-century wedding song from Crete, the bride's mother weeps; “Today the sky is black, today the day is black, / today a mother takes leave of her daughter / ... / You are leaving, daughter, and I shall never laugh again,” quoted in Alexiou 1974: 121. In another example, Alexiou cites: “You are leaving—my eyes are gone, my comfort has gone, the keys of my breast and the pillar of my heart has gone.” For a caution about seeing the relevance of the marriage paradigm in the narrative of this hymn, see Richardson, 2011: 54–55 and 1974: 81–82, 174.

37. Cf. Foley, 1994: 105–108; Passman, 1993; Clay, 1989: 247–60. For a more balanced reading, see Suter, 2002. Beck (2001: 53) argues the central conflict of the hymn is between “the actions of the male gods and the behavior of their female relations.”

38. On the hymn’s irony about Zeus’s power and on the relation between Demeter’s wrath and the restoration of her *timê*, see Segal, 1981: 117–18 and 141–50, respectively. In this hymn, the Horae (54, 192, 492) clearly refer to nature’s seasons.

39. On Rhea’s epithets being “in accord with her function in the poem as the gentle, benign maternal figure,” see Segal, 1981: 141. For the “self-informative quality” of certain rituals, see Rappaport, 1999: 104.

40. As is typically the case, the gods are “assembled together” in Zeus’s house; in this case the noun is *homêguris* (187). At Homeric *Hymn* 28.9–16, Athena also, when first born, causes Olympus to shake, the earth and sea to fear, and the sun to stop until she takes off her armor. On the hymn’s date, see Janko, 1982: 112–13 and West, 2012: 241.

41. This portrait of choral Olympian dancing becomes the prototype of choral dancing throughout all cities in the Archaic Age; cf. Lonsdale, 1993. *Only* in the *Theogony* is this portrait varied, when the Muses dance on Olympus without a male participant.

42. Typhaon is a more overt threat to Zeus than is Hera’s angered, parthenogenic birth of Hephaestus at *Th.* 928. In the hymn, Hephaestus is already born, presumably the offspring of Zeus and Hera (cf. 3.317), where we learn that his deformity has already caused Hera such humiliation that she hurled him out of Olympus. For this hymn in relation to the *Theogony*, see Clay, 1989: 63–74 and Yasumura, 2011: 117–31.

43. Koning, 2010a: 173 and 187–88, respectively.

44. Almeida, 2003: 236. Thalmann (2004: 381) discusses the relevance of Hesiod’s two Erides in the *Works and Days* for the developing polis “to keep [bad] violence at bay [and] to direct it, if it must occur, out of the community, and to use the energies of human aggression creatively for its own ends. This would be a problem for any society, but it is particularly acute for one so centrally constructed on honor as Greek society was.” Also see the seminal analysis in Solmsen, 1949: 107–23.

45. Cf. Solon fr. 36.27 West, and the comments of Alt, 1979; Calame, 2005: 34–35; and Hunter, 2014: 140–41. Like Hesiod, Solon uses poetry “to teach the Athenians” (fr. 4.30 West). For the debate on whether Solon performed at symposia, see Irwin, 2006: 51–72 and Noussia-Fantuzzi, 2010: 45–55. At fr. 13.1–2 West, Solon evokes the Muses as they are presented in the *Theogony*, born from Mnemosyne and residing in Pieria (cf. *Th.* 52–3). In one poem Solon calls “black Earth (Gê) the mightiest mother of the Olympian *daimones*” (36.4–5), an unparalleled reference which only in a most figurative way can conform with the *Theogony*. It is possible that Solon is deliberately reworking myth to draw attention to the Athenian Earth “formerly enslaved but now free” from the despotic rich (36.7).

46. Cf. Blaise, 2006: 116. For a link between Solon’s Dike and Hesiod’s Muses, those who see things both present and past, see Irwin 2005: 176–77, and see 155–93 for a more in-depth discussion of Hesiodic parallels in fragment 4. Also see Almeida,

2003: 175–206, esp. 175–88, and Noussia-Fantuzzi, 2010: 217–65.

47. In a few passages, Hesiod's Dike seems to refer to a moral principle of justice (cf. W&D 219–24 and 256–64, especially), as is the case at Solon fr. 4.14–15 West. For a full discussion of whether Dike in Solon marks an evolution in Greek political thought, see Almeida, 2003: 70–118 and 175–236. Also see L'Homme-Wery, 1996; Gagarin, 1992 and 1974; Dickie, 1978; Havelock, 1978; and Palmer, 1950. Also Machaira, 1990, and Simon, 1986, and Chapter 2, note 29, and note 52, *infra*.

48. Blaise, 2006: 119; cf. Ostwald, 1969: 66. For a more nuanced reading, see Irwin, 2005:187–89. Noussia-Fantuzzi, 2010: 256 sees Solon's reference to *Dusnomia* as a summation of fr. 4.5–29 but does not note that Hesiod's naming of *Dusnomia* similarly summarizes *Th.* 226–29. For Adkins (1985: 47–48), *Eunomia* conveys situations where “appointments are correct.” For Solmsen (1949: 34), she represents “well-ordered community life.” See also Ehrenberg, 1949; Vlastos, 1946; Jaeger, 1926. For the iconography of *Eunomia*, see Kossatz-Deissmann, 1988.

49. Cf. Koning, 2010a: 189: “From its earliest reception onwards, the Greeks regarded the *Theogony* as a textbook of great philosophical import.” Cf. Walker, 2000: 25

50. Cf. Hölscher, 1968. On the interesting case of the Pythagoreans in relation to the *φυσιολόγοι*, see *Metaphysics* I.8, 989b–990a. Cf. XII.8, 1074b and XIV.4, 1091b. Pherecydes of Syros (fl. 544), Anaximander's near contemporary, also bridges the gap between mythographer and Presocratic although Aristotle places him in the former camp because he was still bound by genealogy and anthropomorphic renderings of the gods. Using allegory, etymological decoding, and Phoenician creation stories, he posits *Zas* (etymologically, an intensive ζα-Zeus, very Zeus?), *Chronus* (Time) and *Chthonie* (Of the Earth) as the first gods. In time they merge into Zeus, Cronus and Hera, making *Zas/Zeus* and the other gods both ungenerated first principles and late-born deities. This Zeus, changing into *Eros*, out of opposites makes a cosmos of harmony, unity, friendship, and a sense of sameness. He also banishes into *Tartaros* “any god who is hybriestic.” Cf. Tate, 1927: 214–15. For allegorizing and early philosophy, see Naddaf, 2009.

51. Of course, in Hesiod divine personifications are also forces, powerful in the natural and/or human sphere. In time, many of Hesiod's abstractions came to be worshipped in cult, usually in conjunction with a major deity. Cf. Parker, 1996: 228–37; Stafford, 2000; Stafford and Herrin, 2005; Parker, 2011: 77–79. The philosophers stand outside that tradition. Also see note 46, *supra*.

52. Aristotle was certainly aware that in certain authors the line between poetic *μῦθος* and scientific *λόγος* was far from clear-cut (*Metaph.* I.4, 984a). In addition to the potential for philosophical inquiry in Hesiod, a figure like Xenophanes, Aristotle says, failed to seek sound natural explanations when he said that the earth “reaches downward indefinitely” (DK 21 B28), a poetical expression reminiscent of Hesiod, who said that *Tartaros* was as far below the earth as the sky was above it (cf. *Th.* 720, 727–8 and *Il.* 7.446, 8.16, *Od.* 1.98) (cf. Aristotle, *De caelo* 294a).

53. Vernant, 1982: 117–18. Vernant is influenced by Cornford (1952), although he differs significantly from Cornford in stressing the difference between the intellectual and desacralized thinking of the Ionians and Hesiod's mythic thought.

54. Stokes, 1963: 14 and 1962: 33, respectively, both influenced by Cornford (1952). The standard work on Anaximander is Kahn 1960. He writes (156): “it is above all the larger framework of the *Theogony* which serves as literary precedent

for the new doctrines” of the Milesian cosmologists. On Anaximander’s theory of the natural world, see Kahn, 1960: 75–109; also see Graham, 2006: 5–14. Halpern (2009: 427–42) suggests Assyrian influence. For the Presocratics scrutinizing Hesiod and Homer “as though they were scientific manuals,” see Tate, 1934: 105–109.

55. Cf. Lloyd, 1975: 203 and Cherniss, 1951: 327, both quoted in Graham, 2006: 14n40 and n41. West argues that Anaximander’s τὸ ἄπειρον derives from a non-Hesiodic cosmogonic tradition (1994: 305–307). The word χάος does not appear in Homer. In antiquity, all references to it turn back, directly or indirectly, to the *Theogony* where it means gap or chasm; cf. Miller, 2001: 19–20, West, 1966: ad 116, Mondì, 1989. Sedley (2010: 250–58) wrongly, I suspect, thinks in Hesiod the word refers to chasm and matter and that, as the parent of Night, it “appears to be the source of evil in Hesiod’s universe” (255).

56. Cf. Stokes, 1963: 7–23, especially. Stokes proposes (1963: 11n3) that Eros is absent from Anaximander’s schema because he “is too mythical a figure” for him. About Hesiod’s general confusion, Stokes writes (1962: 15) that he “lived in an age when clear thinking was at a premium.” Kahn describes Hesiod as a “less than a systematic thinker” (1960: 81–82, 95).

57. Stokes (1963: 12–17) further argues that, rather than building off of Anaximander, Anaximenes goes back to the *Theogony* directly, reading it with fresh eyes and simplifying the schematization of the four natural elements. Less bold than Anaximander, he abandons the idea of the τὸ ἄπειρον, but otherwise follows Anaximander’s sequence of the four elements: 1) *air* as the first principle, which 2) surrounds *earth*. Then, deviating from Anaximander and “following” Hesiod (as Stokes has it), he has 3) the *fiery heavenly bodies* emerge from earth, and 4) the *sea* as last. For a much-expanded discussion, see Graham, 2006: 68–93.

58. Graham, 2006: 14, 38, and 84.

59. The translation is Graham’s, 2010: 51; compare Graham, 2006: 29. This is one of the earliest examples of Greek prose, enriched as it is with poetic terms. At roughly the same time, Pherecydes also wrote in prose.

60. Cf. Vlastos, 1947 and 1953, and Kahn, 1960: 168–73. If Anaximander’s conception of justice is political in any way, it is in the sense of retribution against factions which overreach; cf. Graham, 2006: 37, and more broadly 34–8.

61. Vlastos argues that Heraclitus is criticizing Anaximander (1955a: 356–58); Marcovich (1967: 139–40) that he is not.

62. DK 22 B53: πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ ἐστι, πάντων δὲ βασιλεύς. Heraclitus’s alliterative phrasing echoes descriptions of Zeus as “father of gods (and men) and as “king of the gods (and men).”

63. Kahn, 1979: 15, and more broadly 14–16, 144, 207; cf. Vlastos, 1955a: esp. 358–61; Lloyd-Jones, 1971: 35–51; West, 1971a; Morgan, 2000: 53–59.

64. Hesiod states explicitly that there is no justice among animals; *Works and Days* 276–80. The *Odyssey* also suggests that justice belongs to the human and the political realm when the Cyclopes are said to lack an agora and laws/customs (*themistes*) (*Od.* 9.112–15).

65. For Hesiod, the opposite of justice is *hybris*, the overreaching of due portion; cf. *W&D* 213–18, *Th.* 307, Archilochus fr. 177.4. See Shapiro, 1986: 388–89.

66. For Heraclitus, νόμος is the law that accounts for the oneness of just and unjust things, in the same way that the one (true) god sees day and night as one (B67) and all things as just (and beautiful and good) (B102); humans, by contrast,

tend to understand some things as just and others as unjust (B102).

67. Born in the sixth century (of uncertain date between 540 and 515 BCE) in southwest Italy, there is some question whether he was Xenophanes's pupil. On Parmenides and the Ionian cosmologists, see Graham, 2006: 148–85 and 202–203, with bibliography.

68. Graham, 2006: 93–94. See also the excellent works of Schwabl, 1957, 1963a, and 1963b, and Dolin, 1962.

69. Heraclitus also criticizes this passage from the *Theogony*, as Hesiod does not know that Day and Night are one and the same (cf. DK22 B57). See page 76.

70. In addition to Truth being “well-rounded,” so Being is a perfect “well-rounded” sphere (i.e., not infinite), equally balanced from the center outward to all its edges (fr. 8. 42–9). On the “deceptive order” of mortal opinions, see fr. 8. 50–61 and fragments 9–20. For similarities between some of man's opinions and the one Truth, see especially fragment 10.

71. Although the initiate is invited to record what he has learnt, Parmenides, the narrator/poet, does not identify himself with him, suggesting that there may be aspects of the youth's experience which we are not told. Perhaps, as in Xenophanes' poetry, we are to suppose that the full mysteries of the truth are beyond the reach of mortal language. Cf. Morgan, 2000: 85–86. Clay says something of the same about Hesiod when she suggests that in his own story of initiation he invites his audience to see that “the origins of the cosmos and of the gods are beyond human ken” (2000: 64).

72. For Parmenides's verbal echoes with epic, see Mourelatos, 1970: 1–46; Gale, 1994: 51–56; Morgan, 2000: 67–87; and Ferrari, 2008: 49–51.

73. Cf. Aristotle *Metaph.* III.2, 1000a (cf. HesiodT 117c.iv Most) where he also says that Empedocles is the first to identify love as a primal force. Empedocles's vision of perpetual exchange recalls both Heraclitus and Anaximander, although he does not describe the exchange in terms of just retribution. In the tradition of epic evocation, Empedocles calls upon Calliope for aid when speaking about the blessed gods (fr. B131) and at another point he invokes an unnamed Muse (fr. B3.3–5); cf. Murray, 2004: 372; Morgan, 2000: 61–62.

74. *Ol.* 13. 6–8. The phrase “secure foundation for cities” shows that Pindar is thinking of all cities and not just of one city or another. “Sister” in this passage is probably singular referring to Dike, but may be construed as a dual referring to Dike and Eirene. Similarly, “secure foundation for cities” could refer to both sisters, as both Fennell (1893, ad loc.) and Farnell (1932: ad loc.) take it, but Ehrenberg (1949: 76–77) associates the phrase with Dike. Pindar also associates the Horae with the seasons at *Paean* I.6–9 and fr. 75.14–5. For εὐνομία associated with well-run cities, also see *Homeric Hymn* 30.11. Also see Bacchylides 13.186–89. At times, Pindar suppresses personification, as when Aegina is an εὐνομος πόλις (*I.* 5.22). On Pindaric Eunomia, also see Podlecki, 1984: 216–20.

75. Hesiod contrasts Dike and Hybris at *W&D* 213–48. The contrast between εὐνομία and ὕβρις (hybris) first occurs at *Od.* 17.487; also see the treatment of Dike at Solon fr. 4.34 and Bacchylides 15.53–61, Bacchylides (quoting a Hesiodic passage otherwise unattested) names Hesiod as “the minister of the sweet Muses” (5.191–93). Pindar, naming Hesiod, paraphrases *W&D* 412 at *I.* 6.66–7.

76. Segal, 1992: 28 and 21, respectively; cf. Steiner, 1986: 52–56.

77. Dover, 1980: 7; cf. Stafford, 2000: 1–35.

78. According to *W&D* 111, Cronus reigned during the golden age; cf. *Athenaion Politeia* 16.7. For possible mystery-cult elements in Pindar's story of the Titans' release, see Hardie, 2000: 30–32. Unlike Xenophanes, Pindar celebrates the anthropomorphic likeness between man and god, seeing both born from a common mother, Earth. The human likeness to the divine is most evident in man's outer form and in his greatness of mind (cf. *N.* 6.1–7).

79. About *Pythian* I, Hunter and Fuhrer write (2002: 168): in the spirit of the *Theogony*, it establishes “a close analogy between Zeus's harmonious control of the cosmos, based upon the crushing of his enemies, and Hieron's harmonious guidance of his people.”

80. In this ode Hephaestus splits open Zeus's head with an axe to aid in Athena's birth (a detail not in Hesiod). Stesichorus may be the first to say that Athena is born in full armor; cf. *PMG* 233.

81. For a reconstruction of the hymn, see Snell 1975: 81–94 and 303–304; also see D'Alessio, 2005. Stokes (1962: 37) argues that Pindar knew of the passage but rejected it “on the grounds of its crudeness.” Solmsen (1949: 68n226) cannot imagine Pindar ignoring the Metis scene if he knew of it from Hesiod. Its identity as a *Hymn to Zeus* is uncertain; some call it the *The Theban Hymn*. D'Alessio (2009) calls it a *Hymn to Apollo*.

82. West (2013: 69–70) suggests that Themis's role in *Isthmian* 8 derives from the *Cypria*.

83. Because it seems unlikely that the gods would ask Zeus at his wedding to bed down with another goddess, Mnemosyne is probably not the mother of the Muses in this scenario, although she is elsewhere in Pindar (cf. *N.* 7.15, *I.* 6.75; *Paean*s 6.56, 7b.16, 8.85). Segal (2000) proposes that Pindar draws from Hesiod's Metis story when depicting, in the context of Medusa and Medea, a transition from cosmic chaos to an orderly Olympus.

84. Hardie (2000: 37–38) also writes that for Pindar musical and choral dance are an essential expression of social harmony: “The poet seems to have depicted a rational and ordered universe, presenting it as a ἀρμονία revealed to men through μουσική, a musical translation effected, moreover, in ‘the god-built sound of νόμοι’ (fr. 35c), as the just universe was governed by δίκη and by law. The cosmic ἀρμονία will itself have been audible in the music which accompanied the hymn.” The poet's own song and arrangement mimics the divine song and arrangement, although one may question whether Pindar (or Hesiod) felt, as Snell proclaims (1953: 77–78), that the “world has by now reached its final state of beauty and order.”

85. Frequently in this period, writers refer to Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod, and Homer in this order: so, Hippias DK 6, Aristophanes's *Frogs* 1032–6, and Plato's *Apology* 41a, *Republic* 363a, 377d, 612b, *Timaeus* 21d; cf. Xenophon's *Memorabilia* 1.2.56–8, Isocrates 2.385 and 393; the order is not followed in Xenophanes (c.570–c.478), Plato's *Protagoras* 316d, *Minos* 318e and 319a, or *Symposium* 209d, or in Menander's *On Display Oratory* 3.402. On this sequencing of naming, see Koning, 2010a: 52–55.

86. Ford (2002: 131–57) links the new term with the diffusion of written texts; for Graziosi (2002: 18–50) the term distinguishes author from performer.

87. Koning, 2010a: 17: “In the archaic and early classical period, Hesiod and

Homer stand side by side, as poets of almost equal status and importance; slowly but surely, however, Homer becomes the Greek cultural icon *par excellence*.” If right in broad outline, Koning fails to recognize the importance of the *Theogony* in Aeschylus’s *Oresteia* and Plato’s *Symposium* and *Republic*. Also see the *Contest of Homer and Hesiod* discussed at the end of this chapter.

88. Solmsen, 1949: 151.

89. Cf. Griffith, 1983: 1–37. We do not know enough to say whether Aeschylus is responsible for these innovations and reversals, or whether he was writing in response to earlier traditions, perhaps from Eumelos’s *Titanomachy* or Near Eastern stories of tyrannical rulers; cf. S. West, 1994. For similarities with Pindar, see *Pythian* 1.15–28.

90. The *Prometheus Bound* emphasizes the newness of Zeus’s rule at 149–51, 310, 439, 942, 955, and 960; at 35, Hephaestus says that “everyone is harsh when new to power.”

91. In the *Prometheus Bound*, Zeus rules “lawlessly” (ἀθέτως) and “with new laws” (149–50), and sometimes even with “private laws” (ἴδιοι νόμοι) (403). Hesiod, however, does his best to present Prometheus as a tricky god “of crooked-μῆτις” (*Th.* 559) who distributes proportions unevenly. It is that inequity which especially irks Zeus: “Why, my friend have you divided the portions so unfairly” (*Th.* 544)? Of the many writings on Hesiod’s version of the myth, I single out Stocking, 2013; Pucci, 2009: 58–62; Clay, 2003; Rudhardt, 1981; Vernant, 1979; Verdennius, 1971; West, 1966; and Brown, 1953. Ciccollella (2012: 150–53) sketches the changing portrayals of Prometheus from Hesiod to the present.

92. In the *Theogony*, Prometheus is the son of the crafty Titan Iapetus and an obscure Oceanid; cf. Solmsen 151. The play does not identify Prometheus’s father; presumably it is Sky. At *Eum.* 2–3, Themis is cast in her more traditional role as Earth’s child. At *PB* 351–72, Typhoeus is Earth’s offspring, as in the *Theogony*, not Hera’s child, as in the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* and in Stesichorus.

93. Cf. *PB* 907–15. In Pindar, Themis is the goddess with this secret (*I.* 8.29–51); in the *Theogony*, it is Gaia (and Sky) (886–900). At *PB* 209–10, the playwright combines the two as a Themis-Gaia figure.

94. 1) *Od.* 1.29–47 (Zeus’s speaking to the Olympians); 2 and 3) 1.298–300 and 3.234–5 (Athena speaking to Telemachus); 4) 3.193–98 and 255–312 (Nestor speaking to Telemachus); 5) 4.90–92 (Menelaos speaking to Telemachus); 6) 4.517–47 (Proteus speaking to Menelaos); 7) 11.409–34 and 452–3 (Odysseus and the ghost of Agamemnon speaking); 8) 13.383–84 (Odysseus to Athena); 9) 24.96–7 (the ghost of Agamemnon speaking to the ghost of Achilles) and 24.193–202 (the ghost of Agamemnon calling out to Odysseus). As the *Oresteia* myth serves as a foil for the main story, one cannot rule out the possibility that Homer always adapts it to fit the moment, as Olson (1995: 24–42) argues.

95. *Od.* 1.300 = 3.198 = 3.303, 3.250 and 4.525. Regarding *Od.* 3.263–75, see Scully, 1981; Andersen, 1992.

96. Shapiro (1994: 125) argues (rather carelessly, I believe) that in some places “Homer implies that Klytaimnestra acted alone.” Cf. Davies, 1969: 214–60, esp. 239. At 24.96–7 Agamemnon says that Zeus devised his death by Aegisthus’s and Clytemnestra’s hand. Cf. 4.91–2.

97. Cf. Griffin, 1977: 39–53, esp. 44–45. Homer does not mention Iphigeneia’s

sacrifice at Aulis, either. According to Proclus, her sacrifice, the principle stimulant for the queen's part in Agamemnon's demise, is first mentioned in the *Cypria*, part of the Trojan Cycle. It is also mentioned in Hesiod's *Catalogue of Women* [cf. frag. 23b in Merkelbach and West (M-W) = frag. 20a in Most (M) 2007].

98. Neither ancient nor modern commentators can explain why Orestes is here identified with Athens *prior* to his killing of Aegisthus (and Clytemnestra?). One might suspect that Nestor calls Aegisthus "cowardly" (ἄναλκις) because he was δολομήτης and killed by stealth, although when Cassandra uses the same word in the *Oresteia* to describe Aegisthus (Ag. 1224) as a "cowardly lion," she means, it appears, that he let Clytemnestra do the dissembling and the killing. Stephanie West (1988: 181) considerably overstates the evidence, I believe, when she writes regarding *Od.* 3.309–10: "it would be far-fetched to suppose that Orestes's matricide is a post-Homeric development."

99. Frag. 23a.28–30 (M-W) = fr. 19.28–30 (M). Clytemnestra's epithet cannot be read on the papyrus; West proposes "exceedingly manly"; Most prints "man-destroying." In the *Chrestomathia* when summarizing the content of other epic poems about the Trojan War in the Epic Cycle, Proclus refers to Aegisthus and Clytemnestra killing Agamemnon, and Orestes's and Pylades's revenge of that killing, but these poems do not appear to discuss a consequence of matricide (cf. West, 2013: 281–84).

100. For the fragments of Stesichorus's *Oresteia*, see Davies, 1991, vol. I: 208–11. About Stesichorus's *Oresteia*, see Prag, 1985: 73–76 and 44–51. His version is said to have been adapted from a version by Xanthus. It was composed in at least two books; if only two books, then this may be yet another example of a prominent rendering of the myth told in two parts, without the need of a third. He most likely alludes to Iphigeneia's sacrifice as a way of explaining Clytemnestra's motivation, but, *pace* Touchefeu, 1981: 271, there is no evidence that in this telling she displaced Aegisthus as the principal killer. Also see Dyer, 1967: 175n7; Sarian, 1986: 831; Carpenter, 1991: 237. Cf. Euripides's *Orestes* 268–71, a rendering which the scholia says "follows Stesichorus."

101. Both Gais (1981: 373) and Shapiro (1994: 138) date the calyx to the 470s, rejecting Vermeule's dating (1966) to after Aeschylus. For shared motifs with other contemporary vase paintings of the *Oresteia*, see Prag, 1985: esp. 23–26, 89–90n35, and 95–105; Knoepfler, 1993: 53–55 and 66–67.

102. Cf. *Od.* 4.529–37 and 11.411. Some suppose that Agamemnon's murder in the banquet hall is intended to foreshadow Odysseus's slaughter of the suitors in his own hall.

103. Ag. 1375–76 and 1382–83; Cassandra foresees Agamemnon caught in "some sort of net of death" (Ag. 1115–16); Electra describes him as "surprised in a strange net" (*Cho.* 492). Aeschylus weaves net imagery throughout the trilogy, beginning with the image of the "enslaving net of destruction" cast over Troy (Ag. 360–61). Lebeck (1971: 63–68) characterizes it as a "symbol of the trap which is man's destiny."

104. Prag (1985: 35) and Carpenter (1991: 237) think that it is not; Knoepfler (1993: 29–30) suggests that is depicted on a bronze from Olympia circa 600 BCE. Carpenter (1991: 237n35) also writes that the greatest popularity of art works depicting the death of Aegisthus (often seated) falls between 510 and 460 BCE, "perhaps explained by strong anti-tyrannical feelings current in Athens." Pindar's *Pythian* 11 (vv. 17–37), with its account of Clytemnestra's murder of Agamemnon and Cassandra, with a look back to Iphigeneia's sacrifice, appears to work from

105. Cf. Ag. 11. Eduard Fraenkel (1950, vol. II: 11) says that the rare word ἀνδρόβουλον to describe Clytemnestra's "manly-minded" heart "was probably coined for this context by the poet" to impress upon the hearer at the outset "one of the principal features of Clytemnestra's character," although Hesiod's "exceedingly manly" epithet for her is close, if West's suggested reading is correct (see note 99, *supra*).

106. For Aegisthus as womanish, see Ag. 1224–25 and 1625 and *Cho.* 304–305. See note 99, *supra*.

107. Cf. Prag, 1985: 43: Aeschylus was the "first [to bring] the problems and agonies of Orestes's matricide into the open in the *Choephoroi*."

108. In south Italy, most fourth-century renderings of the *Choephoroi* focus on the recognition scene of Orestes and Electra at the tomb of their father; one depicts Clytemnestra, exposing her bosom to Orestes, in an effort to save her life. An Erinyes, with a snake in each hand, one pointed toward Orestes, the other toward his mother, appears above Clytemnestra's head; cf. Taplin, 2007: 56–57.

109. On Orestes's problematic claim of purification while he is still being pursued by the Erinyes, see Sidwell 1996: 45–47 and 52–56. Initially Athena is on the Acropolis but by 685 has moved to the Areopagus; as Taplin notes (1977: 103–107, 38–40, and 390–91), Aeschylus is vague about the particulars of place within the city to suggest instead a general sense of Athens. The jurors also represent the city at large.

110. Johnston (1999: 283) and Jacoby argue for Aeschylean invention in *FGrH* vol. II B Suppl. (1954), 23–27; for adaptation, see Sommerstein, 1989: 3–6.

111. Jacoby 1954: 21 (see note 110, *supra*). Many believe that Aeschylus makes Agamemnon king of Argos, not of Mycenae (or Sparta, as in Stesichorus) to underscore Athens' alliance with Argos in 462. Ephialtes's success in getting Athens to ostracize the pro-Spartan Cimon and to reduce the charge of the Areopagus council at the same time to murder, wounding, and poisoning provide an historical background for the trilogy. Nevertheless, little in Aeschylus's account of the court's creation is historical. Many details of the trial are generic, including calling members of the juror δικάσται (*Eum.* 483, 684, 743). When Athena says she will "select the best citizens" (487) from "the Attic people" (Ἀττικὸς λαὸς) (681), she opens the court to all members of Athens' citizenry and introduces procedures which do not conform with any in the Athenian legal system. Easterling (1988: 100) describes the Athens of the *Eumenides* as "a place of the mind." Cf. Macleod, 1982: 124–44.

112. For the movement from household to civic cults in the trilogy, see Boedeker, 2008: 238.

113. As Conacher writes (1987: 49): no other speech in Greek tragedy expresses such delight in taking responsibility for an act. Displaying Agamemnon's corpse in a net-like cloth further heightens the intensity of the scene: the net, which previously in the play had been a metaphor of fate or technology, now becomes a stage prop. Well after the fact, Aegisthus makes high claims about his role in the plot, calling himself its "crafty schemer" (ῥαφεύς) (1604), but at 1636–37 he reveals a truer picture of his role when he says he let Clytemnestra be the deceiver as he had to lie low. Cf. Cassandra on Aegisthus at 1223–25.

114. As Clytemnestra's awareness grows, she gradually shifts responsibility to the Erinyes; cf. Ag. 1430–33, 1475–80, and 1496–1504.

115. The passage is often compared to Aphrodite's description of the sacred marriage as Sky piercing Earth with his spring rains in Aeschylus's *Danaids*, fr. 49 (Nauck).

116. Apollo ordered the matricide (*Cho.* 1029–32; cf. 269–305), but he cannot keep the Erinyes from entering his inner sanctuary at Delphi (18, 39, 64–93), and he appears incapable of shielding his ward from their pursuit, both while Orestes is alive and later when he will be in Hades, as the Erinyes claim (267–68). Aeschylus does not follow Stesichorus in having Orestes fight off his hunters with Apollo's bow but rather has him purify himself in pig's blood (237, 282–83, 448–52), a proven blood purification ritual but incapable, as it turns out, of protecting a son who has shed mother's blood. Apollo may have carried out the purifications at Delphi himself or given instructions to others, as Dyer argues (1969: 49n30). For parallels with the less-than-efficacious attempts to purify the Alkmeonids in Athens, see Samons, 1999: 231–33.

117. Cf. Coles, 1995: 48–88. Balme (1962) argues that in Aeschylus, the female contributes the matter (ὕλη) of the embryo while the male σπέρμα transmits soul, form, and motion. For fifth-century theories of one-seed reproduction, see Leitaο, 2012: 18–57, with 52–56 related to the *Eumenides*. As Sommerstein notes (1989: *ad loc.* 657–66), linguistic usage in the trilogy speaks against Apollo's claim that mothers do not beget. For Hippocratic treatises arguing that both parents contribute seeds to the embryo, see Dean-Jones, 1994: 148–76 and Lloyd, 1983: 86–111. Deslauriers (2009: 215–31) argues that there is no direct link between Aristotle's claims of sexual difference in his biological and in his political works.

118. For musical metaphor of civic concord in the trilogy, see Scott, 1984: 134–51; cf. Haldane, 1965, and Fleming, 1977.

119. In the first play, persuasion helps the king convince himself to sacrifice his daughter (205–17), and it assists Clytemnestra in convincing Agamemnon to walk on the tapestries (905–37). In the second play, Peitho contributes to the murders of Aegisthus and Clytemnestra, especially when Pylades convinces Orestes to kill his mother (899–903).

120. For less positive views of Zeus in the trilogy, see Cohen, 1986, and for more positive see Burian, 1986, and Bowie, 1993b: 10–31; cf. Solmsen, 1949: 178–224. Griffith (1995) identifies Zeus as guaranteeing the final resolution of the trilogy, but wrongly, I think, sees Olympus as an “aristocratic” family and that Zeus is motivated to support similar families on earth. Little supports Sommerstein's view (1989: 23n19), in my opinion, of “the innocent Orestes” in the *Choephoroi* and that Zeus is neither benevolent nor wise for letting him kill his mother. Orestes has many admirable qualities in the play, but innocence is not one of them. He admits that, even if Apollo had not ordered him to kill Clytemnestra, he would have killed his mother to win back his property and to avenge his father's death (*Cho.* 297–305). Long before he commits matricide, he is aware, unlike his mother or father, that “justice” is on both sides (461). His hesitation before killing his mother is remarkable, but it does not take away from the larger fact that, like all figures in the family of Atreus, blood drives Orestes. The *Choephoroi* makes this clear again and again, including when he eagerly assumes the role of snake, ready to draw his mother's blood (526–50).

121. On this difficult passage, see Smith, 1980: 19–21. The Hesiodic scholia, it should be noted, do not mention Hesiod in relation to this or to any other passage in

Aeschylus; cf. Koning, 2010a: 44.

122. At various points in the trilogy, Zeus's success as victor in three falls (τριάκτηρ, Ag. 172) is not replicated on the human level. In the *Choephoroi*, Orestes and Electra feel that "Ruin (Ἀτη) cannot be beaten in wrestling" (ἀτρίακτος) (339), a *hapax legomenon* that certainly is meant to recall Zeus τριάκτηρ, also a *hapax*. In the third play, the Erinyes celebrate the first of three falls when Orestes admits to having killed his mother (*Eum.* 589), but, as Orestes makes clear, the "city-holding people" (πολιισσοῦχος λεῶς) of Athens will retain "their wrestling grip" for all time and be the true victor (*Eum.* 775–7). During the trial, the Erinyes, echoing contemporary criticism against Hesiod and Homer (cf. Xenophanes and Pindar, above), are eager to point out an inconsistency between Zeus's eagerness to defend a father's lot against matricide and his own violation of Cronus's lot when he imprisoned his father in Tartarus (cf. 640–43). Apollo attempts to soften their indictment by noting that it is always possible to release one from prison (cf. 644–51).

123. Bacon (2001: 48–59) is very good on this point. In the *Theogony*, the Erinyes are born from the Earth from the blood of Ouranos's severed genitals (180–87), but in the *Eumenides* they are the parthenogenic children of Night and share qualities with Hesiod's Keres, daughters of Night and "ruthless avengers ... who pursue the transgressions of men and gods and do not cease from their dread anger until they repay evil vengeance upon the one who has erred" (*Th.* 217 and 220–22), but by the end of the *Eumenides* they repay mortals for good as well as for evil. For the civic ideology of the play, broadly conceived, see Goldhill, 2000.

124. Cf. Kassel and Austin (1983–2001), vol. IV, p. 206. Ruffell, 2000: 477; Storey, 2011, vol. I: 350–51. Bakola (2010: 135–38) discusses similarities between the chorus in *Wealth-Gods* and the Erinyes in the *Eumenides*. Cratinus wrote an *Archilochus*, which also included ridicule of Homer and Hesiod (cf. Kassel and Austin, vol. IV, p. 121–30). A number of comic titles suggest a comic tradition related to creation stories. In addition to the many plays about the births of various gods, titles include: *Earth and Sea* by the Sicilian Epicharmus, a *Theogony* by Antiphanes (in the 360s, which appears to draw on an Egyptian gnostic tradition), and even later *The Agora of the Gods* by Euphron and *Olympus* and *The Birth of Zeus* by Philiscus.

125. Casolari (2003: 1–17) argues that the characterization of the gods in comedy follows their depiction in epic; Parker (2007: 147–52) proposes that comedy's mythological burlesque of the gods is independent of their treatment in tragedy. See Dixon's discussion of myth-making in the comic poets (2015).

126. For ancient references to Chaos, see most recently Koning, 2010a: 195–97; for this myth in relation to Hesiod and Orphic traditions see West, 1966, 1971a, and 1994.

127. At *Frogs* 1030–36, Hesiod is listed among the "noble poets" (including Orpheus, Musaeus, and Homer), where he is presented as a poet of peace for his *Works and Days* in contrast to the war-poet Homer (the two are similarly characterized in Alcidas's *Certamen*, a generation or two later). See HesiodT 18 Most. At *Peace* 1282–84 (ca. 421 BCE), in a passage also echoing an exchange between Hesiod and Homer in the *Certamen*, Opôra (Harvest) and Theôria (Festival-going; Spectacle) in Hesiodic fashion are described as attending "the most holy queen goddess, Eirene" (974–75). See note 145, *infra*.

128. See Kassel and Austin, vol. VIII, fr. 1062. The translation comes from

129. In a play like the *Medea* (431 BCE), the worldly-wise nurse ridicules the poets of old for thinking that their songs at banquets, revels, or feasts could quell grief (190–204). Nothing in the nurse’s language evokes Hesiod, but her argument refutes the singer’s claim that his songs can cause one to forget their personal griefs (cf. *Th.* 94–103). In the same play, the chorus order the Muses of ancient singers to cease their male-authored stories of female faithlessness (421–30), although later in the play they (1279–92) and Jason (1339–40) are at a loss to find in Greek myth a sufficiently horrid example of a woman who knowingly kills her children. Sophocles’s satyr play, the *Pandora* or *Sphyrkopoi* (*Hammerers*), probably included references to Prometheus’s stealing of fire and various gods’ adornment of Pandora.

130. Cf. Graziosi, 2010: 112–13.

131. Ford, 2010: 153; Koning, 2010a and b discuss two conceptions of Hesiod, one a Homeric Hesiod as an authority on morals, the other an “intellectual” one who was philosopher, etymologist, and genealogist (and, of course, the standard source for the history of the gods). For the *Works and Days* as a schoolboy text, see Aeschines: “we memorize the precepts of the poets in our youth in order that we may obey them in our manhood” (3.135). Isocrates complains that although Hesiod, Theognis, and Phocylides are the best advisers for human conduct, people ignore them and follow their own follies (cf. *Ad Nicoclem* 43).

132. *Protagoras* 320c–23a. Ferrarin (2000) downplays the significance of Hesiod in this myth; Koning (2010a: 219–22) makes more of it, as Taylor appears to do, as well (1991: *ad loc.* 322e2 and 340d2–5). Koning (2010a: 358–68 and 377–78) argues that the importance of Hesiod progressively declines at the end of the Classical period (roughly from 450 to 300 BCE), as the allegorists turned Homer into a natural philosopher and Plato turned him into the inspired poet (never even citing Hesiod’s epiphany), but as I hope to show this evaluation undervalues the *Theogony*’s importance for Plato.

133. Cf. O’Sullivan, 1992: 75–79. Wolfsdorf (2008) argues that in the *Choice of Heracles* Proclus adapts Hesiod’s account of the two paths (the easy one being the path of badness, the difficult one being the path of virtue) (*W&D* 287–92) and his encomium on good work (*W&D* 293–319) into an allegory of Heracles’s ethical dilemma. Koning (2010a: 224; cf. 2010b: 102–107) argues that Proclus and Hesiod share a belief in a “one-on-one relationship between words and their referents.”

134. PHerc. 1428 fr. 19 in Henrichs, 1975: 107; also see his 1984: 339–53.

135. Pace Yagamata, who writes (2010: 79–80): “Hesiod fades out until we are left with the Homeric-Socratic charade of Alcibiades’ speech.” Kanaan (2010) compares Socrates in this dialogue to Pandora. On Eros in the dialogue, also see Calame, 1999: 181–85.

136. The Form is mentioned first (first at 28a, 30c, 37c), followed quickly by the Demiurge (28c, 29a), and then Reason considerably later (47e).

137. At *Cratylus* 419d4–9, Socrates says the etymology of εὐφροσύνη is clear to all as “the conveyance [φέρεσθαι] of the soul in concord with the world.” On Plato’s criticism of poetry and the prospect of living without the Muses, Halliwell writes (2012b: 42): “A history of intense commitment to *mousikê* was one of the defining features of Greek culture. It was a history always defined in part by a complex interplay with the personal threat of *amousia*.”

138. Within the larger myth that is the *Republic*, Socrates tells a number of smaller myths, some of which are taken from Hesiod. Most notable is the “noble lie” in which the souls of men are compared to the metals gold, silver, and bronze. In small ways, Socrates explicitly recasts Hesiodic myth, as at III.414b–17b, adapted from the *Works and Days*. For adaptations of Homer in the *Republic*, see Segal, 1978; Howland, 1993; O’Connor, 2007. For Plato’s use of the *Works and Days*’s metallic races in the *Republic*, see Van Noorden, 2010. For parallels between the Hesiod-Perses arguments on justice and strength and those between Socrates and Thrasymachus, see Hunter, 2014: 116–22.

139. The other prominent word in the *Republic* for justice is δίκη, often in the phrase to pay a penalty (διδόναι δίκην), and refers to a retributive payment for excess, so that a person can be brought back within the realms he had transgressed.

140. Cf. Rosen, 1988: 102–18; Saxonhouse, 1992: 151–57.

141. Richardson, 1992: 37. For the similarity between Aristotle’s views of poetry and the Alexandrian principles of textual criticism, see Meijering, 1987: 54–58, 99–100, 171–76 and 223–25, and Porter, 1992: 74–80. Aristotle appears to have offered a number of textual readings, none of which as far as we can tell were accepted by the Alexandrians.

142. Rather than discussing broad narrative themes, Aristotle appears to have discussed individual points: questions about “unreasonable things,” “unusual things,” “paradoxes,” and “things to wonder at.” Examples of wonder include: why Agamemnon tempts the Greek army to return home in *Iliad* II; if the gods drink only nectar, why does Calypso mix a draught for Hermes in *Odyssey* V; why does an epithet for the human voice (αὐδήεσσα) apply to Circe and Calypso; why was Polyphemos a Cyclops if he had a divine father and a sea-nymph as a mother? Like all critics, Aristotle can slip into allegory, as when suggesting that Medusa’s head on Athena’s *aegis* symbolizes her capacity to shun danger. Looking mostly at what Aristotle says about Homer’s poetry, Koning (2010a: 363) argues that Aristotle did not see Hesiod as either a full-fledged philosopher or poet, but this is an unconvincing conclusion given the little we know of Aristotle’s views of Hesiod’s poetry.

143. Cf. Nagy 1990b, Chapter 2.

144. The literature on this is extensive; for recent studies, see Hunter, 2014: 302–15; Koning, 2010a: 248–59 and 268; Graziosi and Haubold, 2005: 41–42; Rosen, 2004; Ford, 2002: 274–77; Graziosi, 2002: 103–10 and 168–80 (for the ancient tradition of identifying Homer with war and Hesiod with peace); O’Sullivan, 1992: 66–105; Richardson, 1981. It is uncertain how closely the *Mouseion* is related to the *Certamen*.

145. Cf. Rosen, 2004, but there is little reason to follow his characterization of Aeschylus as Homeric and Euripides as Hesiodic. He also argues that the *Certamen* asks us to think that the wrong person won, but see Koning, 2010a: 256–68.

Chapter 5

1. Cf *On Kingship* 2.6–14 = HesiodT 57, 153, 154 Most; for the emphasis on rhetoric, see “On Kingship” 2.24 and 27 and *Th.* 80–2. Koning (2010a: 288) stresses the class difference: Homer for kings, Hesiod for slaves. For the crafty staging of Dio’s *Kingship orations*, see Whitmarsh, 2001: 181–216. Whitmarsh (2001: 325–27) argues these orations were delivered in a civic context but not before the emperor. Hunter (2014: 1–20) shows how Dio, displacing Hesiod, adopts his wise sayings as if they were his own.

2. One Hellenistic Stoic reports that (the semi-legendary) Pythagoras saw Hesiod and Homer punished in Hades for these tales—Hesiod tied to a bronze pillar, screaming, Homer hanged from a tree and surrounded by snakes: cf. Hieronymus of Rhodes, ca. 250 BCE, recorded in Diogenes Laertius 8.21 = HesiodT 100 Most.

3. Rosati, 2009: 348–52. For the new Hellenistic aesthetic, see Farrell, 1991: 35–46; for its difference from the classical aesthetic, see Bing, 1988: 10–48, esp. 16–17, and 61. All cultural changes are, of course, gradual and there are numerous signs in late Classical poetry that anticipate Hellenistic poetics.

4. It is uncertain whether Eudemos compiled this material in book form (perhaps under the title “History of Religion”) or (less likely in my opinion) he made allusion to them incidentally in his other writings. It appears as if his work was more historically minded than Hippias’s earlier synthetic *Synagoge* (now lost).

5. Antidorus of Cyme (fl. 300 BCE) (emended, the ms. reads Apollodorus of Cyme), a Peripatetic who wrote on Homer and Hesiod, may have been the first to call himself a γραμματικός rather than a κριτικός; cf. Clement of Alexandria, *Miscellanies* 1.16.79 = HesiodT 133 Most. A contemporary [Timon of Phlius (ca. 230 BCE), quoted in Athenaeus 1.22] parodied the group as “fenced-in papyrus-buffs, endlessly contending in the Muses’ wicker cage.”

6. The value of his text is debated: cf. Davison, 1962: 222–23 and Pfeiffer, 1968: 92 on one side; more critical is West, 2001: 33–45.

7. Cf. Jacoby, 1930: 46–48 and 74–75, West, 1978: 64, and Schroeder, 2009. Recensions were closer to a commentary than a modern critical textual edition which lists variant readings at the bottom of the page.

8. Judging from his *Conversation with Hesiod* I (= HesiodT 45 Most), in the second century CE Lucian also read Hesiod in a sequence of the *Theogony*, followed by the *Catalogue of Women* and then the *Works and Days*.

9. Eratosthenes regarded Homer’s geography as fictional, a view which Strabo modified 200 years later, arguing that factual information was embedded in mythic elaborations. Debiasi (2008) argues that Hesiod gained his knowledge of Sicily and the western points from Euboean exploration and colonization.

10. In West’s assessment (2001: 67): “The authority of his recension [διόρθωσις] was so great as to preclude, or consign to oblivion, any attempt to compete with it.” Among Aristarchus’s many innovations is the codifying of all occurrences of a word in a text to establish a reliable reading. Perhaps influenced by Aristotle’s comments about poets and poetry, it appears that he tried to “explain Homer from Homer” and be cautious about emendations, but, as in the case of those before him, his reasons for questioning a line could also be based on propriety or stylistic tastes.

11. On Aristarchus's monograph, see Schroeder, 2007. Schroeder also proposes (2006: 229) that the view of Hesiod being "the oldest writer of theogonies" dates to Aristarchus; he further suggests (2006:14) that the Alexandrians regarded Homer's and Hesiod's poetry as too disparate for competition, but it should be noted that this period referred to a wide range of poets, including Theocritus, under the rubric of ἑπός. Cf. Halperin, 1983: 249–57 and Hunter, 2006: 28.

12. Cf. Meijering, 1987: 54–58, 99–100, 171–76 and 223–25 and Porter, 1992: 74–80.

13. Aristarchus collaborated with an Apollodorus of Athens (ca. 180–120 BCE), author of a lost treatise entitled *On the Gods* (Περὶ θεῶν), said to be a rationalistic account of Greek religion, widely used by later writers, including Philodemus. Also under his influence were people like Demetrius Ixion (ca. 175 BCE), who wrote an *Exegesis on Hesiod*, and Zenodotus of Alexandria, who some time later wrote a treatise entitled *On Hesiod's Theogony*.

14. Cf. HesiodT 142, 143, and 144 Most. Also see Schroeder (2006), Appendix: Catalog of Hellenistic Scholarship on Hesiod's Poetry: 221–72, esp. 221–48; Di Gregorio, 1975 (who attempts to reconstruct the "core texts" of these fragments); Jacoby, 1930: 106–35; Flach, 1876 (repr. 1970); Gaisford, 1823. Cf. West, 1966: 69–70.

15. Cf. Broggiato, 2001 fr. 78; West, 2001: 77–78; Pfeiffer, 1968: 237–42. Concerned that in the *Catalogue* (fr. 52) Apollo destroys the Cyclopes, Crates substitutes *Th.* 142 (which says that the Cyclopes are like gods) with a verse that describes them as mortal; cf. West, 1966 *ad loc.* On Crates's reading of Hephaestus's making of Achilles's Shield as an allegory of a demiurge creating the cosmos, see Mette, 1936: 36–43, 177–78. More generally, regarding his reading of Homer, see Porter, 1992: 85–114. King Eumenes II (197 to ca. 160 BCE) hired Crates; he also probably built the Library at Pergamon; cf. Pfeiffer, 1968: 235–37. It was at Pergamon that Demetrius Ixion wrote an *Exegesis on Hesiod*.

16. Others solved the problem of equality by saying that Earth and Sky were born in the same way (although that is not the case in Hesiod) or that both were parents of the Titans; cf. Schroeder, 2006: 230–31 (frags. 15–7) and Porter, 1992: 87–114. Zeno (*SVF* 1.276), Algra argues (2001: 570), drew from *Th.* 126–27 when regarding the earth as a sphere.

17. Also see Cingano, 2009: 102–103; Schroeder, 2006: 225; West, 1966: 150. Lamberton (1988: 45–48) accepts Crates's view; cf. Ercolani, 2010, for evidence of ancient copies of the *Works and Days* with and without the proem. Aristarchus and Seleucus athetized *Th.* 114–15, which form the bridge from the proem to the main body of the poem.

18. Without the proem, the *Theogony* would be more like what Aristotle says most epics were (other than the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*): episodic and chronological rather than shaped with a beginning, middle, and end. Crates is credited with reading a line in *Iliad* 14 (14.246a), which is rejected by West and most other editors. If added, it would alter our understanding of Oceanus. Rather than a freshwater river that flows around the Earth, the line suggests that Oceanus (presumably as salt water) flows over the complete Earth. The evidence comes from Plutarch 938d, printed as F20 Broggiato, 2001.

19. One of the Ptolemaic kings, either Ptolemy II or IV, bought a large tract of land either in the sanctuary or nearby. Nor can it be coincidental that the Mouseion,

the Home of the Muses, served as the name of the Muses' sanctuary and the poetic think-tank in Alexandria.

20. Cf. *Palatine Anthology* 7.55 = HesiodT 88 Most, but read Messene, not Messina. Cf. Marg, 1970: 87.

21. Cf. Hurst, 1996; cf. HesiodT 105 Most. In the context of the Mouseion, Calame (1996) discusses the heroization of Hesiod in the Roman period. Robinson (2012) discusses the nature of the sanctuary, especially in the Roman era.

22. Cf. Pausanias 9.26–31.6 (partially quoted in HesiodT 42 and 109 Most) and Strabo 9.2.25; for Askra being deserted, Pausanias fr. 82 = HesiodT 102 Most. For Homer drinking from “Pegasus’ spring” (the Hippocrene), see the Hellenistic *Epitaph on Bion* 76 and Ovid’s *Amores* 3.9.25–6. The *Epitaph on Bion* (v. 87) claims that Askra weeps more for Bion’s death than it does for Hesiod’s. Hesiod’s biographers in the Hellenistic age include Callimachus’s imitator Euphoriion, Eratosthenes, and Hermesianax, whose poem *Hesiod, the keeper of all history* was based largely on the *Catalogue of Women* (cf. Most T56). Others claimed that divine inspiration came from chewing laurel leaves; cf. Lycophron *Alexandra* 6. A statue to Linus was outside the sanctuary.

23. Traditions vary whether Hesiod was buried in a secret location in Locris where he was murdered or if his bones were eventually moved to Orchomenus in Boeotia (HesiodT 102 and 103 Most). According to Pausanias, several cities displayed inscriptions in honor of Hesiod, including Olympia, a place in Macedonia, and one in Armenia (HesiodT 110, 107, 106 Most, respectively).

24. The idea for the Library and Mouseion at Alexandria, modeled on Aristotle’s Lyceum, may have been inspired by Demetrius of Phalerum, a governor of Athens who was exiled to Alexandria in 295. Perhaps while governor, he was said to be the first to set Homer to music and to chant his verses in the theaters, as others were to do for Hesiod, Archilochus, and other archaic poets. There were similar performances in Alexandria. We also hear of the comic actor, Hegesias, in the context of performing Hesiod’s poetry; cf. Athenaeus 14.12 (HesiodT 85 Most).

25. Callimachus returns to these themes in the epilogue; for the arrangement of these fragments, I follow Cameron, 1995: 104–32 and 141–62. Fantuzzi and Hunter (2004: 51–60) propose that the *Aitia* sees itself as a sequel to the *Theogony*, espousing the necessary moral values of communal order; Hunter (2014: 111–12) further stresses that Callimachus reads the *Works and Days* as a moral poem.

26. Whether this tradition had already been established at the Valley of the Muses or it is Callimachus’s inspiration, we cannot say. Zenodotus, Callimachus’s contemporary at the Library, read Termessos (the Attic and koine spelling) for Permessos (the Boeotian spelling) for *Th.* 5. Callimachus prints the more erudite (i.e., local) spelling. Cf. West, 1966, *ad loc.* *Th.* 5, and Schroeder, 2009.

27. In another poem, Callimachus questions the veracity of a Hesiodic genealogy, introducing it by “some say” (cf. Pfeiffer, *Callimachus* ii, p. 103). He also has his own understanding of the link between poetic and mantic inspiration. Teiresias’s insight and loss of eyesight happened, he says, when the lad came upon Athena bathing at mid-day in the Hippocrene on Mt. Helicon. Seeing what was unlawful to see, Teiresias was struck blind but Athena gave him a staff (βάκτρον, not σκήπτρον) and the gift of prophecy in compensation (*Hymn V, On the Bath of Pallas* 70–129).

28. The song most probably refers to Aratus’s *Phainomena*, praising it for filtering Hesiod for what is sweetest. My translation of the epigram is adapted from

Nisetich 2001: 183. I read αἰδοῖν rather than αἰδοῖν. Cameron (1995: 363–66) argues that we should not look at Callimachus as a “new Hesiod”; also see Schroeder, 2006: 219–20. Hunter, (2014: 292–301) discusses the much-asked question whether Aratus owes more to Homer or Hesiod.

29. Clauss, 1986; Brumbaugh (2011) also argues that references to Zeus in the hymn refer to both father and son.

30. The jury is still out as to why Callimachus used the very rare word ἐσσίην for Zeus; the ancients thought it originally meant king bee. Perhaps Callimachus related the idea of Zeus as king bee to his equally rare word ἐσμός, swarm, for the Muses, Zeus’s offspring (*Aetia* fr. 2.2), thought by some ancients to be related to ἐσσίην.

31. Callimachus could be alluding to Philadelphus’s half-brother, renouncing his claim to the throne just as Zeus’s brother has no legitimate claim to the throne. Elsewhere, Callimachus metaphorically refers to a contemporary war between the Ptolemies and their Celtic enemies as a Titanomachy, the Celts being barbarian, latter-day Titans attacking Greeks; cf. *Hymn IV (To Delos)*. 171–74; for the Titans as barbarians, see Pindar, *Pythian I*. In the *Aetia*, when explaining the etymology of the Sicilian city Zankle, Callimachus tells the story of Cronus’s castration of Sky, ζᾶγκλον being a Sicilian word for sickle; cf. *Aetia* 2, fr. 43.68–71.

32. In another hymn, he calls Ptolemy II a “god ... / ... the highest offspring of the Saviors” (*Hymn IV*.165–66). “Saviors” refers to Ptolemy II’s parents: Ptolemy I, Soter and queen Berenike I.

33. Hunter and Fuhrer, 2002: 169. They also note: “the eternal constancy of Zeus’s power (v. 2) is set off against the agonistic struggle of poets and myriad voices of the poetic tradition” (p. 172).

34. Aratus’s *Phainomena* begins “From Zeus let us begin,” echoing the opening line of the *Theogony* “From the Muses of Mt Helicon let us begin,” but more commonly Aratus draws from the *Works and Days* (compare *Ph*.100–5 to *W&D* 256–62). For the place of the *Works and Days* in the poem, see Hunter 2014: 74–75 and 221–26.

35. At the beginning of the hymn, Zeus is said to rule over “the sons of Ouranus” (Οὐρανίδαι) (v. 3); in Hesiod Οὐρανίδαι refers to the Titans or, in the singular, to Cronus, but never to the Olympian gods. Later in the poem, Callimachus calls Zeus “heavenly Zeus” (v. 55).

36. Again, see Brumbaugh, 2011. Zeus is called “son of Cronus” at 61 and 91 and “giver of goods / giver of security” at 91–92.

37. Elsewhere, Callimachus seems to accept Homer’s account as true: at Mecone after the battle with the Giants, the δαίμονες drew lots and distributed honors; cf. *Aetia* fr. 119. Scholars are themselves divided as to whether *Aetia* fr. 119 contradicts the view in *Hymn I* or refers to a later division. In either case, it differs from the *Theogony* 507–84: the division at Mecone was between the Olympians and mortal males (women not yet having been invented) when the principles of sacrifice were invented. Following Hesiod, Aratus says human hardship came about because of the division at Mecone; cf. *Phainomena* 768–70.

38. For Hesiod’s identity with bucolic poetry in the Hellenistic imagination, see Gutzwiller, 2006: 11–15 and 22–23 and 1991: 158–71, and Wright, 1983. Simichidas is reasonably taken as a figure for Theocritus, and Lycidas has been read variously as a stand-in for Apollo, Pan, a satyr, a parody of a god, or even an aspect of Theocritus’s creative imagination. In keeping with the Alexandrian criticism of large poems, Lycidas says he hates the dreamy craftsman who, competing with

Homer, builds castles on mountain peaks (vv. 45–8).

39. While the variation on Hesiod is obvious, David Halperin (1983: 120–24) argues that the scene is also closely modeled on Odysseus and Eumaeus's encounter with the goatherd Melanthius at *Od.* 17.182ff.

40. For Theocritus's "demythologizing" of poetry, see Fantuzzi, 2000.

41. Ptolemy II's eldest son and successor, Ptolemy III, was called Euergetes, also an honorific title for a king in Herodotus (8.85).

42. Cf. Hunter, 1993: 69; Schroeder, 2006: 112–13. In one of the surprisingly few references to Prometheus or Pandora in the Hellenistic corpus, Apollonius in an off-handed comment (perhaps adapted from Sophocles) says that Medea's magical potion came from the root of a tree that grew where Prometheus's blood, oozing from his wound, had dripped to the ground (cf. 3.844–68); cf. Schroeder, 2006: 132–39. He refers to Prometheus again at 2.1246–59; repeating in the same case, although in a different position in the line, Hesiod's rare word for his unbreakable chains, ἀλυκτοπέδαι (2.1249; *Th.* 521). In another episode, the earth-born serpent guarding the Golden Fleece is said to be created when the hot blood dripped from Typhaon's head, no less, and stained the ground (cf. 2.1208–13; for Typhoeus, see 2.38–40). His six-handed monsters (Gêgenees) seem to be a tamer version of Hesiod's Hundred-Handed monsters (compare 1.944–46 and 989–1011 and *Th.* 17–53). At 1.859, Apollonius refers to Hephaestus as "the son of Hera," perhaps following the story of his birth at *Th.* 927–29. Aietes's wife, the Oceanid Eidyia (3.243 and 269), is spelled Idyia at *Th.* 352 (cf. *Th.* 960). At 4.1010 and 1178–79, Apollonius echoes Hesiod's description of the good king at *Th.* 83–92 and of the just city at *W&D* 225–37. He thought the *Shield* was Hesiod's.

43. "The cosmogony has nothing in common with special Orphic accounts; Apollonius would naturally put into Orpheus's mouth the most primitive-sounding versions he knew" (Kirk et al., 1983: 43). For Hellenistic cosmogonic epics (now lost), see Schwabl, 1962: 1544–46, and see Cleanthes, *infra*.

44. Nelis, 2001: 96–112. The Empedoclean element may be inspired by allegorists' reading of the Ares and Aphrodite tale in *Odyssey* VIII.

45. For Zeno, the one god "all by himself in the beginning [made] matter serviceable to himself for the successive stages of creation" by creating fire, water, air, and earth (Diogenes Laertius 7.135–6).

46. Striker, 1987: 91. For questioning the slippage in this statement from "nature" to "the laws of nature," see Lehoux, 2012: 47–76, esp. 61–63.

47. Tate, 1929: 42 and 1930; cf. Most, 1989: 2023.

48. Cicero mocks the Stoics for the former view (cf. *De natura deorum* I.41 = HesiodT 119 Most). Long (1992) argues well for the latter view. For a summary of positions, see Most, 1989: 2018–29. For a sympathetic ancient reading of Stoic tactics, see Philodemus, *On Piety* col 358 (Obbink, 1996: 203–204).

49. Von Arnim *SVF* 1.103–105. Perhaps drawing from *Th.* 126–7, Zeno sees Hesiod as the first to conceive of the Earth as spherical. On these fragments, see Algra, 2001: 566–70. Athenaeus (561c) reports that the Stoics did not regard Eros as a natural force but a god of friendship who "contributes to the city's security." Little supports Steinmetz (1986: 23–24) that Zeno restricted allegorical readings to the *Theogony* alone.

50. For text, translation (here adapted), and useful commentary, see Thom, 2005. Also see Asmis, 2007, for an excellent discussion of this hymn.

51. As quoted by Philodemus, *On Piety* cols 356–57 (Obbink, 1996: 199–200). He also says that earth is called Rhea because water flows (ῥεῖ) from her (SVF 2.1085). She is also the one who destroys because into her we dissolve and because everything in her flows away (SVF 2.1090).

52. Cf. Van Nuffelen, 2011: 85–90.

53. Cf. Rosati, 2009: 373.

54. If from the *Melampodia*, Hera's *eris* would stem from Teiresias's answer that females experience the primary joy. Editors tend to print only the nineteen-line fragment, III.8.11–4, not the full quote; for the fragment alone, see Most, 2007: fr. 294; for the full passage, see de Lacy, 1978: Book III 8.3–19 = 349–53.

55. The ms. reads παρεδέξατο at verse 5 for Zeus bedding down with Metis, a verb not found elsewhere in extant Hesiod. Most editors emend to παρελῆξατο to conform with Hesiodic phrasing elsewhere. In a corrupt but easily emended line, the manuscript reads παρέλεκτο at verse 16 for Zeus bedding down with Themis.

56. While the *Theogony* does not make explicit that Hera's anger stems from Zeus's giving birth to Athena, the Homeric *Hymn to Apollo* does at lines 307–10. Chrysippus's variant says that Athena was born “by the banks of the river Triton” (in Libya) (vv. 12–3), a detail also in Callimachus's *Aetia* fr. 37 (Pfeiffer) and Apollonius at 4.1308–11. Cf. Schroeder, 2006: 117–23.

57. Theophrastus, Heraclides Ponticus, and Daimachus of Plataia are thought to have written an *On Piety*; Straton of Lampsacus and Apollodorus of Athens an *On the Gods*.

58. James Frazer (1921: xxvi) characterizes the *Sacred History* as follows: “unquestionably [it] suffers from the vice inherent in all systems which would explain the infinite multiplicity and diversity of phenomena by a single simple principle, as if a single clue, like Ariadne's thread, could guide us to the heart of this labyrinthine universe; nevertheless the theory of the old Greek thinker contains a substantial element of truth, for deep down in human nature is the tendency, powerful for good as well as for evil, to glorify and worship our fellow-man, crowning their mortal brows with the aureole as well as the bay.”

59. Diodorus names 11 Titans, leaving out Theia, “the Divine One,” for obvious reasons. Quoting from *Works and Days* 111–20 in a version of the text that varies from what we print today, Diodorus's view of Cronus comes in part from Hesiod's description of the Golden Age.

60. See Paton, 1926, *The Greek Anthology*, vol. V, Book XVI.178–82. For the painting in Rome, see Pliny the Elder, *Natural History* Book 35.87 and 91. Prior to Apelles's paintings, Aphrodite's rising from the sea was beautifully sculpted in relief on the Ludovisi Throne for her temple near Locri in southern Italy (ca. 470 BCE).

61. Cf. Simon, 1975: especially 4–6, 41–45, and 51–55; also see Wenning's critical review of Simon (1979: 355–61), and Hardie (1986: 139–43).

62. Cf. Andreae, 2001: 132–47, who dates the altar to 166–56 BCE.

63. Schroeder, 2006: 140–44.

64. Cf. Cribiore, 2001: 197–98 and 141–42.

65. Cf. Pack, 1965: 1) *Th.* 1–7, 28–52, 148–54; 2) *Th.* 1–51; 3) *Th.* 22ff; 4) *Th.* 75–105, 108–44; 5) *Th.* 116; 6) *Th.* 210–38, 260–70, 296–99; 7) *Th.* 271–99; 8) *Th.* 378; 9) *Th.* 566–92, 628–41, 652–64, 1016–20; 10) *Th.* 606–13; 11) *Th.* 626–881; 12) *Th.* 643–56; 13) *Th.* 825–53, 868–96; 14) *Th.* 839–69; 15) *Th.* 930–39, 994–

1004; 16) *Th.* 984. 26 passages come from the *Catalogue of Women*, 13 from the *Works and Days*, 5 from the *Shield*. Dio Chrysostom writes that Homer was “sung even in India where his poems were translated into the Indian’s own speech and song” (*Orations* 53.6–7).

66. Farrell, 1991: 315; cf. Rosati, 2009: 351.

67. The phrase comes from Gale, 2007: 64–67, describing how Lucretius rationalizes—and debunks—the myths of Prometheus and Pandora in the *Works and Days*. Also, see Gale, 1994: 161–74 and 2000: 64–67. For the Gigantomachia in the *DRN*, see 4.136–42; the word Chaos never appears in Lucretius. Perhaps Lucretius’s “happy cities blooming with children” (*DRN* 1.255) echoes *Works and Days* 227.

68. While i.933–50 may draw something from Hesiod, Lucretius’s invocation of *callida Musa/Calliope* (6.93–4) probably draws more from Empedocles (fr. 131.1–3) than from *Th.* 79. Characteristic of his time, Lucretius appears to be rather casual about the various locales of the Muses. In the cup passage, he calls them “daughters of Pieria” (1.925–26, 945–46), while elsewhere they are “daughters of Helicon” (3.1037). As he identifies Homer, not Hesiod, with Helicon and the scepter, he has the Homeric-leaning Ennius carry the “crowd of perennial leafage down from lovely Helicon” (1.117–18). A scholiast (at Persius, *Prologue* 2–3), perhaps mistaking Parnassus for Helicon, writes that Ennius had Homer coming to him in a dream on Parnassus. Ennius himself speaks of the “Muses beating their feet on tall Olympus” (*Annales* fr. 1 Vahlen). For the early Roman poets, these various mountains appear to be interchangeable terms for poetic inspiration. Hesiod also associates the Olympian Muses with Pieria (*Th.* 52–3). Homer calls the Muses Olympian but never associates them with nearby Pieria or with Helicon.

69. Ziogas, 2013: 54; cf. Myers, 1994: 7–9; Farrell, 1991: 48–50, 311–12; Hubbard, 1975; Notopoulos, 1967. It is perhaps not coincidental that the Linus and Hesiod/Orphic figures in *Eclogue* 6 correspond to statues of the same three poets in the Valley of the Muses. In his *praefatio* to the *Georgics*, Servius oddly calls Ascrea an island. Propertius (2.13.1–8) treats “the Ascrean grove” and “Pierian oaks” as if they belonged to the same place; like Orpheus, he hopes his poetry will spellbind his Cynthia (one can hardly imagine Hesiod having such a wish); he also identifies Permessus with elegy (2.10.25–6). Cf. Hunter, 2001: 20–28.

70. On the limited presence of the *Works and Days* in the *Georgics*, see most recently Hunter, 2014: 20–26. For the *Georgics* in contrast with the *Works and Days*, see Nelson 1998: 91–97 and 113–15. For Propertius’s allusion to Vergil and the *Works and Days*, see 2.34.77–80 = HesiodT 91 Most.

71. Cf. Hardie, 1986. For a Hesiodic Gigantomachy in Horace, see *Odes* 3.1.7; and in Propertius, see 2.10. Cf. Hunter, 2006: 20–28. Nelis (2001: 153–54) shows how Vergil’s genealogy of the personified Fama and her fiery tongues (*Aen.* 1.178–88) are also modeled on Typhoeus, *Th.* 820–22.

72. *Fasti* 5.7–46. Barchiesi (1991) shows that Pindar’s *Hymn to Zeus* must also have helped shape this vignette.

73. Cf. Ludwig, 1965: 74–75 and 83–86 and Hardie, 1986: 66–67. His invocation of the gods (*di*) to *perpetuum deducite ... carmen* (1.4) (bring down an unbroken song, from then to now) is a complex phrase as Ovid appears simultaneously to be setting himself apart from the Callimachean aesthetic principles (i.e., to avoid epic songs of chronological continuity, magnitude, and thematic grandeur) and to embrace that aesthetic (i.e., to tell a *deductum carmen*): Myers, 1994: 1–7; Wheeler, 1995; O’Hara, 2004/2005: 150. Certainly, the *Metamorphoses*’ nonlinear narrative links it to Hesiod rather than to Homer, as does

its theogonic beginning and constant interest in stories of origins (*aitia*).

74. Either *discordia* or *lis* could be a Latin translation of Hesiod's Eris or Empedocles's *veĩkoç*.

75. Ovid's description of the made world comes close to being an *ekphrasis* of the thing made; cf. Wheeler, 1995, who proposes that Ovid models this telling on Homer's description of Hephaestus's making of Achilles's shield.

76. Ovid's account of the world passing through a degeneration of Ages from Gold, to Silver, to Bronze (1.89–162) is an obvious evocation of the five ages of man in the *Works and Days*, and in itself suggests that the order and stability described in the opening *ekphrasis* was far from stable. Ovid's account of Giants fighting with Olympians is also clearly in the Hesiodic tradition of the Titans fighting Zeus's army in the *Theogony*.

77. Wheeler, for example, discusses many correspondences between the Caesar episode at the end of Book XV and the beginning of the poem, but he does consider Hesiod in this analysis (2001: 137–54).

78. For the closure of the poem being open-ended, with a sense of change and revision, still present, see Barchiesi, 1997. From exile, voicing the idyllic Hesiodic model of linking poets with just rulers, Ovid will say that everyone, even the gods, needs “the poet's voice” to know that Chaos was separated from matter, that the Giants were defeated, that Bacchus and Heracles prevailed over their adversaries, and that Augustus was deified (*Pont.* 4.8.55–64). Hopes of this vision yielding a lighter sentence (vv. 85–88) never materialized.

79. In this context it is salient to quote from Sara Myers, 1994: 9: “Reference to Hesiod by the Roman poets is not necessarily always to be understood merely as an emblem of Callimachean or Alexandrian aesthetic ideals, but also as an invocation of the *Theogony* as a model for the grandest form of epic poetry.”

80. Cf. Nicoll, 1980; cf. Gildenhard and Zissos, 2000.

81. Johnson, 2008:41–73; cf. Ziogas, 2013: 86–94; Fletcher, 2005; and Spentzou, 2002: 11–16.

82. Manilius laments that “the learned sisters have sung every kind of theme / and every path is worn which leads to Helicon” (II.49–50), but this is a playful conceit, as his inspiration comes from his own contriving.

83. At about the same time, Hyginus's *Fabulae* [its title coming from Jacob Molsheim (Latinized to Micyllus) edition of 1535] has little interest in a theogony except in the *Praefatio*: in this thumb-naill sketch, built it appears around a Hesiodic core, Chaos is “from Mist” (Caligo); Night, Day, Erebus, and Aether are from Chaos and Mist; Vesta, Ceres, Juno, Jupiter, Pluto, and Neptune are from Saturn and Ops (Wealth), and so on. It is worth noting that about the Greek Eris, he says: “*id est Discordia*” (cf. *Fabulae* XCII.1). In *Paradise Lost*, Milton similarly seems to think of his Discordia in the context of Hesiod's Eris, although a number of Renaissance translators will render it as *Lis* or *Contentio*.

84. Rosati, 2009: 360–62.

85. Frazer, 1921: xxxiii and xvii, respectively.

86. Typical of the way the *Library* uses the *Theogony*, it faithfully retains Hesiod's names for the Titans, but it does not follow the *Theogony*'s rather elegant ordering of them—five male Titans, then six Titanides, ending with Cronus, the

youngest (*Th.* 133–38), but serviceably lists the six Titans first (Cronus mentioned last and said to be the youngest), followed by the seven Titanides. It also reverses Hesiod's order of Cyclopes, Hundred-Handers, and Titans. In the Orphic tradition, Earth begets 14 Titans (cf. 114 Kern).

87. The *Library*' phrasing ἀποτεμὼν τὰ αἰδοῖα (I.i.4) does not reproduce Hesiod's witty punning on the verb ἤμῃσε and the noun μῆδεα at *Th.* 180–81, in “he hastily mowed down his father's balls.”

88. The *Library* does not mention that this is Homer's version of Aphrodite's birth.

89. Cf. *Library* I.iii.1. Broadly speaking, this follows the sequence in the *Theogony* (901–921): Themis, Eurynome, Demeter, Memory, Leto, Hera.

90. χωρὶς εὐνῆς, I.iii.5. a phrase found neither in the *Theogony* nor in the Chrysippus variant.

91. The *Library*'s account of Zeus “swallowing down” Metis (καταπίνει, I.iii.6) follows aspects of both the *Theogony* and the variant.

92. For the *Library*'s unique version (at I.vi.3) of Typhon's challenge of Zeus, see [Chapter 3](#). In his work on fishing, the *Halieutica* (written at the time of Marcus Aurelius), Oppian shows little or no familiarity with the *Theogony* when discussing Typhoeus/Typhon. Similarly, at the end of the fourth century or the beginning of the fifth, Nonnus's *Dionysiaca* on the worship of Dionysus refers in the first two books to Typhoeus/Typhon but shows little or no indebtedness to the *Theogony*. A generation or two before Apollodorus, Antagoras of Rhodes shows no knowledge of the *Theogony* when he mentions the troubles he experiences in identifying Eros's parents (cf. Diogenes Laertius IV.26–7). Like many in the Roman period, Apollodorus says that Prometheus is not only humankind's benefactor but also his creator (I.vii.1).

93. Translated by Diller, 1935: 296–313 = 1983: 300. Diller says of the *Library*: “The most valuable mythographical work that has come down from ancient times” (p. 296).

94. Cf. Van Nuffelen, 2011: *passim*, esp. xv–xvi, 1–24, and 101–46. On Pherecydes, see Edwards, 1990.

95. Cf. Koning, 2010a: 17 and 378–79.

96. Cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (ca. 60–ca. 7 BCE), *On Literary Composition* 23.9 and *De imitatione* 2.2 (both in HesiodT 124 Most); cf. his *On Demosthenes* 40. The Roman historian Velleius Paterculus (ca. 19 BCE–ca. 31 CE) says much the same thing: Hesiod is a “man of very elegant talent and distinguished for his very soft sweetness of songs, most desirous of leisure and quiet” (I.7.1 = HesiodT 7 Most). See also [Chapter 1](#), pp. 20–1 and notes 35 and 36.

97. In *On the Sublime*, Pseudo-Longinus (perhaps in the first century CE) has almost no interest in Hesiod, while calling Archilochus and Stesichorus in verse, and Herodotus and Plato (especially) in prose, “most Homeric.” (13.3).

98. Cornutus, *Summary of the Traditions concerning Greek Theology* (also called *On the Nature of the Gods*) 17; Tate's translation (1929: 41), following the movement from the most rarefied (and highest), Ouranus, to the most dense (and lowest), Hades. As a Stoic, he intended to “relate what is transmitted by myths about the gods to the elements” (chap. 35). As an allegorist, Cornutus has Homer and Hesiod giving true accounts about matters in mathematics, astronomy, geology, meteorology, and geography. Cf. Van Nuffelen, 2011: 43–45. For his work as a

school text and its relation to Neronian ideology and contemporary writers, see Most , 1989. At this time Seleucus of Alexandria wrote a commentary on the *Theogony*, *Works and Days*, and *Shield*, but not as far as we know on the *Catalogue of Women* (HesiodT 144 Most).

99. Cf. Van Nuffelen, 2011: *passim*, esp. 1–24, 45–7, 84–7, 125–33, 168–71, 206–12, and 233–41. For Plutarch's views of Platonists and Stoics, see Gill, 2006: 207–38. We see Dio's student Favorinus (at *On Exile* 26.3–5) engage seriously with comments in the *Works and Days*.

100. Working through the scholia, traceable to Proclus's commentary on the *Works and Days*, Hunter (2014: 169–226) speaks of the abiding interest in the Hesiodic moral tradition from the Presocratics through to Plutarch. Plutarch, it appears, deleted eight lines from the *Works and Days* (267–73), presumably because they undermine his vision of a divine providence. According to Morgan, 1998: Table 19, Plutarch has 207 citations of Hesiod, ranked fifth in prominence behind Plato (915), Homer (889), Euripides (359), and Herodotus (304), but ahead of Thucydides (156), Theophrastus (129), Demosthenes (91), Menander (72), and Aristophanes (63), to cite the top 10. By contrast, there are only three citations of Hesiod in Quintilian and Dionysius of Halicarnassus combined.

101. Regarding *On How to Study Poetry*, see Long, 1992: 61–63. Hunter (2014: 121; cf. 35) discusses Plutarch trying “to harmonize Hesiodic and Platonic teaching.” Stamatopoulou (2014) speaks of Plutarch both acknowledging and marginalizing Hesiod as an authority.

102. Fr. 58. For Plutarch's view of Hesiod in relation to divine justice and providence, see frs. 33–4, 38–39, and 46 and Van Nuffelen, 2011: 167–68; cf., Koning, 2010a: 198 and 170–72.

103. On these learned sympotic settings, see Hunter, 2014: 151. On the *Certamen* in Plutarch, see Koning 2010a: 259–62, including 260n84.

104. The translation comes from the Loeb edition, vol. vi, 229. The questioner also asks: What else do the Muses sing to Hesiod about other than the loves of women and of men, rivers, kings, and plants? (18.9.231–33 = HesiodT 59 Most). Here, Lucian orders Hesiod's texts: *Theogony*, *Catalogue of Women* (loosely characterized), *Works and Days*. His contemporary, Maximus of Tyre, echoing the popularity of the *Catalogue of Women*, in his *Philosophical Orations* (26.4.89–93) (in Greek) lists the *Catalogue* first, followed by the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days*.

105. In fact, Hesiod prophesizes a bit when describing humankind in the Age of Iron at *W&D* 176–201.

106. Koning (2010a: 48n102) suggests that the joke is that in Lucian's time, Hesiod was recited, not sung, but see Plutarch's account of singing from the *Theogony* to the accompaniment of the lyre (*Quaest. Conviv* 9.14.1; HesiodT 86 Most).

107. Athenaeus's conversations around the table lean heavily toward topics related to food and courtesans, and while the book is peppered with Hesiodic references, it contains none explicitly from the *Theogony*.

108. Pausanias ascribes the *Theogony* to Hesiod at 1.28.6 but questions its authenticity at 9.31.4–5, as well as at 8.18.1, 9.27.2, 9.35.5, presumably after he visited the Valley of the Muses.

109. See, for example, Lactantius (ca. 240–c.320) in *Divinae Institutiones* I.5.8–10, mentioning especially Orpheus and Hesiod in Greek and Vergil and Ovid in Latin

(I.5.1). He heaps scorn on Jupiter for being the “virtual parricide of his father, marrying his sister, and living his adult life in corruption, debauchery and adultery” (I.10.10–14). Later, he also mentions Euhemerus’s account, drawn from Ennius’s translation of the *Sacred History*, that a Titan, not Jupiter, chained Saturn (I.14.9).

110. Philo, as Van Nuffelen writes (2011: 206–12), is critical of Greek pluralism in any form, whether it be the plurality of *poleis* and legislative systems, or of deities. In every regard, Mosaic Law is better for being universal and according to nature. In *On Joseph* (29–30), he writes that in contrast to the multiple cities and legislations on earth, the cosmos is a megapolis with a single constitution, directed by a single law.

111. Elsewhere, Philo alludes to the *Theogony* (unnamed) as “the myth of men of old”; see “Concerning Noah’s Work as a Planter,” 130.

112. Clement’s references to hundreds of ancient authors and his expressed admiration for Plato and Homer show his great familiarity with Greek literature.

113. MacDonald (2000) argues that the story of Jesus in the Gospel of Mark deliberately follows the story line in Homer’s *Odyssey*, refashioned to carry a religious message; for the martyrdom of Andrew in *The Acts of Andrew* interpreted as a Christianized Odysseus, see MacDonald, 1994.

114. Non-Christians also heap scorn on the idea of Eros being made a god. A century before Clement, in Seneca’s *Phaedra* the Nurse proclaims that “*libido* (lust), base and raging with vice, has made *amor* (love) a god, and has added the title of a false divinity to passion in order to lust more freely” (195–97).

115. In the *Ad Autolycum*, Theophilus twice refers to Chrysippus by name: II.4 and III.8.

116. Cf John I.18. Psalm 44.2 describes the vomiting forth of a *λόγος*, but God is not the agent.

117. In a careless error, Theophilus says that Zeus swallows down, *καταπίνειν*, his daughter Metis; III.3. In similar manner, when describing Adam’s god-like potential in the Garden and Paradise’s fecundity, he quotes from *Genesis* while echoing Hesiod’s description of man and nature in the Golden Age (compare II.25–6 to *Works and Days* 109–26). The main points in this argument come from Curry, 1988: 318–26.

118. Theodoret, *Historia Ecclesiastica* 3.8.1–2 (partially quoted by Young 2008: 72).

119. For the Callimachean echo, compare 12.310 and Callimachus fr. 2.1 Pfeiffer. I thank by student Colin Pang for these observations. Quintus names 30 heroes but indicates there were more. See West, 2013: 203.

120. West (1978: 78 and 78, note 2) says that a parchment codex from the fourth century included all four poems.

121. Cf. Brisson, 2004: 105–106. But, in contrast, Boethius (ca. 480–524 CE) in his largely Neoplatonic *De Consolatione Philosophiae*, a work in verse and prose, humorously imagines the stately Lady Philosophy chasing away the morose “Muses of poetry” from his cell. Proclus wrote a commentary on the *Works and Days*.

122. *Platonic Theology* I.5.25–6, translated by Rappe, 2000: xii, quoted again at 159 and 169. In the *Enneads*, when thinking of the *Symposium*, however, he associates the soul with Aphrodite, sometimes in an elevated form, and at other times in a baser form (VI.9.9).

123. Cf. *In Timaeum* 315, ed. by Diehl 1903, and *In Platonis Rem Publicam* vol. 2, 208, ed. by Kroll 1899, respectively. Proclus also wrote a commentary on the *Works and Days*, which he said should be read for its gnomic utterances before one turned to the *Theogony*. There may already have been a Neoplatonic commentary on the *Theogony*.

124. “God (i.e., Cronus), fettered to an unchanging identity, leaves the ordering of the universe to his son (i.e., Zeus), for it would be out of character to neglect his rule within the divine sphere. ... Ignoring the lower world, Cronus claims his father for himself, with all the upward-motion between them; and he counts all that moves to the inferior, beginning from his son, as ranking beneath him;” *Enneads* V.8.13. As in the *Phaedrus*, this Zeus moves toward the vision of Beauty, with the others in train (cf. V.8.10); cf. Edwards, 2006: 67.

125. Cf. *In Platonis Rem Publicam* vol. i 82 = HesiodT 120c Most.

126. Quoted in *Die Schule des Aristoteles*, vol. VIII: Eudemos von Rhodos, ed. Wehrli, 1969: fr. 150.11–6 from Damascius’s commentary on Plato’s *Parmenides* 124 in *Problems and Solutions Concerning First Principles (Peri Archon)*. On Eudemos fr. 150, see Betegh, 2002: 337–57.

Chapter 6

1. *De Genealogia* I.11c; cf. Milton's "the dreaded name / of Demogorgon," *P.L.* 2.964–65.

2. *Fam.* xviii.2. From Constantinople, Sygeros came to Verona in 1348 as an envoy to the Papal Court. The death refers to Leontius Pilatus, a monk from Calabria, whom Petrarch had asked to translate Homer. The results were far from satisfactory. The absent figure is Barlaam, an Orthodox priest, whom Petrarch had brought to Florence for Greek lessons. Results in this regard were also dismal. The translation of this letter is by Bernardo, 1985.

3. He had Hesiod on his mind again when reading Livy. In a note at XXII.29.8 of his Livy manuscript, Petrarch observed that the "poet Hesiod" shared the same sentiment, information he must have gleaned from his Latin translation of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*.

4. On Chryses, see Morgan, 1983: 179. For other Byzantine writers who said that Hesiod's inspiration came from eating laurel leaves, see West, 1966:165. Tzetzes speaks of twigs (= HesiodT 2 Most) for Hesiod's singular σκῆπτρον. Tzetzes (like Aristarchus) believed that Hesiod lived 400 years after Homer.

5. Cf. Thomas Gaisford, ed., *Poetae minores Graeci*, vol. III (Oxford) 164.10–1. This particularly vivid translation is Koning's (2010a: 247).

6. Cf. Hardie 1986: 96. Triclinius's manuscript, once owned by Cardinal Bessarion, is now at the Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana in Venice; cf. Turyn, 1972: vol. 1, 123–27. Before Triclinius, Ioannes Diaconus Galenus from Constantinople wrote an allegorical commentary on the *Theogony*, again with φυσιολογία themes, for his son when he was a student in Athens.

7. Guardino of Verona (1374–1460) opened a school in Ferrara which attracted students from as far away as Scandinavia and England. Imitating his teacher's systematic approach to learning Greek, he began instruction with Homer, followed by "the remaining writers of epic (*heroici*), tragedy, and comedy." Cf. his "A Program of Teaching and Learning," para. 19, written by Guarino's son in 1459. This translation is by Kallendorf, 2002. We know of two copies of Hesiod owned by Guarino; the one which includes only the *Works and Days* is marked with his notes; cf. Wilson, 1992: 45. Another famous school was opened by Vittorino da Feltre (1378–1446) in Mantua: its curriculum included Hesiod, along with Homer, Pindar, and Athenian dramatists in verse, and writers like Herodotus, Xenophon, Plato, Demosthenes, and Plutarch in prose.

8. Medieval manuscripts tended to include the *Theogony* in collections of *poetae minores*, often alongside Theocritus, as was also true in the first printed edition of Hesiod's works.

9. Chalcondyles came to Italy in 1447, first to Padua, then to Florence. Following his *Works and Days*, he brought out the *editio princeps* of Homer in Florence in 1488.

10. Cf. West, 1964: 165–89, and 1966: 52–67 and 101–103, and 1978. Aloisius Rzach collated many of these manuscripts in his *Hesiodi carmina* (Leipzig, 1902, 1913). Just as the *Theogony* was less popular than the *Works and Days*, so the quality

of its manuscripts was poorer than those of the *Works and Days*. Also see Chapter 4, note 8.

11. From a letter to Martinus Uranius, June 9, 1492; cf. *Opera Omnia* (Turin, 1962), p. 933. Between the time of Ficino's translations (ca. 1462) and this letter about them written 30 years later, a doctor and philosopher in Padua by the name of Nicola Passera Della Porta made a collection of hexameter Greek poems in 1488, including the Orphic *Argonautica*, Dionysius Perigetes's poem on world geography, Apollonius Rhodius's *Argonautica*, Hesiod's *Shield* and *Theogony*, and Aratus's *Phainomena*.

12. Their compatriot, Pico della Mirandola (1463–1494), had in his library a text with works by Theodoricus (sic) and Exiodus (sic) (Theocritus and Hesiod) in Greek and a copy of the *Theogony* in Latin, the latter most likely Boninus Mombritius's translation of 1474, although little in Pico's writings seems inspired by Hesiod.

13. For a sampling, the *Dicta Catonis* of 1515, ed. Ottmar Luscinius (Strasbourg), places the texts in the following order: *W&D*, *Th.*, *Shield*, the *Tabula* of Cebes, Pythagoras, and pseudo-Phocylides (none accompanied by Latin translations). The *Opera* of Hesiod, 1537, ed. Vittorio Trincavelli (Venice), prints *W&D*, *Th.*, and *Shield* (and no Latin translations). Similarly, a Parisian edition of 1544–56, ed. Jacques Bogard and Martin Le Jeune, prints *Orphei Argonautica*, followed by *W&D*, *Th.*, and *Shield* (each with a Latin translation). But a Basil edition of 1542, ed. Johann Birkmann, prints *W&D*, *Shield*, *Th.*, with facing Latin prose translations followed by verse translations of each poem (the *Th.* by Mombrizio), then Giovanni Francesco Boccardo Pilade's *Genealogiae Deorum* in elegiacs, and a prolegomenon by J. Tzetzes. The *W&D* is followed by the *Shield* in a Basil edition of 1544, ed. Joannes Oporinus, and in a Leipzig edition of 1577, ed. Johannes Rhamba (Ramus), reprinted 1581. The 1577 (1581) editions also print Philipp Melanchthon's "Praefatio in Hesiodum" on the *W&D*. Daniel Heinsius's splendid edition (Leiden, 1603; repr. 1613, 1622) prints *W&D*, *Shield*, *Th.*, while Iohannes Clericus's Amsterdam edition of 1701, drawing on Graevius's edition (Amsterdam, 1667) and Heinsius's, prints *Th. Shield*, *W&D*.

14. Chapman's title brings to mind the following quip from Martin West when he was preparing his *Works and Days*: "A waggish pupil, observing what I was engaged with, ordered from the stack of the Bodleian Library a book entitled *Garden Rubbish*, and directed it to be delivered to my desk. ... I was grateful for the joke, and for the reminder that some people, being not on close terms with the *Works and Days*, suppose it to be an early Greek *Georgics*" (1978: v).

15. On this edition and the history of Latin translations in Homeric editions, see Sowerby, 1996: 182–83. Also see Chapter 4, note 8.

16. Spenser draws on Hesiod at *Fairie Queene* 4.11.48–51 (list of Nereids) and 6.10.22 (list of Graces), and makes up his own genealogy for the Hours at 7.7.45 (born from Night and a Jove/Day figure). He also relies on Boccaccio's *Genealogia Deorum Gentilium*.

17. Cf. Bennett, 1931: 176–81.

18. Cf. Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* (1668, published a year after Milton published the first version of *Paradise Lost*): "DAEMONS. As if the Dead of whom they Dreamed, were not Inhabitants of their own Brain, but of the Air, or of Heaven, or Hell; not Phantasmes, but Ghosts ... What kind of things they were, to whom they attributed the name of *Daemons*, appeareth partly in the Genealogie of their Gods, written by *Hesiod*, one of the most ancient Poets of the Grecians; and partly in other

Histories ...” (chap. XLV, in Malcolm, 2012: 1014 (with facing Latin, 1015).

19. Cf. Clark, 1948: 27 and 121. Milton’s contemporary biographers say that he taught Hesiod to others; cf. the life of Milton by John Aubrey (1626–1697) in Darbishire, 1932: 12. Cf. DuRocher, 1985: 45.

20. *First Prolusion* XII (most likely written between 1628 and 1632), translated by Tillyard in Wolfe, 1953: vol. 1, 223.

21. *Paradise Lost* was first published in 10 books in 1667; a second edition, expanded to 12 books, was published in 1674, the year of Milton’s death, this a half century before Cooke’s first English translation of the *Theogony* (1728).

22. Blessington, 1979: 19; Osgood, 1900: xlii. Since Osgood, for Hesiod studies in *Paradise Lost*, see Gallagher, 1979; Northrup, 1981; Forsyth, 1991; Porter, 1982 and 1993; Edwards, 1998; Talbot, 2001.

23. All citations are from Ricks’s edited *Paradise Lost* (1968). Milton’s grand poem includes multiple creation stories, not only God’s creation of the world (rendered from *Genesis* 1 and Job’s version of creation), of Adam and Eve (from *Genesis* 2–4), and of Christ himself, but also Satan’s creation of Sin and Death, a grotesque creation story that draws significantly from Hesiod. But Hesiod’s presence in Milton’s poem goes well beyond the imitation of individual scenes.

24. The best on these parallels is Edwards (1998: 49): “*Paradise Lost* sets out to match the ancients in its prosody and excel them in its subject: it invokes the Holy Spirit in the language both of the Fathers and of the classics, to show that he is at once the only Muse of Christian doctrine and the acknowledged tutor of the Greeks.” Most commentators, however, pass over many of these Hesiodic allusions; cf. Flannagan, 1993; Fowler, 2007; and Lewalski, 2007. Even Patrick Hume, the first to list systematically the classical references in *Paradise Lost* in 1695, only notes the Hesiodic allusion in “Chaos” at i.10, without observing further Hesiodic parallels in reference to the Heavenly Muse, the shepherd, the creation of the Heavens and Earth, the Aonian Mount, or Milton’s Latinizing “inspire” for Hesiod’s ἐνέπνευσαν, perhaps also influenced by Ovid’s *adspirant* at *Met.* 1.2. On the Heavenly Muse and Urania, see Gregory, 1989: 94–124. See also St. Jerome, Letter 58.8.

25. As is always the case with Milton, any one allusion has multiple references. In seeking to soar about the Aonian Mount, Milton may also be drawing from Vergil’s *Georgics* (3.10–11), where Vergil intends to leave Hesiod’s *Works and Days* and move from the Hesiodic *Georgics* to the Homeric *Aeneid*.

26. Inspiration also happens across the line at verses 7 and 8. When Milton writes that his Muse was witness to all events from the beginning of time (an odd conceit) (Heav’nly Muse “instruct me, for Thou know’st; Thou from the first / wast present”; i.19–20), he may be addressing a criticism that Christians and others hurled at Hesiod, namely that he asks his Muses to describe events that happened two generations before they were born.

27. Cf. Porter (1993: 54): “No other single work is alluded to in *Paradise Lost* [Book] 6 so extensively or to such purpose.” Also see Talbot, 2001:22. At vi.4–14, Milton relocates Hesiod’s cave where Night and Day alternate lodging from its home in Tartarus (*Th.* 748–57), making it “fast by” (next to) God’s Throne (vi.5).

28. For the full passage, see ii.643–76. As is always the case with Milton, a multitude of sources inform his creation, including for the gates and wall around Hell *Iliad* 8.10–6. Cf. Osgood, 1900: 80–81 and Northrup 1981: 309–10.

29. From Bryon's letter on "The Rev. W. L. Bowles's Strictures on the Life and Writings of Pope" (1821). In his *Life of Milton*, Samuel Johnson was similarly vexed by Milton's depiction of spiritual beings engaged in a physical battle. Against those who have regarded the whole episode a parody and slapstick, Martindale has rebutted (1986: 97) that it is "structurally too important to be a kind of farce."

30. In the first of these similes, i.196–210, Milton moves from fabled monsters warring against Jove (with material drawn from Hesiod and Ovid) to the biblical Leviathan, as Grose (1973: 151) discusses. For the deliberate rendering of Briareos in positive and negative terms in this simile, see Herman, 1998. For Milton's War in Heaven as a "fully-fledged Homeric battle ... putting the epic form and the epic style under deliberate pressure," see Martindale, 2002: 96–97. For Hesiodic parallels in Milton's battle scenes, compare *Th.* 713–17 and *P.L.* vi.644–46 and 653–55 and *Th.* 383–88 and *P.L.* vi.760–64. Also compare Milton's build-up to battle and Hesiod's description of the Olympians and Titans at war: v.824–26, 832–37, and 844–50 and *Th.* 687–99 and vi.207–19 and *Th.* 678–86. Cf. Northrup, 1981: 306–309. For the War in Heaven drawing on the Zeus-Typhon battle, see Forsyth, 2003: 30–35 and 170–71 and Butler, 1999. For the battle as a means to expose the rebels to laughter, see Stein, 1953: 17–37. For comparisons with European warfare, see Ravard, 1980 and Freeman, 1980.

31. Cf. Porter, 1993: 63–67. See also the fine observations in Gallagher, 1979: 121–48, esp. 125–41, although his argument that Milton imagines that the Devil fed Hesiod his false myth is unconvincing.

32. *P.L.* vii.13, i.516–17, and vii.7, respectively.

33. Cf. *P.L.* ii.1, 285, 506, i.756–57 and 796, respectively. Empson (1961) and Hill (1977) emphasize Cromwellian echoes, while Achinstein (1994: 180) shows that Milton's Satan most closely resembles the Royalist's post-Restoration view of Cromwell, although she argues persuasively (p. 222) that Milton "resists the satanic practice of allegory, in which there is a one-to-one relation between the political order, the cosmic order, and the representational order." Davies (1983) discusses echoes with an array of despotic figures from Charles I to Roman Emperors to Turkish Sultans, although he also warns that one-to-one allegorizing is "fruitlessly reductive" (p. 12). Cf. Newlyn, 1993: 91–97.

34. Sin (one of the guardians of the Gates of Chaos, "seem'd Woman to the waist, and fair, / But ended foul in many a scaly fold / Voluminous and vast" (ii.650–52)), has a clear likeness to Hesiod's Echidna, herself "half a nymph, fair-cheeked and glancing-eyed, / and half again monstrous snake, vast and terrible" (*Th.* 298–99) and guardian in the lower depths (*Th.* 305); cf. Northrup, 1981: 310.

35. Rather than speaking of the armed Athena/Minerva coming out of the head of Satan/Jupiter, Quint (2014: 55–58), for example, turns to the *Telegony*, the last epic in the Epic Cycle, about Odysseus, Telemachus, and Odysseus's son by Circe, Telegonus. For Fuseli's painting, see Calè 2006: 158–64.

36. These creatures have something in common with the monstrous Cyclopes and Hundred-Handers born from Earth and Sky and the monster Echidna and her many hideous children (*Th.* 139–53 and 295–332, respectively).

37. For Chaos as a "formless infinite," Milton appears to draw from Ovid's *Metamorphoses* I.5–9, 16–20. For a good account of this extended invocation, see Ferry, 1963: 25–37. At one point, Milton also says that alongside Chaos "sable-vested Night [sat] enthroned / The consort of his reign" (ii.962–63); for Orphic and Neoplatonic influences here, see Currey, 1957: 48–73.

38. Milton is not the first to construct a negative simile; that already happens in the *Iliad*, although rarely, as at 14.394–99 and 17.20–3, but he employs them extensively, especially in Books I–IV, to define God’s creations by what they are not.

39. Lewis, 1942: 43; Ricks (1963: 125–26 and 148–49) also speaks well of this passage, as does McColley, 1983: 66–68. The *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* also brilliantly sees Persephone, picking flowers, as a flower to be picked, but Milton could not have known of the hymn as it was only rediscovered in 1777.

40. For Ovidian influences, see Green, 2009: 23–51; for Hebrew enfolding, see Hale, 1997: 141; for comparison with Proserpina, see McColley, 1983: 68–69.

41. Cf. Osgood, 1900: xviii–xix and 21–22, and Northrup, 1981: 306 and 310–17. Chambers (1963) suggests that it may come from Plato’s *Timaeus*. For Milton’s description of Chaos at ii.890–917 and the account of creation in Book 7 being Lucretian, see Hardie, 1995.

42. Nothing in Milton’s earlier works links Chaos and Chance. Presumably, Chance is added here to underscore just how disordered and confused is arbitration in Chaos. At ii.965–67, Chaos, Night, and Chance stand next to Rumor, Tumult, and Confusion (cf. Northrup, 1981: 314 and Osgood, 1900: 20–21).

43. Milton’s Chaos also has “embryon Atoms” (ii.900), which suggests that he saw it in terms of Atomists like Democritus and Leucippus, Epicurus and Lucretius (see note 37, *supra*). If so, this line would evoke the Atomists’ theory that all life is a conjoining or dissolutionment of atoms. Cf. Harrison, 1934.

44. In this creative division, he includes divorce: “as God and nature signifies and lectures to us ... by the first and last of all his visible works: when by his divorcing command the world first rose out of Chaos, nor can it be renewed again out of confusion but by the separating of unmeet consorts,” *Divorce* 2.17 (quoted in Forsyth, 1991: 366).

45. Osgood (1900: 30) also thinks that Milton renders Hesiod’s Eris as Discord. We recall that at *Fabulae* XCII.1 Hyginus rendered the Greek Eris as Discordia. If at *P.L.* x.707 Milton is thinking of *Iliad* 11.3–4 (as many scholars argue), he is rendering Eris as Discord. Depicted in the singular, Milton’s Discord, daughter of Sin, draws more from the *Theogony* than Hesiod’s two figures of Eris in the *Works and Days*. Boninus Mombritius, in his far-from-polished Latin translation of the *Theogony* (1474), translates *eris* once as *lis* (“legal controversy; strife”) and once as *contentio* (circa lines 226 and 782, respectively). Niccolò della Valle also uses both Latin terms for *eris* in his Latin translation of the *Works and Days* (1477), as does the prose Latin pony in Spondanus’s edition of the *Works and Days* (1592). In the first English translation of the *Works and Days* (1518), George Chapman oscillates between “contention” (a favored word in his translations of Homer) and “strife” when translating *eris*. After Milton, in the first English translation of the *Theogony* in 1728, Thomas Cooke translates Eris/*eris* (at *Th.* 225/226 and 782) as Strife and contention at 348/349 and 1088, respectively. For Discordia, in company with Luctus, Curae, Morbi, Senectus, Metus, Fames, Egestas, Letum, Labor, Sopor, Gaudia, Bellum, and the Eumenides at the entrance to Orcus, see Virgil, *Aeneid* 6.273–81.

46. Not all editors capitalize Discord and the other nouns in this passage, but at x.707 she must be capitalized.

47. Cf. *P.L.* ii.965–67, iii.203–5, vi.686–87 and 909–11, vii.216–17, and x.109–10, 567–70, and 821–22 (cf. ix.408–11).

48. Cf. Forsyth, 1991.

49. On the multi-valence of this brilliant line, see Forsyth, [1991](#): 348–49.

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